Negative Utilitarianism and Justice
by Socrethics
First version 2006 Last update 2009
|
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. Justice 2.1 Definition 2.2 Social Contract Theory 2.3 Impartiality 2.4 Rawls’ Principles 2.5 Comparison with Classical Utilitarianism 2.6 Comparison with Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism 3.1 The Asymmetry of Pain and Pleasure 3.2 Compassion 3.3 Original Negative Utilitarianism 3.4 Moderate Negative Utilitarianism (NU) 3.5 Implementation 4. Rawls’ Theory Compared with NU 4.1 Human Rights and the Higher Purpose 4.2 Economical Welfare 4.3 Non-Contractual Cases 4.4 Intergenerational Impartiality 5.1 Metaphor 5.2 Synthesis of Rawls’ Theory with NU 6. Conclusion
|
|
Abstract
Starting point The goal of this paper is to find a concept of justice which is inspired by negative utilitarianism but avoids its theoretical weaknesses.
Type of problem How can the following theoretical weaknesses of negative utilitarianism be removed without denying its ethical goal: 1. the zero-tolerance with regard to suffering, which makes it impossible to construct a theory of welfare 2. the possible priority of quantity over quality (many persons with minor suffering can outweigh a few persons with major suffering) 3. the lacking protection of human rights, allowing to sacrifice individuals to an ethical goal which they do not support
Contractualist view Rawls’ Theory of Justice is the concept which comes closest to the intentions of negative utilitarianism without adopting its deficiencies. 1) Human rights can be considered as empirically found safeguards against some of the worst kinds of suffering. 2) The Leximin rule guarantees that the quantity of suffering doesn’t overrule the quality. 3) Human rights guarantee, that individuals cannot be sacrificed to an ethical goal which they do not support.
Negative utilitarian view From the negative utilitarian point of view Rawls’ theory has the following deficiencies: 1) Sentient beings which are not able to actively participate in a social contract remain unprotected 2) Even in a political system of perfect fairness suffering could be immense. Rawls principle of intergenerational impartiality allows such a state to persist. An ethical ideal should include a long-term vision of improvement, using technological progress and population ethics as a means to reduce suffering.
Risk point of view 1) Human rights (although they prevent some of the worst kinds of suffering) are life-friendly and risk-tolerant. 2) Intergenerational impartiality preserves human rights (and hence the corresponding risks). 3) The difference principle is risk-averse (expressed in terms of economic welfare) In other words: Rawls’ concept assumes that the decision-maker in the original position unconditionally tolerates (extreme) suffering in order to survive. Negative utilitarianism makes this tolerance dependent on the future prospects: In a pessimistic scenario negative utilitarianism promotes childlessness in order to avoid suffering.
Synthesis The synthesis of the two concepts would be a social contract of the Rawls’ type whose contractors commit to risk-aversion. Such a society would consist of 1. optimistic adherents of risk-aversion like abolitionists and transhumanists 2. pessimistic adherents of risk-aversion like Buddhists and antinatalists In such a society 1) The interests of non-contractual cases would be represented by contractors. 2) The principle of intergenerational impartiality would be replaced by a risk-averse principle 3) The risk-tolerance in the technological sector would be questioned.
The term contemporary reincarnation ethics catches the essence of the concept but will be avoided, because the term reincarnation is tied to the concept of an individual soul and causes a corresponding confusion.
|
1. Introduction
Starting point
The goal of this paper is to find a concept of justice which is inspired by negative utilitarianism but avoids its theoretical weaknesses.
Type of problem
How can the following theoretical weaknesses of negative utilitarianism be removed without denying its ethical goal:
1. the zero-tolerance with regard to suffering, which makes it impossible to construct a theory of welfare
2. the possible priority of quantity over quality (many persons with minor suffering can outweigh a few persons with major suffering)
3. the lacking protection of individual rights, allowing to sacrifice individuals to an ethical goal which they do not support
2. Justice
2.1 Definition
Justice concerns the proper ordering of things and persons within a society.
1) John Rawls claims that "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is for systems of thought”.
2) Justice can be thought of as distinct from and more fundamental than benevolence, charity, mercy, generosity or compassion.
3) Being treated fairly satisfies a basic need (…). Inequality aversion may not be uniquely human; ideas of fairness and justice may be instinctual in nature.
(Justice, Wikipedia)
1) Distributive justice concerns what is just or right with respect to the allocation of goods in a society.
2) Retributive justice is concerned with punishment for wrongdoing,
For a short description of the main theories see Justice, Wikipedia
This paper concentrates on justice as fairness and welfare maximization within distributive justice.
2.2 Social Contract Theory
Definition
Social contract theories are theories on mutual benefit through cooperation.
1) Contractarianism, which stems from the Hobbesian line of social contract thought, holds that persons are primarily self-interested, and that a rational assessment of the best strategy for attaining the maximization of their self-interest will lead them to act morally (where the moral norms are determined by the maximization of joint interest) and to consent to governmental authority. Gauthier, Narveson, or Buchanan are Hobbesian contractarians.
2) Contractualism, which stems from the Kantian line of social contract thought, holds that rationality requires that we respect persons, which in turn requires that moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person. Thus, individuals are not taken to be motivated by self-interest but rather by a commitment to publicly justify the standards of morality to which each will be held. Rawls or Scanlon are Kantian contractualists
(Contractarianism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
The Kantian tradition (which is favored in Rawls’ theory) derives its principles from a balance (reflective equilibrium) of self-interest and compassion. In reality social contracts may primarily be shaped by self-interest, but Rawls’ theory is normative and not descriptive. The goal is to establish an ethical ideal against which social contracts can be measured.
Rationality
Rationality is a central principle in artificial intelligence, where a rational agent is specifically defined as an agent which always chooses the action which maximizes its expected performance, given all of the knowledge it currently possesses (Rationality, Wikipedia)
The economist’s definition of rationality is analogous to the one of artificial intelligence:
The choice of an individual is rational, if it maximizes his/her utility under the given level of cognition.
Whether Kant neither Rawls claim that human behavior can be described by rationality. The claim is only that rationality has a normative force in defining ethical goals. Rationality is a possible common denominator to overcome the cultural diversity of ethical norms.
In above definition of rationality the definition of utility is an individual matter. But an individual definition of utility is not equivalent to egoism. It may imply altruistic preferences as well as egoistic ones.
Preferences and Cognition
According to above definition, the rationality of a decision can only be judged as far as the preferences and the cognition of the decision-maker are known. From this point of view preferences and cognition are of prime importance, rationality is a means to an end.
1) Biological level
Kant’s statement that “the individual is an end and not a means” has a biological root, see The Selfish Gene by Richard Dawkins.
2) Cultural level
It is unknown if the biological utility function is overruled by cultural laws in the long run, see Utility and Suffering in Culture. A law on the cultural level might be the proliferation of competing memes. Contractarians promote the idea (meme) of rational cooperation and hope to establish this concept as a common preference.
Contractarians claim that moral principles derive their normative force from the idea of contract or mutual agreement. They are thus skeptical of the possibility of grounding morality or political authority in either divine will or some perfectionist ideal of the nature of humanity (contractarianism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
2.3 Impartiality
Definition
What moral impartiality requires is not that everyone receives equal treatment, but rather that everyone be treated as an equal [Dworkin, 227].
Origin
1. Kant's categorical imperative is the best known definition of an impartial moral law. But the idea of moral impartiality is much older and can be found in many religions under the term “Golden Rule” or “ethic of reciprocity. It has been speculated that empathy may lie behind the prevalence of the Golden Rule.
2. Ancient Stoic-Skeptic tradition made a significant impact on the most prominent ethical theory of modern Europe – i.e. on Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy. The Kantian Hellenistic ideal (originating, in my view, from the more profound and more systematic ethical teachings of the Buddhist India) has partially become apparent through Scheler’s criticism of this famous philosopher [Vukomanovic, 167]
Impartial contract
A contract is impartial, if the principles
1) apply equally to all contractors
2) are defined in such a way as to equally benefit all contractors
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Alex Scott
Contractors are supposed to be guided by rationality.
Equal treatment of all contractors means that the principles do not depend on
1) the specific interests (preferences) of a single contractor or a group of contractors
2) temporary circumstances
Rationality
The following reflections correspond to contractualism, the Kantian tradition within social contract theory (see contractarianism):
1) Rationality requires that we respect persons (because otherwise they will not respect us either). One could say that it is only rational to respect strong persons, but everybody can become weak one day (e.g. by illness, accident, age etc.).
2) Respect requires that the moral principles must be such, that they can be justified to each person involved (not only the majority). Why? The disrespect of a minority has the consequence, that the minority disrespects the law. This in turn undermines the stability of society.
3) Addressing each person means that the moral principles
a) must be publicly justified (duty to inform)
b) require mutual agreement (duty to ask for consent)
c) have to be laid down in a contract (to avoid misunderstandings and one-sided changes)
4) The chances to justify the moral principles to each person and reach mutual agreement are improved, if the principles are impartial.
5) A strong argument for impartiality is the close genetic relation between all humans, see Human Genetic Variation. A gene consists on an average on 3000 base pairs. Approximately 99.5% of all base pairs are equal in all humans. If the phenotype could reflect the 99.5% identity of the genotype then all humans would look like identical twins in different stages of their life. One might argue that the quantitative congruence of genes is an impermissible simplification and that the individual cannot be reduced to its genes. Even if the genetic differences are tiny, the personalities that develop out of these differences may be completely different. This however is only a valid argument against equality but not against impartiality. Moral impartiality doesn’t claim that humans are equal; it claims that humans should be treated equally before the law. The qualification for this treatment is independent of the tiny genetic differences between individuals.
Conclusion
Rationality leads to impartiality under the following conditions:
1) as long as cooperation leads to mutual benefit, it is rational to cooperate
2) as long as cooperation is improved by impartiality, it is rational to be impartial
The idea of an impartial contract fulfils the requirements of rational cooperation as opposed to
1) divine will
2) some ideal of the nature of humanity
3) benevolence or sympathetic human sentiment
See contractarianism, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:
The impartial spectator
Some of the most important normative approaches are based on the idea of an impartial spectator. The idea was first mentioned by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments and later taken up by Harsanyi and Rawls.
1. In his Theory of Justice Rawls used the following thought experiment to derive the conditions of an impartial contract: A contract is impartial, if it is derived from an original position in which rational contractors under a veil of ignorance decide how they wish to commit themselves to being governed in their actual lives (Justice as a Virtue, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Behind such a veil of ignorance all individuals are specified as rational, free, and morally equal beings. Behind the veil of ignorance, what will the rational choice be for fundamental principles of society? The only safe principles will be impartial principles, for you do not know whether you would suffer or benefit from the structure of any biased institutions.
2. Rawls called his concept Justice as fairness. Justice in a strict sense would include equality of opportunity in all aspects of life. Fairness is not equivalent to justice, but represents a practicable benchmark for existing political systems.
Buchanan’s anarchistic equilibrium
Buchanan’s theory questions the role of the impartial spectator in establishing a social contract. There is no unique interpretation of the impartial spectator. Is he/she risk-tolerant or risk-averse? The concept attempts to circumvent the problem of incomparable individual utilities, but now the problem reappears in the ambiguous characteristics of the spectator. Buchanan replaces the veil of ignorance by an anarchistic equilibrium, where people with different preferences overcome anarchy by a social contract. Depending on the social status of an individual, the preference for such a contract is stronger or weaker. The propagation of a universal solidarity and compassion can e.g. be interpreted as a strategy of the infirm (Nietzsche) or the strategy of people who have lost their family and seek a replacement. Redistribution can only be justified by the interests of the social partners. The wealthy part of the population is willing to pay a price for stability. Courts are obliged to strict neutrality and have no competence in defining justice (Ökonomische Ethik, Roland Vaubel).
Comment: Buchanan’s concept is rather descriptive than normative; it lacks the constituents to construct an ethical ideal.
2.4 Rawls’ Principles
Well-being has several dimensions, some of which can be influenced, whereas others can’t. Rawls Theory of Justice restricts the investigation to those dimensions that can be influenced.
Definition
1) Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
2) Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
a) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and
b) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle
(Distributive Justice, Wikipedia)
Priorities
The principles are ordered in lexical priority as follows:
1) The liberty principle: The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (i.e., to vote and run for office); freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest. It is a matter of some debate whether freedom of contract can be inferred as being included among these basic liberties.
2) The arrangement of social and economic inequalities:
a) The principle of fair equality of opportunity requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed.
b) The difference principle strives for the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society.
Theory of Justice, Wikipedia
The liberty principle, although not explicitly mentioned above, also includes the protection of the citizen’s physical integrity.
(1) and (2a) are concerned with unquantifiable values, whereas (2b) is accessible to quantitative theories. The rationality of the difference principle is investigated within the framework of game theory, see chapter 2.6
Human rights
According to Rawls above the principles are a prerequisite for rational thinking minorities to participate in a social contract. Rights theorists demand that (1) and (2a) include all preferences which are subsumed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By assigning lexical priority to human rights they become a side constraint for every theory that seeks a quantitative optimization of the state of affairs.
Capitalism
A social contract based on human rights is compatible with capitalism and produces social and economic inequalities. Adam Smith, claims that, in capitalism, an individual pursuing his own good tends also to promote the good of his community, through a principle that he called “the invisible hand”. Experience has shown however that the “invisible hand” cannot protect many people from starving and that free markets have to be complemented by (2b).
Example
The essence of Rawls’ principles can be found in the Preamble of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Federation:
“Only those remain free who use their freedom and
the strength of a people is measured by the welfare of the weakest of its members.”
2.5 Comparison with Classical Utilitarianism
The following comparison is restricted to the economic aspect of welfare, represented by the difference principle.
Rawls’ difference principle
Rawls second principle of justice holds that differences in wealth, status, etc. can be defended only if they create a system of market forces and capital accumulation whose productivity makes the lowliest members of society better off than they would be under a more egalitarian system. The difference principle is the safest principle (Justice as Fairness, by Charles D.Kay) and corresponds to a risk-averse strategy (Rawls Unrisky Business, by Jim Holt). Its implementation though is far from trivial:
1. Maximin interpretation:
If agents (A, B) can have incomes (5, 6) or (4, 9) then the former distribution has to be chosen.
Maximin encounters the following problem: If agents (A, B, C) can have incomes (5, 6, 9) or (5, 7, 8), then Maximin is indifferent
2. Leximin interpretation (not to be confused with the lexical priority of human rights):
If agents (A, B, C) can have incomes (5, 6, 9) or (5, 7, 8) then the latter distribution has to be chosen. The second worst-off decides. If B’s income is the same in both distributions, then C’s income decides etc.
Leximin encounters the following problem: If agent A’s income is minimally higher in the second distribution and the income of B and C considerably lower, then the first distribution has to be chosen. This consequence is called dictatorship of the worst-off (see The Difference Principle).
For more interpretations see
1. Who are the least advantaged?, by Bertil Tungodden and Peter Vallentyne
2. Rawls Differenzprinzip und seine Deutungen, by Peter Koller, Zeitschrift Erkenntnis, Vol.20, No.1, 1983
In order to compare Rawls’ difference principle with the one of classical utilitarianism, we have to map it to a welfare function:
Economic welfare function
For a better understanding of the term welfare function see Introduction to Welfare Economics.
A welfare function according to Bentham sums the utility of each individual in order to obtain society's overall welfare. All people are treated the same, regardless of their initial level of utility. One extra unit of utility for a starving person is not seen to be of any greater value than an extra unit of utility for a millionaire. At the other extreme is the Maximin welfare function (see above). According to the Maximin criterion, welfare is maximized when the utility of those society members that have the least is the greatest. No economic activity will increase social welfare unless it improves the position of the society member that is the worst off. Most economists specify social welfare functions that are intermediate between these two extremes. The social welfare function is typically translated into social indifference curves.
The intermediate form of social indifference curve can be interpreted as showing that as inequality increases, a larger improvement in the utility of relatively rich individuals is needed to compensate for the loss in utility of relatively poor individuals (Welfare economics, Wikipedia)
Is the difference principle compatible with the classical utilitarian principle of marginal utility?
Rawls’s objection is of course that utilitarianism does not protect the claims of the most deprived from being set aside in favor of greater benefits to other, better off, social groups. But this argument is disputable: utilitarians will argue that given the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, the goal of maximizing average welfare will direct a society to prioritize improvements in the situation of the most deprived. And when one considers the detail of Rawls’s proposed policies for implementing his difference principle, it is hard to see anything incompatible with the implications of an
enlightened utilitarianism (Questions of Justice).
Indifference curves are a means to compare concepts of distribution but we lack a rational criterion to select a specific distribution out of the many possible ones. Such a criterion can be found by applying game theory:
1. An impartial spectator in the original position considers inequality as a risk, which has to be properly weighed in order to attain the best state of affairs.
2. The application of game theory (a well as the utilitarian welfare function) presupposes that utility can be measured on a cardinal scale and that it is amenable to an interpersonal comparison (see Wohlfahrtstheorie)
In the following we compare Rawls’ difference principle with the major competing theory of Harsanyi
2.6 Comparison with Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism
The following comparison (as well as the one of chapter 2.5) is restricted to the economic aspect of welfare, represented by the difference principle.
Consequentialism
Historically, hedonistic utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is the aggregate happiness, i.e. the happiness of everyone and not the happiness of any particular person (Consequentialism, Wikipedia)
Why should we subscribe to consequentialism?
An argument for consequentialism is contractarian. Harsanyi argues that all informed, rational people whose impartiality is ensured because they do not know their place in society would favor a kind of consequentialism. Broome (1991) elaborates and extends Harsanyi's argument (Consequentialism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
This argument is of special interest in our context because is reveals that the common denominator of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism and Rawls’ Theory of Justice is contractarian.
Harsanyi’s equiprobability model
Harsanyi’s equiprobability model (Gleichwahrscheinlichkeitsmodell) uses the following definition of impartial decisions:
1. The impartial spectator is an individual within society.
2. After every decision influencing or changing society this individual can find himself with equal probability in every possible position in the changed society.
3. Risk is defined as a product of utility and (mathematical) probability. The expected value of a decision is calculated by adding all possible risks.
Harsanyi [1975] refuses Rawls risk-averse strategy, claiming that it is irrational to make behaviour dependent on some highly unlikely unfavourable contingency regardless of its low probability. He recommends not to base decisions on the worst case but on the Bayesian maximization of utility. Rawls in contrast is convinced that the rational choice of an individual behind the veil of ignorance is the Maximin strategy. He considers risk-aversion to be “normal” under the circumstances of the veil of ignorance. “Normal” in this context means that risk-aversion is compelling because of the cruelty of the risks involved.
For a definition of the term risk see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering.
For a comparison of Rawls’ and Harsanyi’s concepts in the context of a tax system, see Das Maximin-Prinzip von John Rawls, by Jörg Franke
Prioritarianism
Prioritarianism corresponds to the intermediate social welfare function mentioned in chapter 2.5.
The maximin principle can be viewed as an extreme version of prioritarianism (Prioritarianism, Wikipedia)
The more weight is given to the worst cases, the more the maximization of utility converges towards the Leximin and Maximin principle (A Drink from the Group, Livia Levine). A possible approach to implement this convergence is the use of Prioritarian Welfare Functions. Different functions correspond to different kinds of risk-aversion.
Some theorists have developed a justification of prioritarianism, based on risk aversion in the original position [Atkinson / Stiglitz, 340; Hurley, 368-382]. This justification is based on the Rawlsian [1958], Harsanyian [1955] framework of an impartial decision, operationalized via a hypothetical ignorance of one's proper qualities and position in society so that the decider may end up in everybody's skin. Harsanyi has argued that in such a situation one should consider the various possibilities as equiprobable and treat them risk-neutrally; this then leads to utilitarianism. Rawls has argued that in such a situation of uncertainty the maximin criterion for rational decisions should be applied. Prioritarians have criticized both justifications: Maximin (or leximin) is equivalent to infinite risk aversion, which seems to be nearer to paranoia than rationality, and Harsanyi's risk-neutrality is not rational either. The right maxim in such situations is moderate risk aversion, which together with the framework's assumptions leads to prioritarianism as the impartial and morally just welfare function (Prioritarian Welfare Functions, 32)
Rationality
The rationality of the difference principle is still a controversial issue; see Revisiting Rawls by Erik Anger. But Harsanyi’s equiprobability model and prioritarianism are only two of many competing concepts. All of them are finally in competition with regard to survival value. The restriction of inequality by fair laws might produce an inefficient adaptation to a changing environment. In this case the rationality of distributive justice stands against the rationality of (economic) survival.
Conclusion
The classic expositions of Harsanyi and Rawls produce a synthesis that is consistent with the modern theory of non-cooperative games, see Game Theory and the Social Contract. From a game theoretical view Harsanyi’ utilitarianism is compatible with the difference principle according to Rawls. The (risk-tolerant) Bayesian maximization of utility converges towards Rawls’ (risk-averse) Leximin principle, if the weight of the worst cases increases.
3. Negative Utilitarianism
Negative utilitarianism combines Rawls’ risk-aversion with utilitarian empathy.
3.1 The Asymmetry between Suffering and Happiness
In the dispute about the rationality of risk-aversion negative utilitarianism is on Rawls’ side. Experience inevitably leads to risk-aversion because of the asymmetry of suffering and happiness:
Physics
The asymmetry between suffering and happiness seems to be an individual perception at first sight. It could however have its roots in physics. Life is subordinated to the law of thermodynamics and destined to decay. Suffering is unavoidable because of accidents, defeats, illnesses and aging. Happiness is avoidable; it can be terminated at any point in time.
Biology
1. Procreation, the biological climax of happiness, is a short event. Also amorousness is usually a short period within lifetime. The goal of nature is not to make people happy.
2. There are genetic defects which cause immense suffering. No corresponding phenomenon is known which causes immense happiness.
Psychology
1. The goal to maximize happiness has no limits and can never be satisfied. The goal to minimize suffering can be satisfied.
2. It is easy to make someone unhappy but much less easy to make that person happy again (see Bad Is Stronger Than Good). It is easier to produce suffering than to produce happiness.
3. A repetition of painful experiences leads to higher sensibility, a repetition of pleasant experiences leads to lower sensibility.
4. There is a kind of suffering which causes irreversible damage to the psyche and destroys the capability to compensate.
5. Risk-aversion increases with experience. Young people don’t see dangers, elder people become cautious. A hypothetical person with complete experience would be extremely risk-averse.
Economics
1. The “law” of diminishing marginal utility and the logarithmic effect of absolute income on happiness (see Easterlin Paradox) may have their reason in the psychological asymmetry between suffering and happiness
2. The expected utility theory generally accepts the assumption that individuals are risk averse (Expected utility hypothesis, Wikipedia)
3. In prospect theory, loss aversion refers to people's tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. Some studies suggest that losses are twice as powerful, psychologically, as gains (loss aversion, Wikipedia).
4. A loss creates a greater feeling of pain compared to the joy created by an equivalent gain, see Behavioral Finance.
Ethics
A different source of asymmetry is the following intuition:
1. There is no moral duty to be happy.
2. There is a moral duty to help a suffering individual, but there is no moral duty to make an individual happy.
3. We are responsible for the probable misery of future people, but we have no moral duty to procreate because unborn people do not suffer from missed chances.
This usage of the term asymmetry is investigated in The Procreation of Risk
3.2 Compassion
Contractarianism is an attempt to construct ethics on the basis of self-interest and rationality. But Rawls’original position introduces an additional element which could be associated with empathy or enhanced perception of the self. Risk-aversion and empathy lead to compassion. Compassion is the bridge between Rawls’ concept and negative utilitarianism. Compassion is not merely an affective state. It has a cognitive aspect as will be shown in this chapter.
Empathy
Empathy is a psychological concept that describes the ability of one person (the so called observer) to feel in another person (the target). Most contemporary empathy researchers (e.g. Mark Davis, 1994) agree that two different aspects of empathy have to be distinguished: the cognitive and the affective aspect.
1. One speaks of cognitive empathy, if the outcome of an empathic process is that the observer knows what the target feels.
2. One speaks of affective empathy, if the observer feels something because of the perception of the target (compassion, the wish to help, the wish that the perceived situation would not exist etc.)
It has been speculated that empathy may be an essential part of the cause of moral and social behavior in humans and non-human animals.
Empathy might be related to mirror neurons in the human brain [Goldstein, 321], i.e. to a function which enables imitation learning and dissolves the barrier between the self and others.
Cognitive empathy
The cognitive aspect of empathy is sufficient to justify the Golden Rule
1) if the law-maker is conscious, that his role of observer (of suffering) can turn into the role of the target.
2) if the law-maker thinks rational
A person can also apply cognitive empathy to himself. It is a cognitive achievement to look into the future and think about ones destiny. It is possible to consider the person one will be in the future like a different person. In this case the look into the future is similar to an empathic process. As far as the observer knows what the target (in this case the person, that observer will be in the future) feels, it is an example of cognitive empathy.
1) If the person is conscious, that its role of observer will turn into the role of the target and
2) if the person thinks rational
then the Golden Rule can be applied within the same person.
Affective empathy
The more cognitive empathy is accompanied by affective empathy, the more it controls behavior.
1. The closer the relation to the suffering individual, the more affective empathy (in this case compassion) becomes dominant. The root of compassion is the biological utility function and the corresponding family relations. But the feeling of closeness can also emerge independent of the family. The more intense the suffering of an individual, the less he is competitor, rival or opponent. One is more affected by his suffering and he gains closeness. Actual fault of the victim facilitates to stay emotionally distant but only up to a certain point. In extreme cases of suffering the judgment prevails, that nobody deserves such a fate. The saying “I wouldn’t wish this on my worst enemy” may illustrate this.
2. If the feeling of closeness is lacking, then affective empathy often causes a spontaneous refutation, urging the person to look the other way. One doesn’t want “something like that” to exist. It disturbs, strikes as unpleasant or frightens.
It is known, that personal experiences of suffering enhance the capability to feel compassion. It is not required though, that these experiences must be exactly the same or have the same intensity as the ones of a victim. Personal experiences of suffering also change the attitude towards one’s own risks. A person who acts against his own interests is either not informed or irrational. In the latter case an empathic moral law could be used to protect the person from him/herself. But most people refuse a corresponding restriction of autonomy.
Example: A person sometimes changes his/her character within lifetime in such a way, that he/she seems to be a different person. The person of age 15 does not much care about the person of age 50 (e.g. smokes fully conscious of the risk of lung cancer). This lack of compassion within the same person is similar to the one across different persons. The application of the Golden Rule to different life phases of the same individual corresponds to “compassion with ones future self” and motivates e.g. to restrain from smoking.
Compassionate moral laws
Instead of taking the model of an empathic process to explain what happens, when a person looks on his/her own future, it is also possible to turn it the other way round: The emotional process taking place, when a person looks at him/herself from a distance, is a model for the empathic process directed at others. The difference in time (different life phases and corresponding appearance and character traits) is experienced like the difference in space (other persons with different appearance and character traits). The position of the ego becomes relative. This can lead to the insight that the suffering of others is as real (and consequently as important) as ones own suffering. It can (but does not have to) lead to compassion and to the acceptance of corresponding moral laws.
Compassionate moral laws
1. are an extension of impartial moral laws to non-contractual cases and make these issue a major concern of ethics
2. can be implemented by applying cognitive empathy
3. do not meet the requirements of contractarianism.
4. are a benchmark for existing ethical systems
Non-contractual cases
Philosophers, who treat morality as primarily contractual tend to discuss non-contractual cases briefly, casually and parenthetically, as though they were rather rare. The contractarian view is that those who fail to clock in as normal rational agents and make their contracts are just occasional exceptions, constituting one more minority group, but not a central concern of any society [Midgley]
1. There may be a mutual benefit between parents and children. There may also be a mutual benefit between domestic and breeding animals and their owners. But there is no contract which demands a fair treatment of children and animals.
2. The cooperation with mentally retarded or insane persons does not lead to mutual benefit, the benefit is one-sided.
3. Retarded or insane persons cannot carry out their duty and take responsibility. Not all principles of the contract apply to them and therefore they do not fulfill the conditions of an impartial contract.
4. With similar arguments, persons with low intelligence could be excluded from a social contract.
5. Sentient animals can feel pain as well as humans but cannot fulfill the conditions of a contractor.
Conclusion: Mutual benefit and impartial contracts are not a sufficient basis for moral rules.
Since non-contractual cases cannot carry out their duties and take responsibility, human rights cannot meaningfully be assigned. But compassionate moral laws demand that they get protection to an extent which corresponds to their degree of suffering. In this paper we define the degree of suffering roughly as a combination of intensity and duration (see Negative Utilitarianism).
Rawls’ first principle allows for the process of evolutionary adaptation (which requires competition). Non-contractual cases are among the losers in this competition. The idea of Rawls difference principle is to limit the suffering produced by the adaptation process. Non-contractual cases fulfill the trough no fault of one's own condition.
Counter-productivity of compassion
In the context of surgery or accidents compassion leads to a mental blockade
According to consequentialism, the tools (means) have to be oriented towards the goals (ends). Although the goal (reduce suffering) is motivated by compassion, the action may demand quite different feelings or even the absence of emotions.
1. Individual level: People who cannot control their emotions are probably not suited for the profession of a surgeon or a helper in need.
2. Society level: On this level the separation of tools and goals is realized institutionally. The health insurance is not expected to encounter the patient with compassion; it is only expected to help him pay the bills.
Adequacy of compassion
The wish to help automatically disappears, if all beggars are publicly supplied (where “beggars” stands for “visible suffering”).
The perception of suffering is an important factor for the assignment of public and private resources. If the misery is not visible any more and the abuse of social benefit increases, then the wish to help weakens and the resources are cut until the beggars stand on the street again. One could therefore conclude that the problems are attacked in a reasonable way, if they reach a certain extent. “In situations of emergency, the salvaging forces grow” (Goethe).
The weak point in this reflection is that (in a global and long-term view) the distress grows faster than the salvaging forces. Since the phenomena of suffering emerged in evolution, it is growing quantitatively and qualitatively (see paragraph Rationality above). In many instances well-being grows for a majority and suffering (or risk) for a minority. It seems that the phenomena of injustice increases as well with evolution. This consideration not only applies to biological but also to cultural evolution.
Genetic basis
Compassionate moral laws get strong support from recent discoveries in biology:
1) There is a close (99.5%) genetic relation between all humans which is preserved by future generations (see Human Genetic Variation). The characteristics of an individual is also formed by the environment and chance (not only by genes), but the phenotype and the socially caused differences belie the wide commonalities. From a genetic point of view the differences in appearance could be so small (0.5%) that we would not even recognize them. We would be confronted with copies of ourselves in different stages of life and probably develop a more compassionate behaviour. The higher the degree of suffering, the more genetic closeness is an argument for emotional closeness. When it comes to extreme suffering the peculiarities of an individual’s gene-combination become unimportant, we are all the same. From this point of view compassionate laws and the “original position approach to justice” seem perfectly rational, whereas Buchanan’s anarchistic equilibrium appears distorted by temporary and biased interests.
2) The genetic difference between humans and certain animals is in the range of 1%. If the phenotype could reflect the similarity of the genotype then we couldn’t treat animals as we do now.
3) Human behavior is strongly influenced by the biological utility function, see God’s Utility Function. The insight that the temporary and biased self-interests are in truth the ones of the biological utility function can lead to a feeling of being manipulated, to the consciousness of heteronomy and to solidarity with the victims of biological mechanisms. By this change in identity, empathic laws become more rational and self-interest loses some of its attractiveness.
4) The science of evolution reinforces the above mentioned feeling of heteronomy:
a) Suffering and injustice increase in the course of evolution, see Utility and Suffering in Biology.
b) This trend continues within cultural evolution until now; see Utility and Suffering in Culture.
c) Technological progress partially reduces suffering but builds up new risks of a previously unknown dimension. In those instances where the fight against suffering is successful, the success (in a global and long-term view) has to be “paid” by an increase in risks, see On the Perception of Risk and Benefit.
Rationality
1. The respect and support for non-contractual cases becomes rational, if the contractors feel compassion. The more compassion, the more the contractor identifies him/herself with the non-contractual cases and the more the preferences match.
2. Ethical principles can be based on cognitive empathy, provided that all contractors dispose of the necessary information. Non-contractual cases have to be represented by rational contractors. The normative force of cognitive empathy may not be as strong as the one of compassion and may not be sufficient to convince a majority. But the concept can be used to define a moral benchmark.
3. Compassionate preferences are in competition with egoistic preferences with regards to survival value. A rigorous implementation of compassionate laws gets into conflict with the preference of the majority to survive. Consequently, the majority considers rigorous compassionate laws to be irrational.
3.3 Original Negative Utilitarianism
Ancient world
1. The idea to formulate an ethical goal negatively originates in Buddhism and is more than 2000 years old.
2. Greek philosopher Epicurus has sometimes been caricatured as crude hedonist. But Epicurus also maintained the puzzling doctrine that the complete absence of pain constituted "the limit and highest point of pleasure" (Epicurus, David Pearce)
Early utilitarianism
Historically utilitarianism was inspired by Stoicism and therefore closer to negative utilitarianism than the contemporary interpretation:
Although the favored means of the term negative welfarism – a stoician-like control of the birth of one’s desires which it also calls “liberation” (moksa) – is in a sense opposed to economists’ conception (see Happiness-Freedom, Deep Buddhism and Modernity, Kolm 1982), scholarly welfarism is in fact historically the direct descent of this Indian philosophy. Indeed, the 18th century founders of utilitarianism were thoroughly inspired by Stoicism and Epicureanism [Rosen, Kolm], whereas the influence of Buddhist and Jain thoughts on Stoician and other Hellenistic philosophies is explained in the previous reference. The oblivion of self-formation occurred with that of the Rousseau-Kant “autonomy” by some narrowminded post-Mill 19th century scholars (even Mill’s “choice of lifestyle” is a downgrading of full eudemonistic self-formation). Note that the view that utilitarianism is the necessary all-encompassing criterion was, in the West, restricted to English-language scholars influenced by Bentham who introduced this view for a political reason. This is why Rawls appeared to be much less original in other circles who acknowledged constitutional basic rights and where egalitarianism was a familiar ideal. (Macrojustice from Equal Liberty, Serge-Christoph Kolm)
Comment: The Stoic self-control and cosmopolitanism correspond to negative utilitarianism. The optimistic world view of the Stoics corresponds to Popper’s vision.
Popper
In the 20th century, the idea to formulate an ethical goal negatively is attributed to Karl Popper
1. It adds to clarity in the fields of ethics, if we formulate our demands negatively, i.e. if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness [Popper].
2. Similarly, it is helpful to formulate the task of scientific method as the elimination of false theories (from the various theories tentatively preferred) rather than the attainment of established truths [Shearmur].
Popper’s idea could have had the following sources:
1. his discontent with the contemporary interpretation of utilitarianism (see above)
2. the asymmetry of pain and pleasure (chapter 3.1)
3. compassion (chapter 3.2)
4. his epistemological work
5. the failure of happiness-promoting philosophies
6. his personal experiences: sixteen of his closest relatives became victims of Nazi Germany, partially in Auschwitz, some committed suicide (from Die Erkenntnistheorie und das Problem des Friedens)
The term negative utilitarianism was first mentioned by Karl Popper [1945] but he didn’t develop a complete ethical theory. The original interpretation of negative utilitarianism (as described in Negative Utilitarianism) was coined by R.N.Smart and refers to the following statement:
“From the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure and especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure” [Popper]
In this paper we maintain that R.N.Smarts interpretation doesn’t conform to the intentions of Karl Popper. Popper was neither pessimist nor militant (violent), as can easily be derived from his public statements. Example: Die Erkenntnistheorie und das Problem des Friedens. Popper was driven by the philosophy of Enlightenment and thought of improving the state of affairs by means of scientific and ethical progress. It is therefore legitimate to question R.N.Smart’s comment and turn towards a more plausible (moderate) interpretation of negative utilitarianism. For details on R.N.Smart’s interpretation see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering
3.4 Moderate Negative Utilitarianism (NU)
In this paper the abbreviation “NU” will be used for the moderate interpretation of negative utilitarianism.
Preferences
There are two different interpretations of the term preference
1) In philosophy the term preference means desire.
2) In welfare economics and social choice the term preference defines a preference of ordering.
If we want to apply economical theory, then we have to interpret the philosophical term as a rough preference of ordering (see Preference-frustration and the Hedonistic Scale). Preference utilitarianism is classified as desire theory of well-being. It is considered to be ethics, i.e. it implies a theory of the good. Preference utilitarians ass