Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering

It seems that expansion at the cost of the quality of life is a characteristic of the utility function of biology and that the minimization of suffering (which does not favor this expansion) conflicts with biological forces.

Type of problem

Does the minimization of suffering necessarily lead to a hostile theory?

Result

1) A theory which considers the empty world to be the best state of affairs (like Buddhism or antifrustrationism) is hostile per definition.

2) In a theory which weighs risks against chances the hostility depends on the weighing function:

a) With a complete devaluation of chances no world can be morally superior to the empty world.

b) In prioritarianism the devaluation represents a (theoretical) consensus with regard to compassion and risk-aversion. The moral value assigned to the world can be positive or negative depending on this consensus.

3) From a hedonistic perspective there are good arguments for high risk-aversion so that the total welfare of the world community gets a negative sign. In order to change this picture one has to resort to a different (non-hedonistic) kind of reasoning; see The Denial of the World and Objective Reason.

1 Introduction

Starting point

Classical utilitarianism has the deficiency, that it favors expansion at the cost of the quality of life:

Example: A population Z, consisting of 500 billion individuals, each with a life that is barely worth living, is better than a population A consisting of 1 billion individuals, each having lives that are of extremely high quality – as long as the sum of happiness (welfare) is greater in Z than in A. (Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion)

It seems that expansion at the cost of the quality of life is a characteristic of the utility function of biology (the maximal proliferation of genes) and that the minimization of suffering (which does not favor this expansion) conflicts with biological forces.

Type of problem

Does the minimization of suffering necessarily lead to a hostile theory?

2 Basics

2.1 Terminology

Hostility

We distinguish between the following types of hostility:

1. An expansionist strategy which destructs the environment

2. An inferior strategy in the battle for survival, leading to extinction

3. Moral killing (e.g. killing for mercy)

4. The preference for the empty world

In this paper we concentrate on the preference for the empty world. The other issues are investigated in

1. The Perception of Risk and Benefit (destruction of the environment)

2. The Denial of the World and Objective Reason (ethical strategies and the battle for survival)

3. Negative Utilitarianism and Justice (moral killing)

The minimization of suffering

The two most important theories attempting to minimize suffering are

1. Prioritarianism

2. Negative utilitarianism

The ethical goal to minimize suffering is guided by compassion and risk-aversion. As compared to social contract theory it seems to be built on emotions. But these emotions have a cognitive aspect:

1) Risk aversion is a rational answer to the asymmetry between suffering and happiness (chapter 2.2 and 2.3)

2) Compassion is a rational answer to the fact that a significant part of our self exists in the others (chapter 2.4)

3) From the point of view of Rawls’ Original Position risk-aversion and compassion are the same thing.

2.2 The Asymmetry between Suffering and Happiness

Physics

Life is subordinated to the law of thermodynamics and destined to decay. Suffering is unavoidable because of accidents, defeats, illnesses and aging. Happiness is avoidable; it can be terminated at any point in time.

Biology

1. There are genetic defects which cause immense suffering (e.g. Sickle-cell disease). No corresponding phenomenon is known which causes immense happiness.

2. There are more cases of chronic pain than cases of long-lasting pleasure.

Psychology

1. It is easy to make someone unhappy but much less easy to make that person happy again (see Bad Is Stronger Than Good). It is easier to produce suffering than to produce happiness.

2. A repetition of painful experiences leads to higher sensibility, a repetition of pleasant experiences leads to lower sensibility.

3. There is a kind of suffering which causes irreversible damage to the psyche and destroys the capability to compensate.

4. Risk-aversion increases with experience. Young people don’t see dangers, elder people become cautious. A hypothetical person with complete experience would be extremely risk-averse.

Economics

1. The positive utilitarian imperative to "maximize happiness" is insatiable, while the negative utilitarian command to "minimize misery" is satiable: no matter how much happiness we have, the positive principle tells us that more would always be better. But the negative principle ceases to generate any obligations once a determinate but demanding goal has been reached: if misery could be eliminated, no further obligation would be implied by the negative principle [Wolf].

2. The “law” of diminishing marginal utility and the logarithmic effect of absolute income on happiness (see Easterlin Paradox) may have their reason in the psychological asymmetry between suffering and happiness

3. The expected utility theory generally accepts the assumption that individuals are risk averse (Expected utility hypothesis, Wikipedia)

4. In prospect theory, loss aversion refers to people's tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. Some studies suggest that losses are twice as powerful, psychologically, as gains (loss aversion, Wikipedia).

5. A loss creates a greater feeling of pain compared to the joy created by an equivalent gain, see Behavioral Finance.

Ethics

A different source of asymmetry is the following intuition:

1. There is no moral duty to be happy.

2. There is a moral duty to help a suffering individual, but there is no moral duty to make an individual happy.

3. The presence of pain is bad and the absence of pain is good, but whereas the presence of pleasure is good, the absence of pleasure is bad only if somebody is deprived of that pleasure (Better if it had never been, David Benatar,)

As a consequence: We are responsible for the probable misery of future people, but we have no moral duty to procreate because unborn people do not suffer from missed chances.

Man has created new worlds – of language, of music, of poetry, of science; and the most important of these is the world of the moral demands for equality, for freedom, and for helping the weak [Popper, 65].

At this point of chapter 5, Popper added his controversial note 6(2):

We should realize that from the moral point of view suffering and happiness must not be treated as symmetrical; that is to say, the promotion of happiness is in any case much less urgent than the rendering of help to those who suffer, and the attempt to prevent suffering [Popper, 235]

Finally there is an asymmetry regarding the concrete actions to be taken. It is easier to find a consensus on the kinds of suffering to be combated, than on the kinds of happiness to be promoted.

2.3 Risk-Aversion

Risk

Risk is a state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities involve a loss, catastrophe, or other undesirable outcome (Risk, chapter “Risk vs. uncertainty”, Wikipedia)

Obviously, in order to define risk, one has to define situations like loss, catastrophe or undesirable outcome. Risk can be expressed in terms of suffering, preference-frustration, negative welfare etc. This definition makes clear, that risk can only be valuated relative to a goal.

Expected utility theory

The concept of risk-aversion was first introduced in the context of expected utility theory:

1) The expected utility theory deals with the analysis of choices among risky projects with (possibly multidimensional) outcomes.

2) The expected utility model was first proposed by Nicholas Bernoulli in 1713 and solved by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 as the St. Petersburg paradox. Daniel Bernoulli argued that the paradox could be resolved if decision makers displayed risk aversion.

3) The first important use of the expected utility theory was that of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern who used the assumption of expected utility maximization (1944) in their formulation of game theory (Utility, Wikipedia)

In economics, game theory, and decision theory the expected utility theorem or expected utility hypothesis predicts that the "betting preferences" of people with regard to uncertain outcomes (gambles) can be described by a mathematical relation which takes into account the size of a payout (whether in money or other goods), the probability of occurrence, risk aversion, and the different utility of the same payout to people with different assets or personal preferences. It is a more sophisticated theory than simply predicting that choices will be made based on expected value (which takes into account only the size of the payout and the probability of occurrence).

The expected utility theory generally accepts the assumption that individuals are risk averse, meaning that the individual would refuse a fair gamble (a fair gamble has an expected value of zero), and also implying that their utility functions are concave and show diminishing marginal wealth utility. The risk attitude is directly related to the curvature of the utility function: risk neutral individuals have linear utility functions, while risk seeking individuals have convex and risk averse have concave utility functions. The degree of risk aversion can be measured by the curvature of the utility function (Expected utility hypothesis, Wikipedia)

Definition

1) Risk-aversion is the reluctance of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff. The opposite of risk-aversion is risk-tolerance. For an example see Interactive Tutorial on Risk-Aversion.

2) A person behaves risk-neutral if he/she doesn’t demand a premium for risk-taking. The person tolerates risk but doesn’t seek it.

3) A person is risk-seeking if it is attracted to risk, i.e. he/she prefers an investment with a lower expected return but greater risk, to a no-risk investment with a higher expected return. Example: A bungee-jumper pays for risk.

According to the two contradicting goals addressed in the title of this paper Hostility (respectively survival) and the minimization of suffering there are two kinds of risk-aversion and corresponding kinds of ethics:

1. Suffering-aversion. Suffering-averse ethics tolerates a loss of Darwinian fitness in order to avoid suffering.

2. Nonexistence-aversion. In nonexistence-averse ethics survival has priority over the avoidance of suffering

Example: Nonexistence-aversion normally overrules suffering-aversion, but only up to a specific point: voluntary euthanasia proves that the seemingly non-hedonistic goal survival can be mapped to a hedonistic scale.

If not mentioned otherwise in this paper, we will relate the term risk-aversion to suffering-aversion.

The pursuit of happiness and the avoidance of suffering are associated with the term hedonistic reason.

The perception of risk

1) The biological goal is to survive and procreate or, more precisely, to maximize the proliferation of genes (see Dawkins, God’s utility function). Nature designed the hedonistic mechanism in such a way that it serves survival. Animals are suffering-tolerant.

2) In many cultures the hedonistic mechanism serves survival as well as in biology. But in contrast to animals, humans can reflect and deny goals. Asceticism, seen as adaptation to a scarce environment, serves two contradicting goals:

a) it serves survival as demonstrated by the Spartans and the Roman Stoics

b) it serves the avoidance of suffering as demonstrated by the Buddhists. In monastic Buddhism the goal to avoid suffering overrules the goal to survive. Intense (but volatile) happiness is devaluated in order to avoid risk. This example of suffering-averse ethics may be called hostile but not irrational. Cultural rationality is different from biological rationality.

3) In high-technology cultures we observe a similar phenomenon. Technology serves two contradicting goals

a) it improves the Darwinian fitness

b) it serves the avoidance of suffering as demonstrated by bioethical abolitionism. In the context of transhumanism the goal to live without pain even overrules the goal to have a biological and human existence. This kind of ethics is neither hostile nor irrational, but certainly deviates from biological rationality.

Since the biological nature of humans is characterized by suffering-tolerance and unrealistic optimism, the perception of technological as well as natural risks are distorted (see On the Perception of Risk and Benefit). Individual distortions depend on individual experience. The more experience, the less distortion. The perception on the society level is an aggregation of individual perceptions.

Empirical findings

Following some findings in the context of risk-aversion:

1. The hedonistic valuation of risk (in terms of suffering) can vastly deviate between individuals. The same expected outcome may cause major or a minor suffering, depending on the observer's risk-aversion. But independent of the observer’s initial attitude and his/her innate sensibility, the degree of risk-aversion increases with experience. Experience enforces risk aversion because of the asymmetry between suffering and happiness (chapter 2.2).

2. There is a controversial discussion about the phenomenon of hedonic adaptation, i.e. about the capability to adapt (get used) to suffering. Thesis: The capability to adapt decreases with higher degrees of suffering.

3. Risk-aversion depends on the kind of happiness or suffering. Prospect Theory e.g. discovered specific curves for risk-aversion in the context of monetary wins and losses. But the suffering involved in losing money is not representative for all kinds of suffering. The intensity of suffering (as opposed to duration) seems to have an exponential dimension (see e.g. Modified Negative Utilitarianism by Dan Geinster).

2.4 Compassion

Empathy

Empathy is a psychological concept that describes the ability of one person (the so called observer) to feel in another person (the target). Most contemporary empathy researchers agree that two different aspects of empathy have to be distinguished: the cognitive and the affective aspect [Davis]:

1. One speaks of cognitive empathy, if the outcome of an empathic process is that the observer knows what the target feels.

2. One speaks of affective empathy, if the observer feels something because of the perception of the target (compassion, the wish to help, the wish that the perceived situation would not exist etc.)

It has been speculated that empathy may be an essential part of the cause of moral and social behavior in humans and animals (see e.g. research of Tania Singer).

Cognitive empathy

The cognitive aspect of empathy is sufficient to justify the Golden Rule

1) if the law-maker is conscious, that his role of observer (of suffering) can turn into the role of the target.

2) if the law-maker thinks rational

A person can also apply cognitive empathy to himself. It is a cognitive achievement to look into the future and think about ones destiny. It is possible to consider the person one will be in the future like a different person. In this case the look into the future is similar to an empathic process. As far as the observer knows what the target (in this case the person, that observer will be in the future) feels, it is an example of cognitive empathy.

1) If the person is conscious, that its role of observer will turn into the role of the target and

2) if the person thinks rational

then the Golden Rule can be applied within the same person.

Instead of taking the model of an empathic process to explain what happens, when a person looks on his/her own future, it is also possible to turn it the other way round: The emotional process taking place, when a person looks at him/herself from a distance, is a model for the empathic process directed at others. The difference in time (different life phases and corresponding appearance and character traits) is experienced like the difference in space (other persons with different appearance and character traits). The position of the ego becomes relative. This can lead to the insight that the suffering of others is as real (and consequently as important) as ones own suffering.

Affective empathy

The more cognitive empathy is accompanied by affective empathy, the more it controls behavior.

1. The closer the relation to the suffering individual, the more affective empathy (in this case compassion) becomes dominant. The root of compassion is the biological utility function and the corresponding family relations. But the feeling of closeness can also emerge independent of the family. The more intense the suffering of an individual, the less he/she is a competitor, rival or opponent and the more we feel close to him/her. It is easier to stay emotionally distant; if the victim is self-responsible for his/her suffering, but only up to a certain point. In extreme cases of suffering the judgment prevails, that nobody deserves such a fate. The saying “I wouldn’t wish this on my worst enemy” catches the essence of this phenomenon.

2. If the feeling of closeness is lacking, then affective empathy often causes a spontaneous refutation, urging the observer to turn away. We don’t want “something like that” to exist. It disturbs, strikes as unpleasant or frightens.

It is known, that personal experiences of suffering enhance the capability to feel compassion. It is not required though, that these experiences must be exactly the same or have the same intensity as the ones of a victim. Personal experiences of suffering also change the attitude towards one’s own risks. A person who acts against his/her own interests is either not informed or irrational. In the latter case an empathic moral law could be used to protect the person from him/herself. But most people refuse a corresponding restriction of autonomy.

Example: A person sometimes changes his/her character within lifetime in such a way, that he/she seems to be a different person. The person of age 15 does not much care about the person of age 50 (e.g. smokes fully conscious of the risk of lung cancer). This lack of compassion within the same person is similar to the one across different persons. The application of the Golden Rule to different life phases of the same individual corresponds to “compassion with ones future self” and motivates e.g. to restrain from smoking.

Counter-productivity of compassion

Example: In the context of surgery or accidents compassion leads to a mental blockade

According to consequentialism, the tools (means) have to be oriented towards the goals (ends). Although the goal (reduce suffering) is motivated by compassion, the action may demand quite different feelings or even the absence of emotions.

1. Individual level: People who cannot control their emotions are probably not suited for the profession of a surgeon or a helper in need.

2. Society level: On this level the separation of tools and goals is realized institutionally. The health insurance is not expected to encounter the patient with compassion; it is only expected to help him pay the bills.

Adequacy of compassion

Example: The wish to help automatically disappears, if all beggars are publicly supplied (where “beggars” stands for “visible suffering”).

The perception of suffering is an important factor for the assignment of public and private resources. If the misery is not visible any more and the abuse of social benefit increases, then the wish to help weakens and the resources are cut until the beggars stand on the street again. One could therefore conclude that the problems are attacked in a reasonable way, if they reach a certain magnitude. “In situations of emergency, the salvaging forces grow” (Goethe).

The weak point in this reflection is that (in a global and long-term view) the distress grows faster than the salvaging forces. Since the phenomena of suffering emerged in evolution, it is growing quantitatively and qualitatively, see

1) The Biological Evolution of Pain

2) The Cultural Evolution of Suffering

3) Technological progress partially reduces suffering but builds up new risks of a previously unknown dimension. In those instances where the fight against suffering is successful, the success (in a global and long-term view) has to be “paid” by an increase in risks, see On the Perception of Risk and Benefit.

In many instances well-being grows for a majority and suffering (or risk) for a minority. It seems that the phenomenon of injustice increases as well with evolution.

Non-contractual cases

Philosophers, who treat morality as primarily contractual tend to discuss non-contractual cases briefly, casually and parenthetically, as though they were rather rare. The contractarian view is that those who fail to clock in as normal rational agents and make their contracts are just occasional exceptions, constituting one more minority group, but not a central concern of any society [Midgley]

The contractarian logic is insufficient as a general moral basis for the following reasons:

1. The principle of mutual benefit doesn’t protect orphans.

2. Also the cooperation with mentally retarded or insane persons cannot be based on mutual benefit, the benefit is one-sided.

3. With similar arguments, persons with low intelligence could be excluded from a social contract.

Since non-contractual cases cannot carry out their duties and take responsibility, they cannot be considered to be equal contractors. But compassionate moral laws demand that they get protection to an extent which corresponds to their degree of suffering. Rawls’ first principle allows for the process of evolutionary adaptation (which requires competition). Non-contractual cases are among the losers in this competition. The idea of compassionate moral laws is to limit the suffering produced by the adaptation process.

Rationality

The respect and support for non-contractual cases becomes rational, if the contractors feel compassion. The more compassion, the more the contractor identifies him/herself with the non-contractual cases and the more the preferences match. But compassion is not merely an affective state; it has cognitive aspects as well:

1. Compassion may serve self-interest

2. Compassion is a rational answer to the fact that a significant part of our self exists in the others, i.e. it corresponds to an enhanced perception of the self.

Following the arguments in more detail:

Self-interest

1) Self-interest is involved insofar, as every human being passes through stages where his/her mental capacity corresponds to a non-contractual case. The child spends many years acquiring the competence in speech and consciousness which is typical for humans. Old people, finally, lose step by step their mental capabilities, in particular by strokes and dementia (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease).

2) Ones own future children or grand-children could be mentally retarded or handicapped.

Enhanced perception of the self

This point of view gets support from recent discoveries in biology:

1) Empathy might be created by mirror neurons in the human brain [Goldstein, 321], i.e. to a function which enables imitation learning and dissolves the barrier between the self and others.

2) There is a close genetic relation between all humans.

Human genetic variation is estimated to be at least 0.5%, i.e. there is a 99.5% similarity (Human Genetic Variation).

The characteristics of an individual is also formed by the environment and by chance (not only by genes), but the phenotype and the socially caused differences belie the wide commonalities. There are good reasons to claim that the 0.5% deviation and the life story form individuality, but why should the 99.5% not be an important part of our “self”.

3) If compassion is rational, then the avoidance of traumatic suffering has the highest moral priority. The higher the degree of suffering the more we are all alike, i.e. the peculiarities of an individual’s gene combination and life story become unimportant. In the context of moral priorities vulnerability is the essential part of us. It exists in our fellow humans and is reincarnated over and over. Obviously there are two meanings of the word essential:

a) In order to distinguish individuals their gene combination and life story is essential.

b) In the context of moral priorities the degree of suffering is essential. This meaning of the word essential reminds of Sartre’s observation that the essential values in life are only revealed in the most critical situations. Traumatic suffering is at the core of existence.

4) Self-interest is strongly influenced by the biological utility function, see God’s Utility Function. The insight that the temporary and biased self-interests (the motives of self-realization) are in truth the ones of the biological utility function can lead to a feeling of being manipulated, to the consciousness of heteronomy and to solidarity with the victims of biological mechanisms. By this change in identity, compassionate laws become more rational and self-interest loses some of its attractiveness.

The Other Self

If you awake in the morning

and clearly recall the past

then you are still the same

and your self is secured by its history.

But if you wake up with new eyes

and slowly begin to see

then you are no more the same

and your other self died with its memories.

3 The Empty World as Smaller Evil

3.1 Prioritarianism

History

1. In economics prioritarianism is based on the Pigou-Dalton principle:

Following a suggestion by Pigou (1912), Dalton proposed the condition that a transfer of income from a richer to a poorer person, so long as that transfer does not reverse the ranking of the two, will result in greater equity (Hugh Dalton, Wikipedia)

The theory assumes that total equity has a positive sign before and after the redistribution.

2. In a wider (hedonistic) context, prioritarianism is based on compassion respectively sympathy [Lumer, 2] and risk-aversion. The goal is to maximize general welfare and not only economic welfare (equity). In such a theory the sign of total welfare may turn negative, if the weight of the people with negative welfare is strong enough.

Definition

1. Prioritarians hold that an outcome’s goodness is a function of overall well-being across all individuals, with extra weight given to worse off individuals. This view first appeared under the name “the priority view” in Derek Parfit’s renowned 1991 article “Equality or Priority.” But the idea dates back to Temkin’s 1983 Ph.D. thesis, where it was presented under the name “extended humanitarianism.” And the word “prioritarianism” first appears in Temkin’s “Equality, Priority, and the Levelling Down Objection” (Larry Temkin, Wikipedia)

2. The core idea of the Priority View is that gains in welfare matter more, the worse off people are, and losses in welfare matter less, the better off people are [Arrhenius 2000, 110]

Prioritarianism has two aspects

1. In a history of social welfare happy people get less moral weight than suffering people. The devaluation of happiness is a measure for compassion (sympathy, solidarity).

2. In decisions under uncertainty, happy outcomes are morally devaluated relative to unhappy outcomes. The devaluation is a measure for risk-aversion. The decision about the goodness of outcomes conforms to expected utility theory.

For a representative in the Original Position the devaluation is the same in both cases, i.e. compassion and risk-aversion is the same thing.

Classification

As well as classical utilitarianism, prioritarianism is a consequentialist theory. It is actually considered to be the dominant version of consequentialism (see Rule Consequentialism).

An agent should perform the act, which leads to the best consequences or state of affairs.

1) From the point of view of the suffering individual the result of an ethical decision is more important than the attitude, which is at the bottom of the decision. One can achieve a bad result with a good attitude if one isn’t aware of counterproductive mechanisms.

2) Normally the attitude is important because it aims at the desired result and tries to correct errors. Nevertheless the attitude is valuated according to the result and not vice-versa.

3) In this paper sentient animals are included in the term state of affairs, i.e. their interests have to be represented by human agents.

Comparison with classical utilitarianism

Prioritarianism resembles utilitarianism. Indeed, like utilitarianism, prioritarianism is a form of aggregative consequentialism; however, it differs from utilitarianism in that it does not rank outcomes solely on the basis of overall well-being (Prioritarianism, Wikipedia)

Prioritarianism preserves the efficiency of utilitarianism and a particular concern for those badly off. It doesn’t exclusively concentrate on total welfare but also accounts for an unjust distribution.

The difference between utilitarianism and prioritarianism is a controversial matter:

Example:

If the priority view should turn out to be untenable, that would not be the failure of a substantive view that the good of worse-off people deserves priority. It would simply be because we have no metric for a person’s good that is independent of the priority we assign it [Broome 1991, 222].

Comparison with egalitarianism

Prioritarianism is not vulnerable to the so-called Leveling Down Objection. According to this objection it cannot in any respect, be better to increase equality when this means lowering the welfare of some and increasing the welfare of none (Prioritarianism, Nils Holtug).

The difference between egalitarianism and prioritarianism is the subject of a complex theoretical discussion.

Examples:

1. John Broome: Equality versus Priority, A useful distinction

2. Marc Fleurbaey (2001), Equality versus Priority, How relevant is the distinction?

3. Nils Holtug (2004), Prioritarianism

History of social welfare

For the purpose of this paper we can use the terms utility, quality of life and well-being as synonyms.

Social welfare is the accumulated well-being of all members of the society.

Imagine a two-person society: its only members are Jim and Pam. We compare the following two histories:

1. In society 1, Jim's well-being level is 110 (blissful); Pam's is -73 (hellish); overall well-being is 37.

2. In society 2, Jim's well-being level is 23; Pam's well-being level is 13; overall well-being is 36.

Prioritarians would say that society 2 is better or more desirable than society 1 despite being lower than society 1 in terms of overall well-being. Bringing Pam up by 86 is weightier than bringing Jim down by 87.

Prioritarianism is arguably more consistent with commonsense moral thinking than utilitarianism when it comes to these kinds of cases, especially because of the prioritarian's emphasis on compassion. It is also arguably more consistent with common sense than radical forms of egalitarianism that only value equality (adapted from Prioritarianism, Wikipedia).

Different Prioritarian Welfare Functions correspond to different degrees of compassion.

How can we valuate welfare in such a way, that society 2 in above example gets a higher value than society 1?

Roughly, the idea is that we should maximize welfare, but gains in welfare matter more, the worse off people are, and losses in welfare matter less, the better off people are (…). Another way to express this intuition is to say that the marginal value of welfare is diminishing [Arrhenius 2000, 106].

One can achieve this result by applying a strictly increasing concave transformation to the numerical representation of people’s welfare before summing them up [Arrhenius 2008, 8]

Strictly increasing concave transformation means the following: The lower the welfare of an individual is relative to the others, the more weight it gets in the accumulation and vice-versa [Holtug, 13]. The total of all weights (percentages) equals 1 (respectively 100%). Giving more weight to the bad-off individuals pulls down the total welfare of a society. In our example Pam’s welfare in society 1 gets more weight than in society 2, so that society 1 is pulled down relative to society 2.

Maximization under conditions of risk

Instead of looking at a history of welfare we look at the future and compare possible societies. Prioritarianism represents a compromise between Bayes and Maximin. The more weight is given to the worst case, the more the maximization of utility converges towards Maximin (see A Drink from the Group, Livia Levine).

The maximin principle can be viewed as an extreme version of prioritarianism (Prioritarianism, Wikipedia)

In order to illustrate the conditions of risk we take the same example as above but we assume that there is a choice between society 1 and 2. For a representative in the Original Position the probability is 50% to become Jim and 50% to become Pam:

1. In society 1 we have a 50% probability for well-being level 110 and a 50% probability for level -73 so that the expected welfare amounts to 18.5, i.e. 50% of the overall well-being 37 above.

2. In society 2 we have a 50% probability for well-being 23 and a 50% probability for level 13 so that the expected welfare amounts to 18.0, i.e. 50% of the overall well-being 36 above.

We see that the weight we have to give to Pam in order to pull down the moral value of society 1 (below society 2) is exactly the same as in above example. In other words: The measure for compassion in histories corresponds to the measure for risk-aversion in decisions under uncertainty (under the premises of the Original Position)

In order to illustrate the effect of probability we enhance our example slightly:

Let’s assume that we have 99 Jims and only one Pam in our population. For a representative in the Original Position the probability to become one of the Jims is accordingly 99% and the probability to become Pam only 1%. Above example then looks as follows:

1. In society 1 we have a 99% probability for well-being level 110 and a 1% probability for level -73 so that the expected welfare amounts to 108.17

2. In society 2 we have a 99% probability for well-being 23 and a 1% probability for level 36 so that the expected welfare amounts to 23.13.

We see that the weight we have to give to Pam in order to pull down the moral value of society 1 (below society 2) is much higher than in above example. In other words: The low probability to become a sufferer (Pam) has to be overruled by a high risk-aversion in order to get the same result as above (i.e. a preference for society 2).

Population ethics

Prioritarianism defines an axiology for societies with the same number of people [Arrhenius 2000, 110]

3.2 Negative Total Welfare

In most numerical examples on prioritarianism the sign of total welfare is positive. Obviously happiness is given enough weight in order to compensate all the suffering in this world. But is that reasonable? Or is there a kind of suffering that cannot be compensated by any other value in life?

Degree of suffering

The degree (or quality) of suffering is defined by a certain combination of intensity and duration. There are accordingly two cases which make it impossible to compensate suffering by happiness:

1) Duration: The utility of life turns negative, if a painful state connects with a long duration so that positive valuations slowly faint away.

2) Intensity: The utility of life turns negative, if the intensity of a negative event is such, that it abruptly overrules all previous valuations.

The utility of life remains negative

1) if the psychological capability to compensate is destroyed and the destruction is as irreversible as a physical destruction

2) if there is not enough time or chance left to compensate

If the overall valuation is negative we call the life not worth living.

In this paper we use the following terminology for the degree of suffering:

1. Minor suffering can be compensated with the happiness of previous experiences, i.e. the utility of life has a positive sign.

2. Major suffering turns the utility of life negative. It can be associated with certain forms of physical trauma, psychological trauma and major depressive disorders and fulfils the criteria (duration, intensity or both) mentioned above. An experienced person prefers non-existence to another confrontation with major suffering. Conversely, we can define major suffering as the kind of suffering that causes the preference for non-existence in an experienced person. In this paper we assume that this kind of suffering exists for each and every experienced person, i.e. major suffering is a universal value.

Most people accept the existence of major suffering in this world, but a minority doesn’t. In the following we investigate the relation between compassion, risk-aversion and the acceptance of major suffering. For this investigation we use the concept of the impartial observer:

The impartial observer

Some of the most important normative approaches are based on the idea of an impartial observer. The idea was first mentioned by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments and later taken up by Harsanyi and Rawls.

1. In his Theory of Justice Rawls used the following thought experiment to derive the conditions of an impartial contract: A contract is impartial, if it is derived from an Original Position in which rational contractors under a veil of ignorance decide how they wish to commit themselves to being governed in their actual lives (Justice as a Virtue, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Behind such a veil of ignorance all individuals are specified as rational, free, and morally equal beings. Behind the veil of ignorance, what will the rational choice be for fundamental principles of society? The only safe principles will be impartial principles, for you do not know whether you would suffer or benefit from the structure of any biased institutions.

2. An impartial observer in the Original Position considers inequality as a risk, which has to be properly weighed in order to attain the best state of affairs. Harsanyi connected utilitarianism with the axiomatic basis of game theory. The application of game theory presupposes that utility can be measured on a cardinal scale and that it is amenable to an interpersonal comparison (see Wohlfahrtstheorie).

Degree of compassion

Classical utilitarianism doesn’t use a weighing function: One half of a population (if it is happy) is sufficient to compensate the suffering of the other half (equal distribution of degrees assumed). We call this compassion-neutral.

In a history of social welfare a prioritarian rule impedes the compensation of suffering by happiness. The more weight is given to suffering (relative to happiness), the more difficult it becomes to compensate. The devaluation of happiness relative to suffering, and the devaluation of minor suffering relative to major suffering is a measure for compassion. We start with low compassion and then increase the weight of suffering (respectively decrease the weight of happiness), so that the weighing function becomes more concave:

1) Low compassion tolerates the compensation of the major suffering of a minority, by the happiness and the minor suffering of a majority. It devaluates social welfare (relative to classical utilitarianism), but the sign remains positive.

2) High compassion denies major forms of suffering. Social welfare turns negative, even if the major suffering concerns a minority only.

Degree of risk-aversion

Classical utilitarianism is risk neutral: If we are in a neutral state (utility equal zero) and accept a bet with

1) 50% chance to become happy (positive utility)

2) 50% risk to become a major sufferer (negative utility)

then we speak of a risk-neutral attitude.

From the Original Position (risk) point of view the compensation of suffering by happiness corresponds to the calculation of an average for the expected value. A prioritarian rule pulls the average down, because the outcomes with suffering get more weight.

Prioritarianism is risk-averse: This corresponds to a devaluation of happiness relative to suffering, and to the devaluation of minor forms of suffering relative to major forms:

1. Low risk-aversion means to accept bets, where the risk of major suffering (with a small probability) is tolerated, i.e. compensated by the chance to become happy (with a high probability). The expected utility of life is devaluated (relative to classical utilitarianism), but the sign remains positive.

2. High risk-aversion denies the risk of major suffering. The expected utility of life turns negative as long as this risk exists, even if the probability is small.

Turning point

We can roughly distinguish between two attitudes relative to suffering:

1. Accept the world as it is, i.e. postulate that no matter what kind of suffering existed and exists; it is worth to preserve life.

2. Deny the world as it is, i.e. postulate that there are kinds of suffering that cannot be justified (compensated) by other values in life.

In prioritarianism

1. the first attitude is characterized by positive total welfare

2. the second attitude is characterized by negative total welfare

As compared to classical utilitarianism the moral value of the happy majority is decreased (dashed white area) and the moral value of the suffering minority increased (dashed shaded area). Let’s assume that we start with classical utilitarianism (where compassion is neutral and total welfare has a positive sign) and then increase compassion. As long as we stay in the realm of low compassion, positive welfare is devaluated relative to classical utilitarianism, but the sign of total welfare stays positive. This corresponds to the picture, which is usually associated with prioritarianism. If we continue to increase compassion, then, at a certain degree (shaded area), the sign of total welfare turns negative. The turning point (degree) is high risk-aversion, i.e. the world is denied as long as there is a risk of major suffering. The rationality of high risk-aversion, however, is a controversial issue.

3.3 The Rational Degree of Risk-Aversion

Risk-aversion in the Original Position

In order to arrive at a principle of justice, we apparently need to figure out the appropriate level (degree) of risk aversion in the original position (Rawls and Risk Aversion, Drew Schroeder).

The rational degree of risk-aversion depends on the interpretation of the Original Position. From the perspective of decision theory there are two possible interpretations:

1) Maximize expected utility under conditions of risk.

Examples:

a) Harsanyi’s utilitarianism

b) Prioritarianism

2) Decision-making under uncertainty.

Examples:

a) Angner

b) Rawls’ theory of justice

Harsanyi’s interpretation

Harsanyi suggests that outcomes and probabilities can be estimated on the basis of the actual population:

1. The actually existing levels of welfare serve as a basis for possible outcomes.

2. The more people exist with a specific level of welfare, the higher the probability is to be born in exactly this position.

Example:

1) If the society is ruled by a prioritarian principle (i.e. applies a redistribution of economic welfare), then the differences in welfare are much smaller (-10, +10) than with Harsanyi’s principle (-20, +20).

2) It is assumed that the probability to be born in the group of the lucky people is considerably higher (80%) than the probability to born among the poor (20%).

poor people

20%

lucky people

80%

Total

Prioritarian principle

-10

+10

-2 + 8 = 6

Harsanyi’s principle

-20

+20

-4 + 16 = 12

Under these assumptions Harsanyi’s principle is rational and prioritarianism is unreasonably risk-averse. It is defensible to distribute economic welfare according to a risk-neutral strategy.

Prioritarian interpretation

In Harsanyi’s interpretation people remain risk-neutral, no matter what kind of risk is at stake. But this assumption contradicts empirical findings:

People do in fact get more risk-averse the larger the stakes. The original position is in many senses the biggest-stakes gamble possible: your whole life’s prospects are being determined! (Rawls and Risk Aversion, Drew Schroeder).

In a general hedonistic model we do not talk about the distribution of economic welfare, we talk about the distribution of suffering and happiness. The probability to become a victim of major suffering (e.g. by accident or illness) is considerable. And there is not only the risk to become the victim of a tragic destiny, but also the risk to be born as a very sensitive person (who cannot bear the horrible suffering or death of other persons).

According to prioritarianism risk-neutrality expresses a lack of knowledge and experience. Risks are systematically underestimated; see On the Perception of Risk and Benefit. If we concede an undistorted perception of risk to the representative, then he/she will be considerable more risk-averse than an uninformed gambler.

We will therefore enhance above example with a weighing function for risk-aversion. The column poor people is replaced by major sufferers, indicating that economic welfare is replaced by general welfare. The outcomes are multiplied with a factor for risk-aversion (in our example 0.8 for the sufferers, 0.2 for the lucky ones):

major sufferers

20%

lucky people

80%

Total

Prioritarianism

-10 (x 0.8)

+10 (x 0.2)

-1.6 + 1.6 = 0

Harsanyi’s principle

-20 (x 0.8)

+20 (x 0.2)

-3.2 + 3.2 = 0

Under these assumptions the result is equal for both principles. If we make the prioritarian weighing function

1. slightly more concave, then prioritarianism is rational

2. slightly less concave, then Harsanyi’s principle is rational.

Why should it be more concave?

1. Since the highest risks are at stake, the representative in the Original Position should have the best available information, hence complete experience. We could even maintain that the term complete experience includes the experiences of passed generations and that the representative should be able to correct the immense loss of experience, caused by the death of individuals.

2. Risk-aversion increases with experience because of the asymmetry between suffering and happiness. If we concede complete experience to the representative, then he/she will be highly risk-averse. To know suffering by ones own experience makes all the difference in the evaluation of game strategies.

3. At the present state of knowledge the risk of major suffering cannot be removed in the foreseeable future. According to the definition in chapter 3.2 a highly risk-averse representative prefers non-existence to another confrontation with major suffering, even if the probability is small. A preference for non-existence means that the valuation of the world is negative.

Angner’s interpretation

According to [Angner] we should apply Levi’s theory of decision to the Original Position. Levi’s theory takes into account, that the factors in above calculation are insufficiently known.

Example (referring to above table):

If probabilities are insufficiently known then we have to distinguish between the following cases:

1. The probability to become a major sufferer is low enough to be tolerated. In this case Harsanyi’s principle is favored

2. The probability to become a major sufferer is too high to be tolerated. In this case Rawls’ principle is favored.

3. It is unclear whether the probability to become a major sufferer is low enough to be tolerated or not. In this case the representative may use the Maximin (Leximin) criterion to break ties.

It has been objected that Maximin reasoning is an expression of paranoia or excessive pessimism. This is not, however, an adequate criticism of Levi’s account. Note that the agent who uses security considerations to break ties between alternatives does not assume that the worst outcome is most likely to happen [Angner, 14]

In the following example we look at the general case where not only probabilities but also outcomes are insufficiently known. The example concerns the distribution of economic welfare, but can easily be adapted to the distribution of suffering:

Suppose that an agent in the original position has to choose between the principles of justice favored by Rawls, and those favored by Harsanyi. The agent is concerned that she may be poor, and knows that Harsanyi’s principle permit quite substantial welfare differences for the benefit of total utility. What is the probability that she will be poor? [Angner, 14]

In a society which implements Rawls’ difference principle the welfare of the poor and the lucky do not deviate as much as in a society which implements Harsanyi’s principle. Fixed outcomes (like welfare +10) are replaced by ranges (like welfare 1-10):

poor people

lucky people

Rawls’ principle

1-10

2-20

Harsanyi’s principle

0-2

10-100

The decision problem can be characterized as follows:

1. If the probability for belonging to the poor is small, then adopting Harsanyi’s principle is rational.

2. If the probability for belonging to the poor is high, then adopting Rawls’ principle is rational.

If it is unclear whether the probability to become poor is low enough to be tolerated or not, then we need a secondary criterion to break the ties:

Provided Rawls’ characterization of the original position, agents’ probabilities and utilities may be sufficiently indeterminate to justify the use of Maximin (Leximin) reasoning [Angner, 14]

In the following section we investigate if Leximin is the only rational choice of a secondary criterion.

Rawls’s interpretation

According to Rawls it is inappropriate to derive outcomes and probabilities from the short-lived characteristics of the actual world community. Levels of welfare and probability distributions change with each generation. They can even change dramatically within days, e.g. by a natural catastrophe or a technological disaster.

Rawls denies that the parties have a psychological disposition to risk-aversion. He argues however that it is rational to choose as if one were risk averse under the highly exceptional circumstances of the original position. His point is that, while there is nothing rational about a fixed disposition to risk aversion, it is nonetheless rational in some circumstances to choose conservatively to protect certain fundamental interests against loss or compromise (Original Position, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

If Rawls’ veil of ignorance was a veil of risk, and you knew that positions would be randomly assigned, then perhaps some moderately risk-averse expected utility calculation would be appropriate. Or perhaps Harsanyi’s risk-neutral utilitarianism would be chosen. It’s a veil of ignorance, however, and so you’re supposed to have no idea how likely it is that you’ll end up in any given position. The assumption that you’re equally likely to end up in each position is unjustified (…). We can’t even begin to calculate expected utility, since we can’t begin to assign probabilities to the various possible outcomes. If we can’t even begin to calculate expected utility, then the whole notion of risk aversion doesn’t get a grip (Rawls and Risk Aversion, Drew Schroeder).

In a situation of unknown probabilities there are two plausible decision procedures:

1. Leximin (in accordance with Rawls’ claim)

2. The principle of insufficient reason which says that when one is ignorant about which of several states of affairs will obtain, one should arbitrarily assign equal probabilities to each state (in accordance with Harsanyi’s claim).

Susan Hurley found an argument in favor of Leximin:

Hurley suggests that risk-aversion and uncertainty-aversion are separate things. Being averse to a known gamble is different than being averse to entering a situation where one has no information about what the odds are. Experimentally, people do display uncertainty-aversion independent of risk-aversion.

Uncertainty-aversion leads to Leximin without assuming that the parties to the Original Position are maximally risk-averse. Maximin (Leximin) is not a value commitment on the part of the representative, but the only rational choice of a secondary criterion.

(Rawls and Risk Aversion, Drew Schroeder).

In practice there is hardly a single worst case of suffering and the boundaries between different degrees of suffering are fluent. The Leximin rule would therefore have to be replaced by a prioritarian rule.

Moderate risk-aversion

The investigation so far suggests that high risk-aversion is rational. In the practical implementation, however, high risk-aversion leads to unpleasant consequences. It threatens survival and is therefore associated with mental illness (paranoia). The argument for moderate risk-aversion is one of acceptance and practicability:

Some theorists have developed a justification of prioritarianism, based on risk aversion in the original position [Atkinson / Stiglitz, 340; Hurley, 368-382]. This justification is based on the Rawlsian [1958], Harsanyian [1955] framework of an impartial decision, operationalized via a hypothetical ignorance of one's proper qualities and position in society so that the decider may end up in everybody's skin.

1. Harsanyi has argued that in such a situation one should consider the various possibilities as equiprobable and treat them risk-neutrally; this then leads to utilitarianism.

2. Rawls has argued that in such a situation of uncertainty the maximin criterion for rational decisions should be applied.

3. Prioritarians have criticized both justifications: Maximin (or Leximin) is equivalent to infinite risk aversion, which seems to be nearer to paranoia than rationality, and Harsanyi's risk-neutrality is not rational either. The right maxim in such situations is moderate risk aversion, which together with the framework's assumptions leads to prioritarianism as the impartial and morally just welfare function (Prioritarian Welfare Functions, 32)

In this citation the term prioritarianism is associated with moderate risk-aversion. Independent of this (incorrect) restriction we end up with a kind of relativism or intuitionism. A certain version of prioritarianism is rational for those who agree with the encoded degree of compassion respectively risk-aversion. The relativism with regard to risk-aversion is caused by a conflict of interests and can only be removed by accepting the unpleasant consequences of hedonistic reason (as practiced e.g. by Buddhists). For more information on this issue see The Denial of the World and Objective Reason.

3.4 Antinatalism

Definition

Antinatalism is the philosophical position that asserts a negative value judgement towards birth. It has been advanced by figures such as Arthur Schopenhauer, Brother Theodore and David Benatar. Schopenhauer, in his essay On the Suffering of the World comments clearly advocates childlessness (…) Similarly, Benatar argues from the hedonistic premise that the infliction of harm is generally morally wrong and therefore to be avoided, and the intuition that the birth of a new person always entails nontrivial harm to that person, that there exists a moral imperative not to procreate (Antinatalism, Wikipedia)

Examples of antinatalist movements:

1. Voluntary Human Extinction Movement (VHEMT), About the Movement

2. No Kidding!

The Antinatalist intuition

The Antinatalist intuition says that the world would be better off without humans. The source of this intuition is

1. the denial of the status quo combined with

2. the uncertainty of progress

Antinatalists deny the status quo and account for the probable persistence of the status quo.

There are many reasons to deny the status quo

1. the existing degree of suffering

2. the inhuman nature of humans

3. the inevitability of moral dilemmas

etc.

According to the antinatalist intuition this world is not a place that can be recommended to a child – not if you love the child. Procreation is rather as an offense than a gift. The responsibility is exclusively on the side of the parents. The suffering of the possible children cannot be legitimated by the suffering of childless parents.

Parents not only suppress the risk to create possible victims, they also suppress the risk to create possible offenders. A small aspect of the destructive human potential is demonstrated by the killing of animals for food (for an example see Blood of the Beasts). Whereas the taboo of killing non-sentient animals may be based on a distorted perception as well (e.g. in Jainism), the general risk to be confronted with moral dilemmas is unavoidable. Some of them (like The Torture of the Mad Bomber) are strong arguments for denying the world as it is.

Pro

1. David Benatar's Better Never To Have Been challenges a deep source of status quo bias. Benatar argues that coming into being is always harm. Consequently the ideal population size is zero. Indeed the author advocates the extinction of all sentient life. He is realistic about his prospects of success.

2. Benatar's argument rests on a critical asymmetry. If someone had never existed, Benatar argues, the absence of any pleasure s/he might have experienced wouldn't be bad (…). This asymmetry underlies the widely acknowledged intuition that no one is morally obliged to have children. By contrast, Benatar argues, if the suffering undergone in someone's life hadn't existed, then the absence of suffering would be a good thing. From this fundamental asymmetry - i.e. suffering is intrinsically harmful, but there is nothing morally bad about an absence of pleasure - Benatar draws his nihilistic conclusion.

(Review of Better Never to Have Been, David Pearce)

Contra

1. Christopher Belshaw’s Review

2. According to Antinatalism it is always morally right to stay childless, no matter what the consequences are for the remaining population (in particular for the childless parents). If the population size cannot be reduced to zero (which is probable) then the degree of suffering could increase in a shrinking population. A small population with a high degree of suffering is not morally better than a large population with a low degree of suffering.

4 The Empty World as Perfect State

4.1 Buddhism

The Noble Truths

Following a brief description of the teachings:

1. “Life is inseparably tied to suffering.”

2. “The cause of suffering are attachments (desires) in a world where everything changes, nothing is permanent.”

3. “Suffering can be terminated by ending human desire.”

4. “Human desire can be ended by following the Eightfold Path.”

In the language of utilitarianism:

1. First Truth: The utility (dominant end) in Buddhism is the avoidance of suffering. Negative utility increases with the degree of suffering.

2. Second Truth: Suffering is caused by the frustration of desires.

3. Third Truth: Suffering can be terminated by ending the creation of desires.

4. Forth Truth: The creation of desires can be ended by following the Eightfold Path.

At its origin (which is Theravada) the Buddhist concept concentrated on individual redemption. But the Eightfold Path is tied to the doctrine of reincarnation and therefore implies a concept of justice: a deviation from the Eightfold Path produces reincarnation and corresponding continuous suffering. The dependency of redemption on ethical knowledge induced a controversial debate in early Buddhism. Is there a moral obligation to actively promote ethical knowledge? The idea of a global missionary activity rose up with the Mahajana movement in the 2nd century. The ethical ideal of the Mahajana School is the Bodhisattva, a person who delays his or her own enlightenment in order to compassionately assist all other beings.

What kind of ethics is Buddhism?

Following some aspects for a classification:

1) Buddhism is a form of consequentialism. An agent should perform the act, which leads to the best consequences or state of affairs.

2) The root of Buddhism is hedonistic: the avoidance of suffering.

3) Suffering is caused by the frustration of desires. Since there are many kinds of desires there are also many kinds of suffering. The moral value is preference-based.

4) Buddhism devaluates (volatile) biological desires in order to reduce suffering and is therefore risk-averse ethics.

5) Buddhism defines morally desirable and undesirable behavior. The Eightfold Path is virtue ethics and can be seen as a kind of moral perfectionism.

Transience

In the life story of Buddha it is reported that he spent his youth in the sheltered environment of a noble family. His father, who was hoping his son would later become his successor, protected the child from all evils of life and enclosed him with every imaginable luxury. But one day the future Buddha managed to leave the palace unnoticed by the guards. On his excursion to the outside world he was confronted with four situations which he understood as signs:

- In the first situation he was shocked about the condition of an old man.

- In the second situation he was confronted with illness

- In the third situation he was confronted with death.

- In the forth situation he was impressed by the inner calmness of a monk

When he realized, that he was exposed to illness, aging and death as everybody else, he left his wife and his son and went to the jungle where he spent six years in rigorous asceticism, hoping to find a solution to the problem of suffering. The life story of Buddha clarifies that transience and decay is at the root of Buddhism. Only the insight into unrealistic emotional attachments can liberate from suffering. With Zarathustra’s “all joy wants eternity” deception is pre-programmed. We can also replace eternal happiness by the (non-hedonistic) survival at any price or the wish that the most loved persons don’t have to die; the result will be the same. Any unrealistic dominant end implies a negative valuation of life.

The normative imposition of the reality principle to society is of course a questionable undertaking. But we have to imagine this principle as guideline or warning (as practised in Buddhism) and not as coercion:

1. If the dominant end is the avoidance of major suffering, then the reality principle helps protecting ones own future self, by warning from short-sighted and illusionary forms of happiness.

2. If the dominant end is eternal life, then the reality principle is a reminder of transience, like the Buddhist destruction of sand mandalas or the Christian „Memento homo, quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris“ (“Remember, man, that you are dust and unto dust you shall return”). It prevents from building castles on sand and suggests changing the dominant end.

Childlessness

Buddhist and Hindu monks pursue the moral ideal of childlessness. Hindu monks believe that nothing detracts the human soul more from the path of liberation than the birth of a child (see Hinduismus), a claim that makes sense in the light of genetic reincarnation

4.2 Negative Utilitarianism

Definition

Most utilitarian theories deal with producing the greatest amount of good for the greatest number of people. Negative utilitarianism (NU) requires us to promote the least amount of evil or harm, or to prevent the greatest amount of suffering for the greatest number. Proponents like Karl Popper, Christoph Fehige and Clark Wolf argue that this is a more effective ethical formula, since, they contend, the greatest harms are more consequential than the greatest goods. Karl Popper also referred to an epistemological argument: “It adds to clarity in the fields of ethics, if we formulate our demands negatively, i.e., if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness.” (Negative Utilitarianism, Wikipedia)

In this paper we concentrate on the original NU, a theory which is characterized by the complete devaluation of happiness.

For more information see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice.

Comparison with Buddhism

1. Buddhism advocating minimizing dukkha (pain, dissatisfaction) – rather than maximizing sukkha (from which “sugar” comes) may be a kind of negative welfarism. [Kolm, 8]

2. Buddha has also been cited as a supporter of antifrustrationism

Buddha is on our side [Fehige, 522].

Antifrustrationism is closely related to the original NU, see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice.

Buddhism and the original NU both consider the empty world to be the best state of affairs. The Buddhist reflection goes as follows:

1. Ecstasy is devaluated because it is transient.

2. Long-term happiness can only be reached with a contemplative life-style and has a different character than ecstasy.

3. Perfection (the Nirwana) finally can only be reached by the elimination of all desires. By eliminating desires, however, we approach non-existence (of the ego).

For a more detailed description see On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes in Population Ethics.

Comparison with prioritarianism

1) For the original NU the empty world is the best state of affairs. As long as this state cannot be reached, the eradication of major suffering - e.g. by biological abolitionism - is the smaller evil (as compared to the status quo).

2) For prioritarians a world without suffering is the best state of affairs. As long as major suffering cannot be eradicated, prioritarians diverge in the valuation of empty world:

a) if total welfare is valuated negative, then the empty world is the smaller evil (as compared to the status quo)

b) if total welfare is valuated positive, then the status quo is the smaller evil (as compared to the empty world)

Theory	ideal	second best
Original NU	empty world	eradication of major suffering
Prioritarianism with negative total welfare	eradication of major suffering	empty world
Prioritarianism with positive total welfare	eradication of major suffering	status quo

5 Metaphor

The city of Omelas

In her novel The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas Ursula K.LeGuin describes a city whose well-functioning depends on the suffering of a child [LeGuin]. The suffering child is a symbolic representation of the suffering minority. The child is used as a symbol to express the innocence of the victims. In a certain sense, the most suffering individuals pay the price for all others who suffer less or are happy.

Hostile inhabitants

The inhabitants of Omelas who believe, that the suffering of the child persists or even increases with evolution can be divided in the following two groups:

1) The ones who walk away from Omelas: Buddhists, Antinatalists and other pessimists, who retire from life. Hindus who attempt to leave the wheel of reincarnation.

2) The ones who try to destroy Omelas: Militant negative utilitarians or other people, who combat life.

Life-friendly inhabitants

The inhabitants of Omelas who believe, that the suffering of the child decreases with evolution can be divided in the following two groups:

1. The ones who try to improve Omelas: Bioethical abolitionists and like-minded Paradise engineers, but also optimists with non-technical concepts for the reduction of suffering.

2. The ones who believe in salvation: The supporters of various revealed religions

The future of the city

The people who accept Omelas as it is and comply with the state of affairs (e.g. Stoics) don’t contribute to the global termination of suffering. The optimistic and conciliatory inhabitants of Omelas have a better Darwinian fitness than the hostile ones. Omelas will therefore remain populated, even if the suffering of the child persists or increases. A technological solution to the problem is possible but unlikely. The most probable end of suffering seems to be the destruction of life. But we shouldn’t associate this eventuality with militant strategies like moral killing. Ironically destruction will rather be caused by risk-takers who desperately want to live, e.g. the creators of the MAD doctrine or the millions of people who cause a climatic catastrophe (see The Cultural Evolution of Suffering).

global termination of suffering

by non-human forces

by human forces

by destruction

close to certain

Buddhists

possible

Risk-takers

by salvation

very unlikely

Believers

unlikely

Paradise engineers

6 Conclusion

1) A theory which considers the empty world to be the best state of affairs (like Buddhism or antifrustrationism) is hostile per definition.

2) In a theory which weighs risks against chances the hostility depends on the weighing function:

a) With a complete devaluation of chances no world can be morally superior to the empty world.

References

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10) Hurley, Susan L. (1989): Natural Reasons. Personality and Polity. New York; Oxford

11) Kolm Serge-Christoph, Macrojustice from Equal Liberty

12) LeGuin Ursula (1973), The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, New Dimensions No.3, edited by Robert Silverberg

13) Lumer Christoph (2005), Prioritarian Welfare Functions, in Daniel Schoch (ed.): Democracy and Welfare, Paderborn: Mentis

14) Midgley Mary (1994), Duties concerning islands, an Essay in Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, Oxford University Press

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17) Wolf Clark (1997), Person-affecting Utilitarianism and Population Policy, in J. Heller and N. Fotion, Eds, Contingent Future Persons, Kluwer Academic Publishers