On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes in

  Population Ethics

     B.Contestabile admin@socrethics.com First version 2007   Last version 2008

Abstract

Starting point

Starting point of this paper is the following citation concerning the state of contemporary population ethics:

“Most discussion in population ethics has concentrated on how to evaluate populations in regard to their goodness, that is, how to order populations by the relations “is better than” and “is as good as”. This field has been riddled with paradoxes which purport to show that our considered beliefs are inconsistent in cases where the number of people and their welfare varies.” [Arrhenius 2004, 201].

Type of problem

The best known and most discussed example shattering our intuitions is Parfit’s

Mere Addition Paradox. This paper explores the potential of the Buddhist Truths to answer the following questions:

▪ What is at the source of the Mere Addition Paradox?

▪ Why are paradoxes unavoidable in population ethics?

Result

▪ The comparison of classical utilitarian and Buddhist intuitions demonstrates the close tie between intuitions and interests. The perplexing Buddhist intuition about non-existence can be explained (except for metaphysical reasons) by a radically different priority given to survival.

▪ The method of measuring the quality of life is not decisive for the existence of paradoxes. The Buddhist axiology changes but doesn’t remove counter-intuitive combinations.

▪ If the conflict of interest (quantity versus quality) is described within a two parameter model, it causes conflicting intuitions. In axiologies which favour quantity (utilitarianism) or quality (perfectionism) the conflicting intuitions inevitably lead to paradoxes.

▪ In order to find a compromise one would have to find a universal interest and a corresponding universal intuition. The obvious candidate to meet this request is sympathy. But since there is no universal consensus on the desirable degree of sympathy, the normative force of such an approach is limited.

▪ Breaking out of the two parameter model and accepting the incommensurability of certain qualities threatens the normative claim of population ethics.

The full text was published 2010 in

Contemporary Buddhism, Volume 11, Issue 1

p.103-113