The Moral Ideal of the Complete Life
B.Contestabile admin@socrethics.com Last version 2008
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction 3. Questioning the Hellenistic Ideal 4. Questioning the Aristotelian Ideal 6. Conclusion
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Starting point The moral ideal of non-violence and disengagement is challenged by the concept of the complete life. Essential traits of the human character have to be suppressed in order to extirpate the passion of anger.
Type of Problem The goal of this paper is to investigate the moral value of non-violence, ethical skepticism and (emotional) retreat. It concentrates on the following questions:
1. The passion of anger (outrage) is one of the central factors causing harm. Whereas the Hellenist philosophers promoted the extirpation of this passion, Aristotle created the ethical ideal of a complete life, which includes a controlled model of all passions. What are the arguments in favor of extirpation? 2. Is life-friendly ethics (the complete life) morally superior? 3. Can the goal to reduce suffering be reconciled with the ideal of a complete life? 4. Is it reasonable to promote a universal ideal of the human character?
Result 1) Is it desirable to extirpate the passion of anger (outrage)? Ethics serves interests. In the context of retreat-oriented ethics the passion of anger is undesirable; in the context of life-friendly ethics it is defensible.
2) Is life-friendly ethics (the complete life) morally superior? If the goal is to improve justice of the Rawls type, then the following answer can be given: a) The engagement for justice is probably morally superior, although the radical skepticism of hermits and monks has to be respected (because of the complexity of the system). b) Procreation doesn’t necessarily contribute to the improvement of justice. The commitment to a family is therefore not morally superior to a retreat-oriented way of living.
3) The biological goal (maximize the proliferation of genes) is in conflict with the goal to reduce suffering, the latter being in the weaker position. Can the goal to reduce suffering be reconciled with the ideal of a complete life? For a possible answer see Konkurrierende Lebensziele.
4) Is it reasonable to promote a universal ideal of the human character? Universal virtues can only be derived on the basis of a minimal consensus on the worldview and the concept of justice. Since such a consensus must tolerate life-friendly and retreat-oriented ethics it can only give a very rough picture of the ideal character. It is more appropriate to say that it defines a general framework for desirable character types, each of them corresponding to a specific role within society.
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Starting point
The moral ideal of non-violence and disengagement is challenged by the concept of the complete life. Essential traits of the human character have to be suppressed in order to extirpate the passion of anger.
Type of Problem
The goal of this paper is to investigate the moral value of non-violence, ethical skepticism and (emotional) retreat. It concentrates on the following questions:
1. The passion of anger (outrage) is one of the central factors causing harm. Whereas the Hellenist philosophers promoted the extirpation of this passion, Aristotle created the ethical ideal of a complete life, which includes a controlled model of all passions. What are the arguments in favor of extirpation?
2. Is life-friendly ethics (the complete life) morally superior?
3. Can the goal to reduce suffering be reconciled with the ideal of a complete life?
4. Is it reasonable to promote a universal ideal of the human character?
Definition
▪ Virtue ethics is based on the thesis, that even in a variable environment (in the long run) some character traits can be detected, which are desirable for everybody.
▪ For a detailed definition of Nicomachean virtues see Aristotles’ table of virtues.
In Greek philosophy the concept of an ideal character and universal virtues was introduced by Plato (424-348 B.C.), the teacher of Aristoteles (384-322 B.C.), see Konkurrierende Lebensziele.
The claim on universality
Following a few arguments against the proclamation of universal virtues:
1. For some people an ethical norm is easy to comply, for others extremely difficult, depending on the constitution, environment and biography. Consequently the introduction of norms often replaces a certain kind of injustice by a new one. This becomes especially manifest if biochemical determined character traits are involved (see Eine interdisziplinäre Betrachtung zur Unfreiheit). If the new injustice concerns the majority of people (excessive ethical demand) then it produces more suffering than it prevents.
2. In a changing environment evolutionary adaptations emanate quickly. New character traits appear or old ones are revitalized. In the 17th century La Bruyère already documented more than thousand types of characters. A rigid character ideal doesn’t fit into a variable environment.
3. A culture with its virtues is a successful adaptation to a certain environment, but there is not only one possible successful adaptation.
4. Cultures are in competition. The victorious culture declares their pattern of behavior to be virtuous.
5. Within a culture there are specializations with corresponding virtues. A family of artists doesn’t propagate the same virtues as a family of sportsmen or intellectuals.
6. In the context of a complex culture virtues can rarely be translated into concrete arguments for decision-making.
Thesis
Virtue ethics is derived ethics. It cannot propagate intrinsic values.
In the following we will question both
▪ the Hellenistic ideal, which is based on the (claimed) universality of Hellenistic virtues
▪ the Aristotelian ideal of the “complete" life, which is based on the (claimed) universality of Aristotelian virtues
3. Questioning the Hellenistic Ideal
A life without a family or a partnership without passionate love can be seen as a lack of commitment. The relevant questions according to Martha Nussbaum are the following:
▪ How far does the attachment of Hellenistic schools to various versions of freedom from pain and disturbance allow their pupils to form commitments to anything outside their own virtue?
▪ And how complete is the life that results?
[Nussbaum, 499]
Skepticism
The Skeptics divest their pupil of all commitments, including cognitive ones, on the grounds that any commitment to the world, even a commitment to the fact that it is this way or that, puts the pupil at risk. Far less does the pupil have any commitment to loved ones or country or even to his/her own past, character or taste. These things are there, and they exert their causal force – but if they happen not to, the pupil does not go after them. This gives him/her a life of remarkable safety; but it impoverishes the self and makes the self untrustworthy for others [Nussbaum, 500]
Epicureanism
The Epicurean seems to understand ataraxia itself in a more active way than the Skeptic – not just as the absence of disturbance, but, in positive terms, as the healthy and unimpeded functioning of all our faculties, including the corresponding risks:
▪ the cognitive risk of seeing the world in a definite way, a way that might be falsified by experience.
▪ the risk of virtuous actions even when it is not advantageous
▪ the risk of friendship
[Nussbaum, 500]
But the Epicurean life remains incomplete insofar as it excludes marriage, sexual love, children and the political community
Stoicism
Stoicism was the way in which some of the noblest figures in later antiquity have answered the problem of existence and conquered the anxieties of fate and death (Transtheism, Wikipedia)
The Stoics’ dilemma on this point is that apatheia and its cognitive basis would seem to be at odds with the sort of risk-taking loyalty and courage a Stoic hero is said to possess. Stoic friends and spouses must live in such a way that the death or departure of the other will not cause grief. Though pietas may produce much loyal and quasi-committed action, the Stoic goes through the motions like one playing a role. He entrusts no part of his good to any other. This lack of deep love and openness may seem to render that life impoverished and incomplete [Nussbaum, 500].
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Conclusion
Obviously the Hellenistic schools propagate ideals which are far from a complete life. But before dismissing these ideals we have to question the normative claim which asks for a complete life.
4. Questioning the Aristotelian Ideal
Reviewing the development of Greek philosophy from the Pre- Socratics to the Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics, one is struck by the overwhelming concern in the later schools with peace of mind. There is, as a consequence, one quality that preclassical and classical Greeks possessed preeminently and that Stoics, Epicureans, and Skeptics preeminently lacked: enthusiasm (Hellenistic Thought, by Forrest Baird).
Definition
▪ The term completeness addresses the balance between biological and ethical demands. This concept might have its origin in Hinduism, see Konkurrierende Lebensziele. The radical suppression of natural emotions makes life incomplete, as well as the uncontrolled addiction to passion.
▪ Emotions should be controlled, but understood and respected at the same time. This ideal of was introduced by Aristotle’ in his analysis of the human soul. The structure of the Aristotelian soul is a predecessor of Freuds structure of mind.
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rational |
Calculative Intellectual Virtue (Ego) |
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mixed |
Appetitive Moral Virtue (Super-Ego) |
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irrational |
Vegetative Nutritional Virtue (Id) |
The human soul has an irrational element which is shared with the animals, and a rational element which is distinctly human. The most primitive irrational element is the vegetative faculty which is responsible for nutrition and growth. An organism which does this well may be said to have a nutritional virtue. The second tier of the soul is the appetitive faculty which is responsible for our emotions and desires (such as joy, grief, hope and fear). This faculty is both rational and irrational. It is irrational since even animals experience desires. However, it is also rational since humans have the distinct ability to control these desires with the help of reason. The human ability to properly control these desires is called moral virtue, and is the focus of morality. Aristotle notes that there is a purely rational part of the soul, the calculative, which is responsible for the human ability to contemplate, reason logically, and formulate scientific principles. The mastery of these abilities is called intellectual virtue (Aristotle, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, chapter 7).
Commitment
The term complete life is associated with familial and political commitments. Increasing levels of commitment (at some point) allow or even require the use of violence. Obviously an incomplete life is the price that has to be paid for a reduction of the commitment-related risk.
But on what grounds can the Aristotelian ideal be called morally superior to the Epicurean one?
How can the ideal of a complete life (a life with high commitment) justify the corresponding risk?
▪ The ideal of a complete life corresponds to the approval of “life as it is”.
▪ The ideal of completeness is associated with the political goal of the community [Nussbaum, chapter 3].
Both arguments are linked to an affirmative world view (see Aristotelian view of God) which in turn is anchored in the unconscious wish to survive and procreate. Both arguments are questionable as a justification of moral superiority. “Life as it is” can be explained by natural laws, but natural laws are morally indifferent. Consequently the will to retreat has to be respected as a reasonable alternative for all people who cannot accept the state of affairs. The attempt to establish a single ethical ideal like the “complete” life (including all kinds of passions) is mistaken. Ethics serves interests. Life-friendly ethics is fundamentally different from retreat-oriented ethics:
▪ Examples for life friendly ethics (familial and political engagement):
Aristotelians, Roman Stoics, Hindus
▪ Examples for retreat-oriented ethics (childlessness and political passivity):
Hermits, Buddhist Monks, Epicureans
The desirability of a virtue can only be judged in the light of the ethical goal to be pursued. Following a few examples:
Criteria for moral superiority
The criteria used by Martha Nussbaum to claim the moral superiority of a complete life are emotional richness, openness and trustability [Nussbaum, 500]. Following some argument in defense of the incomplete life:
1) Emotional richness.
a) Contemplative happiness is less intense than biological happiness but normally more durable. If a monk is capable to reach a meditative state of ecstasy, then the valuation becomes even more difficult (because of the incomparable nature of this kind of happiness).
b) With regards to anger it is far from evident that its loss leads to an impoverished life. Anger may be tied to passionate love but not to all kinds of love. On what grounds should passionate love be morally superior to charitable love or compassion? In addition anger is not only linked to passionate love but also to the risk of violence.
2) Openness
a) Contemplative happiness is difficult to communicate but that doesn’t make it morally inferior to unveiled happiness.
b) Open and direct communication not only solves problems but also creates conflicts. The moral value of openness depends on the context. As far as openness is associated with spontaneity, it is in conflict with control and sublimation. Aristotle associates virtue with the control of desires as well as Epicurus.
c) Nussbaums criticism may be justified in the context of partnership relations. But many modern professions require a high degree of self-control and devaluate spontaneity. Conflicting goals (environments) lead to conflicting virtues.
3) Trustability
To deny a commitment isn’t morally suspicious per se. Monks and Epicureans deny the commitment to a family, but they are perfectly trustable. A skeptic hermit may refuse all kinds of commitments but he is predictable.
Conversely commitment isn’t morally superior per se. A skeptic becomes morally suspicious if he commits to a family or a political organization.
The moral ideal of Buddhists and Epicureans cannot easily be refuted. In the context of Apatheia [Höffe, 101] Aristotle used the argument that insensitiveness is far from human nature but (in contrast to the Stoics) Epicureans and Buddhists are not insensitive, they are differently sensitive. If they manage to avoid excessive self-control (and corresponding mental illness) then the “complete” life looks like a questionable risk.
What are the arguments for the extirpation of passion? [Nussbaum, 508]
Since there are two fundamentally different kinds of ethics, this question is imprecise. Virtues (the mastering of passions) are behavioral patterns which are directed towards goals. We first have to define the goal before we can judge virtues. If the goals are in conflict, then the virtues are as well. Following a few examples:
The fear of death
It is the job of Epicurian argument to remove false beliefs and the desires that causally depend on them [Nussbaum, 195].
▪ Retreat-oriented ethics: Agrees with Martha Nussbaums valuation
▪ Life-friendly ethics: In the context of war the fear of death is ambivalent. It can undermine the fighting spirit but it can also have a high survival value.
Conclusion: There is no universally valid argument to remove this passion.
Compassion
Where pity and compassion are concerned there are good reasons to approve the Lucretian tendency to leave it in human life as a basic source of communal affiliation, rather than to banish it in the name of self-sufficiency, as the Stoics do [Nussbaum, 508].
▪ Retreat-oriented ethics: Agrees with Martha Nussbaums valuation
▪ Life-friendly ethics: Pity and compassion are extremely disturbing for a Stoic warrior.
Conclusion: A man who is member of the community and warrior at the same time is confronted with conflicting demands on behalf of his character.
Anger
The most controversial question is the one of the extirpation of anger, the passion which is at the root of violence.
Is it possible to accept the Hellenistic arguments about the elimination of anger, while still rejecting their more general attack on passions such as love, fear and grief? [Nussbaum, 509]
Seneca (a non-orthodox Stoic philosopher) and Lucretius (an Epicurean poet) have complex and ambivalent positions, in both the public and the private sphere.
▪ Lucretius’ attempt to describe the bases of community shows and retains the basis for anger on behalf on oneself and one’s own. This legitimate anger is not free of potentially disturbing consequences. It is a difficult balancing act, to create a community in which individuals both protect themselves and cherish their friends.
▪ Seneca, too, has great difficulty describing a community that is both self-respecting and free from anger. His analysis makes a powerful case against anger and in favor of a medical attitude toward injury and wrongdoing. But in cases where a tyrant damages someone whom one loves, detachment gives way to cursing.
According to [Nussbaum, 509] one must make a choice: either give up both love and anger, as the orthodox Stoics do, or run the risk of harming. This judgment again ignores that there are conflicting ethical goals:
▪ Retreat-oriented ethics
In this case we have to deny violence (in contrast to the orthodox Stoics). The abandonment of love and anger is a means to this end. The notion that the orthodox Stoics decrease the risk of harming (by giving up passion) is only true within the community but not relative to the outside world. A Stoic hero (as well as a Hindu warrior) fights in the name of a universal law and not in the name of his individual passion - an attitude which allows him to kill without mercy.
▪ Life-friendly ethics
In this case we have to retain both love and anger. The difficult problem Lucretius and Seneca are dealing with is to distinguish between legitimated and undesirable anger, a problem which can only be solved by a concept of justice.
Conclusion:
▪ There are good reasons to sacrifice passionate love in order to eliminate anger as long as the goal is to retreat from life.
▪ There are few arguments to sacrifice passionate love as long as the goal is to survive and procreate. The passion of anger (which is tied to passionate love) might be required to defend the family or the community.
There is no universally valid argument to remove the passion of anger.
The passion for wealth, power and luxury
All three of the above mentioned schools recommended living in accordance with nature and dropping the frenzied pursuit of wealth, power and luxury. These pseudo-goals are at best highly limited tools of human functioning, mere instruments without intrinsic value. Epicureans and Stoics, by their analysis of connections between these false ends and socially divisive desires, provide a further consequentialist argument in favor of their reform of preferences. If the Hellenistic thinkers are correct, then the behavior of individuals who seek to maximize wealth and other satisfactions – far from being either natural or rational - is the product of a diseased form of social teaching. For Lucretius it is still worse – the consequence of a false and self-deceptive belief that one can defeat one’s own death by accumulation. Such behavior will not be chosen by fully informed human beings, when they have duly scrutinized the alternatives through a process of critical argument [Nussbaum, 500]
▪ Let’s assume that the ethical priority is survival and procreation. In this case we have to ask why wealth, power and luxury shouldn’t be a component of emotional richness. For most individuals these attributes evoke strong emotions because they are tied to the social status.
▪ The accumulation of wealth, power and luxury is irrational as a means to defeat aging and death. It is however (in many instances) a means to moderate the power of contingency [Hampe] in the same way as an insurance does.
Wealth and power definitely increase the Darwinian fitness. In Hinduism artha is one of the four aims in life.
Artha is the acquisition of arts, land, gold, cattle, wealth, equipages and friends. It is, further, the protection of what is acquired, and the increase of what is protected. Artha should be learnt from the king's officers, and from merchants who may be versed in the ways of commerce (Kama Sutra)
Obviously the Hindus don’t consider the improvement of Darwinian fitness to be a pseudo-goal. In the context of the Dharma, a part of wealth is spent for religious and social purposes. This leads to a different argument. It is questionable to devaluate wealth and power at all without a context. The usage decides about the morality.
Again we see that the definition of virtue depends on what we are aiming at. If ethics is associated with survival and procreation then the striving for wealth and power is perfectly rational. Buddhists and Epicureans deny these passions because their goal is different.
Summary
▪ Since virtue ethics is derived ethics, we first have to clarify the ethical goal.
▪ Since there are contradicting ethical goals we first have to find a minimal consensus on a concept of justice.
▪ Universal virtues can only be derived on the basis of this minimal consensus.
1) Is it desirable to extirpate the passion of anger (outrage)? Ethics serves interests. In the context of retreat-oriented ethics the passion of anger is undesirable; in the context of life-friendly ethics it is defensible.
2) Is life-friendly ethics (the complete life) morally superior? If the goal is to improve justice of the Rawls type, then the following answer can be given:
a) The engagement for justice is probably morally superior, although the radical skepticism of hermits and monks has to be respected (because of the complexity of the system).
b) Procreation doesn’t necessarily contribute to the improvement of justice. The commitment to a family is therefore not morally superior to a retreat-oriented way of living.
3) The biological goal (maximize the proliferation of genes) is in conflict with the goal to reduce suffering, the latter being in the weaker position. Can the goal to reduce suffering be reconciled with the ideal of a complete life? For a possible answer see Konkurrierende Lebensziele.
4) Is it reasonable to promote a universal ideal of the human character? Universal virtues can only be derived on the basis of a minimal consensus on the worldview and the concept of justice. Since such a consensus must tolerate life-friendly and retreat-oriented ethics it can only give a very rough picture of the ideal character. It is more appropriate to say that it defines a general framework for desirable character types, each of them corresponding to a specific role within society.
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1. Nussbaum Martha (1994), The Therapy of Desire, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1994 2. Hampe Michael (2006), Die Macht des Zufalls, Wolf Jobst Siedler Verlag, Berlin 3. Höffe Otfried, Hrsg.(2006), Nikomachische Ethik, Akademie Verlag
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Further Reading
Epicureanism 1. Amore Khan, Epicurus 2. Cook Vincent, Epicurus and Epicurean Philosophy
Stoicism 2. Garret Jan, Introduction to Stoic Ethics 3. Miller Jon, Stoics and Spinoza on Suicide
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