Negative Utilitarianism and Justice
by Socrethics
First version 2005 Last version 2010
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Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. Rawls’ Theory Compared with Classical Utilitarianism 2.1 Social Contract Theory 2.2 Impartiality 2.3 Rawls’ Principles 2.4 Comparison with Bentham’s and Pigou’s Utilitarianism 2.5 Comparison with Mill’s Utilitarianism 2.6 Comparison with Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism 3.1 Definition 3.2 The Asymmetry of Pain and Pleasure 3.3 Risk-Aversion 3.4 Compassion 4. Negative Utilitarianism (NU) 4.1 Historical Background 4.2 Terminology 4.3 Definition 4.4 Social Welfare 4.5 Ethical Progress 5. Rawls’ Theory Compared with NU 5.1 Economical Welfare 5.2 Human Rights and the Higher Purpose 5.3 Non-Contractual Cases 5.4 Intergenerational Impartiality 6.1 Metaphor 6.2 Synthesis of Rawls’ Theory with NU 7. Conclusion
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Abstract
Starting point The goal of this paper is to find a concept of justice which is inspired by negative utilitarianism but avoids its theoretical weaknesses.
Type of problem How can the following theoretical weaknesses of negative utilitarianism be removed without denying its ethical goal: 1. the zero-tolerance with regard to suffering, which makes it impossible to construct a theory of welfare 2. the lacking protection of human rights, allowing to sacrifice individuals to an ethical goal which they do not support
Contractualist view Rawls’ Theory of Justice is the concept which comes closest to the intentions of negative utilitarianism without adopting its deficiencies. 1) Human rights can be considered as empirically found safeguards against some of the worst kinds of suffering. 2) Human rights guarantee, that individuals cannot be sacrificed to an ethical goal which they do not support.
Negative utilitarian view From the negative utilitarian point of view Rawls’ theory has the following deficiencies: 1) Sentient beings which are not able to actively participate in a social contract remain unprotected 2) Even in a political system of perfect fairness suffering could be immense. Rawls principle of intergenerational impartiality allows such a state to persist. An ethical ideal should include a long-term vision of improvement, using technological progress and population ethics as a means to reduce suffering.
Risk point of view 1) Human rights (although they prevent some of the worst kinds of suffering) are risk-tolerant. 2) Intergenerational impartiality preserves human rights (and hence the corresponding risks). In other words: Rawls’ concept assumes that the decision-maker in the original position unconditionally tolerates extreme suffering in order to survive. Negative utilitarianism makes this tolerance dependent on the future prospects: In a pessimistic scenario negative utilitarianism promotes childlessness in order to avoid extreme suffering.
Synthesis The synthesis of the two concepts would be a social contract of the Rawls’ type whose contractors commit to risk-aversion. Such a society would consist of 1. optimistic adherents of risk-aversion like bioethical abolitionists and like-minded transhumanists 2. pessimistic adherents of risk-aversion like Buddhists and antinatalists In such a society 1) The interests of non-contractual cases would be represented by contractors. 2) The principle of intergenerational impartiality would be combined with a risk-averse principle; particularly in population ethics (see The Procreation of Risk). 3) The risk-tolerance in the technological sector would be questioned.
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1. Introduction
Starting point
Justice concerns the proper ordering of things and persons within a society.
1) John Rawls claims that "Justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is for systems of thought”.
2) Justice can be thought of as distinct from and more fundamental than benevolence, charity, mercy, generosity or compassion.
3) Being treated fairly satisfies a basic need (…). Inequality aversion may not be uniquely human; ideas of fairness and justice may be instinctual in nature.
(Justice, Wikipedia)
1) Distributive justice concerns what is just or right with respect to the allocation of goods in a society.
2) Retributive justice is concerned with punishment for wrongdoing,
For a short description of the main theories see Justice, Wikipedia
This paper concentrates on justice as fairness and welfare maximization within distributive justice.
The goal is to find a concept of justice which is inspired by negative utilitarianism but avoids its theoretical weaknesses.
Type of problem
How can the following theoretical weaknesses of negative utilitarianism be removed without denying its ethical goal:
1. the zero-tolerance with regard to suffering, which makes it impossible to construct a theory of welfare
2. the lacking protection of individual rights, allowing to sacrifice individuals to an ethical goal which they do not support
2. Rawls’ Theory Compared with Classical Utilitarianism
2.1 Social Contract Theory
Social contract theories are theories on mutual benefit through cooperation.
Contractarians claim that moral principles derive their normative force from the idea of contract or mutual agreement. They are thus skeptical of the possibility of grounding morality or political authority in either divine will or some perfectionist ideal of the nature of humanity (contractarianism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
If an agreement with mutual benefit can be found, it is rational to sign a corresponding contract. But contractarians don’t claim that human behavior can be described by rationality. The claim is only that rationality has a normative force in defining ethical goals. Rationality is a possible common denominator to overcome the cultural diversity of ethical norms.
1) Contractarianism, which stems from the Hobbesian line of social contract thought, holds that persons are primarily self-interested, and that a rational assessment of the best strategy for attaining the maximization of their self-interest will lead them to act morally (where the moral norms are determined by the maximization of joint interest) and to consent to governmental authority. Gauthier, Narveson, or Buchanan are Hobbesian contractarians.
2) Contractualism, which stems from the Kantian line of social contract thought, holds that rationality requires that we respect persons, which in turn requires that moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person. Thus, individuals are not taken to be motivated by self-interest but rather by a commitment to publicly justify the standards of morality to which each will be held. Rawls or Scanlon are Kantian contractualists
(Contractarianism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
In reality social contracts may primarily be shaped by self-interest, but Rawls’ theory is normative and not descriptive [Rawls 1958, 183]. The goal is to establish an ethical ideal against which social contracts can be measured. Contractarian ideals are based on the concept of impartiality.
2.2 Impartiality
Definition
What moral impartiality requires is not that everyone receives equal treatment, but rather that everyone be treated as an equal [Dworkin, 227].
Origin
1. Kant's categorical imperative is the best known definition of an impartial moral law. But the idea of moral impartiality is much older and can be found in many religions under the term “Golden Rule” or “ethic of reciprocity. It has been speculated that empathy may lie behind the prevalence of the Golden Rule.
2. Ancient Stoic-Skeptic tradition made a significant impact on the most prominent ethical theory of modern Europe – i.e. on Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy. The Kantian Hellenistic ideal (originating, in my view, from the more profound and more systematic ethical teachings of the Buddhist India) has partially become apparent through Scheler’s criticism of this famous philosopher [Vukomanovic, 167]
Impartial contract
A contract is impartial, if the principles
1) apply equally to all contractors
2) are defined in such a way as to equally benefit all contractors
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Alex Scott
Contractors are supposed to be guided by rationality.
Equal treatment of all contractors means that the principles do not depend on
1) the specific interests (preferences) of a single contractor or a group of contractors
2) temporary circumstances
Rationality
The following reflections correspond to contractualism, the Kantian tradition within social contract theory:
1) Rationality requires that we respect persons. Respect requires that the moral principles must be such, that they can be justified to each person involved (not only the majority):
a) Each contractor may, some day, find him-/herself in a minority position (because of illness, accident, age etc.).
b) The disrespect of a minority has the consequence, that the minority disrespects the law. This in turn undermines the stability of society.
2) Addressing each person means that the moral principles
a) must be publicly justified (duty to inform)
b) require mutual agreement (duty to ask for consent)
c) have to be laid down in a contract (to avoid misunderstandings and one-sided changes)
3) The chances to justify the moral principles to each person and reach mutual agreement are improved, if the principles are impartial.
4) A strong argument for impartiality is the close genetic relation between all humans, see Human Genetic Variation. A gene consists on an average on 3000 base pairs. Approximately 99.5% of all base pairs are equal in all humans. If the phenotype could reflect the 99.5% identity of the genotype then all humans would look like identical twins in different stages of their life. One might argue that the quantitative congruence of genes is an impermissible simplification and that the individual cannot be reduced to its genes. Even if the genetic differences are tiny, the personalities that develop out of these differences may be completely different. This however is only an argument against equality but not against impartiality. Moral impartiality doesn’t claim that humans are equal; it claims that humans should be treated equally before the law. The qualification for this treatment is independent of the tiny genetic differences between individuals.
Conclusion
Rationality leads to impartiality under the following conditions:
1) as long as cooperation leads to mutual benefit, it is rational to cooperate
2) as long as cooperation is improved by impartiality, it is rational to be impartial
The idea of an impartial contract fulfils the requirements of rational cooperation as opposed to
1) divine will
2) some ideal of the nature of humanity
3) benevolence or sympathetic human sentiment
See contractarianism, Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:
The impartial spectator
Some of the most important normative approaches are based on the idea of an impartial spectator. The idea was first mentioned by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments and later taken up by Harsanyi and Rawls.
1. In his Theory of Justice Rawls used the following thought experiment to derive the conditions of an impartial contract: A contract is impartial, if it is derived from an original position in which rational contractors under a veil of ignorance decide how they wish to commit themselves to being governed in their actual lives (Justice as a Virtue, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Behind such a veil of ignorance all individuals are specified as rational, free, and morally equal beings. Behind the veil of ignorance, what will the rational choice be for fundamental principles of society? The only safe principles will be impartial principles, for you do not know whether you would suffer or benefit from the structure of any biased institutions.
2. Rawls called his concept Justice as fairness. Justice in a strict sense would include equality of opportunity in all aspects of life. Fairness is not equivalent to justice, but represents a practicable benchmark for existing political systems.
Buchanan’s anarchistic equilibrium
Buchanan’s theory questions the role of the impartial spectator in establishing a social contract. There is no unique interpretation of the impartial spectator. Is he/she risk-tolerant or risk-averse? The concept attempts to circumvent the problem of incomparable individual utilities, but now the problem reappears in the ambiguous characteristics of the spectator. Buchanan replaces the veil of ignorance by an anarchistic equilibrium, where people with different preferences overcome anarchy by a social contract. Depending on the social status of an individual, the preference for such a contract is stronger or weaker. The propagation of universal solidarity and compassion can e.g. be interpreted as a strategy of the infirm (Nietzsche) or the strategy of people who have lost their family and seek a replacement. Redistribution can only be justified by the interests of the social partners. The wealthy part of the population is willing to pay a price for stability. Courts are obliged to strict neutrality and have no competence in defining justice (Ökonomische Ethik, Roland Vaubel).
Comment: Buchanan’s concept is rather descriptive than normative; it lacks the constituents to construct an ethical ideal.
2.3 Rawls’ Principles
Well-being has several dimensions, some of which can be influenced, whereas others can’t. Rawls Theory of Justice restricts the investigation to those dimensions that can be influenced.
Definition
1) First principle of justice: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
2) Second principle of justice: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
a) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and
b) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle
(Distributive Justice, Wikipedia)
Priorities
The principles are ordered in lexical priority as follows:
1) The liberty principle: The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (i.e., to vote and run for office); freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest. It is a matter of some debate whether freedom of contract can be inferred as being included among these basic liberties.
2) The arrangement of social and economic inequalities:
a) The principle of fair equality of opportunity requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed.
b) The difference principle strives for the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society.
Theory of Justice, Wikipedia
The liberty principle also includes the protection of the citizen’s physical integrity.
Fair equality of opportunity
Rawls’ concept of equality of opportunity goes beyond the one of classical utilitarianism. He denies an over-representation of upper class members in offices and positions even if it produces an increase in total welfare. The equal formal access to offices and positions is not sufficient; the statistical probability for lower class members to succeed has to be the same as for upper class members. For an example see [Clarenbach, chapt.3.2]
Human rights
1. According to Rawls above principles are a prerequisite for rational thinking minorities to participate in a social contract. Rights theorists demand that (1) and (2a) include all preferences which are subsumed under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By assigning lexical priority to human rights they become a side constraint for every theory that seeks a quantitative optimization of the state of affairs.
2. A social contract based on human rights is compatible with capitalism and produces social and economic inequalities. Adam Smith, claims that, in capitalism, an individual pursuing his own good tends also to promote the good of his community, through a principle that he called “the invisible hand”. Experience has shown however that the “invisible hand” cannot protect many people from starving and that free markets have to be complemented by (2b).
Example: The essence of Rawls’ principles can be found in the Preamble of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Federation:
“Only those remain free who use their freedom and
the strength of a people is measured by the welfare of the weakest of its members.”
2.4 Comparison with Bentham’s and Pigou’s Utilitarianism
We start with a comparison of the economical aspect of justice, represented by
1. Rawls’ difference principle
2. Bentham’s and Pigou’s welfare functions
Terminology
1. For a definition of the terms preference-satisfaction, preference- frustration, happiness and suffering see Preferences and the Hedonistic Scale.
2. In classical utilitarianism utility is a function of consumption. Consumption is measured in terms of preferences for goods and services. Utility is associated with the happiness which is created by consumption [Bentham, 120]. For details on Bentham’s utilitarianism see Short History of Welfare Economics.
3. Economical welfare is cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable. It corresponds to Bentham’s definition of utility.
Rawls’ difference principle
The difference principle holds that differences in wealth, status, etc. can be defended only if they create a system of market forces and capital accumulation whose productivity makes the lowliest members of society better off than they would be under a more egalitarian system. The difference principle is the safest principle (Justice as Fairness, by Charles D.Kay) and corresponds to a risk-averse strategy (Rawls Unrisky Business, by Jim Holt). Its implementation though is far from trivial:
1. Maximin interpretation:
If agents (A, B) can have incomes (5, 6) or (4, 9) then the former distribution has to be chosen.
Maximin encounters the following problem: If agents (A, B, C) can have incomes (5, 6, 9) or (5, 7, 8), then Maximin is indifferent
2. Leximin interpretation (not to be confused with the lexical priority of human rights):
If agents (A, B, C) can have incomes (5, 6, 9) or (5, 7, 8) then the latter distribution has to be chosen. The second worst-off decides. If B’s income is the same in both distributions, then C’s income decides etc.
Leximin encounters the following problem: If agent A’s income is minimally higher in the second distribution and the income of B and C considerably lower, then the first distribution has to be chosen. This consequence is called dictatorship of the worst-off (see The Difference Principle).
3) Prioritarian interpretation: Let’s return to Rawl’s definition of the difference principle: “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are (…) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (…)”. The term greatest can be interpreted in such a way that everybody profits from inequalities, but that the least advantaged profit most. A prioritarian rule would e.g. distribute savings in such a way that the quota increases with decreasing welfare. Conversely the taxes owed would increase with increasing welfare.
For more interpretations see
1. Who are the least advantaged?, by Bertil Tungodden and Peter Vallentyne
2. Rawls Differenzprinzip und seine Deutungen, by Peter Koller, Zeitschrift Erkenntnis, Vol.20, No.1, 1983
In order to compare Rawls’ difference principle with Bentham’s and Pigou’s utilitarianism, we have to map it to a welfare function.
Welfare function according to Bentham
Let’s assume the society consists of two persons P1 and P2, who dispose of two goods G1 and G2. The welfare function according to Bentham would look as follows:
1. Social welfare (W) is the total of the two individual utilities (U): W = U1 + U2
2. The utility functions are identical for both persons. It is assumed that the utility (usefulness) of the two goods is the same for both persons.
3. The utility depends linearly (factors a1, a2) on the quantities (q) of the goods.
U1 = (a1 x q11) + (a2 x q12)
U2 = (a1 x q21) + (a2 x q22)
where q12 = the quantity of good G2, consumed by person P1.
Under these premises social welfare should increase linearly with the Gross National Product (GNP).
[Kleinewefers, 40]
Welfare function according to Pigou
Let’s assume the society consists of two persons P1 and P2, who dispose of two goods G1 and G2. The welfare function according to Pigou would look as follows:
1. Social welfare (W) is the total of the two individual utilities (U): W = U1 + U2
2. The utility function is identical for both persons. It is assumed that the utility (usefulness) of the two goods is the same for both persons.
3. The utility function U = U (q1, q2) is of the Gossen type, i.e. the marginal utility decreases with increasing consumption.
Under a given GNP the maximum social welfare can be attained, if the goods are equally distributed among the two persons [Kleinewefers, 41]. For more information on the term welfare function see Short History of Welfare Economics.
Comparison
A welfare function according to Bentham sums the utility of each individual in order to obtain society's overall welfare. All people are treated the same, regardless of their initial level of utility. One extra unit of utility for a starving person is not seen to be of any greater value than an extra unit of utility for a millionaire. At the other extreme is the Maximin welfare function. According to the Maximin criterion, welfare is maximized when the utility of those society members that have the least is the greatest. No economic activity will increase social welfare unless it improves the position of the society member that is the worst off. Most economists specify social welfare functions that are intermediate between these two extremes. The social welfare function is typically translated into social indifference curves (Welfare economics, Wikipedia)
Above indifference curves show combinations of individual utilities which result in the same social welfare, i.e. combinations which make no difference with regard to social welfare. Each curve corresponds to a different social welfare. Following a short comment to each type of curve:
1) Since a utilitarian social indifference curve confines an isosceles triangle, each total of individual utilities represented by a point on the curve, results in the same value. No matter how unequal the distribution is, an improvement of utility of the rich individual always compensates the loss in utility of the poor individual
2) The social welfare of a Maximin social indifference curve is the sum of two equal utilities and is depicted by the vertex of the curve. Increasing the utility of only one person (no matter how much) doesn’t increase social welfare.
3) The intermediate form of social indifference curve can be interpreted as showing that as inequality increases, a larger improvement in the utility of relatively rich individuals is needed to compensate for the loss in utility of relatively poor individuals (Welfare economics, Wikipedia)
Is the difference principle compatible with the principle of diminishing marginal utility?
The neoclassical principle of diminishing marginal utility says that the greater the amount of utility a person already has the smaller will be the utility gain of any extra increment of wealth. As a consequence, total utility can be increased by a redistribution of welfare from the rich to the poor. Under these premises utilitarianism becomes egalitarian and corresponds to the Maximin principle (see Short History of Welfare Economics).
Rawls’s objection is of course that utilitarianism does not protect the claims of the most deprived from being set aside in favor of greater benefits to other, better off, social groups. But this argument is disputable: utilitarians will argue that given the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, the goal of maximizing average welfare will direct a society to prioritize improvements in the situation of the most deprived. And when one considers the detail of Rawls’s proposed policies for implementing his difference principle, it is hard to see anything incompatible with the implications of an
enlightened utilitarianism (Questions of Justice).
If we take into account that the society’s total income is negatively affected by the redistribution (because hard working people lose the motivation to create additional income) then the optimal redistribution is rather prioritarian than egalitarian and can be associated with the prioritarian interpretation of the difference principle. This interpretation corresponds to the intermediate social indifference curve shown on the right hand side of above diagram.
The liberty principle
According to Rawls justice cannot be the result of an executive decision which maximizes the total utility of the society.
The two assumptions of classical utilitarianism
1. individuals having similar utility functions
2. diminishing marginal utility
can be interpreted as moral and political principles in a somewhat technical language (rather than psychological propositions).
One might say that this is what Bentham and others really meant by them, at least as shown by how they were used in arguments for social reform (…). But this still leave the mistaken notion that the satisfaction of desire has value in itself (…). To see the error of this idea one must give up the conception of justice as an executive decision altogether and refer to the notion of justice as fairness. Participants in the social contract have an original and equal liberty and their common practices are considered unjust unless they accord with principles which the contractors freely acknowledge before one another and so accept as fair [Rawls 1958, 191-192].
2.5 Comparison with Mill’s Utilitarianism
Liberalism according to Mill
John Rawls, in his history of political philosophy [Rawls Lectures], warned to disesteem John Stuart Mill, an indication that he appreciated Mill’s work. How could Mill claim that liberalism is compatible with utilitarianism?
1. Utilitarianism attempts to increase the total utility of the community. The individual is subordinated to this goal.
2. Liberalism claims that individual actions are only restricted by the condition not to harm others.
The key for compatibility lies in Mills interpretation of utility [Schefczyk]:
1. Mill stands in the tradition of Epicurus and Bentham according to which happiness (respectively the absence of suffering) is the only rational goal of human behavior. Mill’s innovation was to introduce a ranking for different kinds of happiness. The ranking is justified by competence, i.e. by the judgment of experienced persons. The judgment if football is preferable to the opera can only be made by persons who made a positive experience with both kinds of events. People who don’t enjoy the opera (or don’t even know it) cannot morally valuate the corresponding kind of happiness; they lack a specific perception, respectively knowledge.
2. Even if all competent persons accord in ranking pleasures then this ranking is still not generally relevant. The life of an individual cannot be improved by imposing an “official” ranking upon him/her.
3. Most philosophers agree that the life of an unhappy human is preferable to the life of a happy pig. But Mill doesn’t conclude that we should invest all our energy in top-quality actions. All kinds of happiness reach a point of satiation and we should therefore attempt to diversify our engagements.
The liberal characteristics of Mill’s concept can be summarized as follows [Schefczyk]:
1. Tolerance, accept that perception and experiences are different
2. Informality, unconstraint
3. The denial of external and internal perfectionism
On this basis Mill claims that liberty is a consequence of the utilitarian goal. Since humans are different, the pressure for conformity and the denial of individual liberty contradicts the interests of all humans.
The point in Mill’s argument consists in not only seeing other people as competitors but also as enrichment. Diversified experiences produce empirical data about possible kinds of happiness. The ethical ideal according to Mill is not restricted to tolerance, it is open and affirmative; a liberal is willing to learn and profit from other person’s experiences.
The priority of the liberty principle
The utilitarian arguments for the priority of liberty rights are the following:
1. Without liberty the individuals cannot articulate their preferences and the society lacks diversity. Without diversity there is no maximization of utility.
2. A constitution which is based on liberty rights guarantees legal security. The fear of arbitrariness, torture etc. causes an enormous loss of utility.
The goods that are associated with the term liberty have a corresponding high weight within the utility function. But, from a utilitarian point of view, despite of this high weight, there is still a trade-off with other goods.
Examples:
1. A minor worsening of basic rights would probably be tolerated for a huge gain in economical welfare. In reality the political debates prove that liberty rights don’t have an absolute priority. Repressive regimes often find support in the population, a phenomenon which cannot be explained solely by the assumption that the majority cherish the illusion to remain untroubled.
2. A medic cares for two patients, one of them deadly ill and the other one curable. However he has only one dosage of the required medicament. Rawls would give the medicament to the deadly ill because he/she suffers more, a utilitarian would give it to the one with the higher potential to survive. The utilitarian position has a good chance to be accepted by the majority.
[Clarenbach, chapt.3.3]
In contrast, Rawls’ liberty principle has lexical priority and doesn’t allow any trade-off [Rawls 1958, 184-187].
While Mill recognized that reasons for justice have a special weight, he thought that it could be accounted for by the special urgency of the moral feelings which naturally support principles of such high utility. But it is a mistake to resort to the urgency of feeling; as with the appeal to intuition, it manifests a failure to pursue the question far enough [Rawls 1958, 189].
Example:
The conception of justice as fairness, when applied to the practice of slavery would not allow one to consider the advantages of the slaveholder (…). The gains accruing to the slaveholder cannot be counted as in any way mitigating the injustice of the practice [Rawls 1958, 188].
The second principle of justice
The second principle excludes the justification of inequalities on the grounds that the disadvantages of those in one position are outweighed by the greater advantages of those in another position. This rather simple restriction is the main modification I wish to make in the utilitarian principle as usually understood (…). It is a restriction of consequence, and one which utilitarians, e.g. Hume and Mill, have used in their discussions of justice without realizing apparently its significance [Rawls 1958, 168]
2.6 Comparison with Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism
Indifference curves (as depicted in chapter 2.4) are a means to compare concepts of distribution but we lack a rational criterion to select a specific distribution out of the many possible ones. Game theory is a possible means to find such a criterion. An impartial spectator in the original position considers inequality as a risk, which has to be properly weighed in order to attain the best state of affairs.
Utility
1. In Bentham’s and Pigou’s utilitarianism the term utility corresponds to the happiness which is created by consumption. In Harsanyi’s utilitarianism the concept of utility is more general. Utility corresponds to the net value of preference-satisfactions and preference-frustrations and (in contrast to classical utilitarianism) the concept of “preference” is not restricted to goods and services. The term preference-satisfaction relates to any kind of happiness, and the term preference-frustration to any kind of suffering.
2. The application of game theory (a well as the utilitarian welfare function) presupposes that utility can be measured on a cardinal scale and that it is amenable to an interpersonal comparison (see Wohlfahrtstheorie)
Social welfare
Harsanyi (as well as Bentham and Pigou) assumes that preference-satisfactions and –frustrations can be mapped to a single hedonistic scale. The term quality of life, well-being or welfare is the net result of all preference-frustrations and -satisfactions. Satisfied preferences are counted positively and frustrated preferences negatively.
1) Welfare is positive, if the sum of all preference-satisfactions exceeds the one of all frustrations.
2) Welfare is negative, if the individual has lost his/her preference to exist.
Under these premises the term utility corresponds to the term welfare. The accumulated utilities of all members of society correspond to the term social welfare.
Consequentialism
Historically, hedonistic utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is the aggregate happiness, i.e. the happiness of everyone and not the happiness of any particular person (Consequentialism, Wikipedia)
Why should we subscribe to consequentialism?
An argument for consequentialism is contractarian. Harsanyi argues that all informed, rational people whose impartiality is ensured because they do not know their place in society would favor a kind of consequentialism. Broome (1991) elaborates and extends Harsanyi's argument (Consequentialism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
This argument is of special interest in our context because is reveals that the common denominator of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism and Rawls’ Theory of Justice is contractarian. At the same time Harsanyi opened the door to a new understanding of classical utilitarianism:
Harsanyi’s approach leads to a justification of classical utilitarianism from a remarkably new point of view (see John C.Harsanyi)
In the following we compare Rawls’ difference principle with the major competing theory of Harsanyi:
Harsanyi’s equiprobability model
Since Harsanyi connected utilitarianism with the axiomatic basis of game theory, the following comparison concentrates on the aspect of risk.
Harsanyi’s equiprobability model (Gleichwahrscheinlichkeitsmodell) uses the following definition of impartial decisions:
1. The impartial spectator is an individual within society.
2. After every decision influencing or changing society this individual can find himself with equal probability in every possible position in the changed society.
3. Risk is defined as a product of utility and (mathematical) probability. The expected value of a decision is calculated by adding all possible risks.
Harsanyi’s concept (similarly to Rawls’) converts normative statements about compassion or solidarity into normative statements about risk.
Harsanyi [1975] refuses Rawls risk-averse strategy, claiming that it is irrational to make behaviour dependent on some highly unlikely unfavourable contingency regardless of its low probability. He recommends not to base decisions on the worst case but on the Bayesian maximization of utility. Rawls in contrast is convinced that the rational choice of an individual behind the veil of ignorance is the Maximin strategy, because the decision-maker behind the veil of ignorance is supposed to know the world. Experience leads to risk-aversion.
The classic expositions of Harsanyi and Rawls produce a synthesis that is consistent with the modern theory of non-cooperative games, see Game Theory and the Social Contract. From a game theoretical view Harsanyi’ utilitarianism is compatible with the difference principle according to Rawls. The (risk-tolerant) Bayesian maximization of utility converges towards Rawls’ (risk-averse) Leximin principle, if the weight of the worst cases increases.
For a definition of the terms risk and risk-aversion see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering.
For a comparison of Rawls’ and Harsanyi’s concepts in the context of a tax system, see Das Maximin-Prinzip von John Rawls, by Jörg Franke
The rationality of the difference principle is still a controversial issue; see Revisiting Rawls by Erik Anger. But Harsanyi’s equiprobability model is only one of many competing concepts. All of them are finally in competition with regard to survival value. The restriction of inequality by fair laws might produce an inefficient adaptation to a changing environment. In this case the rationality of distributive justice stands against the rationality of (economical) survival.
The liberty principle
Harsanyi’s concept is not restricted to the economical aspect of welfare (the difference principle). He assumes that, despite of the high weight the liberty principle has within the utility function, there is still a trade-off with other goods. Rawls however, insists on the absolute priority of the liberty principle. Classical utilitarianism can only be reconciled with the concept of fairness, if fairness is considered to be a side constraint of the utility function. But then utilitarianism loses its characteristics:
If one wants to continue using the concepts of classical utilitarianism, at least the utility functions must be so defined that no value is given to the satisfaction of interests which violated the principles of justice. In this way it is no doubt possible to include these principles within the form of the utilitarian conception; but to do so is, of course, to change its inspiration altogether as a moral conception. For it is to incorporate within it principles which cannot be understood on the basis of a higher order executive decision aiming at the greatest satisfaction of desire [Rawls 1958, 191].
The lexical priority of the liberty principle is also discussed in the context of negative utilitarianism, chapter 5.2.
3. Prioritarianism
In this paper we interpret negative utilitarianism as a special case within prioritarianism (the case where social welfare is valuated negative). We therefore start with some characteristics of prioritarianism.
3.1 Definition
The core idea of the Priority View is that gains in welfare matter more, the worse off people are, and losses in welfare matter less, the better off people are [Arrhenius, 110]
1) Prioritarianism is the dominant version of consequentialism (see Rule Consequentialism).
2) Prioritarianism preserves the efficiency of utilitarianism and a particular concern for those badly off. It doesn’t exclusively concentrate on total welfare but also accounts for an unjust distribution.
3) Prioritarianism is based on the intuition of sympathy [Lumer, 2]. But the degree of sympathy which is encoded in the formulas can be challenged by more or less deviating concepts. Since there is no universal consensus on the desirable degree of sympathy, the normative force of such an approach is limited. Prioritarianism is rational for those who agree with the encoded degree of sympathy.
4) Prioritarianism is a possible interpretation of the slogan “The least suffering for the smallest number”. This slogan is the converse of Bentham’s “The greatest happiness for the greatest number”. The maximization of happiness doesn’t mean that suffering has no weight and vice-versa. The original negative utilitarianism which doesn’t give any weight to happiness is a boundary case within prioritarianism.
5) Prioritarianism is the subject of a complex theoretical discussion. Example:
a) Pro: Holtug Nils, prioritarianism
b) Contra: [Broome 1991, 222]
Risk-aversion in the original position
Prioritarianism has two aspects
1. In a history of social welfare happy people get less moral weight than suffering people. The devaluation of happiness is a measure for compassion (sympathy, solidarity).
2. In decisions under uncertainty, happy outcomes are morally devaluated relative to unhappy outcomes. The devaluation is a measure for risk-aversion. The decision about the goodness of outcomes conforms to expected utility theory.
In this paper we assume that the devaluation is the same in both cases. For a decision-maker in the original position compassion and risk-aversion is the same thing:
Some theorists have developed a justification of prioritarianism, based on risk aversion in the original position [Atkinson / Stiglitz, 340; Hurley, 368-382]. This justification is based on the Rawlsian [1958], Harsanyian [1955] framework of an impartial decision, operationalized via a hypothetical ignorance of one's proper qualities and position in society so that the decider may end up in everybody's skin. Harsanyi has argued that in such a situation one should consider the various possibilities as equiprobable and treat them risk-neutrally; this then leads to utilitarianism. Rawls has argued that in such a situation of uncertainty the maximin criterion for rational decisions should be applied. Prioritarians have criticized both justifications: Maximin (or Leximin) is equivalent to infinite risk aversion, which seems to be nearer to paranoia than rationality, and Harsanyi's risk-neutrality is not rational either. The right maxim in such situations is moderate risk aversion, which together with the framework's assumptions leads to prioritarianism as the impartial and morally just welfare function (Prioritarian Welfare Functions, 32)
Following some examples:
History of social welfare
Prioritarianism defines an axiology for societies with the same number of people.
Imagine a two-person society: its only members are Jim and Pam. We compare the following two histories:
1. In society 1, Jim's well-being level is 110 (blissful); Pam's is -73 (hellish); overall well-being is 37.
2. In society 2, Jim's well-being level is 23; Pam's well-being level is 13; overall well-being is 36.
Prioritarians would say that society 2 is better or more desirable than society 1 despite being lower than society 1 in terms of overall well-being. Bringing Pam up by 86 is weightier than bringing Jim down by 87.
Prioritarianism is arguably more consistent with commonsense moral thinking than utilitarianism when it comes to these kinds of cases, especially because of the prioritarian's emphasis on compassion. It is also arguably more consistent with common sense than radical forms of egalitarianism that only value equality (adapted from Prioritarianism, Wikipedia).
Different Prioritarian Welfare Functions correspond to different degrees of compassion. For an example see the intermediate social welfare function mentioned in chapter 2.4.
How can we valuate welfare in such a way, that society 2 in above example gets a higher value than society 1?
Roughly, the idea is that we should maximize welfare, but gains in welfare matter more, the worse off people are, and losses in welfare matter less, the better off people are (…). Another way to express this intuition is to say that the marginal value of welfare is diminishing [Arrhenius 2000, 106].
One can achieve this result by applying a strictly increasing concave transformation to the numerical representation of people’s welfare before summing them up [Arrhenius 2008, 8]
Strictly increasing concave transformation means the following: The lower the welfare of an individual is relative to the others, the more weight it gets in the accumulation and vice-versa [Holtug, 13]. The total of all weights (percentages) equals 1 (respectively 100%). Giving more weight to the bad-off individuals pulls down the total welfare of a society. In our example Pam’s welfare in society 1 gets more weight than in society 2, so that society 1 is pulled down relative to society 2.
Decisions under uncertainty
Instead of looking at a history of welfare we look at the future and compare possible societies. With reference to chapter 2.6 we can say that
Prioritarianism represents a compromise between Bayes and Maximin. The more weight is given to the worst case, the more the maximization of utility converges towards Maximin (see A Drink from the Group, Livia Levine).
The maximin principle can be viewed as an extreme version of prioritarianism (Prioritarianism, Wikipedia)
In order to illustrate decision under uncertainty we take the same example as above but we assume that there is a choice between society 1 and 2. For a decision-maker in the original position the probability is 50% to become Jim and 50% to become Pam:
1. In society 1 we have a 50% probability for well-being level 110 and a 50% probability for level -73 so that the expected welfare amounts to 18.5, i.e. 50% of the overall well-being 37 above.
2. In society 2 we have a 50% probability for well-being 23 and a 50% probability for level 13 so that the expected welfare amounts to 18.0, i.e. 50% of the overall well-being 36 above.
We see that the weight we have to give to Pam in order to pull down the moral value of society 1 (below society 2) is exactly the same as in above example. In other words: The measure for compassion in histories corresponds to the measure for risk-aversion in decisions under uncertainty (under the premises of the original position)
In order to illustrate the effect of probability we enhance our example slightly:
Let’s assume that we have 99 Jims and only one Pam in our population. For a decision-maker in the original position the probability to become one of the Jims is accordingly 99% and the probability to become Pam only 1%. Above example then looks as follows:
1. In society 1 we have a 99% probability for well-being level 110 and a 1% probability for level -73 so that the expected welfare amounts to 108.17
2. In society 2 we have a 99% probability for well-being 23 and a 1% probability for level 36 so that the expected welfare amounts to 23.13.
We see that the weight we have to give to Pam in order to pull down the moral value of society 1 (below society 2) is much higher than in above example. In other words: The low probability to become a sufferer (Pam) has to be overruled by a high risk-aversion in order to get the same result as above (i.e. a preference for society 2).
Consequentialism
As well as classical utilitarianism, prioritarianism is a consequentialist theory:
An agent should perform the act, which leads to the best consequences or state of affairs.
1) From the point of view of the suffering individual the result of an ethical decision is more important than the attitude, which is at the bottom of the decision. One can achieve a bad result with a good attitude if one isn’t aware of counterproductive mechanisms.
2) Normally the attitude is important because it aims at the desired result and tries to correct errors. Nevertheless the attitude is valuated according to the result and not vice-versa.
3) In this paper sentient animals are included in the term state of affairs, i.e. their interests have to be represented by human agents.
Rationality
Risk aversion and compassion are at the core of prioritarianism, i.e. in contrast to social contract theory it seems to be built on emotions. But, as will be shown in the two following chapters, these emotions have cognitive aspects:
1) Risk aversion is a rational answer to the asymmetry between suffering and happiness
2) Compassion is a rational answer to the fact that a significant part of our self exists in the others.
3) From the point of view of Rawls’ original position risk-aversion and compassion is the same thing
3.2 The Asymmetry between Suffering and Happiness
Physics
The asymmetry between suffering and happiness seems to be an individual perception at first sight. It could however have its roots in physics. Life is subordinated to the law of thermodynamics and destined to decay. Suffering is unavoidable because of accidents, defeats, illnesses and aging. Happiness is avoidable; it can be terminated at any point in time.
Biology
1. Procreation, the biological climax of happiness, is a short event. Also amorousness is usually a short period within lifetime. The goal of nature is not to make people happy.
2. There are genetic defects which cause immense suffering. No corresponding phenomenon is known which causes immense happiness.
Psychology
1. It is easy to make someone unhappy but much less easy to make that person happy again (see Bad Is Stronger Than Good). It is easier to produce suffering than to produce happiness.
2. A repetition of painful experiences leads to higher sensibility, a repetition of pleasant experiences leads to lower sensibility.
3. There is a kind of suffering which causes irreversible damage to the psyche and destroys the capability to compensate.
4. Risk-aversion increases with experience. Young people don’t see dangers, elder people become cautious. A hypothetical person with complete experience would be extremely risk-averse.
In many cases risk-aversion reduces Darwinian fitness. The perception of risk is therefore distorted in such a way that it serves survival. Openly suffering people threaten this distortion because they make risk aware. This leads to the following asymmetry in the acceptance of suffering and happiness:
1. It is more difficult to take part in other people’s suffering than to take part in other people’s joy.
2. A person who masters his/her grief gets more recognition than a person who remains controlled in the hour of triumph.
3. Compassion and tears are considered to be a sign of weakness (unless the emotions express admiration for heroic people). Conversely happiness is interpreted as a sign of strength so that people don’t hesitate to show it
[Smith, chapter 1, section 3].
Economics
1. The positive utilitarian imperative to "maximize happiness" is insatiable, while the negative utilitarian command to "minimize misery" is satiable: no matter how much happiness we have, the positive principle tells us that more would always be better. But the negative principle ceases to generate any obligations once a determinate but demanding goal has been reached: if misery could be eliminated, no further obligation would be implied by the negative principle [Wolf 1997].
2. The “law” of diminishing marginal utility and the logarithmic effect of absolute income on happiness (see Easterlin Paradox) may have their reason in the psychological asymmetry between suffering and happiness
3. The expected utility theory generally accepts the assumption that individuals are risk averse (Expected utility hypothesis, Wikipedia)
4. In prospect theory, loss aversion refers to people's tendency to strongly prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains. Some studies suggest that losses are twice as powerful, psychologically, as gains (loss aversion, Wikipedia).
5. A loss creates a greater feeling of pain compared to the joy created by an equivalent gain, see Behavioral Finance.
Ethics
A different source of asymmetry is the following intuition:
1. There is no moral duty to be happy.
2. There is a moral duty to help a suffering individual, but there is no moral duty to make an individual happy.
3. The presence of pain is bad and the absence of pain is good, but whereas the presence of pleasure is good, the absence of pleasure is bad only if somebody is deprived of that pleasure (Better if it had never been, David Benatar,)
As a consequence: We are responsible for the probable misery of future people, but we have no moral duty to procreate because unborn people do not suffer from missed chances.
This usage of the term asymmetry is investigated in The Procreation of Risk
Man has created new worlds – of language, of music, of poetry, of science; and the most important of these is the world of the moral demands for equality, for freedom, and for helping the weak [Popper, 65].
At this point of chapter 5, Popper added his controversial note 6(2):
We should realize that from the moral point of view suffering and happiness must not be treated as symmetrical; that is to say, the promotion of happiness is in any case much less urgent than the rendering of help to those who suffer, and the attempt to prevent suffering [Popper, 235]
Conclusion
In the dispute about the rationality of risk-aversion prioritarianism is on Popper’s and Rawls’ side. Experience inevitably leads to risk-aversion because of the asymmetry of suffering and happiness:
3.3 Risk-Aversion
Utility
In classical utilitarianism utility corresponds to the happiness which is created by consumption. In the course of history the concept of utility became more abstract and was finally interpreted as the dominant end of human behavior (no matter what that is). The replacement of the abstract concept of utility by the concrete meaning happiness is called hedonic reduction.
Utility corresponds to the net value of preference-satisfactions and preference-frustrations but (in contrast to classical utilitarianism) the concept of “preference” is not restricted to goods and services. The term preference-satisfaction relates to any kind of happiness, and the term preference-frustration to any kind of suffering. Prioritarianism, as well as classical utilitarianism, adopts the hedonic reduction of the term utility. Hedonic reduction opens the theory to empirical testing [Hirata, 24].
Expected utility
The concept of risk-aversion was first introduced in the context of expected utility theory:
1) The expected utility theory deals with the analysis of choices among risky projects with (possibly multidimensional) outcomes.
2) The expected utility model was first proposed by Nicholas Bernoulli in 1713 and solved by Daniel Bernoulli in 1738 as the St. Petersburg paradox. Daniel Bernoulli argued that the paradox could be resolved if decision makers displayed risk aversion.
3) The first important use of the expected utility theory was that of John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern who used the assumption of expected utility maximization (1944) in their formulation of game theory (Utility, Wikipedia)
In economics, game theory, and decision theory the expected utility theorem or expected utility hypothesis predicts that the "betting preferences" of people with regard to uncertain outcomes (gambles) can be described by a mathematical relation which takes into account the size of a payout (whether in money or other goods), the probability of occurrence, risk aversion, and the different utility of the same payout to people with different assets or personal preferences. It is a more sophisticated theory than simply predicting that choices will be made based on expected value (which takes into account only the size of the payout and the probability of occurrence).
The expected utility theory generally accepts the assumption that individuals are risk averse, meaning that the individual would refuse a fair gamble (a fair gamble has an expected value of zero), and also implying that their utility functions are concave and show diminishing marginal wealth utility. The risk attitude is directly related to the curvature of the utility function: risk neutral individuals have linear utility functions, while risk seeking individuals have convex and risk averse have concave utility functions. The degree of risk aversion can be measured by the curvature of the utility function (Expected utility hypothesis, Wikipedia)
Following some findings in the context of risk-aversion:
1. Risk-aversion is an individual matter:
The man who would give up all his life's joy, rather than have it contain also the slightest degree of suffering, can do so from a classical utilitarian position. The negative utilitarian position is functionally equivalent to a certain type of classical utilitarian position - a position where pleasure holds very little value (Negativity, utilitarian.org).
The man who would give up all his life’s joy, rather than have it contain also the slightest degree of suffering is extremely risk-averse and would be called mentally ill, according to any known standard.
2. Risk-aversion depends on the kind of happiness or suffering. Prospect Theory e.g. discovered specific curves for risk-aversion in the context of monetary wins and losses. But the suffering involved in losing money is not representative for all kinds of suffering. The intensity of suffering (as opposed to duration) seems to have an exponential dimension (see Negative Utilitarianism).
3. There is a controversial discussion about the phenomenon of hedonic adaptation.
3.4 Compassion
Compassion is not merely an affective state (empathy with suffering people) it has cognitive aspects as well:
1. The close genetic relationship between all humans which says that a significant part of our self exists in the others. This relationship might explain the phenomenon of the enhanced perception of the self.
2. Contractarianism is an attempt to construct ethics on the basis of self-interest and rationality. From the point of view of Rawls’original position risk-aversion and compassion is the same thing. Compassion is the bridge between Rawls’ concept and prioritarianism.
Empathy
Empathy is a psychological concept that describes the ability of one person (the so called observer) to feel in another person (the target). Most contemporary empathy researchers (e.g. Mark Davis, 1994) agree that two different aspects of empathy have to be distinguished: the cognitive and the affective aspect.
1. One speaks of cognitive empathy, if the outcome of an empathic process is that the observer knows what the target feels.
2. One speaks of affective empathy, if the observer feels something because of the perception of the target (compassion, the wish to help, the wish that the perceived situation would not exist etc.)
It has been speculated that empathy may be an essential part of the cause of moral and social behavior in humans and non-human animals.
Empathy might be related to mirror neurons in the human brain [Goldstein, 321], i.e. to a function which enables imitation learning and dissolves the barrier between the self and others.
Cognitive empathy
The cognitive aspect of empathy is sufficient to justify the Golden Rule
1) if the law-maker is conscious, that his role of observer (of suffering) can turn into the role of the target.
2) if the law-maker thinks rational
A person can also apply cognitive empathy to himself. It is a cognitive achievement to look into the future and think about ones destiny. It is possible to consider the person one will be in the future like a different person. In this case the look into the future is similar to an empathic process. As far as the observer knows what the target (in this case the person, that observer will be in the future) feels, it is an example of cognitive empathy.
1) If the person is conscious, that its role of observer will turn into the role of the target and
2) if the person thinks rational
then the Golden Rule can be applied within the same person.
Affective empathy
The more cognitive empathy is accompanied by affective empathy, the more it controls behavior.
1. The closer the relation to the suffering individual, the more affective empathy (in this case compassion) becomes dominant. The root of compassion is the biological utility function and the corresponding family relations. But the feeling of closeness can also emerge independent of the family. The more intense the suffering of an individual, the less he is competitor, rival or opponent. One is more affected by his suffering and he gains closeness. Actual fault of the victim facilitates to stay emotionally distant but only up to a certain point. In extreme cases of suffering the judgment prevails, that nobody deserves such a fate. The saying “I wouldn’t wish this on my worst enemy” may illustrate this.
2. If the feeling of closeness is lacking, then affective empathy often causes a spontaneous refutation, urging the person to look the other way. One doesn’t want “something like that” to exist. It disturbs, strikes as unpleasant or frightens.
It is known, that personal experiences of suffering enhance the capability to feel compassion. It is not required though, that these experiences must be exactly the same or have the same intensity as the ones of a victim. Personal experiences of suffering also change the attitude towards one’s own risks. A person who acts against his own interests is either not informed or irrational. In the latter case an empathic moral law could be used to protect the person from him/herself. But most people refuse a corresponding restriction of autonomy.
Example: A person sometimes changes his/her character within lifetime in such a way, that he/she seems to be a different person. The person of age 15 does not much care about the person of age 50 (e.g. smokes fully conscious of the risk of lung cancer). This lack of compassion within the same person is similar to the one across different persons. The application of the Golden Rule to different life phases of the same individual corresponds to “compassion with ones future self” and motivates e.g. to restrain from smoking.
Compassionate moral laws
Instead of taking the model of an empathic process to explain what happens, when a person looks on his/her own future, it is also possible to turn it the other way round: The emotional process taking place, when a person looks at him/herself from a distance, is a model for the empathic process directed at others. The difference in time (different life phases and corresponding appearance and character traits) is experienced like the difference in space (other persons with different appearance and character traits). The position of the ego becomes relative. This can lead to the insight that the suffering of others is as real (and consequently as important) as ones own suffering. It can (but does not have to) lead to compassion and to the acceptance of corresponding moral laws.
Compassionate moral laws
1. are an extension of impartial moral laws to non-contractual cases and make these issue a major concern of ethics
2. can be implemented by applying cognitive empathy
3. do not meet the requirements of contractarianism.
4. are a benchmark for existing ethical systems
Non-contractual cases
Philosophers, who treat morality as primarily contractual tend to discuss non-contractual cases briefly, casually and parenthetically, as though they were rather rare. The contractarian view is that those who fail to clock in as normal rational agents and make their contracts are just occasional exceptions, constituting one more minority group, but not a central concern of any society [Midgley]
1. There may be a mutual benefit between parents and children. There may also be a mutual benefit between domestic and breeding animals and their owners. But there is no contract which demands a fair treatment of children and animals.
2. The cooperation with mentally retarded or insane persons does not lead to mutual benefit, the benefit is one-sided.
3. Retarded or insane persons cannot carry out their duty and take responsibility. Not all principles of the contract apply to them and therefore they do not fulfill the conditions of an impartial contract.
4. With similar arguments, persons with low intelligence could be excluded from a social contract.
5. Sentient animals can feel pain as well as humans but cannot fulfill the conditions of a contractor.
Conclusion: Mutual benefit and impartial contracts are not a sufficient basis for moral rules.
Since non-contractual cases cannot carry out their duties and take responsibility, human rights cannot meaningfully be assigned. But compassionate moral laws demand that they get protection to an extent which corresponds to their degree of suffering. Rawls’ first principle allows for the process of evolutionary adaptation (which requires competition). Non-contractual cases are among the losers in this competition. The idea of Rawls difference principle is to limit the suffering produced by the adaptation process. Non-contractual cases fulfill the trough no fault of one's own condition.
Counter-productivity of compassion
Example: In the context of surgery or accidents compassion leads to a mental blockade
According to consequentialism, the tools (means) have to be oriented towards the goals (ends). Although the goal (reduce suffering) is motivated by compassion, the action may demand quite different feelings or even the absence of emotions.
1. Individual level: People who cannot control their emotions are probably not suited for the profession of a surgeon or a helper in need.
2. Society level: On this level the separation of tools and goals is realized institutionally. The health insurance is not expected to encounter the patient with compassion; it is only expected to help him pay the bills.
Adequacy of compassion
Example: The wish to help automatically disappears, if all beggars are publicly supplied (where “beggars” stands for “visible suffering”).
The perception of suffering is an important factor for the assignment of public and private resources. If the misery is not visible any more and the abuse of social benefit increases, then the wish to help weakens and the resources are cut until the beggars stand on the street again. One could therefore conclude that the problems are attacked in a reasonable way, if they reach a certain magnitude. “In situations of emergency, the salvaging forces grow” (Goethe).
The weak point in this reflection is that (in a global and long-term view) the distress grows faster than the salvaging forces. Since the phenomena of suffering emerged in evolution, it is growing quantitatively and qualitatively:
1) Biological evolution, see Utility and Suffering in Biology.
2) Cultural evolution; see Utility and Suffering in Culture.
3) Technological progress partially reduces suffering but builds up new risks of a previously unknown dimension. In those instances where the fight against suffering is successful, the success (in a global and long-term view) has to be “paid” by an increase in risks, see On the Perception of Risk and Benefit.
In many instances well-being grows for a majority and suffering (or risk) for a minority. It seems that the phenomenon of injustice increases as well with evolution.
Genetic basis
Compassionate moral laws get strong support from recent discoveries in biology:
1. There is a close (99.5%) genetic relation between all humans which is preserved by future generations (see Human Genetic Variation). The characteristics of an individual is also formed by the environment and chance (not only by genes), but the phenotype and the socially caused differences belie the wide commonalities. From a genetic point of view the differences in appearance could be so small (0.5%) that we would not even recognize them. We would be confronted with copies of ourselves in different stages of life and probably develop a more compassionate behaviour. The higher the degree of suffering, the more genetic closeness is an argument for emotional closeness. When it comes to extreme suffering the peculiarities of an individual’s gene-combination become unimportant, we are all the same. From this point of view compassionate laws and the “original position approach to justice” seem perfectly rational, whereas Buchanan’s anarchistic equilibrium appears distorted by temporary and biased interests.
2. The genetic difference between humans and certain animals is in the range of 1%. If the phenotype could reflect the similarity of the genotype then we couldn’t treat animals as we do now.
3. Human behavior is strongly influenced by the biological utility function, see God’s Utility Function. The insight that the temporary and biased self-interests are in truth the ones of the biological utility function can lead to a feeling of being manipulated, to the consciousness of heteronomy and to solidarity with the victims of biological mechanisms. By this change in identity, empathic laws become more rational and self-interest loses some of its attractiveness.
Rationality
1. The respect and support for non-contractual cases becomes rational, if the contractors feel compassion. The more compassion, the more the contractor identifies him/herself with the non-contractual cases and the more the preferences match.
2. Ethical principles can be based on cognitive empathy, provided that all contractors dispose of the necessary information. Non-contractual cases have to be represented by rational contractors. The normative force of cognitive empathy may not be as strong as the one of compassion and may not be sufficient to convince a majority. But the concept can be used to define a moral benchmark.
3. Compassionate preferences are in competition with egoistic preferences with regards to survival value. A rigorous implementation of compassionate laws gets into conflict with the preference of the majority to survive. Consequently, the majority considers rigorous compassionate laws to be irrational.
4. Negative Utilitarianism (NU)
4.1 Historical Background
Ancient world
1. The idea to formulate an ethical goal negatively originates in Buddhism and is more than 2000 years old.
2. Greek philosopher Epicurus has sometimes been caricatured as crude hedonist. But Epicurus also maintained the puzzling doctrine that the complete absence of pain constituted "the limit and highest point of pleasure" (Epicurus, David Pearce)
3. While Epicurus has been commonly misunderstood to advocate the rampant pursuit of pleasure, what he was really after was the absence of pain (both physical and mental, i.e., suffering) - a state of satiation and tranquility that was free of the fear of death and the retribution of the gods. When we do not suffer pain, we are no longer in need of pleasure, and we enter a state of 'perfect mental peace' (ataraxia). (Epicurus, Wikipedia)
Early utilitarianism
Historically utilitarianism was inspired by Stoicism and Epicureanism and therefore closer to negative utilitarianism than the contemporary interpretation:
Although the favored means of the term negative welfarism – a stoician-like control of the birth of one’s desires which it also calls “liberation” (moksa) – is in a sense opposed to economists’ conception (see Happiness-Freedom, Deep Buddhism and Modernity, Kolm 1982), scholarly welfarism is in fact historically the direct descent of this Indian philosophy. Indeed, the 18th century founders of utilitarianism were thoroughly inspired by Stoicism and Epicureanism [Rosen, Kolm], whereas the influence of Buddhist and Jain thoughts on Stoician and other Hellenistic philosophies is explained in the previous reference. The oblivion of self-formation occurred with that of the Rousseau-Kant “autonomy” by some narrowminded post-Mill 19th century scholars (even Mill’s “choice of lifestyle” is a downgrading of full eudemonistic self-formation). Note that the view that utilitarianism is the necessary all-encompassing criterion was, in the West, restricted to English-language scholars influenced by Bentham who introduced this view for a political reason. This is why Rawls appeared to be much less original in other circles who acknowledged constitutional basic rights and where egalitarianism was a familiar ideal. (Macrojustice from Equal Liberty, Serge-Christoph Kolm)
Also the Stoic cosmopolitanism corresponds well to utilitarianism. Stoicism, in contrast to Buddhism, was characterized by an optimistic world view. In contemporary negative utilitarianism we find both, optimistic and pessimistic visions of the future.
Popper
In the 20th century, the idea to formulate an ethical goal negatively is attributed to Karl Popper:
…there are no institutional means of making a man happy, but a claim not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good [Popper, 158]
At this point of chapter 9, Popper added his controversial note 2:
I believe that there is, from the ethical point of view, no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure. Both the greatest happiness principle of the Utilitarians and Kant’s principle “Promote other people’s happiness…” seem to me (at least in their formulations) wrong on this point which, however, is not completely decidable by rational argument (…). In my opinion human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway.
A further criticism of the Utilitarian formula “Maximize pleasure” is that it assumes, in principle, a continuous pleasure-pain scale which allows us to treat degrees of pain as negative degrees of pleasure. But, from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure and especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure. Instead of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least amount of avoidable suffering for all; and further, that unavoidable suffering – such as hunger in times of unavoidable shortage of food – should be distributed as equally as possible.
There is some analogy between this view of ethics and the view of scientific methodology which I have advocated in my The Logic of Scientific Discovery. It adds to clarity in the fields of ethics, if we formulate our demands negatively, i.e. if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness. Similarly, it is helpful to formulate the task of scientific method as the elimination of false theories (from the various theories tentatively preferred) rather than the attainment of established truths [Popper, 284].
Popper’s notes on ethics were not only influenced by his epistemological work, but also by personal and historical experience:
1) The failure of happiness-promoting philosophies like classical utilitarianism and Marxism
2) Sixteen of Popper’s closest relatives became victims of Nazi Germany, partially in Auschwitz, some committed suicide (from Die Erkenntnistheorie und das Problem des Friedens)
R.N.Smart
The term negative utilitarianism was introduced by R.N.Smart in a paper criticizing Popper’s approach to ethics:
….one may reply to negative utilitarianism (hereafter called NU for short) with the following example, which is admittedly fanciful, though unfortunately much less so than it might have seemed in earlier times.
Suppose that a ruler controls a weapon capable of instantly and painlessly destroying the human race. Now it is empirically certain that there would be some suffering before all those alive on any proposed destruction day were to die in the natural course of events. Consequently the use of the weapon is bound to diminish suffering, and would be the ruler’s duty on NU grounds (…).
Admittedly my example does not quite work as it stands against Professor Popper inasmuch as he propounds two other principles to set alongside NU, viz. (briefly) "Tolerate the tolerant" and "No tyranny". Presumably the benevolent world-exploder might be thought intolerant and/or tyrannical (…) …if we allow "Tolerate the tolerant" and "No tyranny" to stand as principles alongside NU, there will be a conflict between them and NU regarding our example. If we take NU seriously, surely we should over-ride the other principles (Negative Utilitarianism)
There is no indication in Popper’s text which says that NU should override the other principles. On the contrary, it is more likely that Popper would have promoted human rights as a side constraint for any attempt to improve the state of affairs.
1. Concerning the conflict between human rights and NU see chapter 5.2
2. For an analysis of NU’s hostile potential see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering.
The pinprick argument
The strict interpretation of the statement “…from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure (…)” leads to counter-intuitive conclusions. The most important says that not even the pain of a pinprick can be compensated by happiness and the empty world would accordingly be preferable to a world with minor suffering (see The Pinprick Argument). Other disturbing consequences of a complete devaluation of happiness are the following:
1) Let’s consider two persons with equal lifetime and equal periods of suffering. One of them experiences happy periods in addition, the other one neutral periods. Since happiness has no intrinsic moral value, NU assigns the same (negative) number to the welfare of both lives. This is counter-intuitive to most people and only becomes plausible, if we assume that the loss of happiness at the end of life creates a corresponding suffering. An unhappy person has nothing to lose and is therefore better off at the end of life. Nevertheless (since a person may also die in an accident without being conscious of such a loss) the complete devaluation of happiness is a conceptual weakness.
2) If one population contains a life with negative welfare, and another doesn’t, then the latter population is always better and the difference in positive welfare doesn’t matter at all. Negativist theories don’t allow for any trade-offs between negative and positive welfare [Arrhenius, 100].
However, a complete devaluation of happiness doesn’t conform to the intentions of Karl Popper. Risk aversion and compassion are at the core of Popper’s notes on ethics, but with respect to the major risks in life and not to the pain of a pinprick.
1) Popper used the term pain, and not the terms inconvenience and disturbance when he spoke about the moral dubiety of compensation and the context of his note was the fight against the greatest and most urgent evils of society [Popper, 158]. He never denied compensation in minor cases of suffering.
2) If we assume that the moral weight of suffering people is higher than the one of happy people then it becomes difficult to compensate severe cases of suffering. Not because the process of compensation is denied or because happiness has no value, but simply because happiness doesn’t have enough value. Parfit’s claim about compensation [Parfit, 337] and Wolf’s misery principle [Wolf 2004, 63] agree with Popper’s intuition concerning the compensation across different persons.
3) It is more plausible to affirm compensation within the same person. But even then, it may be questioned in major cases of suffering:
a) Sometimes a trauma is perceived like the end of life and new happiness like the happiness of a different person. No happiness of the new person can ever repair what has been done to the old person. If we deny compensation across different persons, then we should also deny compensation in such a case.
b) If a chain smoker comes down with lung cancer, can we say that the early smoking pleasure compensates the later illness? From a moral point of view it is dubious to consume pleasure at the cost of ones own future self. If we consider our future self to be a different person (which is defensible in view of the personality change) then we should deny compensation in such a case.
Conclusion
It seems that the critics of Popper’s notes on ethics more or less criticized their own interpretation of negative utilitarianism. It is therefore legitimate to look for a more plausible (prioritarian) interpretation of Popper’s statements.
4.2 Terminology
For a definition of the terms utility and welfare see chapter 2.6
For a definition of the terms risk-aversion and expected utility see chapter 3.1
In this paper we interpret negative utilitarianism as a special case within prioritarianism. We start with a few terms that are required to define this special case:
Degrees of suffering
The degree of suffering is defined by a certain combination of intensity and duration (Negative Utilitarianism, Dan Geinster). There are accordingly two cases which make it impossible to compensate suffering by happiness:
1) Duration: The utility of life turns negative, if the feeling that life is not worth living connects with a long duration.
2) Intensity: The utility of life turns negative, if the intensity of a negative event outweighs the positive contributions of all other periods in life.
If the psychological capability to compensate is destroyed and the destruction is as irreversible as a physical destruction, then both criteria may apply.
In this paper we use the following terminology:
1) Minor suffering can be compensated by happiness, i.e. the utility of life has a positive sign.
2) Major suffering turns the utility of life negative. It can be associated with terms like physical trauma, psychological trauma and major depressive disorders and fulfils the criteria (duration, intensity or both) mentioned above.
3) Extreme suffering corresponds to strongly negative utility, i.e. to extreme cases within major suffering.
Degrees of compassion
In a history of social welfare a prioritarian rule impedes the compensation of suffering by happiness. The more weight is given to suffering (relative to happiness), the more difficult it becomes to compensate. We start with a linear weighing function and then increase step by step the weight of suffering (respectively decrease the weight of happiness), so that the function becomes more concave:
1) If happiness is not devaluated, then one half of a population (if it is happy) is sufficient to compensate the suffering of the other half. As soon as the number of happy people exceeds the number of suffering people social welfare gets a positive sign. We call this compassion-neutral. Classical utilitarianism conforms to this term.
2) Prioritarianism assigns more moral weight to suffering people than to happy people so that compensation becomes accordingly difficult. The devaluation of happiness relative to suffering is a measure for compassion.
a) Low compassion: A majority of happy people outweighs the suffering of a minority, but social welfare turns negative before the number of suffering people reaches half of the population.
b) High compassion: A majority of happy people outweighs the major suffering but not the extreme suffering of a minority. Social welfare turns negative, if there is a single person with extreme suffering.
c) Extreme compassion: Happiness cannot outweigh the least kind of suffering. Social welfare turns negative, if there is a single suffering person, even if the degree of suffering is minimal.
Degrees of risk-aversion
From the original position (risk) point of view the compensation of suffering by happiness corresponds to the calculation of an average for the expected value. A prioritarian rule pulls the average down, because the outcomes with suffering get more weight.
1) Risk neutrality: If we are in a neutral state (utility equal zero) and accept a bet with
a) 50% chance to become happy (positive utility)
b) 50% risk to become a major sufferer (negative utility)
then we speak of a risk-neutral attitude.
2) Risk-aversion means that (starting from a neutral position) we only accept a bet, if the probability for happiness is higher than the one for suffering. This corresponds to a devaluation of happiness relative to suffering.
a) Low risk-aversion means to accept a bet with a high probability for happiness and a low probability for suffering. The expected utility of life turns negative, before the probability for suffering reaches the one for happiness.
b) High risk-aversion means to accept a bet with a low probability for major suffering and no risk for extreme suffering. The expected utility of life turns negative, if there is a risk of extreme suffering.
c) Extreme risk-aversion means to exclusively accept bets, where happiness is guaranteed. The expected utility of life turns negative, if there is a risk of suffering, even if the degree and the probability are minimal.
4.3 Definition
Relation to prioritarianism
We can roughly distinguish between two attitudes relative to suffering:
1. Accept the world as it is, i.e. postulate that no matter what kind of suffering existed and exists; it is worth to preserve life.
2. Deny the world as it is, i.e. postulate that there are kinds of suffering that cannot be justified (compensated) by other values in life.
In prioritarianism
1. the first attitude is characterized by positive social welfare
2. the second attitude is characterized by negative social welfare
In this paper we interpret negative utilitarianism as the domain within prioritarianism where social welfare turns negative.
Risk-aversion in the original position
Let’s assume that we start in a position, where social welfare has a positive sign, and then increase compassion. At a certain degree of compassion social welfare turns negative. From the point of view of a decision-maker in the original position, the turning point is characterized by a certain degree of risk-aversion, i.e. compassion corresponds to risk-aversion in the original position and negative social welfare corresponds to a negative expected utility of life.
The different versions of negative utilitarianism correspond to different degrees of risk-aversion in the original position:
1) According to the pinprick version the turning point (degree) is extreme risk-aversion.
2) In this paper we suggest that a more plausible turning point (degree) is high risk-aversion.
We will use the abbreviation NU for the second of above two versions.
Rawls’ decision-maker in the original position doesn’t know in which position he/she will be born. But he/she knows that the more people exist with a specific utility, the higher the probability is to be born in exactly this position. The probability to become a victim of major suffering corresponds to the number of people with a corresponding degree of suffering. There is not only the risk to become the victim of a tragic destiny, but also the risk to be born as a very sensitive person (who cannot bear the horrible suffering or death of other persons). Nevertheless, statistically spoken, the probability to become an extreme sufferer is small. So why should the decision-maker in the original position assign a negative total utility to life? The answer is experience. Experience enforces risk-aversion because of the asymmetry of suffering and happiness (chapter 3.2). With increasing experience, the dominant end of behavior converges towards the avoidance of extreme suffering. A hypothetical complete experience (including all kinds of suffering and happiness) would therefore result in a clear first priority given to the avoidance of extreme suffering. NU postulates that the judgments of Rawls’ decision-maker should be based on such a complete experience.
It may be rational to distribute economical welfare according to a risk-neutral strategy, but it is irrational (for an experienced person) to take the risk of extreme suffering (unless it prevents suffering of an even higher magnitude).
Comparison with Buddhism
See Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering
Comparison with classical utilitarianism
The classical utilitarian idea to calculate individual utility out of a utility function is discarded in the context of NU. Like prioritarianism, NU concentrates on the calculation of social welfare out of individual utilities. The relation between classical utilitarianism and NU can best be understood if the two ethics are seen as border cases within prioritarianism. Classical utilitarianism is the border case without any devaluation of happiness. The more happiness is devaluated, the more prioritarianism converges towards NU.
1) Bentham found pain and pleasure to be the only intrinsic values in the world: "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure." From this, he derived the rule of utility: the good is whatever brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people, human beings (Utilitarianism, Wikipedia)
Concerning prioritarianism we can conclude that
a) the higher the intrinsic moral value of happiness is relative to suffering, the more it makes sense to increase respectively maximize it.
b) the lower the intrinsic moral value of happiness is relative to suffering, the more it makes sense to concentrate on the avoidance of suffering, i.e. it makes no sense to increase happiness above the level that is required to avoid cultural depression.
If happiness has little intrinsic moral value, then chances can easily be sacrificed in order to avoid risks. NU is risk-averse ethics; classical utilitarianism is risk-neutral.
2) Any amount of suffering can be outweighed by a sufficient amount of happiness. There may be no imaginable amount of happiness that can outweigh the horrors of Auschwitz. But there might be an unimaginable amount that can do it (see Negativity, utilitarian.org).
a) In classical utilitarianism it is theoretically possible that the suffering of the Auschwitz victims could be outweighed by the happiness of the post war generations. Popper heavily opposed this idea. He generally denied the idea that the suffering of a person might be compensated by the happiness of a different person. In a strict sense this principle corresponds to the Leximin rule (see chapter 2.4). But an extreme interpretation of Popper’s statement about compensation doesn’t correspond to his intentions. It is more plausible to claim that there are certain kinds of suffering that cannot be compensated, and not to deny the principle of compensation as such.
b) In NU actual suffering can be justified, if it prevents future suffering of an even greater magnitude. But the Holocaust certainly doesn’t allow such an interpretation.
3) The purity argument
A negative utilitarian could respond that the pain from a pinprick is of a qualitatively different nature than the pain of, say, bone cancer, or bereavement, or torture, or the mass cruelties of genocide. A pinprick or its equivalent doesn't involve suffering - with its terrible baggage of emotional distress.
Yet this response to the Pinprick Argument seems ad hoc. It undermines the purity of the negative utilitarian ethic. For where is the supposed cut-off point? When does pain become real suffering? How much mild pain/suffering is morally permissible? Who should determine these limits? If the avoidance of pain or suffering is accounted more morally important than happiness, but happiness is not accounted wholly morally negligible, then how can their relative importance be quantified? How can well-being and suffering be made commensurable? What kind of metric should be used? Should the fate of the world rest on an arbitrary, or at least a conventional, cut-off point on the pleasure-pain axis? (The Pinprick Argument)
1. An ethical theory can never be pure like a mathematical function. Take classical utilitarianism: at what point does happiness turn into suffering? No matter where we draw the line between the morally good and bad the cut-off point will always be vague. Contemporary utilitarianism uses the term vague without being called impure or messy. Example: [Broome 2004, 172].
2. The problem how to make happiness and suffering commensurable also exists in classical utlilitarianism. The weighing of happiness against suffering is investigated in prioritarianism (chapter 3).
3. Is there a kind of suffering that cannot be compensated by any other value in life? NU claims that this kind of suffering exists, at least for experienced or empathic persons. No doubt there are numerous obstacles in finding a consensus on negative utilitarian priorities but the same applies to classical utilitarianism. Example: Copenhagen Consensus. According to Popper a piecemeal (trial and error) strategy is the most promising approach.
4.4 Social Welfare
For a definition of the term social welfare see chapter 2.6.
How can utility be measured?
The idea of classical utilitarianism was to calculate individual utility out of preferences for consumption. As long as utility is measured in terms of money there is a well-known cardinal scale. But as soon as happiness is detached from the monetary system, its measurement becomes difficult. The Hedonistic Calculus gives some insight into the complexity of the matter.
1. Neoclassical economics has given up cardinal values for economical preferences. For all other preferences it is even more unrealistic to define their contribution to happiness in cardinal terms. The idea of an individual utility function which allows calculating utility out of preferences doesn’t make sense.
2. The idea to calculate individual utility is still alive, although in a modest form. The happiness of every period in one’s life is equally weighed and accumulated. Negative periods are compensated by positive ones so that the result is (in most cases) a positive number [Broome 2004, 241].
3. Happiness economics has shown that people can answer to survey questions like “Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy?” The fact that this is possible suggests that all kinds of preference-frustrations and –satisfactions (including immaterial ones) can somehow be mapped to a single hedonistic scale. Individual utilities are not calculated but measured directly and empirically.
In the following we assume that NU disposes of empirical data (subjective valuations) for individual utility.
Top-down or bottom-up?
Individualism is the ethical norm of traditional economics. It is assumed that each individual knows best what is good for him/her (subjectivism) and that the restriction of individual liberty can only be justified by majority decision: Each individual has the same weight (rights) in collective decisions (see Short History of Welfare Economics, chapter 1). In theory this corresponds to a bottom-up kind of ethics, but in practice the most important preferences (besides the biological ones) are determined top-down by socialization [Kleinewefers, 278].
If NU could be implemented, it would represent a risk-averse and compassionate socialization, an ethical ideal which corrects arbitrary and inexperienced preferences. But in contrast to other socializations NU is based on a scientific worldview and attempts to justify its norms in the Kantian tradition. Insofar the top-down process of socialization is open to bottom-up criticism. The NU-ideal promotes
1. the goal to reduce the number of suffering people
2. legal and economical conditions that support this goal
3. guidelines for education that support the goal and its implementation
Since NU does not advocate an ideological dictatorship it stands in democratic competition with alternatives like subjectivism.
1) The promotion of the ethical norm (NU ideal on the constitutional level) is a top-down process
2) The decisions about new laws and public investments are a mixture of (top-down) expert knowledge and (bottom-up) democratic (dis)approval.
3) The control, if the target has been achieved, is a bottom-up (utilitarian) aggregation of subjective valuations, i.e. an aggregation of survey results about suffering.
Preference aggregation
1) Public concerns: Preferences have to be aggregated by means of voting systems.
How can the effect of legal changes and economical investments on social welfare be estimated? Appropriate methods are the quantitative and qualitative valuation of alternatives, using statistics, cost-benefit analysis, simulations of systemic networks as proposed by Frederic Vester, etc. Possible changes have to be analyzed by specialists and result in technocratic options for action. These options enter the political process and end in democratic decisions. The hedonistic success of democratic decisions can only be verified by using the utilitarian bottom-up method (surveys about individual well-being).
2) Individual concerns:
a) The aggregation of material preferences in free markets makes the economy efficient but produces negative side effects like damage caused to the environment, instability of the financial system and unhealthy specialization. Whereas the environment theoretically can be protected and financial markets stabilized, the forces of the market (which serve the interests of the majority) will continue to violate the interests of minorities. Free markets destroy e.g. the livelihood of indigenous people and the chances to live a simple life without technology. Does the gain in technological power outweigh the frustrations of unnatural living conditions? In a global free market we lose alternative cultures (ethics) which could serve as a basis for surveys and comparisons. The traditional aggregation of economical preferences into indicators like income (as a measure of potential consumption and corresponding happiness) is clearly insufficient (see Short History of Welfare Economics)
b) Immaterial preferences are aggregated in the surveys of happiness economics, although intermingled with the other types of preferences. Concerning the shortcomings of happiness economics see Moral Relativism and the Search for Happiness.
4.5 Ethical Progress
Principle of consequentialism
A negative expected utility asks for childlessness. But humankind could never be eliminated by the moral ideal of childlessness, so that major suffering continues. On the other hand parenthood can be morally justified (according to NU) if the children contribute to the reduction of suffering. If we interpret cultural evolution as a kind of earthly redemption, then the unavoidable suffering of the actual and past generations could be considered as a necessary sacrifice for future generations. All depends on the belief (respectively disbelief) in ethical progress:
1. The vision of Enlightenment is correct according to NU, if and only if it can be shown, that the state of affairs can be improved.
2. A non-violent strategy (like Mahajana Buddhism) is correct according to NU, if and only if it can be shown, that all violent actions (including the monopoly of power of the state) are counterproductive.
3. A completely passive strategy (like Theravada Buddhism) is correct according to NU, if and only if it can be shown, that all actions (including selfless aid) are counterproductive.
Since we cannot exclude the vision of Enlightenment, we have to account for both, optimistic and pessimistic scenarios of the future. How would a corresponding constitution look like?
NU constitution
The term improvement of social welfare has a specific meaning in NU. Popper suggested that we should search for a consensus on the avoidance of suffering, and leave the search for happiness to the individual.
“The role of the state is not to make people happy but to relieve avoidable suffering.”[Popper]
Given that the vision of Enlightenment is correct: What are the legal preferences that reduce the number of major sufferers? Since there is no theoretical answer to this question we have to work with empirical data:
1. Human rights and the corresponding rights-duty duality [Rawls 1958, 179] can be considered as empirically found safeguards against major kinds of suffering. More precisely we can make the case that human rights produce the smallest number of major sufferers. Consequently it is not allowed to improve the state of affairs by (painlessly) killing the sufferers (as insinuated in R.N.Smarts interpretation of negative utilitarianism) and voluntary euthanasia is only allowed under conditions which prevent abuse. The question, if this empirical justification of human rights has to be seen as a weakness of the theory will be discussed in chapter 5.2.
2. In a world of limited resources an increasing population increases the potential for conflicts. A tool to reduce the number of major sufferers is therefore a risk-averse population policy.
3. Experience has shown that the risks of complex systems are systematically underestimated. The number of major sufferers can be reduced by a risk-averse strategy with regard to natural and technological risks.
If the constitution is too rigorous, the number of major depression increases; if it is too negligent, the number of psychological and physical traumas increases. Obviously risk-aversion has two dimensions: life is risky but so is the suppression of life.
Measurement of social welfare
In countries where surveys are prohibited we can roughly measure social welfare by the number and quality of human rights violations (e.g. on the basis of Amnesty’s annual report), a measure which is quite different from the popular GDP. In states where human rights are respected we can measure the subjective perception of suffering by means of surveys (see happiness economics).
Let’s assume that human rights are implemented and we measure social welfare by means of the World Values Survey, which classifies well-being according to the question “Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy?”. This is not a cardinal scale, but delivers enough information to set priorities.
1. NU would attempt to decrease the number of not at all happy people with first priority and valuate the situation negative as long as extremely suffering people exist.
2. Classical utilitarianism would attempt to increase the GDP, involving all classes of well-being. It would compensate the number of unhappy people with the happy ones and valuate the situation positive.
The ranking of the countries by the criterion social welfare would accordingly be different.
What difference does it make, if global ethical priorities are based on the classical utilitarian approach to save as many lives as possible or the negative utilitarian approach to remove as much suffering as possible? For an answer to this question see Negative Utilitarian Priorities.
Political strategy
Whatever the future holds, NU ethics will presumably still fail to resonate with the overwhelming majority of the population - especially after our emotional well-being increases as the adoption of enhancement technologies gathers pace. So perhaps the most effective way for a negative utilitarian to promote his/her ethical values is not to proselytize under that label at all. Instead, the negative utilitarian may find it instrumentally rational to give weight overtly to the "positive" values of ordinary classical utilitarians, preference utilitarians/preference consequentialists, and the far wider community of (mostly) benevolent non-utilitarians who share an aversion to "unnecessary" suffering. The indirect approach to NU is likely to yield the greatest payoff. Only by our striving to promote "positive" goals as well, and campaigning for greater individual well-being, is the ethic of NU ever likely to be realized in practice (Direct versus Indirect NU, in The Pinprick Argument, by David Pearce)
David Pearce’s strategy corresponds well with NU, as long as the “positive” goals prevent suffering (e.g. depression) and don’t have to be “paid” with future suffering.
Private initiatives
Suggestions for private initiatives can be found in Negative Utilitarian Priorities.
5. Rawls’ Theory Compared with NU
Rawls knew Popper’s normative claims [Rawls 1958, 174] and may have been influenced by Popper’s work:
1. The liberty principle is the basis of an open society as defined by Popper.
2. The difference principle takes account of Popper’s notes on asymmetry (chapter 4.1)
5.1 Economical Welfare
We start the comparison with the economical aspect of welfare, represented by the difference principle. In the realm of economy welfare is cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable.
Regulation
Economics according to NU would be more regulated (restricted) than economics according to Rawls, because it promotes the protection of non-contractual cases (chapter 5.3) and risk-aversion in the technological sector (chapter 5.4). Empirical findings support the thesis that individualism enables faster progress in the economical sector than collectivism [Hirata, 19] and consequently produces more resources for redistribution. Regulation may have a similar effect like collectivism and NU may therefore lose in an economical competition with Rawls (at least as long as the technological risk-takers don’t produce a disaster). NU, however, questions the moral significance of the absolute level of economical welfare.
Redistribution
There are various interpretations of Rawls’ difference principle (besides Maximin) which make a comparison difficult. NU attempts to balance
1) the suffering produced by the inequality of economical welfare with
2) the suffering produced by redistribution, e.g. tax systems
According to the law of diminishing marginal utility a rich person suffers less from an established redistribution than a poor person suffers from the lacking of such redistribution. But classical utilitarianism doesn’t take into account the discouragement produced by taxes. If the hard working people are discouraged, then the economy is less efficient, produces fewer resources for redistribution and the suffering of the poor will accordingly increase. In view of the economy’s complexity, good solutions can only be found by the analysis of empirical data and pragmatic changes to the tax system. The result will be an indifference curve of the intermediate type (see chapter 2.4).
5.2 Human Rights and the Higher Purpose
Risk-aversion
Risk-aversion follows from the idea of the original position and justifies the difference principle. But it is hard to see why distributive justice should be risk-averse and human rights risk-tolerant. Rawls obviously considered human rights to be risk-averse. The thesis in other words goes as follows: Human rights cause lower risks than a further restriction of those rights. But is that true?
Example: If a certain speed limit causes 2% or 20% victims a year is irrelevant in Rawls’ theory, as long as it reflects the will of the majority. A moral principle which demands to lower the speed limit against the will of the majority is considered to be totalitarian.
Let’s look at some justifications of the thesis:
1. Suffering belongs to life and cannot be eliminated. This argument doesn’t hold in the speed limit example above.
2. A further restricting of human rights asks too much from the majority and induces counterproductive results. This argument again, doesn’t hold in the speed limit example.
3. Technological progress is partly uncontrollable. This is a valid argument for global warming (because of the complexity of the system), but not for the speed limit.
4. To tolerate certain kinds suffering (injustice) increases the Darwinian fitness (of the members) of a culture. This is probably the essence of the matter. Road traffic is just one example of a whole collection of cruel games with winners and losers, games which are tolerated or even welcome by the majority. The injustice concerns those who become victims in spite of denying the games.
To implement NU means to investigate which kinds of happiness (or advantages, efficiency etc.) can be sacrificed in order to reduce total suffering. The avoidable suffering then has to be weighed against the suffering produced by a restriction of liberty. The best state is equilibrium between these two different kinds.
Reflective equilibrium
1) According to Rawls the best state of affairs is defined by a reflective equilibrium between liberty and solidarity. Human rights represent the core of this equilibrium, i.e. they define a compromise between liberty and protection. In contrast, NU theoretically allows sacrificing human rights, if the sacrifice reduces total suffering. The overruling of human rights by total utility is not a peculiarity of NU; it applies to utilitarianism in general.
2) The arguments in favor of Rawls are of an empirical nature, predominantly historical experiences with totalitarian ideologies. History justifies a deep skepticism opposite to ethical theories which promise a decrease in suffering by restricting human rights. The minority problem is not only disturbing in tyranny and fascism, but also in democracies. Under certain circumstances the aggregation of preferences allows exterminating a minority by majority decision [Hare, 121-122]. In order to make NU compatible with Rawls’ theory, human rights would have to be guaranteed as side constraints of welfare maximization [Noczick]. These side constraints guarantee that the individual cannot be subordinated to a higher purpose of any kind. But thereby NU loses its original characteristics. If the higher purpose is the elimination of extreme suffering then side constraints might make it impossible to ever reach this goal. The two positions can best be compared with a thought experiment: Assume that the actual state of affairs persists or worsens and that there is a technology which allows painlessly annihilating life on earth:
a) A democrat of the Rawls type wouldn’t use the technology because it violates human rights.
b) A negative utilitarian would be morally obliged to use it
(Negative Utilitarianism, David Pearce)
But again, the overruling of human rights (under certain conditions) is not a particularity of NU; it applies to utilitarianism in general. If it were known with certainty that the future suffering exceeds the future happiness, then a classical utilitarian would have to act in the same way.
Skepticism
Both concepts can be challenged from a skeptical point of view:
1) Rawls concept is pluralistic and tolerant with regard to all religions and beliefs except for those which question human rights. From a skeptical point of view human rights are not so much the result of philosophical insight, but rather the result of historical experiences (in particular the Holocaust). New experiences may lead to changes. Example: the right to have an unlimited number of children or the right to live an unlimited number of years might have to be restricted.
2) NU would (if life could be annihilated painlessly) terminate the process of cognition, an ethical position which is intolerable from a skeptical point of view. NU, on the other hand, considers skepticism as a principle which blocks action and perpetuates extreme suffering.
5.3 Non-Contractual Cases
A major point of criticism in Rawls’ concept is the lacking protection of non-contractual cases. The impartial spectator should protect all sentient beings according to their degree of suffering, no matter if they think rational and no matter if they are able to sign a contract. Such an impartial spectator, though, would transcend the boundaries of social contract theory.
Bentham
Bentham became known as one of the most influential of the utilitarians, through his own work and that of his students. These included his secretary and collaborator on the utilitarian school of philosophy, James Mill; James Mill's son John Stuart Mill; and several political leaders including Robert Owen, who later became a founder of socialism (…)
Bentham is widely recognized as one of the earliest proponents of animal rights. He argued that animal pain is very similar to human pain and that the day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. Bentham argued that the ability to suffer, not the ability to reason, must be the benchmark of how we treat other beings. If the ability to reason were the criterion, many human beings, including babies and disabled people, would also have to be treated as though they were things (Jeremy Bentham, Wikipedia)
Rawls
Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. For it is clear that the contractarian idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system, that is, to a system including principles for all the virtues and not only for justice (…) Obviously if justice as fairness succeeds reasonably well, a next step would be to study the more general view suggested by the name "rightness as fairness." But even this wider theory fails to embrace all moral relationships, since it would seem to include only our relations with other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves toward animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend that the contract notion offers a way to approach these questions which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to put them aside. We must recognize the limited scope of justice as fairness (Animal Ethics)
Conclusion
1. NU attempts to protect all sentient beings (according to their degree of suffering) which are not able to actively participate in a social contract. Speciesism is denied.
2. Rawls’ theory builds on impartiality and neglects the non-contractual cases.
Animals are protected by the principles of NU, but not by Rawls’ Theory of Justice.
5.4 Intergenerational Impartiality
Moral impartiality
There are various sorts of behavior that may be described as ‘impartial,’ and some of these obviously have little or nothing to do with morality (…) Consider an insane serial killer who chooses his victims on the basis of their resemblance to that some celebrity. The killer may be impartial with respect to his victims' occupations, religious beliefs, and so forth, but it would be absurd to regard this as a form of moral impartiality (Impartiality, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Intergenerational moral impartiality
If not mentioned otherwise in this paper, the term intergenerational impartiality is used in the sense of intergenerational moral impartiality.
1. The principle says that the actual generation isn’t allowed to improve its situation at the cost of future generations.
2. Inversely it says that the actual generation cannot be obliged to sacrifice itself for future generations.
According to Rawls the principle of intergenerational impartiality follows from the idea of the original position. Impartial laws can be considered as the rational choice of a future individual. But the distribution of economical welfare among generations is the subject of a controversial discussion; see Should we discount future generations welfare?
The principle of intergenerational impartiality is in conflict with certain human rights.
Examples:
1. The right to have an unlimited number of children is (in world of limited resources) in conflict with the right to alimentation, see The Procreation of Risk.
2. If the carbon technology induces global warming, it can be stopped by majority decision, even if the people in this branch of the industry lose their jobs. But if a majority works in the carbon industry and votes for politicians who promote their short-term interests, then the right to vote is in conflict with the right to live in a sustainable environment.
According to Rawls, intergenerational impartiality overrules the rights of the actual generation. But this hierarchy of principles has first to be enacted by a vast majority before it can be codified in the constitution. The case where this isn’t possible represents a well known moral dilemma:
Should a minority (e.g. Plato’s aristocrats) implement intergenerational impartiality by force, if the majority violates the principle?
The related question, if violence is a rational strategy to implement or defend human rights, is investigated in The Principle of Non-Violence and Disengagement. There is no universal answer.
The multigenerational entity
In NU the future generations (as far as they can be analyzed) are treated like components of a multi-generation entity. This multi-generation entity is subject to a risk-averse principle in much the same way as a single generation is subject to the (risk-averse) difference principle. The actual generation therefore can be morally obliged to make sacrifices according to the same logic as a wealthy single person can be obliged to accept the redistribution principle. Possibly a small sacrifice of the actual generation could improve the situation of countless future generations. In Rawls theory there is no higher purpose like the total welfare across all generations. The principle of intergenerational impartiality assigns the same rights to each generation.
Example:
1. Consider the case where it is known, that lives with positive welfare become increasingly (and definitely) unlikely. In this case NU would demand childlessness and Rawls’ theory would leave the decision up to the individual. NU is hostile from a biological point of view, but compassionate with regards to the suffering of the possible children.
2. If we now shift the probabilities in such a way that the chance to become happy increases and the risk to suffer decreases, then we will at some point arrive at the present situation (with an earthly redemption being highly improbable but not completely impossible). A pessimistic negative utilitarian would still ask for childlessness and prevent many possible children from suffering, whereas Rawls’ theory produces much happiness but doesn’t prevent people from catastrophes.
In a more general sense the situation can be depicted as follows:
If extreme suffering is inseparably tied to life (as postulated by the First Noble Truth of Buddhism) then Rawls’ theory supports the persistence of extreme suffering.
The principle of intergenerational impartiality unconditionally accepts a state of affairs, as long as the other principles are respected. But even in a perfectly fair political system, suffering could be immense. The suffering minority has to accept the state of affairs, because the happy majority accepts it. The principle of intergenerational impartiality only demands that the actual generation doesn’t decrease its suffering at the cost of future generations. Can we use the term justice for a concept, which supports the happiness of a majority at the cost of the extreme suffering of a minority?
Most people begin with the presumption that we morally ought to make the world better when we can (Consequentialism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
Rawls was conscious of the problem by speaking of justice as fairness and admitting that there are other meanings of justice.
6. Reincarnation Ethics
6.1 Metaphor
Intentionally or not, Rawls original position has an affinity to the Hindu concept of reincarnation. With respect to the term “veil of ignorance” (an allusion to the Sanscrit “avarana” or “veil of Maya”) it is allowed to speculate that Rawls was inspired by old Indian philosophy. Hindus imagine that a soul which descends into the body comes under the influence of cosmic delusion called Maya [Zimmer]. Individual delusion or ignorance creates ego-consciousness. Thus, when deluded and tempted by Maya the soul becomes the individual being which identifies itself with the finite body-frame and worldly objects. Rawls’ individual behind the veil of ignorance corresponds to a Hindu soul, waiting for incarnation.
6.2 Synthesis of Rawls’ Theory with NU
Synthesis
The synthesis of NU and Rawls’ Theory of Justice can be seen as a contemporary form of reincarnation ethics. In the following description we use above metaphor:
1. The contractor behind the veil of ignorance represents the interests of the future generations. He cannot look into the future but he is well informed about the past. This representative would choose a risk-averse welfare function if he/she is forced to be incarnated. Why? To be well informed means to know extreme suffering not only intellectually but also emotionally. To be well informed also means to dispose of the complete emotional experience of all individuals. For this purpose we look at the countless reincarnations (of genes) like a continuous stream of experiences similar to the different stages in the life of an individual. Extreme suffering leaves irreversible traces (like irreversible physical injuries) in the memory of the representative.
2. In real life the transfer of experience is prevented by the death of the individuals. The goal of reincarnation ethics is to pass the emotional experience (risk-aversion) to future generations by means of cultural tradition. This is the core of an alternative to the biological utility function. Rawls concept implicitly (without mentioning it) makes the assumption that the contractors are emotionally experienced (which explains their risk-aversion).
3. In Rawls metaphor it is assumed, that the rationally thinking contractors behind the veil of ignorance will be incarnated as rationally thinking contractors (some kind of a privileged incarnation). If we want to account for the NU protection of non-contractual cases then there are no such privileges: a contractor could be reincarnated as an insane child or as a laboratory animal. The synthesis is closer to the Hindu concept.
Rationality
Hinduism is reincarnation ethics, based on the knowledge of the sixth century B.C. Recent discoveries in biology have shown that a contemporary interpretation of reincarnation could bring the concept back to life. Ever since the close genetic relation between all humans is known, compassion seems to be more rational (see chapter 3.4) and reincarnation less counter-intuitive. If the idea of individual souls waiting for reincarnation is replaced by the idea of the gene-pool, then nothing is left which couldn’t be reconciled with a scientific worldview. An individual, who doesn’t know in which position he/she will be reincarnated, prefers impartial laws and risk-aversion. For a more general discussion on the rationality of root metaphors in ethics see Moral Relativism and the Search for Happiness.
There is a strong reason not to use the term contemporary reincarnation ethics without a clear definition of its meaning. The term reincarnation is historically tied to the reincarnation of individual souls and causes a corresponding confusion.
7. Conclusion
Contractualist view
Rawls’ Theory of Justice is the concept which comes closest to the intentions of negative utilitarianism without adopting its deficiencies.
1. Human rights can be considered as empirically found safeguards against some of the worst kinds of suffering.
2. Human rights guarantee, that individuals cannot be sacrificed to an ethical goal which they do not support.
Negative utilitarian view
From the negative utilitarian point of view Rawls’ theory has the following deficiencies:
1. Sentient beings which are not able to actively participate in a social contract remain unprotected
2. Even in a political system of perfect fairness suffering could be immense. Rawls principle of intergenerational impartiality allows such a state to persist. An ethical ideal should include a long-term vision of improvement, using technological progress and population ethics as a means to reduce suffering.
Risk point of view
1. Human rights (although they prevent some of the worst kinds of suffering) are risk-tolerant.
2. Intergenerational impartiality preserves human rights (and hence the corresponding risks).
In other words: Rawls’ concept assumes that the decision-maker in the original position unconditionally tolerates extreme suffering in order to survive. Negative utilitarianism makes this tolerance dependent on the future prospects: In a pessimistic scenario negative utilitarianism promotes childlessness in order to avoid extreme suffering.
Synthesis
The synthesis of the two concepts would be a social contract of the Rawls’ type whose contractors commit to risk-aversion.
Such a society would consist of
1. optimistic adherents of risk-aversion like bioethical abolitionists and like-minded transhumanists
2. pessimistic adherents of risk-aversion like Buddhists and antinatalists.
In such a society
1. The interests of non-contractual cases would be represented by contractors.
2. The principle of intergenerational impartiality would be combined with a risk-averse principle; particularly in population ethics (see The Procreation of Risk).
3. The risk-tolerance in the technological sector would be questioned.
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References
1. Atkinson, Anthony B.; Joseph E. Stiglitz (1980): Lectures on Public Economics. London, McGraw-Hill 2. Bentham, J., Value of a Pain or Pleasure (1778), in: B. Parekh (ed.): Bentham´s Political Thought, London 1973 3. Broome John (1991), Weighing Goods, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 4. Broome John (2004), Weighing Lives, Oxford University Press 5. Clarenbach Lars Albert (1999), Die Wohlfahrtstheorie auf der Grundlage kardinaler Messbarkeit und interpersoneller Vergleichbarkeit von Nutzen, Diplomarbeit, Köln 6. Dworkin Ronald (1977), Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press 7. Goldstein Bruce (2007), Sensation and Perception, Wadsworth 8. Harsanyi, John C. (1955): Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. In: Journal of Political Economy 63. Pp. 309-321. 9. Harsanyi John C. (1975), Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’ Theory, American Political Science Review 69: 594-606. 10. Hare Richard Mervyn (1976), Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, Contemporary British Philosophy, H.D. Lewis Ed. 11. Hirata Johannes (2004), Happiness and Economics 12. Hurley, Susan L. (1989): Natural Reasons. Personality and Polity. New York; Oxford 13. Kleinewefers Henner (2008), Einführung in die Wohlfahrtsökonomie, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 14. McCarthy David (2007), Utilitarianism and Prioritarianism II, Economics and Philosophy, 24, 1-33, Cambridge University Press 15. Midgley Mary (1994), Duties concerning islands, an Essay in Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, Oxford University Press 16. Nozick Robert (1994), The Rationality of Side Constraints, in Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, Oxford University Press 17. Parfit Derek (1984), Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford 18. Popper Karl R.(1945) The Open Society and its Enemies, Volume I, London, Fifth Edition (revised), Routledge, UK, 1966 19. Rawls, John B. (1958): Justice as Fairness. In: Philosophical Review 67. Pp. 164-194. 20. Rawls John (1971), A Theory of Justice, Belknap Publishers, Cambridge 21. Rawls John, Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2007, edited by Samuel Freeman. 22. Schefczyk Michael (2010), Der Nutzen der Freiheit, in Neue Zürcher Zeitung Nr.12, S.69 23. Singer Peter (1979), Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 24. Smith Adam (2004), Theorie der ethischen Gefühle, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg 25. Wolf Clark (1997), Person-affecting Utilitarianism and Population Policy, in J. Heller and N. Fotion, Eds, Contingent Future Persons, Kluwer Academic Publishers 26. Wolf Clark (2004), Repugnance, Where is Thy Sting? in The Repugnant Conclusion, Essays on Population Ethics, Kluwer Academic Publishers 27. Zimmer Heinrich (1961), Philosophies of India, edited by J.Campbell
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Further Reading
Empathy 1. Davis Mark, Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach 2. Rutgers University, Animal Rights 3. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Moral Development, 4. Sztybel David, Empathy and Rationality in Ethics
Empirical Research 1. Bosmans Christoph, Schokkaert Erik, Social Welfare, The Veil of Ignorance and Purely Individual Risk 2. Traub Stefan, Seidl Christian, Schmidt Ulrich, Levati Maria, Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding – or somebody else?
Game Theory 1. Baker L.S. (1999), Risk Aversion, Interactive Tutorial 2. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Game Theory and Ethics, 3. Voss Thomas, Wiese Harald, Vertragstheorie aus spieltheoretischer Sicht
Justice 1. Brian Barry (1989), Theories of Justice, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles 2. Broome John (1999), Ethics out of Economics, Cambridge University Press, UK 3. Cordes Christian, Schuber Christian, Towards a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract 4. Nzitat Henry P., From Equality to Inequality 5. Mongin Philippe, The Impartial Observer Theorem of Social Ethics 6. Sen Amartya, Equality of What? 7. Shearmur Jeremi (1996), The Political Thought of Karl Popper, Routledge, London
Negative Utilitarianism 1. Philosophy Forums, Negative Utilitarianism 2. Ryder Richard, Painism - historical and ethical aspects
Rawls’ Theory 1. Kay Charles, Justice as Fairness 2. Scott Alex, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 3. WordiQ, A Theory of Justice
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