Preferences and the Hedonistic Scale

Animal behavior is controlled by elementary biological preferences. Human behavior is controlled by a complex aggregation of hedonistic and non-hedonistic preferences, with or without the contribution of a cognitive process and a phenomenon called free will. The details of this process are investigated by cognitive psychology, personality psychology, social psychology, economics and ethics.

Type of problem

1. Are there lives not worth living?

2. Is there a preference for suffering?

3. Is there a dominant end in human behavior? Do people maximize their happiness?

4. Does the individual know best, what is good for him/her?

Result

1) There is a high probability that lives not worth living do in fact exist.

2) A preference for suffering can be explained by a non-obvious compensation. Non-obvious means

a) hidden or unconscious hedonistic compensation

b) satisfaction of non-hedonistic preferences (including the preference to exist under all circumstances)

3) Is there a dominant end in human behavior?

a) The Homo Oeconomicus is certainly an oversimplification. But it cannot be excluded that human behavior attempts to maximize life satisfaction. Life satisfaction is not merely an affective state, but includes a cognitive component.

b) Experience enforces risk-aversion. With increasing experience the dominant end tends towards the avoidance of extreme suffering.

4) Does the individual know best, what makes him/her happy?

An inexperienced individual cannot maximize his/her happiness. The appropriate knowledge has to be transferred by means of cultural tradition.

1. Introduction

Starting point

Type of problem

1. Are there lives not worth living?

2. Is there a preference for suffering?

3. Is there a dominant end in human behavior? Do people maximize their happiness?

4. Does the individual know best, what makes him/her happy?

2. Basics

2.1 The Hedonistic Scale

Suffering and Happiness

1. Suffering is a synonym for negative reinforcement, or punishment and tends to extinguish a certain behavior.

2. Happiness is the opposite of suffering.

This definition is adopted from The ethics of pain, by Richard Ryder. Richard Ryder uses the terms suffering and pain respectively happiness and pleasure as synonyms. For the purpose of this paper we can adopt this terminology. Ryder’s definition then conforms more or less with the following:

1. „...pleasure is an experience that one likes or that one wishes to continue on its own account.

2. Pain is an experience that one dislikes and wishes to cease.” [Shaw, 46]

1. Pleasure will here be understood broadly, to include all pleasant feeling or experience, such as elation, ecstasy, delight, joy, and enjoyment.

2. Pain will be taken to include all unpleasant feeling or experience: aches, throbs, irritations, anxiety, anguish, chagrin, discomfort, despair, grief, depression, guilt and remorse.

Ordinary language must be stretched to accommodate these broad usages (Hedonism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Degree of suffering

The degree of suffering or happiness is defined by a certain combination of intensity and duration. According to intensity the terms suffering and happiness can be differentiated as follows:

Direction / Intensity	Weak	Moderate	Strong
positive	serenity	joy	ecstasy
negative	pensiveness	sorrow	grief

High intensity normally correlates with short duration and vice-versa. The degree of happiness reached by long-lasting serenity can therefore be higher than a short moment of ecstasy. Conversely the degree of suffering endured by long-lasting depression can be higher than a short moment of horrifying pain. Concerning the assessment of pain and suffering see Utility and Suffering in Culture.

2.2 Preferences

Definition

There are two definitions of the term preference

1) In philosophy the term often (not always) means desire. Associated terms are interest, attachment, motivation, goal, reason to act etc. Desires are tied to emotions and control behavior. For a metaethical investigation see [Fehige].

2) In welfare economics (microeconomics in particular) and social choice the term defines a preference of ordering. The context is a choice between any variables that affect social welfare, mostly a choice between products or services.

Preference of ordering

1) Economists began to see people's well-being as consisting in the satisfaction of preferences or desires, the content of which could be revealed by their possessors. This made possible the ranking of preferences, the development of ‘utility functions’ for individuals, and methods for assessing the value of preference-satisfaction using, for example, money as a standard (Well-being, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Example: A consumer has a preference (desire) for apples. The same consumer also has a preference (desire) for oranges. As far as now, we use the term preference in the philosophical sense. If we now say that the consumer prefers apples to oranges, then we rank preferences. The ranking is a preference in the economist sense. It can be seen as a specification of the philosophical term in a concrete situation of choice.

2) Economics started in the 18^th century with cardinal utility, measuring the satisfaction from goods and services and then proceeded to ordinal utility, measuring preferences of ordering.

Today’s economists instinctively think comparative; philosophers seem not to (Ethics out of Economics, 9)

Completeness

1) In economics the assumption is made that the consumer is able to form an opinion about the relative merit of any alternative to a product or service. This assumption (which is called completeness) is questionable. In most applications there are infinite numbers of alternatives and the consumer is not conscious of them.

For example, one does not have to make up one's mind about whether one prefers to go on holiday by plane or by train if one does not have enough money to go on holiday anyway (although it can be nice to dream about what one would do if one would win the lottery). However, preference can be interpreted as a hypothetical choice that could be made rather than a conscious state of mind. In this case, completeness amounts to an assumption that the consumer can always make up their mind whether they are indifferent or prefer one option when presented with any pair of options (Preference, Wikipedia)

2) The term preference suites for cases where an actor has a choice between options. Why did (and still do) philosophers use the term as a synonym for desire? The answer is that wanting something involves an (implicit) choice.

Example: To prefer apples means

a) to want (like) apples

b) not to be indifferent with respect to apples

c) not to dislike apples

The three choices mentioned here form a kind of completeness. The hypothetical or unconscious choice between all sorts of fruit in economics corresponds to a specification of such a rough choice. In other instances (like the preference to exist) there is just one alternative, so that the philosophical definition matches the economical one.

Conclusion

We can interpret

1. the philosophical term preference (desire) as a rough preference of ordering

2. the economical term preference (preference of ordering) as a specification of the philosophical term.

Mostly the context discloses which interpretation makes sense.

2.3 Emotions

Definition

In the following an empirical basis is chosen for the classification of emotions. According to factor analysis emotions can be divided into four distinct groups which correspond to basic biological preferences. For each emotion which induces an offensive behavior, there is also an opposite emotion (see Emotions, Evolutionary Perspective, Wikipedia):

Offensive behavior

Preference	Weak Emotion	Moderate Emotion	Strong Emotion
explore	attentiveness	expectancy	anticipation
destroy	annoyance	anger	rage
retain, repeat	serenity	joy	ecstasy
accept	admission	welcome	incorporation

Defensive behavior

Preference	Weak Emotion	Moderate Emotion	Strong Emotion
stop moving	surprise	amazement	astonishment
escape	timidity	fear	terror
let go, avoid	pensiveness	sorrow	grief
reject	tiresomeness	dislike	disgust

Link to the hedonistic scale

The basic biological preferences serve the utility function of life, which is the replication of DNA (see God’s Utility Function by Richard Dawkins). Satisfaction of a preference induces positive reinforcement, frustration induces negative reinforcement. According to the definition in chapter 2.1 the term satisfaction therefore corresponds to happiness and the term frustration to suffering.

It is worth pointing out here that if one characterizes pleasure as an experience the subject wants to continue, the distinction between hedonism and desire theories becomes quite hard to pin down (Well-being, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).

But it adds to clarity if one speaks of different kinds of happiness and suffering, where each kind is characterized (colored) by the underlying preference (emotion).

1. Since the hedonistic scale originally serves survival, all basic biological preferences can be called hedonistic. From this point of view above tables are sophisticated descriptions of biological hedonism.

2. Biological preferences can be overruled by cultural ones. The most prominent example is voluntary euthanasia. Empirical research on relates the term happiness to specific cultural preferences (correlation factors), see The Economics of Happiness and World Database of Happiness.

We can imagine that in the course of evolution a very simple scale controlling a very simple behavior, differentiated into a more sophisticated scale, controlling a more complex behavior. But at its basis, the system still remains hedonistic and reinforces or disapproves a certain behavior.

Degree

Since frustrations and satisfactions are hedonistic events, the degree of a frustration or satisfaction corresponds to the hedonistic definition of the term degree in chapter 2. The intensity depends on the context (i.e. on the preferences involved). All emotions are context related. Every single event which produces emotions is embedded in a complex structure of preferences. The intensity of physical suffering is increased by preference-frustrations and reduced by preference-satisfactions:

1. If the context involves an additional source of suffering, the intensity is increased (example: pain caused by an injury may be increased by loosing social status)

2. If the context involves a source of happiness, the intensity is reduced (example: birth of a child)

The intensity of suffering is therefore the result of the following two factors:

1. Emotionality of the preferences involved: suffering is intense, if the frustrated preferences are related to intense emotions.

2. Compensation of the preferences involved: various preferences may be frustrated and possibly various others are satisfied by the same event. Decisive for the intensity is the net sum of frustrated and satisfied preferences, i.e. the result of an aggregation mechanism.

2.4 The Cause of Suffering

The first attempts to clarify the relation between suffering and preference-frustration go back as far as Buddhism. Preference-based ethics and hedonistic ethics are seen as two different aspects of the same phenomenon and not as opposing concepts. In chapter 2.3 we adopted this view by saying that preference-frustrations represent different kinds of suffering. But is it appropriate to say that the existence of a preference is a necessary condition for suffering? Is suffering caused by preferences as suggested in the Second Noble Truth of Buddhism?

Mind and body

It might be more precise to say that each sensory perception is interpreted by the brain using an internal context. The internal context activates specific preferences which are either satisfied or frustrated. Example: When a loud noise at night is due to the wind, people bother much less than when it is due to neighbors [Hirata, 17].

Since the interpretation goes as far as turning physical pleasure into mental pain and vice-versa it is also tenable to say, that suffering is caused by this mechanism. Examples:

1) Physical pleasure turns into mental pain: forbidden love

2) Physical pain turns into mental pleasure: masochism

The view that suffering is caused by preference-frustration is supported by the following arguments:

1. Suffering is always in a context. There is no suffering without interpretation; there is no objective physical suffering. The intensity of suffering is strongly influenced by this interpretation.

2. From an evolutionary point of view, preferences are the primary thing. Living beings without a pain-producing nervous system still have preferences. Preferences are necessary for survival. Pain mechanisms developed because they proofed to have an evolutionary advantage, they were caused by the preferences (in the course of evolution).

By associating the basic functions of life with the term preference ordinary language has to be stretched a little bit. We have to imagine that there are countless biological preferences which are not conscious for reasons of efficiency. They become conscious however, if the corresponding biological mechanism fails. Example: The preference for a smooth digestion becomes conscious, if we feel pain in the stomach.

Mind without body

How can phenomena like phantom pain be explained with above concept? Suffering without a function is interpreted by the brain as if it would have a function and related to the corresponding preferences. The interpretation can e.g. be that life is in danger where it is not. The cause of this kind of suffering is therefore an inadequate interpretation by the brain. The preference-frustration lacks a reference to reality, but is still decisive for the intensity of suffering. Insofar the situation is not much different from other cases of mental suffering without reference to reality.

Conclusion: Suffering without a cause is a misleading terminology. The suffering in question has a cause (preference-frustration) but the preferences activated by the brain are inadequate.

3. Preference Aggregation

3.1 Compensation

Accidental Compensation

Example: An unexpected headache

1) may put important projects in danger and therefore be experienced as a big misfortune

2) may be (partially) compensated by an advantage, e.g. having a good reason not to see the dentist.

If the individual discovers, that he/she can successfully avoid unpleasant meetings by headaches, then he/she may develop a (subconscious) preference for headaches. But in this case the compensation is not accidental any more; it has become the kind of compensation which is discussed in the next chapter.

Compensation by higher order preference

If compensation is not accidental, then it is related to a higher order preference which involves a combination of suffering and happiness. This kind of compensation can be classified as follows:

a) within the same person (example: work hard for a test)

b) across different persons (example: sacrifice for others).

a) synchronous (example: masochism)

b) diachronic (example: vaccination).

a) hedonistic (example: suffer for love)

b) non-hedonistic (example: suffer for justice).

The term utility can be associated with a higher order preference. Utility is

1. increased by those mental states which the person prefers to have

2. decreased by those mental states which the person prefers to avoid

Derek Parfit calls this concept preference hedonism [Parfit, App.I].

Example: Near the end of his life Freud refused pain-killing drugs, preferring to think in torment than to be confusedly euphoric. Of these two mental states, euphoria is more pleasant. A preference-hedonist claims that, since Freud preferred to think clearly though in torment, his life went better than under pain-killing drugs (Ethics, 3). The satisfaction of the higher order preference being able to think clearly compensates physical pain.

The preference to exist

It is obvious that different kinds and intensities of happiness and suffering cannot be added like natural numbers. Nevertheless the totality of all preference-frustrations and -satisfactions leads to a state which can be associated with a term like life satisfaction and can be expressed by a degree (see Moral Relativism and the Search for Happiness). The preference to exist can be regarded as a paramount preference, whose satisfaction compensates for all painful experiences. The preference to exist can be interpreted in a hedonistic or non-hedonistic way:

1. hedonistic: the joy of living

2. non-hedonistic: the will to live under any circumstances

The probability of compensation

Compensation (if not accidental) has to be estimated and is afflicted with a certain probability (risk). Bad estimations result in uncompensated suffering, i.e. in the frustration of the higher order preference (which is a combination of suffering and happiness).

Example: An overweight person decides for a diet in order to lower his/her blood pressure

The frustration involved in the diet precedes the happiness of becoming healthier. At the time the person takes the decision to go for a diet, the anticipated happiness can only be estimated.

This estimation can prove to be wrong for several reasons:

1. The anticipated medical effect might not take place; the blood pressure might remain constant.

2. The anticipated medical effect might take place, i.e. the blood pressure drops, but the anticipated increase in happiness does not occur.

Group compensation (justice)

Consider the following examples:

1. a member voluntarily sacrifices itself for the interests of the community

2. a member is sacrificed against its will to the interests of the community

So far we have only considered the first case. The question whether the interests of the community (family, nation, culture etc.) can compensate (outweigh, justify) the suffering of an individual is the subject of theories of justice.

In weighing preferences against each other it has to be considered that the emotions behind a certain preference and therefore its valuation varies across individuals. The difference can sometimes be expressed by numbers and sometimes only by the order of the preferences. The interpersonal comparison of preferences is a complex and controversial matter (e.g. Condorcet-Paradoxon). For more information on this issue see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice.

3.2 Uncompensated Suffering

The narrower sense

1) If all sources of compensation are exhausted, the person looses his preference to exist and enters a state which is characterized by the choice between evils. The person is tired of life, but suicide appears to be the even greater evil.

Definition: The term uncompensated suffering in the narrower sense corresponds to the frustration of the preference to exist. Fabian Fricke in Verschiedene Versionen des negativen Utilitarismus uses the term uncompensated suffering in this narrow sense.

2) The frustration that makes suicide possible is a state, where suicide becomes the smaller evil. The suffering necessary to commit suicide may be the worst kind of suffering one can imagine. But under certain premises (a weak preference for existence, availability of euthanasia) suicide may not be connected to the most intense feelings.

Conclusion: The term uncompensated suffering in the narrower sense does not necessarily indicate the highest degree of suffering.

3) The term uncompensated suffering in the narrower sense means that the individual considers his/her life not worth living. How reliable is such a statement?

a) There are some good reasons to consider such a statement as provisional. It doesn’t matter if the judgement is made due to the intensity of a single horrible event or due to a long-lasting combination of frustrations. Even in the latter case the individual may be able to compensate and later reach a state of happiness provided that his/her psychological immune system remains intact (see Stumbling on Happiness by Daniel Gilbert). An example for the extraordinary capability of humans to compensate (adapt) is given by Alexandr Solzhenitsyn in One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich.

b) Solzhenitsyn’s narration is not a parable of general validity. The Russian writer Warlam Schalamow e.g. considers Solzhenitsyn’s work to be forged by literary ambitions [Schmid]. In some cases the psychological immune system is destroyed irreversibly (analogous to an irreversible physical damage) or the remaining lifetime is not sufficient to compensate.

c) There are cases where the chance to compensate is practically zero, because it is known in advance that the individual will suffer from the beginning and his state will worsen. Example: severe cases of spina bifida.

d) The process of dying might (in some cases) be so horrible, that the final judgment turns into the negative.

In the first two cases the suffering individual can communicate the value of life from his/her inner perspective. In the other cases a communication is impossible and the inner perspective may be misjudged from outside. Nevertheless we can say that there is a high probability that lives not worth living do in fact exist.

Conversely if an individual valuates his personal life worth living this does not necessarily mean that he/she valuates life in general worth to be created. An individual, who is conscious of the risks, may realize that he/she was just lucky and prefer to remain childless.

The wider sense

The high-order preference to exist can be considered as a source of compensation for all kinds of low-order frustrations. But in daily life we are not aware of this mechanism. Unnecessary (senseless) frustrations are experienced as uncompensated suffering, whereas investments or sacrifices only hurt, if they later prove to fail. Failure is experienced as a loss of sense. For senseless frustrations we use the term uncompensated suffering in the wider sense.

Example: If a child is born dead, then the suffering of birth remains uncompensated, unless the mother is able to see a (religious) sense in whatever happens.

1) How is it possible to avoid uncompensated suffering if one doesn’t know in advance, if suffering can be compensated?

One must try to estimate compensation as well as possible. In case of a rational decision the action is only taken if the estimated chances outweigh the estimated risks. The risk is taken consciously (calculated risk). The following cases have to be distinguished:

a) It is known in advance that an action will produce suffering. Example: A person who decides for a vaccination assumes that the pain of the injection outweighs the suffering of a possible illness.

b) It is known in advance that behaviour is tied to a certain risk. Example: Excessive self-control implies the risk of depression

c) There is a choice between risks. Example: In the transportation of passengers there is sometimes a choice between public and private transportation. Private transportation is faster and more comfortable but involves a higher risk than public transportation.

Every individual has his/her own capability to compensate and therefore his/her own risk-profile.

2) How is it possible to know, if suffering isn’t useful or necessary to mature spiritually?

Consciousness of the “Condition Humana” (i.e. the unavoidability of accidents, defeats, aging, illness and death) occurs in every human sooner or later. But the processing of negative experiences is not necessarily positive in the sense of spiritual maturity. It can also lead to depression and suicide. Sometimes one cannot know in advance, if one succeeds with a positive interpretation of the events. To accept avoidable suffering under the assumption that it will contribute to spiritual maturity means to consciously take a risk.

Example: Everybody who knows the risks of a stroke has to think about the problem of a living will. Such a document gives directives to the doctors and nursing staff how they should proceed if the patient looses its capability to speak and to act. One cannot know in advance if the state of a complete paralysis contributes to spiritual maturity or if it represents a senseless (uncompensated) suffering. If one instructs the doctors to omit all measures which could prolong life, then one possibly regrets this instruction at the point in time of paralysis. The alternate risk consists in being kept alive artificially in a horrible state of suffering. There is no security, just the choice between risks.

Conclusion

The aggregation of preferences is a complex and poorly understood process. Seemingly incommensurable preferences have to be condensed into a single judgment like uncompensated suffering or net happiness. Under the assumption, that such a judgment can be made, the terms uncompensated suffering and preference-frustration can be linked as follows:

1. Uncompensated suffering in the narrower sense corresponds to the frustration of the preference to exist.

2. Uncompensated suffering in the wider sense corresponds to all kinds of senseless frustrations.

The wider sense includes the narrower sense.

3.3 Non-Hedonistic Preferences

Definition

Non-hedonistic preferences seemingly don’t contribute to happiness. Since the hedonistic system originally serves survival and procreation, non-hedonistic preferences cannot be explained on the biological level; they are a cultural phenomenon.

Examples: pride, honor, justice, progress, perfection, altruism etc

Non-hedonistic preferences are sometimes associated with the term higher cause. The classical example of compensation by a higher cause can be found in theodicy . If a non-hedonistic preference outweighs a certain degree of suffering then this degree maps it to the hedonistic scale. More precisely we have to speak of two different types of happiness (respectively suffering) that are balanced against each other.

Example 1: The non-hedonistic preference is the pursuit of truth

1. If a politician talks about unpleasant truths he may be voted out, i.e. he will have to suffer for his ideal

2. If pleasant lies bother the politician more than the loss of an election, then he compensates this loss with the value of his ideal.

Conclusion: The hedonistic value of the ideal (truth) corresponds to the degree of suffering caused by the loss of an election.

Example 2: The non-hedonistic value is to prove ones free will.

The hedonistic content of this seemingly non-hedonistic preference is revealed when an individual has to decide, how much misery he/she is willing to bear in order to prove his/her free will. At a certain degree of suffering, the interest to prove anything will fade away.

Sometimes I’m asked: "What if I don't want to be happy? What if I want to be miserable?”

Then I answer: "Be miserable - if that makes you happy!"

Andrew Matthews

This is an extreme example which shows, that even the non-hedonistic preference to be miserable can be mapped to the hedonistic scale. It is always possible to find a hedonistic interpretation for a seemingly non-hedonistic behavior. This is the point made by motivational hedonism.

Motivational hedonism

Motivational hedonism is the claim that only pleasure or pain motivates us. It is the most significant form of psychological hedonism.

Motivational hedonism will here be construed as the claim that (…) one is always and only motivated by the greatest balance of pleasure over pain for oneself; that is by maximization of the net amount or value of pleasure minus pain for oneself.

Any confirmed case of an individual being motivated by something other than pleasure or pain would refute motivational hedonism. Here are some standard candidates:

1. the soldier with no belief in the afterlife who opts for a painful death for himself to save his comrades

2. the parent motivated to give her or his child a good start in life

3. the walker motivated to kick a stone just ‘for the hell of it’

The standard response to such cases is to conjecture a suitably hedonistic rival motivational story.

1. Despite himself, the soldier was really motivated by the underlying belief that it would secure him a joyful afterlife, or at least a half-second's sweet pleasure of heroic self-sacrifice.

2. The parent was really motivated only by his own pleasurable intention to give the child a good start in life.

And so on. If one already accepts motivational hedonism, one might be convinced by such re-interpretations. They show that hedonist rival conjectures can generally be made, even when humans seem clearly to be motivated by other and more diverse things, but they do not show that the hedonist re-interpretations are the more plausible ones (Hedonism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Preference hedonism

In this paper we consider the hedonist re-interpretation to be more plausible because of our model of behavior. Behavior is driven by preferences, which are either satisfied or frustrated. Individual utility is

1. increased by those mental states which the person prefers to have

2. decreased by those mental states which the person prefers to avoid

Derek Parfit calls this concept preference hedonism [Parfit, App.I].

The satisfaction of an altruistic preference (e.g. the parent’s motivation to give the child a good start in life) combines pleasure for oneself with pleasure for others.

3.4 The Preference for Suffering

The subchapters of 3.4 correspond to those of chapter 3.1 in order to emphasize the role of compensation in the preference for suffering.

Combinations of suffering and happiness

A combination of suffering and happiness seems to be a preference for suffering, if the happiness is hidden to the external spectator

Example: masochism, Wikipedia.

Non-hedonistic preferences

A preference for suffering may help to satisfy a non-hedonistic preference.

Examples:

1) Abdication of the pleasures of life: The non-hedonistic value may be a suffering-oriented paramount sense of life. In a religion where suffering on earth can be compensated by eternal happiness in heaven or where the religious leader was a martyr, suffering may become a (subconscious) source of satisfaction.

2) There are patients which continue a psychoanalytical therapy although their suffering increases. The increase in suffering, which may be caused by the loss of a neurotic protection mechanism, is compensated by an increase in consciousness. Similarly the effort involved in the Buddhist way of living is compensated by insights gained in meditation.

The preference to survive

A preference for a specific kind suffering is required in a choice between evils:

Example: The preference to survive and expand (the biological goal to replicate DNA) as well as its suppression (the cultural goal to retire from life) produces suffering. Overruling (frustrating) the biological goal by a cultural one means to choose between different kinds of suffering.

The probability of compensation

A preference for suffering may be based on the hope for a later compensation. Since compensation is tied to a certain risk and to an individual estimation of this risk, the preference for suffering appears to be irrational for persons with different estimations.

Example: Suffering can be an enriching experience which contributes to a more empathic attitude or a kind of spiritual growth. The meaning of suffering is an individual matter and may not be revealed until much later. Nevertheless there remains a risk that suffering cannot be compensated till the end of life. Rational ethics (as opposed to religious ethics) refuses the thesis, that there is always a hidden sense in suffering.

Group compensation (justice)

Since humanity could theoretically cease to procreate, the preference of the majority to survive corresponds to the acceptance of suffering. From this point of view the survival of the majority justifies the suffering of the minority. For more information on this issue see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice.

Conclusion

A preference for suffering can be explained by a non-obvious compensation. Non-obvious means

1. hidden or unconscious hedonistic compensation

2. satisfaction of non-hedonistic preferences (including the preference to exist under all circumstances)

4. Model of Human Behavior

4.1 Homo Oeconomicus

Assumptions

Traditional economics uses a model of human behavior which is called Homo Oeconomicus. It is based on the following assumptions:

1. The conception of value: It is assumed that for a given individual and for any given set of alternatives there is always one best alternative that is determined by that individual’s set of preferences. This set of preferences is subordinated to a dominant end which corresponds to the Aristotelian idea of a summum bonum. In its most general form it doesn’t have to represent a clear concept like pleasure. By convention, economists have labeled this dominant end utility.

2. Behavioral determinism: It is assumed that behavior is determined by the motives behind the preferences. If the motives are known the decision can be calculated by an algorithm weighing the strength of the motives.

3. Utility maximization axiom: Assumption 1 and 2 are usually presented in one single axiom, the utility maximization axiom. It says that human behavior is completely determined by the motivation to maximize utility along a given set of preferences. This maximization procedure is called utility function. The axiom says something about the internal world of the decision-maker but it leaves open, if he/she has the information and the intelligence to match his/her preferences with the outside world. This matching procedure is the subject of the following assumption.

4. The rational anticipation hypothesis: This hypothesis says that people make rational decisions within the limits of available information. Rationality doesn’t require perfect knowledge and perfect foresight, but it requires an intelligent usage of the available information. A person who is caught at a radar post for the first time is called risk-tolerant but not irrational. If the same person is caught many times at the same radar post we tend to call such a person irrational (provided that the situation causes uncompensated suffering).

5. Rational utility maximization hypothesis: If we summarize the assumptions mentioned so far we get the rational utility maximization hypothesis. It simply states that people reasonably well maximize their utility. This is the basis for the claim in economics that each individual knows best what is good for him/herself

6. Hedonistic reduction: The term utility is an almost empty concept, if we don’t specify what the “dominant end” could be. Most economists conceptualize the dominant end as some form of hedonistic satisfaction or “psychic income”. Unfortunately the precise meaning is rarely specified and, even worse, the term utility is used for both, the abstract meaning dominant end and the concrete meaning happiness. The replacement of the abstract meaning dominant end by the concrete meaning happiness is called hedonistic reduction. Hedonistic reduction opens the economical theory of human behavior to empirical testing (whereas otherwise it would remain axiomatic or tautological).

[Hirata, 21-24]

Empirical findings

1. Conception of value: In empiric psychology it is frequently observed that minor modifications of the experimental settings lead to completely different results. If different elicitation procedures produce different orderings of options, how can preferences and values be defined? And in what sense do they exist?

2. Happiness maximization: Both survey data and experiments show that behavior systematically deviates from happiness maximization, both intentionally and erroneously. In particular people use socially established criteria of success which cannot be related to happiness and sometimes they account for moral considerations at the cost of subjective well-being. People decide based on rules, habits and gut feelings, none of which involve explicit predictions of future happiness. And sometimes they just take decisions mindlessly.

3. Rational anticipation: Various experiments have shown that people make systematic mistakes in predicting the importance of alternatives. For example they tend to overestimate the impact of almost any given aspect of life as soon as attention is drawn to it, an effect which is called focusing illusion. Similarly, people systematically overestimate their taste for diversity.

[Hirata, 24-26]

Homo reciprocans [Fehr, 845-859] competes with homo oeconomicus in being a realistic description of human behavior:

People do produce public goods, they do observe normative restraints on the pursuit of self-interest (even when there is nobody watching), and they will put themselves to a lot of trouble to hurt rule breakers (Homo Reciprocans, C.M.Shalizi)

4.2 Free Will

Volitional rationality

A crucial assumption of economical theory is that preferences are given, i.e. cannot be chosen by the individual. They are the purely deterministic result of genetic endowment, socialization, parental education and experiences in general. In other words people have no free will. The question of free will is analyzed in Eine interdisziplinäre Betrachtung zur Unfreiheit. In this paper we assume that people have basic biological preferences, but hat they are capable to chose cultural preferences (within the compatibilistic concept of free will).

When preferences aren’t given, the solution to the happiness maximization problem is undefined. Before an individual knows which course of action will make him/herself happy, he/she has to chose preferences. There are two basic alternatives:

1. Biological orientation: follow the given drives and impulses (instrumental rationality)

2. Cultural orientation: chose preferences by reason (volitional rationality)

The latter may include considerations of legitimacy, a quest for meaning, a quest for reality (see Experience machine) etc. Even a dominant end must be chosen from among numerous possibilities.

[Hirata, 28-29]

The paradox of hedonism

Indeed, the paradox of hedonism is, roughly, the claim that those motivated in favor of pleasure get less of it, and those motivated against pain get more of it (Hedonism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

The capability to choose favorable preferences is limited. Examples:

1. Motivated in favor of pleasure: The attempt to increase chances by choosing an “easy” life may end in satiation or in a permanent need for escalation.

2. Motivated against pain: The attempt to reduce risk by choosing a controlled life may produce a major depressive disorder and illness, so that the result is finally the kind of suffering, one wanted to avoid in the first place.

Unfortunately there are many kinds of happiness which only unfold in the absence of a pushing motivation, and many kinds of suffering which unfold despite the presence of an anxious motivation. The general hedonistic model is one of (unconscious) dynamic adaptation:

1. Volitional rationality can only attempt to influence this adaptation in long-lasting processes like education and training

2. If volitional rationality leads to depression, then the biological orientation has to be reactivated by similarly long-lasting processes (therapies).

Conclusion

Stable preferences describe an individual’s personality, volatile preferences allow flexible decisions. Preferences are embedded in complex networks which are partially stable and partially dynamic. Children are born with biological preferences which are then adapted to a specific cultural environment and modified by free will. Insofar people rather make than have preferences. But the modification of biological preferences is limited by the risk of mental illness.

4.3 Maximization of Utility

Expansion and contraction

What makes the difference between the maximization of preference-satisfaction and the minimization of preference-frustration?

1. If we consider a single preference, its satisfaction and the avoidance of its frustration is just a different view on the same phenomenon.

2. If we consider a hierarchy of preferences, then the frustration of a lower level preference may be desirable, as far as it serves the satisfaction of a higher order preference. But if the higher order preference is satisfied or if its frustration is avoided is the same thing.

The difference between the two strategies concerns the creation and elimination of preferences.

1) Expansive strategy

The abundant creation of new preferences is an adaptation to situations where preferences can easily be satisfied, i.e. where satisfaction is realizable with little energy. Each new preference increases the chances to increase satisfaction. The expansive strategy is limited by the environment. The lack of energy leads to the elimination of less important preferences.

2) Contractive strategy

The elimination of preferences is an adaptation to situations where preferences are difficult to satisfy. By this adaptation energy can be saved which in turn improves the chances to survive. Each eliminated preference diminishes the risk of frustration, i.e. there is a tendency for contraction. The contractive strategy is limited by the biological preference to survive and expand. Available energy leads to the reactivation of preferences.

Conflicting goals

Cultural demands are partially internalized so that we find a competition between biological and cultural preferences within the psyche (see Konkurrierende Lebensziele). The maximization of net happiness is a complex process consisting of

1) Maximizing satisfaction:

a) The direct satisfaction of preferences

b) The satisfaction produced by the elimination of preferences (liberation from responsibilities, painful attachments etc.)

c) The satisfaction produced by the creation of preferences (increase in power, influence etc.)

2) Minimizing frustration

a) The direct frustration of preferences

b) The frustration produced by the elimination of preferences (suppression of biological needs etc.)

c) The frustration produced by the creation of preferences (responsibilities, risky attachments etc.)

Risk

Since the development of the environment is unknown, an individual is always exposed to the risk of preference-frustration. Some risks are perceived in the same way by a vast majority and are therefore called objective. But basically the perception of risk is an individual matter. The adaptation is rational if it serves the goal (utility, dominant end) of the individual:

1) If the goal is to survive and procreate then a growth-oriented concept like Nicomachean ethics (with all its implied risks) is rational.

2) If the goal is to avoid frustrations then retreat-oriented concepts like the ones of Buddha or Epicurus (with all their missed chances) are rational.

Risk-averse ethics is as rational as risk-tolerant ethics as long as it serves the goal of the individual. Kinds of happiness which involve a high risk are given lower utility and vice-versa.

Maximin

Frequently, in game theory, Maximin is distinct from Minimax. Minimax is used in zero-sum games to denote minimizing the opponent's maximum payoff. In a zero-sum game, this is identical to minimizing one's own maximum loss, and to maximizing one's own minimum gain.

Maximin is a term commonly used for non-zero-sum games to describe the strategy which maximizes one's own minimum payoff. In non-zero-sum games, this is not generally the same as minimizing the opponent's maximum gain, nor the same as the Nash equilibrium strategy (Minimax, Wikipedia)

The Maximin criterion minimizes the maximum loss (respectively negative utility) and is therefore non-utilitarian. On the other hand it can be considered as an extreme case of Bayes: The more weight is given to the worst case, the more the maximization of utility converges to Maximin (A Drink from the Group, Livia Levine).

Harsanyi questions the Maximin criterion. He postulates that it is irrational to make your behavior dependent on some highly unlikely unfavorable contingencies, regardless of how little probability you are willing to assign them [Philosophisches Seminar, 20]

There are two objections to this claim:

1) Maximin may be plausible in cases where the probabilities are unknown. Harsanyi recommends to assume equiprobability in those cases [Philosophisches Seminar, 22]

2) Maximin may be plausible in cases where the loss is immense [Philosophisches Seminar, 21]

It appears plausible to argue that many rational people do not wish to gamble, especially if their lives are at stake. A small probability is not a sufficient criterion to take a deadly risk [Shrader-Frechette, 107].

This justification of Maximin however is misleading. We can only decide about rationality, if we know the goal of the concerned persons. The decision to take a deadly risk doesn’t identify the decision-maker as an irrational. Deadly risks are only irrational if combined with the goal to survive at any price.

There is an asymmetry between happiness and suffering (see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice). It is therefore plausible to assume that experience enforces risk-aversion with regard to suffering. With increasing experience the dominant end of human behavior tends towards the hedonistic Maximin and may finally even overrule the will to survive (e.g. in voluntary euthanasia).

Conclusion

Human behavior is a dynamic adaptation to (volatile) internal and external demands. Despite of this complexity it is possible that humans

(in the long-run) attempt to maximize utility, at least as long as we interpret utility with life satisfaction (as in the Eurobaromenter and World Values Survey). Life satisfaction contains culturally stamped kinds of happiness and a cognitive component.

4.4 Rational Anticipation

Distorted perception of chances

The perception of risk may be distorted, not only by an individual, but also by the majority of people. The standard example for a distorted perception of chances is the expected relation between income and happiness:

When the whole society becomes richer, nobody seems to be any happier. People compare their income with some level of expectations. That level moves up with actual income. The reason is habituation and rivalry.

Income and Happiness, Rethinking Economic Policy.

To escape from this mechanism requires insight into the functioning of the biological utility. To chose a cultural utility means to decide for a different kind of happiness (respectively suffering). For more reflections on this issue see Moral Relativism and the Search for Happiness.

Distorted perception of risk

There is reason to believe that risk is systematically underestimated, see

1. On the Perception of Risk and Benefit

2. The Procreation of Risk

How can risk be reduced?

1. If suffering is caused by preference-frustration (chapter 2.4), then it can also be reduced by preference-elimination. Preference-elimination however frustrates the biological drive to unfold and expand and causes suffering as well. For the latter reason most people prefer a life with highs and lows (i.e. high volatility) to a dull life. High volatility correlates with high intensity. The different kinds of happiness which result from different levels of intensity are depicted in chapter 2.1.

2. Things would look different if preferences could be eliminated without suffering so that the highs wouldn’t be missed. This is more or less the vision of the Buddhist philosophy; see On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes in Population Ethics.

5. Conclusion

1) There is a high probability that lives not worth living do in fact exist.

2) A preference for suffering can be explained by a non-obvious compensation. Non-obvious means

a) hidden or unconscious hedonistic compensation

b) satisfaction of non-hedonistic preferences (including the preference to exist under all circumstances)

3) Is there a dominant end in human behavior?

b) Experience enforces risk-aversion. With increasing experience the dominant end tends towards the avoidance of extreme suffering.

4) Does the individual know best, what makes him/her happy?

An inexperienced individual cannot maximize his/her happiness. The appropriate knowledge has to be transferred by means of cultural tradition.

References

1. Fehige C. and Wessels U. eds. (1998), Preferences, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter

2. Fehr Ernst, Gächter Simon (1998), Reciprocity and Economics: The economics implications of Homo Reciprocans, European Economic Review 42

3. Hirata Johannes (2004), Happiness and Economics

4. Parfit Derek (1984), Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford

5. Philosophisches (2005/06), Seminar der Universität Zürich, Elemente der Risikoethik, Wintersemester

6. Schmid Ulrich (2007), Am Kältepol der Grausamkeit, NZZ Nr.149, B1

7. Shaw, W.H. (1999), Contemporary Ethics – Taking Account of Utilitarianism, Malden (Mass.) und Oxford

8. Shrader-Frechette Kristin (1991), Risk and Rationality, Philosophical Foundations of Populist Reforms, Berkeley: University of California Press