The Denial of the World and Objective Reason

B.Contestabile admin@socrethics.com First version 2010 Last Version 2011

Table of Contents

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Basics

3. Root Metaphors

4. Population Ethics

5. Conflicting Reasons

6. The Battle of Interpretations

7. The View of a Distant Observer

8. The View of an Impartial Representative

9. Conclusion

References

Abstract

Starting point

“Wer die Welt verwirft, wird von der Welt verworfen” (Rudyard Kipling).

“Those who deny the world will be rejected by the world”.

Above saying describes the mechanism, which makes sure that optimism prevails. Optimists have a better survival value and the survivors are always right. But are the survivors also the winners? Not from the Buddhist point of view which suggests that we should rather leave the wheel of reincarnation.

Type of Problem

1. Can the world be valuated by reason?

2. Is nature (the world) beautiful and good (as postulated by Spinoza and Leibniz) or is it cruel and pitiless (as postulated by Schopenhauer and Hobbes)?

Result

Can the world be valuated by reason?

Humans are distinct from other living beings insofar as they are able to decouple the hedonistic system (the striving for happiness, the avoidance of suffering) from its original goal (survival and procreation):

1. It is reasonable to survive and procreate (expand): we call this vital reason

2. It is reasonable to pursue happiness and avoid suffering: we call this hedonistic reason

At a certain degree of suffering, hedonistic reason overrules vital reason, i.e. the value of survival can be measured within a hedonistic framework. If we disregard aspects which are not relevant for sentient beings, then the value of the world corresponds to the aggregated (and weighed) welfare of its inhabitants.

Is nature (the world) beautiful and good (as postulated by Spinoza and Leibniz) or is it cruel and pitiless (as postulated by Schopenhauer and Hobbes)?

1) The view of hedonistic reason (serving the pursuit of happiness and the reduction of suffering)

a) An impartial representative (in the Original Position) who advocates hedonistic reason should be highly risk-averse. For a justification of this normative claim see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering.

b) A highly risk-averse representative assigns a negative value to the world.

2) The view of vital reason (serving survival and procreation):

An impartial representative who advocates vital reason delegates the valuation of the world to the individual. Diversification is more successful than universalism in this context.

It belongs to the logic of survival and procreation to valuate the world positively or to preserve a vision of hope at least. Survival requires a certain ability to ignore risks, forget painful experiences and limit compassion.

3) The view of objective reason (serving both interests):

Hedonistic reason has the better arguments, but is not able to survive. In order to survive it has to cooperate with vital reason. The optimal symbiosis of the two interests cannot be predefined but has to be checked out in practice. It is the task of normative ethics to develop and launch different concepts of symbiosis.

4) Descriptive view (empirical data):

a) Concerning vital reason: In the 20^th century humanity developed a potential for self-destruction.

b) Concerning hedonistic reason: Suffering increases quantitatively and qualitatively in the course of evolution. At the present state of knowledge it is impossible to foresee, if this trend can durably be broken.

1. Introduction

Terminology

Reality is the state of things as they actually exist, rather than as they may appear or may be thought to be. In its widest definition, reality includes everything that is and has being, whether or not it is observable or comprehensible (Reality, Wikipedia)

Nature, in the broadest sense, is equivalent to the natural world, physical world, or material world. "Nature" refers to the phenomena of the physical world, and also to life in general. It ranges in scale from the subatomic to the cosmic (Nature, Wikipedia).

Nature, as we perceive it, is a model of (a part of) reality.

For the purpose of this paper the terms nature and world can be treated as synonyms.

Starting point

Wer die Welt verwirft, wird von der Welt verworfen

Those who deny the world will be rejected by the world

Rudyard Kipling, The Undertakers

Type of Problem

1. Can the world be valuated by reason?

2. Is nature (the world) beautiful, good or even perfect (as postulated by Spinoza and Leibniz) or is it cruel and pitiless (as postulated by Schopenhauer and Hobbes)?

2. Basics

Reason

1. Theoretical reasoning is the process of taking theoretical (i.e., epistemic) reasons into account so as to determine what to believe or accept.

2. Practical reasoning is the process of taking practical reasons into account so as to determine what to do or what attitudes to have

(Reason, Wikipedia)

In more detail:

1) Theoretical reasoning is characterized by

a) adapting beliefs to experiences (principle of Empiricism)

b) the principle that no fact can be real or no statement true unless it has sufficient reason why it should not be otherwise (Principle of sufficient reason)

2) Practical reasoning is characterized by

a) choosing efficient means in order to attain a given goal (instrumental reason).

b) the principle that the individual should act according to maxims of universal desirability (principle of universalization)

Reason can judge, which principles are adequate for which area of application [Larmore, 1-2].

Reason and emotion

Rationality simply refers to the success of goal attainment, whatever those goals may be (Rationality, Wikipedia)

We will use the term instrumental rationality for the rational pursuit of unreflected goals.

The term reason (or volitional rationality), however, is characterized as follows:

1. A kind of reflection which is able to weigh the biological goal (survival and procreation) against a cultural goal (in particular the avoidance of suffering)

2. The attempt to enhance knowledge and to use the best available information (including emotional experience).

Obviously, in this definition, emotion cannot be separated from intellect because emotional experience is considered to be a kind of knowledge.

The dominant approach in contemporary philosophy rests on assigning emotions an evaluative content (…) the emotion provides a reason for or against action [Greenspan, 207]

The traditional antagonism between reason and desire (emotion) doesn’t make sense. Every desire materializes because there are reasons to pursue the object of desire [Larmore, 47].

Emotion inevitably introduces vagueness into moral arguments.

Objective reason

Instrumental rationality represents a specific interest. It corresponds to a lawyer, who cannot choose his/her client.

Reason (volitional rationality) allows reflecting interests and valuating them. It corresponds to a lawyer who can reject clients and choose contracts. But finally reason, as well as instrumental rationality, serves interests.

1) If reason is applied on the society level, then it corresponds to a lawyer, who decided to become a judge and now represents the interests all members of the community. A formal attempt to take an objective point of view in ethics is game theory.

2) If we apply reason to valuate the world, then we have to include the interests of all sentient beings as proposed by Peter Singer. If we exclude a social class, a race or a species, then we distribute privileges.

Decisions are individually, locally or globally reasonable, depending on the participating interests:

1. The pursuit of individual interests is associated with the term subjective reason.

2. The valuation of the world (as discussed in this paper) is an application of reason on the global level and is associated with the term objective reason.

Is there an objective foundation of morality? In accordance with [Nagel, 141-143] we assume that there is such a foundation.

Our claims about value (e.g. the objective badness of pain) may be true or false independently of our beliefs and inclinations [Nagel, 144]

Morality is a form of objective reengagement [Nagel, 222].

How can objectivity be applied to define a theory of justice? The valuation of the world is a part of this topic, i.e. in this paper we investigate a topic on the society level. A valuation which is objectively “right” or “true” has the character of an ethical ideal and may be in conflict with subjective reason.

Conflict with subjective reason

Objectivity is the central problem of ethics. Not just in theory, but in life. The problem is to decide in what way, if at all, the ideal of objectivity can be applied to practical questions [Nagel, 138].

A theory of justice includes individual rights and duties. Individual interests may conflict with individual duties. They may also conflict with common interests which are not duties (like helping charitable organizations or contributing to the progress of humanity)

We should certainly try to harmonize our lives to some extent with how we think the world should be. But there is no necessity to abandon all values that do not correspond to anything desirable from an impersonal standpoint, even though this may be possible as a persona choice – a choice of self-transcendence [Nagel, 173].

For information about the conflict between individual and societal interests see

a) Konkurrierende Lebensziele

b) Moralischer Perfektionismus und Gerechtigkeit

c) Negative Utilitarianism and Justice

Moral universalism

Moral universalism is the meta-ethical position that some system of ethics, or a universal ethic, applies universally, that is, for "all similarly situated individuals", regardless of culture, race, religion, nationality, sexuality, or other distinguishing feature. Moral universalism is opposed to moral nihilism and moral relativism. (Moral Universalism, Wikipedia)

According to Kant rationality requires that we respect persons, which in turn requires that moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person. Thus, individuals are not taken to be motivated by self-interest but rather by a commitment to publicly justify the standards of morality to which each will be held (Contractarianism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

The Kantian claim that we are all autonomous persons of equal dignity leads to the consequent reciprocity of moral claims. If we extend reciprocity to the generalized other, then we get the principle of universalization. Those claims enjoy general validity which every person can assert against others in a rational way. The term rational way means: tested by the general principle of role reversal [Ulrich 32].

In his Theory of Moral Sentiments Adam Smith depicts the universalistic moral point of view as the one of an impartial spectator:

We endeavor to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it.

In the following we will use the term impartial representative because the valuation of the world is made by an involved person (as imagined in Rawls’ or Harsanyis’ Original Position).

Conclusion

1. The valuation of the world (as far as it can be supported by arguments) is an application of objective reason.

2. The principle of moral universalism is appropriate in this matter, i.e. the arguments that are used in the valuation of the world must be plausible for every rational individual.

3. The principle of moral universalism corresponds to the view of an impartial representative.

3. Root Metaphors

We start with metaphors that make the valuation of the world a subject of discussion.

Definition

1. A root metaphor is the underlying worldview that shapes an individual's understanding of a situation (Metaphor, Wikipedia)

2. A root metaphor is one from which other metaphors spring (Root metaphor, Minds.org)

Root metaphors can be unique to individual cultures, nations, organizations or groups. For example one culture may have a root metaphor of life as a journey, whilst another may see it as opportunity (Root metaphor, Minds.org)

Root metaphors are a special class of memes.

Root metaphors in philosophy

1) Once methods of philosophizing from supposedly certain bases of knowledge have been given up, methods for seeking probable knowledge by way of hypotheses become acceptable. And this is the point of departure for the root metaphor theory of philosophic thought. The problem then arises as to what are the sources of world hypotheses. The suggestion is that world hypotheses get started like any man's everyday hypothesis framed to solve some puzzling practical problem. The man looks back over his past experience for-some analogous situation which might be applicable to his present problem. Similarly, a philosopher, puzzled about the nature of the universe, looks about for some pregnant experience that appears to be a good sample of the nature of things. This is his root metaphor. He analyzes his sample, selects its structural elements, and generalizes them as guiding concepts for a world hypothesis of unlimited scope. This set of concepts becomes the set of categories of his world hypothesis.

2) If the world hypothesis proves fruitful in its application to the varied items of the world, it will be adopted by other men, and a school of philosophy comes into being, dedicated to the development of this world theory (Weltanschauung). Its categories will be refined and modified to render them as adaptable as possible to the total range of the world's facts to which they are applied. The root metaphor itself becomes refined by this process. There evolves a give-and-take between the categories and the facts to which they are applied. The categories are modified to fit the facts, and the facts are interpreted in terms of the categories. The philosophers of the school will then perceive the facts as they are structured by their categories, and the ultimate facts in terms of their categories will come to appear to these philosophers as indubitable.

(Metaphor in Philosophy, Stephen Pepper)

Root metaphors in ethics are traditionally embedded in myths.

Root metaphors in ethics

In his book The View from Nowhere Thomas Nagel describes how we move from intuitive decisions to reasoning in cases where we encounter conflicting intuitions:

When we move outside of base desires, or more importantly encounter a conflict among them, Nagel puts forth that a common extension is to move to prudential reasoning. We step outside of the present and look at what our future interests may be. Yet, prudence itself may come in to conflict, requiring still higher levels of abstraction in our reasoning [Schory]

In this paper we will use the following abstractions:

1. Classical utilitarianism qualifies for valuating the world, because it assumes that welfare is interpersonally comparable and cardinally measurable.

2. Harsanyi connected classical utilitarianism with the axiomatic basis of game theory and compared it with Rawls’ Theory of Justice. Game theory provides a systematic tool for investigating ethical matters [Binmore].

Metaphors as well as abstract models, attempt to reduce complexity without losing essential information. Mathematical models express losses by finite numbers and the term “game” insinuates that the gambler can easily withdraw from the situation. A distant way of thinking is required for descriptive sciences. But seen from the inner perspective of an individual the major risks are emotionally loaded to such an extent, that quantification doesn’t make sense and a metaphor seems to be more adequate. The following metaphors not only deliver structural information, but also describe life as a game of unconceivable cruelty and no chance to escape. They consider contingency as a major determinant of happiness. Contingency means

1. war, terror, criminality, natural catastrophes, accidents, illnesses, etc. but also hazardous opportunities

2. the fortune to be born in a certain position (talents, looks, social status etc.)

The behavioral strategies (goals, interests) of the individuals cannot basically change the human condition. Each of the three metaphors looks at the same phenomenon, but from a slightly different point of view:

Metaphor 1: The Casino

You can’t win.

You can’t break even.

You can’t even quit the game.

Ginsberg’s Theorem [Bloch]

Imagine that humans are born with an addiction to participate in a random number game, named Roulette. The optimists are convinced to win, but science suggests that the long-term odds are in favor of the bank. The gambler’s maximum win is a feeling of ecstasy but the maximum loss is so horrible that it is repressed by most participants.

1. Psychoanalysts recognize that the denial of the game leads to depressions and psychosomatic illnesses. They encourage people to visit the Casino and get engaged.

2. Adherents of Nietzsche attempt to change the rules in their favor.

3. Stoics limit the risk by becoming insensitive to losses.

4. Buddhist monks believe that the Stoic strategy leads to a long-term increase in suffering. They recommend to get rid of the addiction and offer a corresponding therapy

Obviously the reasoning about happiness cannot be separated from the reasoning about suffering (risk) and the situation is characterized by a moral dilemma: gambling as well as boycotting the casino is risky. There are two ways to deal with the situation:

1) Optimists believe that our world (the Casino) can be improved. Some of them (like Nietzsche) think that our existence is required precisely for that purpose. The Stoics believe in an internal improvement (modified perception) that makes the world seem perfect.

2) Pessimists valuate life as too risky and don’t believe in a major improvement. Buddhists (in contrast to the Stoics) adapt to a metaphysical world and not to the material world.

Optimists seek for improvements; pessimists seek for ways to quit the game or close the Casino. In view of the moral dilemma neither of them succeeds without taking risks. But ethics is a question of priorities. A philosophical school which reasons about the avoidance of the worst case promotes different ethical priorities than a school which reasons about survival. According to these different ethical goals we can distinguish between

1) The Greek tradition: Develop a strategy for survival. Cope with suffering.

2) The Indian tradition: Liberate from (genetic) reincarnation. Cope with non-existence (of the ego).

The empirically found majority preference for risk-aversion is enforced by experience. A gambler who experienced the worst case will not gamble again. All others continue to play, because it hurts to leave the Casino. If the unlucky gambler could pass his/her experience to the untroubled ones, they would play more cautiously or quit the game. The trick of life is to prevent this passing of information. The idea of risk-averse ethics is to unveil and overcome the trick.

From an empirical point of view above metaphor can be questioned as follows:

1. Does science really suggest that the long-term odds are in favor of the bank? Science suggests that the future is unforeseeable, a statement that allows both an improvement and a worsening of the situation. In a situation of uncertainty it is prudent to assume that a high potential of suffering persists and that (at least) a minority will be affected by an unforeseen development or hazard. This minority accounts for the significance of the metaphor.

2. “A pessimist is an optimist with experience” (saying). Is it true that the unlucky gambler cannot pass his/her experience to the lucky ones? There is, of course, a flow of information from sufferers to lucky people, in particular if there are close relationships between the actors. Empathy allows understanding what is going on in the sufferers mind. And yet, the worst kinds of suffering cannot be communicated to a person who didn’t make a corresponding experience. The phenomenon of “dimensionality” is better known in the context of intense happiness. A child cannot have a feeling for an adult’s sexual pleasure; mystic ecstasy or drug experiences cannot be communicated to inexperienced people.

In Kafka’s life metaphor Before the Law the dimensions are represented by gates and gatekeepers. The rooms behind the doors are ambivalent, i.e. they represent states of ecstasy as well as states of immense suffering. The gatekeepers make happiness impossible and protect from suffering at the same time. The wanderer, who isn’t allowed to pass the gate, never attains “insight”. But he might be better off staying a distant observer, because he couldn’t even bear the first of countless dimensions.

Disclaimer: This is an interpretation of the novel by the author. There is no universally valid meaning of Kafka’s work [Von Matt].

3. If the lucky gambler could pass his/her experience to the inexperienced ones, wouldn’t they abandon caution and strive for ecstasy? Yes, they would, but the first experience of extreme suffering turns things upwards down. There is no symmetry between happiness and suffering (see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering).

Metaphor 2: The city of Omelas

In her novel The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas Ursula K. LeGuin describes a city where the good fortune of the citizens requires that an innocent child is tortured in a secret place [LeGuin]. If we assume that the Casino is located in the city of Omelas and replace the innocent child by the innocent losers of our random number game, then we see the Casino in a different light. In contrast to the previous metaphor the problem is not lacking information, but a silent agreement among the winners that torture is tolerable. For those who believe in free will, humanity could theoretically leave Omelas (like Buddhist monks) and close the Casino. But most people would consider non-existence as a weird scenario and modify the root metaphor until it becomes life-friendly. Following some example modifications:

1. The game (of life) is “holy” and justifies every kind of suffering

2. In the future there will be no traumatic suffering thanks to scientific progress

3. The winners of the game have no responsibility for the losers; the Casino is conducted by an anonymous instance and not by the gamblers themselves. Suffering is caused by a divine creator and not (indirectly) by humans who procreate.

4. The Casino is conducted by the gamblers themselves but they aren’t responsible for their lack of compassion:

If one had an imagination vivid enough and sympathy sufficiently sensitive really to comprehend and to feel the sufferings of other people, one would never have a moment's peace of mind. A really sympathetic race would not so much as know the meaning of happiness. But luckily, we aren't a sympathetic race." (Aldous Huxley, Crome Yellow, 1921).

The shift of responsibility from the ego to an anonymous instance is of special concern. Huxley first describes the compassionate view, but then handles it like a bad dream and assigns reality to the distant view. The compassionate view is only hypothetical (“If one had an imagination……”) and can be refuted by reality (“….luckily we aren’t a sympathetic race”).

We all have the strength to endure

the misfortune of others

La Rochefoucauld

The Omelas metaphor suggests that individual happiness is ambivalent. The joy of the majority is at the cost of the suffering minority; one is not possible without the other. The Milgram experiment revealed that the average citizen doesn’t rebel against torture, even if he/she can see the victims personally and directly. All that is required is an authority which tells them that torture serves a “higher purpose”. If the relation between offender and victim is complex and indirect, then responsibility is denied even more; a phenomenon which is known in the context of structural violence.

Metaphor 3: The veil of ignorance

The Casino metaphor concentrates on risk, the Omelas metaphor on compassion. Rawls, in the tradition of Smith and Kant, combines these two issues into a single one. He proposes delegating the design of moral rules to a representative in the Original Position behind a Veil of Ignorance. Because this representative doesn’t know in which position he/she will be born, it is in his/her own interest to implement solidly rules.

What primarily distinguishes Rawls's impartial perspective from its antecedents (in Hume, Smith, Kant, etc.) is that, rather than representing the judgment of one person, it is conceived socially, as a general agreement by (representatives of all adult) members of an ongoing society (Original Position, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

A general agreement can only be found with regard to universal values. But what are these values?

From the objective standpoint, the fundamental thing leading to the recognition of agent-neutral reasons is a sense that no one is more important than anyone else (…). If impersonal value is going to be admitted at all, it will naturally attach to liberty, general opportunities, and the basic resources of life, as well as to pleasure and the absence of suffering [Nagel, 171]

Happiness and the absence of suffering are universal values, but in Rawls’ theory liberty has priority, i.e. the individuals decide about the tolerable suffering. We are left with the question “What is a reasonable degree of risk-aversion?” a question which is still the issue of a controversial debate:

1. In the area of economic welfare it may be reasonable to choose a risk-neutral strategy as suggested by Harsanyi.

2. It is unclear, if Human Rights are sufficiently risk-averse (Example: The human right to have an unlimited number of children may contribute to wars, epidemics, ecological destruction etc.).

If Omelas is ruled by Rawls’ Theory of justice, then political rights guarantee that the majority is free to decide about the societal risks to be taken. Only a totalitarian government could impose a higher degree of risk-aversion:

If our collective "going on" is considered, in effect, as "going somewhere" (towards some state of affairs which it is the meaning of history to reach), should this not have priority and justify, if necessary, a very unequal distribution between generations of the sacrifices needed to reach Utopia? John Rawls had to deal with this problem in his theory of justice, because he conceived a "scheme of cooperation" extending though all successive generations, the aim of which was the full realization of just institutions. He however rejected the idea that this end was "to be thought of as that alone which gives meaning and purpose to the whole process. To the contrary, all generations have their appropriate aims. They are not subordinate to one another any more than individuals are." (…) These persons should be free to define anew their common values (the "aims" of their own generation) at each moment of history. So "going somewhere" is kept within bounds by a vision of fundamental equality: our concern for the future may express our present values and aims, but these cannot pretend to limit the right of future people to define and pursue their own (Obligations to Future Generations, Visser 't Hooft)

Under a Rawlsian constitution the risk-takers, Stoics and Buddhists peacefully live together and the game goes on forever (unless nature decides to intervene). But political rights have a bitter taste in this context. The happiness of the majority perpetuates the immense suffering of a minority.

Comparison with Hinduism

Intentionally or not, Rawls original position has an affinity to the Hindu concept of reincarnation. With respect to the term “veil of ignorance” (an allusion to the Sanscrit “avarana” or “veil of Maya”) it is allowed to speculate that Rawls was inspired by old Indian philosophy. Hindus imagine that a soul which descends into the body comes under the influence of cosmic delusion called Maya [Zimmer, 370]. Individual delusion or ignorance creates ego-consciousness.

Thus, when deluded and tempted by Maya the soul becomes the individual being which identifies itself with the finite body-frame and worldly objects (False Ego, Gurbani.org).

Rawls’ individual behind the veil of ignorance corresponds to a Hindu soul, waiting for incarnation.

Hinduism is reincarnation ethics, based on the knowledge of the sixth century B.C. Recent discoveries in biology have shown that a contemporary interpretation of reincarnation could bring the concept back to life. Ever since the close genetic relation between all sentient beings is known, compassion seems to be more rational and reincarnation less counter-intuitive. If the idea of individual souls waiting for reincarnation is replaced by the idea of the gene-pool, then nothing is left which couldn’t be reconciled with a scientific worldview. And if the genome can be modified by individual choices (as assumed by epigenetics) then the two concepts converge even more.

Cross Comparison

▪ Metaphor 1: The Casino

A gambler can only accept the risk of life because of lacking experience, i.e. a rational and experienced gambler retreats from a game which exposes him/her to the risk of traumatic suffering. The game of life continues because the experiences of the sufferers cannot be transferred to the happy people.

▪ Metaphor 2: The city of Omelas

In contrast to metaphor 1 the problem is not lacking information, but a silent agreement among the happy majority that the torture of a single person is tolerable. The game of life continues because the happy people deny any responsibility for the tortured person.

▪ Metaphor 3: The veil of ignorance

The value of the world is an aggregation of individual valuations. It is positive because the impartial representative doesn’t overrule the individual valuations.

Obviously two different methods of valuation are used:

▪ In metaphor 1 and 2 the impartial representative valuates the world directly.

▪ In metaphor 3 the impartial representative delegates the valuation to the individuals of the actual generation.

Metaphor 1 and 2 suggest a negative valuation of the world. In metaphor 2 it was mentioned, though, that most people modify the metaphors in such a way that they become life-friendly. In practice the world is valuated according to metaphor 3 and we are far from a consensus on risk-aversion. The search for universalistic intuitions is a topic of population ethics.

4. Population Ethics

The character of nature

“Is nature good or bad?”

The good and bad are produced by an interaction of the inanimate world, animals and humans. In this paper we make no distinction between the good and bad that is produced by human free will, morality and other categories. The result of the natural laws represents the character of nature. The character of nature shouldn’t be associated with a human character (as it is done in the Old Testament, where God is sometimes described as an austere and angry father). Insofar the question “Is nature good or bad?” is misleading. Nature is not a being and doesn’t have a purpose, a will or an intention.

In a universe of electrons and selfish genes, blind physical forces and genetic replication, some organisms are going to get hurt, others are going to get lucky, and you won't find any rhyme or reason in it, nor any justice. The universe that we observe has precisely the properties we should expect if there is, at bottom, no design, no purpose, no evil and no good, nothing but pitiless indifference [Dawkins, 80-85]

In this citation Dawkins (using the term pitiless) still ascribes a character to the universe. But from a distant point of view the universe is just as little pitiless, as it is compassionate; it is simply indifferent.

In population ethics we have to ask if nature is good or bad for humans. Humans are not only distant observers; they are engaged in nature, affected by nature and even part of nature. They are forced to take decisions and to estimate outcomes:

We shall have to make a serious effort to predict our actions’ effects on population, and to assign a value to those effects. In many cases, the factor we typically ignore—population—is likely to turn out the most important of all [Broome 2005, 411].

Is it possible to change the character of nature? Since humans are part of nature this question immediately leads to the controversial debate about free will:

▪ If there is a free will, then the answer seems to be “Yes” at first sight. But it may well be that humans (despite their free will) are unable to control the complexity of the system

▪ Without free will, the answer is “No”. But nature may change its character without human contribution.

For more information about this topic see Eine interdisziplinäre Betrachtung zur Willensfreiheit. In this paper we assume that there is a free will, which allows influencing the character of nature.

The value of the world

Are we competent enough to valuate the world?

▪ The term value of the world concerns the presently known world. There might be other forms of life on distant galaxies or secrets of nature that could change our judgment. But we have to make decisions here and now and cannot await the end of the cognitive process.

▪ Even if we are incompetent and we never disclose the mysteries of nature; we still have to make decisions. We can only choose to make decisions with or without reason. Reasonable decisions rely on the best available contemporary information.

In this paper we disregard aspects of the world that are not relevant for sentient beings.

In the absence of humans the world doesn’t reflect (moral) reasons. But as soon as humans exist, the world gets a normative dimension.

For humans the world is not normatively mute; it contains instructions how to think and how to act [Larmore, 35-36].

Wie gut oder schlecht ist eine Welt? Das hängt allein davon ab, wie gut oder schlecht es den Individuen in der Welt geht (…).

Und wie gut oder schlecht geht es den Individuen? Das hängt allein davon ab, wie wohl sie sich fühlen und in welchem Masse die Wünsche, die sie hegen, erfüllt sind [Wessels, 11].

How good or how bad is the world? That solely depends on how good or bad the individuals are in this world (…). And how good and how bad are the individuals? That solely depends on how well they feel and to what extent their wishes are fulfilled [Wessels, 11].

▪ We assume that the term “individuals” includes all sentient beings.

▪ If individuals are human beings, then we assume that the term good is a synonym for the term life satisfaction. Life satisfaction has an affective component (how well they feel) and a cognitive component (the fulfillment of their wishes).

So far it remains unclear, how the life satisfaction of the individuals should be aggregated into the “value of the world”. The kind of population ethics that stands in the tradition of classical utilitarianism assumes that life satisfaction is cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable (and therefore summable):

The good of all people at all times determines how good the world is overall [Broome 1999, 218].

The term at all times means that we have to add historical, actual and (estimated) future values. In implies e.g. that the potential of the actual population to cause an environmental disaster has to be taken into account in estimating the value of the world.

Criteria for valuation

With above assumptions (cardinality, comparability) the value of a population can be characterized by the following two parameters:

1. The number of sentient beings (past, actual and future)

2. The (weighed) welfare of these beings

See [Arrhenius]

What are the criteria for declaring a specific combination of welfare and population size morally better?

1. Can “betterness” be measured by the total welfare of a population as in classical utilitarianism, i.e. is it defensible to compensate the suffering of a minority with the happiness of the majority [Broome 2004, 199]?

2. Is it reasonable to radically refuse the compensation of major suffering, i.e. deny the world on the basis of a single tortured person as in negative utilitarianism (respectively in the Omelas metaphor)?

In classical utilitarianism the welfare of animals is out of consideration. Every individual has the same weight in the accumulation. But as soon as sentient animals are included the theory cannot disregard the weighing problem. In prioritarianism the welfare of each individual is weighed before aggregating it into total welfare. The weighing problem is at the core of the theory (see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice).

If we include animal welfare in total welfare then we are confronted with an even more complex form of population ethics. How many human sufferers of a certain degree weigh up the slightly higher suffering of an animal? If we knew that the suffering of the animal is comparable to the one of the humans, then we would have to give it an equal weight. There are, however, reasons to believe that the degree of human suffering is higher than the one of animals. If the suffering concerns the lack of resources, then this argument becomes even stronger. There is hardly a moral principle which allows animals procreating and expanding at the cost of humans. Since reproductive liberty is already contended within human rights it is even more questionable within animal rights. In the following investigation we will neglect this topic because it doesn’t change the characteristics of the problem. The characteristics of the problem are contradicting intuitions:

Impossibility theorem

Accumulating individual welfare into a total seems to be a manageable task. The problematic nature of these calculations only reveals, if the values of two populations are compared.

The size of a population has a certain value, but also the quality of life. What is “better”

▪ a slightly larger population with a slightly lower welfare or

▪ a slightly smaller population with a slightly higher welfare?

According to an impossibility theorem in population axiology [Arrhenius] there is no consistent set of criteria which satisfies the intuitions of the majority.

The intuitions are inconsistent because the underlying interests are inconsistent (see On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes in Population Ethics).

We are confronted with two competing concepts of the term “better” which both claim to be reasonable

1. It is reasonable to pursue happiness and avoid suffering: we call this hedonistic reason. According to hedonistic reason the slightly smaller population with a slightly higher welfare is preferable.

2. It is reasonable to survive and procreate (expand): we call this vital reason. According to vital reason the slightly larger population with the slightly lower welfare is preferable.

In the following we will investigate the conflict between these two kinds of reason:

5. Conflicting Reasons

Disclaimer

We do not investigate in this paper:

1. Reasons of autonomy (desires, projects, commitments and personal ties of the individual agent)

2. Reasons of deontology (claims of other persons not to be maltreated in certain ways)

3. Reasons of obligation (special obligations we have towards parents, children, spouses, siblings, fellow members of a community etc.)

[Nagel, 164-165]

Hedonistic reason

According to hedonistic reason happiness and suffering (respectively the concept of life satisfaction) decide about the value of a life. A life worth living corresponds to a positive value of life.

1) An impartial representative who advocates hedonistic reason should be highly risk-averse. For a justification of this normative claim see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering. The consequence of high risk-aversion in the Original Position is a negative sign of total welfare.

2) Lives worth living should be created because they increase the total amount of welfare (happiness). But lives worth living cannot be guaranteed and for a highly risk-averse representative the risk is too high. Even for non-Buddhists the empty world ends to be counter-intuitive, if suffering (or the corresponding risk) exceeds a certain degree. If major suffering could be removed (e.g. by a technological redemption like bioethical abolitionism), then the sign of total welfare might turn into positive territory and each new child would improve the state of affairs. But it is unreasonable to count on that.

Vital Reason

How does a community have to be organized, so that it survives in the competition with other communities (and accordingly provides the best chances to survive for each individual)? Although impartiality may contribute to the internal stability, it is not necessarily the answer. It is well possible that the members of an unfair community develop a higher Darwinian fitness than those living in a “just” community (who assigns a higher moral weight to suffering individuals). The most radical representation of vital reason is social Darwinism.

1) Individuals with a positive valuation of the world are the ones which are able to adapt and consequently the ones that should survive and procreate.

2) Social Darwinians wouldn’t accept a common goal like “maximization of total welfare”, because they consider the diversification of goals to be more successful in the struggle for survival. The value systems (world views) of individuals may be incommensurable.

3) Risk-aversion is an individual matter and shouldn’t be imposed on each and every individual. The decision about procreation (as well as the decision about voluntary euthanasia) is tied to an individual biography and cannot be understood from outside.

4) The value of a new child is measured by its contribution to the survival value of the community.

Some philosophers, such as Plato, have been unhappy that the higher self was trapped in a particular human life, and others, such a Nietzsche, have denigrated the role of the objective standpoint [Nagel, 223].

Nietzsche would have denigrated hedonistic reason but, by conceding the definition of value to the individual, he upgrades vital reason. Individualism is a normative claim (an ethical ideal) as well as collectivism; it originates in the biological utility function, which is an objective principle.

Comparison

Vital reason is a non-hedonistic view, but can be reinterpreted according to motivational hedonism (see Hedonism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Vital reason is risk-tolerant (with regards to suffering) whereas hedonistic reason is risk-averse.

Since the hedonistic system originally served survival and procreation, the result of hedonistic and vital reasoning is often the same:

1. The capability to feel pain is an efficient warning mechanism and indispensable for survival. It took a long way in evolution until it served some philosophers as an argument for hostility.

2. The hedonistic system originally encouraged the individual to behave life-friendly. The attempt to avoid all external risks by retreating from life increases the risk of psychosomatic illness. Risk-aversion concerns internal risks as well as external risks.

Following some cases where the result of hedonistic and vital reason is not the same:

1) Depression is always relevant for hedonistic reason. Not so for vital reason: The depression of isolated old people is irrelevant from a biological point of view.

2) Hedonistic reason supports voluntary euthanasia, vital reason denies it.

3) If population policy is left to the individuals (as maintained by vital reason), then risk-tolerant individuals tend to have many children and highly risk-averse individuals tend to remain childless. Risk-tolerant individuals accept the risk of major suffering whereas risk-averse individuals don’t. This evolutionary mechanism leads to a higher degree of suffering and contradicts hedonistic reason.

A major difference between the two types of reason concerns the handling of information:

1. If the ultimate goal is hedonistic, then all relevant information (in particular experience) has to be preserved.

2. If the ultimate goal is survival and procreation, then hedonistic information may be distorted, suppressed and annihilated.

The handling of information is only part of complete strategy as depicted in the table below:

6. The Battle of Interpretations

(Kampf der Deutungen)

Strategies

Each of the two basic kinds of reason (respectively interests) is able to interpret the world in a radically different manner (as lawyers do). The following table can be understood as strategies of lawyers or politicians, intending to discredit the opponents view.

Hedonistic reason

serving risk-aversion

Vital reason

serving survival and procreation

Metaphor 1

▪ attempts to pass the experience of the unlucky gamblers to the lucky ones

▪ attempts to preserve historical experiences

▪ suppresses the information about unlucky gamblers

▪ discards historical experiences which don’t serve survival

Metaphor 2

▪ makes parents (indirectly) responsible for the suffering in this world

▪ promotes compassion, extends the perception of the self

▪ denies any responsibility of the parents for the suffering in this world

▪ considers compassion to be a sign of

weakness, restricts the perception of the self

Metaphor 3

▪ attributes the competence for the valuation of the world to an impartial representative

▪ postulates that the impartial representative is risk-averse

▪ attributes the competence for the valuation of the world to the individual

▪ postulates that the impartial representative is risk-neutral

Axiologies

One of the most important strategies consists in conquering the interpretative predominance with regard to the definition of value (axiology).

1) In classical utilitarianism the negative welfare of the sufferers is compensated by the positive welfare of the happy people so that the result looks positive. The positive sign has a deep psychological impact and makes the philosophy life-friendly.

2) If happiness is devaluated relative to suffering then, at a certain point, total welfare gets a negative sign and the philosophy develops a hostile potential.

The following table shows some important secular ethics ordered by increasing hostility:

Theory	Priority of vital reason	Hostile potential
Social Darwinism	absolute	survival justifies any kind of suffering
Rawls’ Theory of Justice	very high	life-friendly individuals are protected by human rights
Classical utilitarianism	high	life-friendly, as long as the estimated total happiness exceeds total suffering
Prioritarianism	variable	the weighing function decides if the current situation or a future scenario is valuated negative
Negative utilitarianism	low	hostile, except if a future decrease in suffering compensates for actual suffering
Buddhism	very low	definitely hostile but non-violent, no belief in a future decrease of suffering
Eduard von Hartmann Ulrich Horstmann	zero	self-destructive

Social Darwinism is vital reason in its pure form. Then, with each step downwards in above table, the influence of hedonistic reason increases. Classical utilitarianism and Rawls’ Theory of Justice are just two of many concepts with a claim on rationality. All of them are in competition with regard to survival. The restriction of inequality by fair laws (respectively by the minimization of suffering) might produce an inefficient adaptation to a changing environment. The rationality of distributive justice stands against the rationality of (economic) survival.

Schopenhauer versus Nietzsche

1) We have associated the most radical representation of vital reason with social Darwinism. A worthy lawyer in this matter would e.g. be Friedrich Nietzsche.

2) According to above table a radical representation of hedonistic reason is Buddhism. A worthy lawyer in this matter would e.g. be Arthur Schopenhauer.

We summarize the two positions in a kind of closing statement, starting with hedonistic reason:

How would we call a regime that promotes the happiness of a majority at the cost of an (accidentally selected) tortured minority? We would probably call it an arbitrary government (Willkürherrschaft). If the happy majority agrees with the rule and the agreement is encouraged by means of misinformation, repressed information and threat of punishment (e.g. depression), then we would speak of a fascistic regime. We would also deeply distrust optimistic forecasts, in view of the suffering and injustice produced in the past. Buddhism (which attempts to reveal the true character of the system and pursues the path of liberation) takes the role of a resistance movement.

In the words of Schopenhauer:

"Look at this world of poor beings under the respect that they only exist for some time by devouring each other - and you will admit that a god who got the idea to change itself into such a world must really have been troubled by Satan." As the work of a demon it were "the worst of all possible worlds", hence any form of optimism had to be condemned as "not only absurd, but also as infamous thinking, indeed", as "bitter mockery of the nameless sufferings of mankind" (Structure and Dynamic of the Cosmos, Ludwig Ebersberger)

A representative of vital reason would turn this view upside down as follows:

How would we call a regime that permanently distributes depressing news in order to discourage people from survival and procreation? We would probably call it degenerated or even mentally ill. If a minority (of philosophers) imposes this world view on the majority by means of brainwashing we would speak of a totalitarian regime. We would also deeply distrust pessimistic forecasts, in view of the regimes notorious world-weariness. Nietzsche’s philosophy (which attempts to reveal the true character of the system and works on anti-depressants) takes the role of a resistance movement.

In the words of Nietzsche:

In summa: die Welt, wie sie sein sollte, existiert; diese Welt, in der wir leben, ist nur ein Irrtum, - diese unsere Welt sollte nicht existieren (…). Welche Art von Mensch reflektiert so? Eine unproduktive leidende Art; eine lebensmüde Art [Nietzsche 1885, 402]

Translation:

Summarized: the world, as it should be, exists; the world we are living in is only a delusion, - this (our) world should not exist (…).

What kind of people think like that? An unproductive, suffering kind; a suicidal kind.

Buddha versus Rawls

1. The priority of Rawls’ liberty principle is a clear commitment to vital reason. According to the principle of intergenerational impartiality each generation is free to valuate the world independent of the previous generations. The reduction of suffering is just one of many possible goals and may be pursued or dropped according to the actual generation’s priorities.

2. In contrast the Buddhist priority for hedonistic reason suggests that culture (in analogy to an individual’s life) should be a learning process. Emotional knowledge (experience) should be preserved (in order to improve ethical decisions) in much the same way as we preserve scientific and technological knowledge for the next generation.

Example:

1) Rawls’ theory is reluctant relative to a restriction of reproductive liberty (vital reason)

2) Monastic Buddhism promotes childlessness (hedonistic reason).

The two theories also disagree with respect to the use of violence:

1) Rawls (and many other political philosophers) think that ethics has to emerge out of a voluntary consensus among impartial contractors. Totalitarian systems tend to degenerate, even if they start with admirable intentions. However, the democratic consensus has to be defended by police forces, armies etc. if required. This is a clear commitment to vital reason.

2) The Buddhist principle of non-violence (ahimsa), in contrast, discards the will to survive and procreate.

7. The View of a Distant Observer

The descriptive view

The descriptive view is the view of a distant observer, an observer who should be free from interests. The term “free from interests” has to be handled with care, however:

1. the selection of a topic and the energy spent on its description reflect an interest

2. The capability to step back and look at the things from a distance helps to understand complex systems, whereas intuition is adequate (and above all quick) in manageable situations. There is no doubt, that originally the descriptive view with its search for realistic representations of the environment served survival and procreation as well as intuition. The usage for a different purpose (e.g. the reduction of suffering) is a kind of creative misappropriation and can be associated with the term Exaptation [Metzinger, 122].

Objective Risk

Estimations of welfare (e.g. in surveys on life satisfaction) include risk estimations. There are, however, reasons to believe that subjective estimations are distorted. The following distortions can be measured and are therefore called objective:

1) Natural and technological risks are systematically underestimated (see On the Perception of Risk and Benefit). Objective risk is measured by statistical data about accidents, natural catastrophes, illnesses etc.

2) Not only is the probability of damages underestimated, but also the physical or mental consequences. Risk-aversion increases with experience.

3) An increasing part of the population participating in surveys is influenced by drugs (tranquillizers, antidepressants, stimulants etc.).

Not only drugs, but also genuine (natural) happiness distorts perception by telling the individual that the risks are negligible or far away. Underestimated risks (partly due to insufficient experience) are the basis of unrealistic optimism. Unrealistic optimism leads to avoidable technological risks and overpopulation in situations where caution and self-restriction is indicated. If realism is not asserted by reason, then it is enforced by means of epidemics, wars, technological disasters etc.

Evolutionary perspective

From a descriptive point of view the survival value decides about the success of an ethical norm. The actual populations are simply those that have proved to be better with regard to survival value. On the other hand they also proved to be worse (than previous populations) with regard to suffering and risk.

1) A specific kind of population ethics is considered to be rational by the majority, if it corresponds to the risk-profile of the majority.

2) The population ethics of the majority is risk-tolerant because (in the course of evolution) it proved to have a higher survival value. In a competitive environment risk-averse population ethics succumbs to risk-tolerant population ethics.

For a detailed investigation of historical data and trends, see The Cultural Evolution of Suffering.

The valuation of the world

An empty world is a world without preferences, a world with absolute indifference concerning valuations. There is no ex ante preference for existence and consequently no regret about a possible but unrealized happy population. We cannot valuate the empty world without being part of the world. Under the assumption that there is a human observer, the denial or affirmation of the empty world simply reflects the preferences of this observer.

1. A happy observer prefers existence; a suffering observer may prefer non-existence.

2. A happy observer tends to use vital reason; a suffering observer tends to use hedonistic reason.

Both claim to act in accordance with a rational worldview. A distant observer, however, doesn’t care who is morally right or wrong, he/she just describes the battle of interpretations and its outcome.

Example:

The terms beautiful world and cruel world are inter-subjective valuations and serve a purpose:

1) Positive (optimistic) valuations serve the expansion of life

2) Negative (pessimistic) valuations serve contraction.

As mentioned above, most valuations are based on underestimated risk so that the world is seen too positive. As a consequence there is a tendency to expand life in situations where contraction is indicated. But the terms “too positive” and “contraction is indicated” are expressions of hedonistic reasoning. A distant observer dispassionately notes that unrealistic optimism is a successful strategy of life in order to maximize the replication of genes, despite of epidemics, wars etc. (with some exceptions where is leads to the extinction of a species).

In this paper we used a descriptive point of view so far, i.e. we didn’t take sides. Hedonistic reason, vital reason and their battle were seen from a distance.

There is one important component of ethics that is consequentialist and impersonal (…). Life is filled with basic pleasures and pains, and they matter. Perhaps other basic human goods such as health and survival have the same status [Nagel, 164-165].

Do they have the same status? We will now try to find arguments for a hierarchy of interests.

8. The View of an Impartial Representative

In contrast to the distant observer the impartial representative has to take decisions (about the definition of the common good, about the laws of the community etc.). Objective reason is the tool for taking these decisions. Since the impartial representative is driven by two conflicting interests (survival and hedonism) we could say that he/she suffers from an inner conflict. But we could also describe his/her situation by the one of a judge, who has to decide between two combating lawyers, one representing hedonistic reason and the other one representing vital reason.

Hedonistic reason

Following some arguments for subordinating vital reason to hedonistic reason:

1) The valuation of life on the basis of hedonistic reason is a typically human interrogation. Aristotle assigned a higher ethical level to those attributes, which distinguish humans from animals.

2) The example of voluntary euthanasia demonstrates that the value of survival can be measured within a hedonistic framework.

3) Objective reason should provide of complete knowledge, including emotional knowledge (experience). For an experienced impartial representative the avoidance of major suffering is the strongest interest, stronger than the will to survive (see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering).

4) In a situation of uncertainty about the future we have to anticipate the persistence of major suffering and cannot count on improvements.

Buddhist reason

Hedonistic reason often refers to decision theory and game theory (see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering). Buddhist reason is a special form of hedonistic reason insofar as it valuates the history and the future of the game:

1. Life is inseparably tied to suffering (First Noble Truth). All sorts of life-friendly ethics (including Christian love) perpetuate suffering. Evolution may be compared to a hamster wheel where the situation gets worse, the faster the creatures run (see The Biological Evolution of Pain, The Cultural Evolution of Suffering). It is therefore reasonable not to participate in such a process or to turn it backwards. If we turn it backwards far enough we return to the animal world and finally to an inanimate world. According to Buddhism non-existence (of the ego) is the best state of affairs, but emptiness is often associated with a spiritual form of existence, similar to the Hindu Brahman.

2. From the Buddhist perspective the creation of egos is simply a misconception. The suffering which is produced by the transience of the ego can only be alleviated by weakening the attachment to the ego. So why create an ego in the first place? Once the ego is created, its perception is deluded by the will to survive. To ask the actual generation if it valuates life positively is like asking an addict about his/her preference for drugs. Why should we create a state which forces us to interpret suffering in an endurable way?

Vital reason

Following some arguments for subordinating hedonistic reason to vital reason:

1. The will to survive and procreate originates in the biological utility function and is the most obvious sense of life. Intuitions which are driven by the biological interest associate non-existence with death. Death in turn is associated with coldness, darkness, loneliness, powerlessness, loss, deprivation, never-ending night etc. The horror of death corresponds to the strength of the attachments to the world. The Buddhist preference for non-existence is in complete contradiction to any natural intuition about the value of life.

2. We could subordinate hedonistic reason to vital reason because life creates and eliminates hedonistic systems. No matter what kind of ethics we denote as “rational” or “higher”, it is impossible to overrule the forces of evolution globally and long-term.

3. The knowledge and experience which is incarnated in hedonistic reason can only be passed to future generations by means of vital reason.

Objective reason

According to our definition objective reason has to decide between the two conflicting interests.

▪ The major argument against vital reason is that it tolerates a world where the degree of suffering increases.

▪ Even if the degree of suffering increases, hedonistic reason doesn’t have the power to destroy life.

It makes therefore sense to look for a symbiosis of the two interests which preserves the knowledge of hedonistic reason. The forms of symbiosis which are fit (in the Darwinian sense) cannot be found by analytical thinking, they have to be checked out in practice. It is the task of normative ethics to develop, launch and test such concepts.

Examples:

1) The tension between world denial and world affirmation is a characteristic of Hinduism. Monastic Buddhism (which developed out of Hinduism) represents hedonistic reason; laic Buddhism keeps the doctrine alive. This symbiosis managed to survive for more than 2500 years.

2) The most prominent example which is currently considered to be objectively reasonable is Rawls’ Theory of Justice. From the perspective of hedonistic reason the theory should be amended by additional risk-averse principles (see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice). But the struggle for survival decides about the moral weight of hedonistic reason. It is not even sure

a) if human rights are able to survive in the competition with totalitarian systems

b) if redistribution (the difference principle) is able to survive in the competition with more liberal societies.

9. Conclusion

Can the world be valuated by reason?

1. It is reasonable to survive and procreate (expand): we call this vital reason

2. It is reasonable to pursue happiness and avoid suffering: we call this hedonistic reason

Is nature (the world) beautiful and good (as postulated by Spinoza and Leibniz) or is it cruel and pitiless (as postulated by Schopenhauer and Hobbes)?

1) The view of hedonistic reason (serving the pursuit of happiness and the reduction of suffering)

b) A highly risk-averse representative assigns a negative value to the world.

2) The view of vital reason (serving survival and procreation):

An impartial representative who advocates vital reason delegates the valuation of the world to the individual. Diversification is more successful than universalism in this context.

3) The view of objective reason (serving both interests):

4) Descriptive view (empirical data):

a) Concerning vital reason: In the 20^th century humanity developed a potential for self-destruction.

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