Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering

It seems that expansion at the cost of the quality of life is a characteristic of the utility function of biology and that the moral value of negative utilitarianism (which does not favor this expansion) conflicts with biological forces.

Type of problem

Does the minimization of suffering necessarily lead to a hostile theory?

Hostility

1) Negative utilitarianism devaluates (volatile) chances in order to avoid risks and is therefore risk-averse ethics. Negative utilitarian population ethics is hostile in a pessimistic scenario and life-friendly in an optimistic scenario.

2) Monastic Buddhism is risk-averse as well as negative utilitarianism. In contrast to negative utilitarianism it excludes an optimistic scenario and is therefore definitively hostile.

3) With a complete devaluation of chances no world can be morally superior to the empty world. In Prioritarianism the devaluation is incomplete and represents a (theoretical) consensus with regard to compassion. The moral value assigned to the world can be positive or negative depending on this consensus.

Population ethics

1) A specific kind of population ethics is considered to be rational by the majority, if it corresponds to the risk-profile of the majority.

2) The population ethics of the majority is risk-tolerant because (in the course of evolution) it proved to have a higher survival value. In a competitive environment prioritarian population ethics succumbs to risk-tolerant population ethics. Competition can only be stopped if the perception of risk and benefit changes on a global level.

3) For an observer in the original position risk-averse population ethics is rational.

1 Introduction

Starting point

Classical utilitarianism has the deficiency, that it favors expansion at the cost of the quality of life:

Example: A population Z, consisting of 500 billion individuals, each with a life that is barely worth living, is better than a population A consisting of 1 billion individuals, each having lives that are of extremely high quality – as long as the sum of happiness (welfare) is greater in Z than in A. (Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion)

It seems that expansion at the cost of the quality of life is a characteristic of the utility function of biology (the maximal proliferation of genes) and that the moral value of negative utilitarianism (which does not favor this expansion) conflicts with biological forces.

Type of problem

Does the minimization of suffering necessarily lead to a hostile theory?

2 Risk Ethics

2.1 Terminology

Preference-satisfaction and –frustration, happiness and suffering

For a definition of these terms see Preferences and the Hedonistic Scale.

In this paper it is assumed that preference-satisfactions and –frustrations can be mapped to a single hedonistic scale (i.e. to terms like happiness and suffering). Example: The paramount preference survival is weighed up against suffering in the context of voluntary euthanasia.

Utility

1) Utility is the dominant end of human behavior. The replacement of the abstract concept of utility by the concrete meaning happiness is called hedonic reduction. In this paper we apply the hedonic reduction.

2) Individual utility is not equivalent to egoism. It can imply altruistic preferences as well as egoistic ones.

Welfare

The term quality of life, well-being or welfare is the net result of all preference-frustrations and -satisfactions. Satisfied preferences are counted positively and frustrated preferences negatively.

1) Welfare is positive, if the sum of all preference-satisfactions exceeds the one of all frustrations.

2) Welfare is negative, if the individual has lost his/her preference to exist.

Under the premises of hedonic reduction the term utility corresponds to the term welfare.

Risk

Risk is a state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities involve a loss, catastrophe, or other undesirable outcome (Risk, chapter “Risk vs. uncertainty”, Wikipedia)

Obviously, in order to define risk, one has to define situations like loss, catastrophe or undesirable outcome. Risk can be expressed in terms of suffering, preference-frustration, negative welfare etc. This definition makes clear, that risk (in contrast to uncertainty) can only be valuated relative to a goal. We can distinguish between the risks of

1) active behavior, e.g. the risks in the fight for dominance and expansion

2) passive behavior, e.g. the risks of stagnation in a changing environment (Stillstand = Rückschritt)

The risk-profile of a person is the entirety of the person’s attitudes towards risk (in different areas of decision-making).

The perception of risk

1) The biological goal is to survive and procreate or, more precisely, to maximize the proliferation of genes (see Dawkins, God’s utility function). Nature designed the hedonistic mechanism in such a way that it serves survival. Animals are suffering-tolerant.

2) In many cultures the hedonistic mechanism serves survival as well as in biology. But in contrast to animals, humans can reflect and deny goals. Asceticism, seen as adaptation to a scarce environment, serves two contradicting goals:

a) it serves survival as demonstrated by the Spartans and the Roman Stoics

b) it serves the avoidance of suffering as demonstrated by the Buddhists. In monastic Buddhism the goal to avoid suffering overrules the goal to survive. Intense (but volatile) happiness is devaluated in order to avoid risk. This example of suffering-averse ethics may be called hostile but not irrational. Cultural rationality is different from biological rationality.

3) In high-technology cultures we observe a similar phenomenon. Technology serves two contradicting goals

a) it improves the Darwinian fitness

b) it serves the avoidance of suffering as demonstrated by bioethical abolitionism. In the context of transhumanism the goal to live without pain even overrules the goal to have a biological and human existence. This kind of ethics is neither hostile nor irrational, but certainly deviates from biological rationality.

Since the biological nature of humans is characterized by suffering-tolerance and unrealistic optimism, the perception of technological as well as natural risks are distorted (see On the Perception of Risk and Benefit). Individual distortions depend on individual experience. The more experience, the less distortion. The perception on the society level is an aggregation of individual perceptions.

Hostility

We distinguish between the following types of hostility:

1. An expansionist strategy which destructs the environment

2. An inferior strategy in the battle for survival, leading to extinction

3. The preference for the empty world, the moral demand for childlessness

4. Moral killing (e.g. killing for mercy)

Except for the first type, all others may be caused by the goal to minimize suffering.

Rationality

1. Rationalism is a movement which asserts that reason and evidence should be held superior to religious teachings.

2. A rational argument is logically valid, i.e. does not lead to contradictions

3. Individuals are rational if they act optimally in pursuit of their goals, whatever those goals may be

4. Rationality is a central principle in artificial intelligence, where a rational agent is specifically defined as an agent which always chooses the action which maximizes its expected performance, given all of the knowledge it currently possesses

(Rationality, Wikipedia)

The economist’s definition of rationality is analogous to the one of artificial intelligence:

The choice of an individual is rational, if it maximizes his/her utility under the given level of cognition.

2.2 Definition

Risk ethics

1) Risk ethics investigates the general question under which conditions a person is permitted to expose him/herself or others to a risk [Philosophisches Seminar, 4].

2) Risk ethics is a form of consequentialism.

3) Risk ethics investigates the basis for rational decision-making in ethics.

4) Following the work on expected utility theory of Ramsey and von Neumann, decision-theorists have accounted for rational behavior using a probability distribution for the agent. Ramsey and Savage noted that the individual agent's probability distribution could be objectively studied in experiment. Since individuals act according to different probability judgments, these agents' probabilities are "personal" (but amenable to objective study). (Bayesian Probability, Wikipedia).

5) The most important criteria to valuate risks/chances are Bayes and Maximin [Philosophisches Seminar, 18].

6) It is assumed that the risks are cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable.

7) The term risk can relate to objective risk or to a distorted perception

Risk-aversion

1) Risk-aversion is the reluctance of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff. The opposite of risk-aversion is risk-tolerance. For an example see Interactive Tutorial on Risk-Aversion.

2) A person behaves risk-neutral if he/she doesn’t demand a premium for risk-taking. The person tolerates risk but doesn’t seek it.

3) A person is risk-seeking if it is attracted to risk, i.e. he/she prefers an investment with a lower expected return but greater risk, to a no-risk investment with a higher expected return. Example: A bungee-jumper pays for risk.

According to the two contradicting goals addressed in the title of this paper Hostility (respectively survival) and the minimization of suffering there are two kinds of risk-aversion and corresponding kinds of ethics:

1. Suffering-aversion. Suffering-averse ethics tolerates a loss of Darwinian fitness in order to avoid suffering.

2. Nonexistence-aversion. In nonexistence-averse ethics survival has priority over the avoidance of suffering

The topic of this paper is the conflict between these two kinds of risk-aversion.

Example: Nonexistence-aversion normally overrules suffering-aversion, but only up to a specific point: voluntary euthanasia proves that the seemingly non-hedonistic goal survival can be mapped to a hedonistic scale.

Expected utility

The concept of risk-aversion was first introduced in the context of expected utility theory:

The expected utility theory deals with the analysis of choices among risky projects with (possibly multidimensional) outcomes (Utility, Wikipedia)

In economics, game theory, and decision theory the expected utility theorem or expected utility hypothesis predicts that the "betting preferences" of people with regard to uncertain outcomes (gambles) can be described by a mathematical relation which takes into account the size of a payout (whether in money or other goods), the probability of occurrence, risk aversion, and the different utility of the same payout to people with different assets or personal preferences. It is a more sophisticated theory than simply predicting that choices will be made based on expected value (which takes into account only the size of the payout and the probability of occurrence).

The expected utility theory generally accepts the assumption that individuals are risk averse, meaning that the individual would refuse a fair gamble (a fair gamble has an expected value of zero), and also implying that their utility functions are concave and show diminishing marginal wealth utility. The risk attitude is directly related to the curvature of the utility function: risk neutral individuals have linear utility functions, while risk seeking individuals have convex and risk averse have concave utility functions. The degree of risk aversion can be measured by the curvature of the utility function (Expected utility hypothesis, Wikipedia)

Risk-averse ethics

Risk-averse ethics devaluates (volatile) chances in order to avoid risks.

If not mentioned otherwise in this paper, the term risk-averse ethics

1. is used in the sense of suffering-averse ethics

2. excludes distorted perceptions

According to this definition it is in conflict with survival and develops a hostile potential.

Risk-averse population ethics devaluates the chances of possible people in order to avoid risks (see The Procreation of Risk)

Bayes

The Bayes criterion represents a classical utilitarian position. It maximizes the (subjective) expected value of a decision’s consequences. The expected value is calculated as follows:

1. in cases of chance: the product of probability times profit (positive utility)

2. in cases of risk: the product of probability times loss (negative utility)

Obviously the Bayes criterion corresponds to the definition of rationality used in this paper (chapter 2.1)

But what does it mean to maximize utility? In real life we are confronted with a mixture of risks and chances, i.e. we have to take chances and avoid risks at the same time.

For the following investigation we assume that

1. chances (utility) can be expressed in terms of preference-satisfaction

2. risks (negative utility) can be expressed in terms of preference-frustration

Under the assumptions given in Preference-frustration and the Hedonistic Scale these terms can be mapped to a single hedonistic scale (i.e. to terms like happiness and suffering)

Population ethics

Classical utilitarianism assigns a moral value to the creation of lives barely worth living and is therefore confronted with Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion).

Maximin

Minmax is a decision rule used in decision theory, game theory, statistics and philosophy for minimizing the maximum possible loss. Alternatively, it can be thought of as maximizing the minimum gain (Maximin). Originally formulated for two-player zero-sum game theory (…). It has also been extended to more complex games and to general decision making in the presence of uncertainty.

(Minimax, Wikipedia)

Maximin can only be applied if there isn’t a clearly defined worst case, but not if there are several cases with immense loss, each one with a specific probability.

1. A key feature of Maximin decision making is that it is non-probabilistic: in contrast to decisions using expected value or expected utility, it makes no assumptions about the probabilities of various outcomes, just scenario analysis of what the possible outcomes are. It is thus robust to changes in the assumptions, as these other decision techniques are not.

2. Further, Maximin only requires ordinal measurement (that outcomes be compared and ranked), not interval measurements (that outcomes include "how much better or worse").

(Minimax, Wikipedia)

The Maximin criterion maximizes the minimal utility (instead of accumulating utilities) and is therefore non-utilitarian. On the other hand it can be considered as an extreme case of Bayes: The more weight is given to the worst case, the more the maximization of utility converges to Maximin (A Drink from the Group, Livia Levine).

Population ethics

Assume that a population A consists of a very large number of people with blissful lives and one person suffering terrible pain. In another population B, everybody suffers terrible pain but slightly less than the poor person in A. According to Maximin, B is better than A. One could say that Maximin imposes a dictatorship of the worst off [Arrhenius, 101].

2.3 Hostile Potential

Destructive potential

Classical utilitarianism (Bayes) considers society as an entity (complex organism) which is exposed to risk. For such an entity the same reflections apply as for an individual; the maximization of utility is a complex mixture of expansion and contraction. It is plausible to assume that this mixture is influenced by the biological nature of humans. Since the biological goal is characterized by a maximization function (see God’s utility function) it is also plausible to assume that it favors the expansive strategy. Classical utilitarianism has a tendency to support the biological mechanism; it favors the expansive strategy even in a scarce environment. By doing so the biological preference to expand life at any price (which is questioned by cognition) is reinstalled at the cultural level.

1) On the biological level the goal to propagate genes is encoded in relatively rigid mechanisms which do not consider long-term risk or radical changes in the environment. This lack of flexibility can lead to the destruction of basic life resources and to the downfall of the species. But in slowly changing environments the risk-tolerance of biological mechanisms proved to be superior to risk-aversion.

2) From an evolutionary point of view technological progress represents a quickly changing environment. The biological nature of humans, which is adapted to slowly changing environments, has a tendency to underestimate technological risks (see on the Perception of Risk and Benefit). In times of rapid technological progress the risk-tolerant strategy doesn’t necessarily have the best survival value. Overpopulation and over-consumption may lead to the loss of sustainability and to the collapse of the environment which is necessary for survival.

In nature the hostile potential of utilitarianism normally leads to a partial destruction and rarely to a complete destruction of the species. Partial destruction is followed by a period of shock until the biological forces resume expansion. Adaptation is rather a history of expansionism and catastrophes, than a history of smooth alignment.

Competitive inferiority

In philosophy, the term "Maximin" is often used in the context of John Rawls's A Theory of Justice, where he refers to it [Rawls 1971, 152] in the context of the Difference Principle. Rawls defined this principle as the rule which states that social and economic inequalities should be arranged so that "they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society". In other words, an unequal distribution can be just when it maximizes the benefit to those who have the most minuscule allocation of welfare.(Minimax, Wikipedia)

In a competitive environment an economy which implements the difference principle may succumb to a more risk-tolerant economy. Is Maximin a rational strategy?

1) Rawls promotes the Maximin criterion on the society level. He objects that we cannot carry the (utilitarian) Bayes criterion (on the individual level) to decisions on the society level, e.g. to decisions about risky technologies.

2) According to Harsanyi the Maximin strategy is irrational because it is based on some highly unlikely unfavorable contingencies. He maintains that the distinction between small scale and large scale is irrelevant in this context. There are countless examples in risk ethics which show, that the concerned activities would be chocked under an extremely risk-averse regulation; and in many cases it is impossible to draw the line between those activities which are required for survival and those which could be sacrificed.

3) Shrader-Frechette votes in favor of Rawls:

„Situations of individual risk are voluntarily chosen, whereas situations of societal risk typically are involuntarily imposed“. There is no analogy between the two situations [Shrader-Frechette, 105]:

a) Fairness: With the (utilitarian) Bayes criterion each person gets equal weight in decisions on the society level. If some persons profit from such a decision whereas others are harmed, then it may be unfair to equally weigh them.

b) Human rights: With the Bayes criterion even human rights could be violated in order to maximize utility on the society level.

[Philosophisches Seminar, 21].

Let’s consider a concrete example like a predicted asteroid impact with a small probability. Let’s further assume that the predicted impact destroys humanity if it occurs:

1) If the goal is survival at any price (nonexistence-averse ethics) then, according to the Maximin strategy, all resources must be concentrated on the deflection of the asteroid. This strategy is

a) Maximin-rational because it makes every effort to save humanity

b) Bayes-irrational because it consumes all available resources for an unlikely event.

2) If the goal is to increase economical welfare (i.e. if the moral value of humanity is associated with welfare) then, according to the Bayes strategy, we can take the small probability of the impact into account and allocate much fewer resources to the deflection of the asteroid. This strategy is

a) Bayes-rational because resources can be allocated to promising projects with a high probability

b) Maximin-irrational because it takes the (small) risk to be annihilated.

If two nations are in competition and each of them is threatened with a different asteroid, then the one with the Bayes-strategy will succeed with a high probability. The Maximin strategy of the other nation proves to be inferior in the context of competition. Obviously two kinds of survival are pursued in this example:

1. the survival of the gene pool (humanity as a whole)

2. the survival of individual genes (expressed in terms of welfare)

From a biological point of view the second goal is the prime goal, i.e. the survival of humanity as a whole is only important as far as it serves the survival of individual genes. The hedonistic system is not designed to care about life as a whole. As long as humanity is not destroyed, the people who concentrate on the second goal win the competition. Obviously there is a conflict of goals between the survival of humanity as a whole and the survival of individual genes. Individuals attempt to burden the cost of the first goal on the community and save their resources for the second.

The preference for the empty world

1) Since Maximin attempts to avoid the worst case, it doesn’t assign moral value to the creation of a new life. The probability that a child will have to experience the worst case is very low, but always greater than zero. The Maximin principle asks for childlessness, unless the suffering of the possible parents (from childlessness) equals the worst case.

2) If the Maximin principle is applied to the minimization of suffering, it allows the (painless) destruction of the world.

Moral killing

If the Maximin principle is applied to the minimization of suffering, it allows killing for mercy.

3 Prioritarianism

3.1 Definition

The core idea of the Priority View is that gains in welfare matter more, the worse off people are, and losses in welfare matter less, the better off people are [Arrhenius, 110]

1) Prioritarianism is the dominant version of consequentialism (see Rule Consequentialism).

2) Prioritarianism preserves the efficiency of utilitarianism and a particular concern for those badly off. It doesn’t exclusively concentrate on total welfare but also accounts for an unjust distribution. Examples can be found in Negative Utilitarianism and Justice.

3) Prioritarianism is based on the intuition of sympathy [Lumer, 2]. But the degree of sympathy which is encoded in the formulas can be challenged by more or less deviating concepts. Since there is no universal consensus on the desirable degree of sympathy, the normative force of such an approach is limited. This limitation, however, can also be seen as a gain in flexibility (as compared to classical utilitarianism and Maximin). Prioritarianism is rational for those who agree with the encoded degree of sympathy.

4) Prioritarianism is a possible interpretation of the slogan “The least suffering for the smallest number”. This slogan is the converse of Bentham’s “The greatest happiness for the greatest number”. The maximization of happiness doesn’t mean that suffering has no weight and vice-versa. The original negative utilitarianism which doesn’t give any weight to happiness is a boundary case within prioritarianism.

5) Prioritarianism is the subject of a complex theoretical discussion. Example:

a) Pro: Holtug Nils, prioritarianism

b) Contra: [Broome, 222]

Risk-aversion in the original position

Prioritarianism has two aspects

1. In a history of social welfare happy people get less moral weight than suffering people. The devaluation of happiness is a measure for compassion (sympathy, solidarity).

2. In decisions under uncertainty, happy outcomes are morally devaluated relative to unhappy outcomes. The devaluation is a measure for risk-aversion. The decision about the goodness of outcomes conforms to the axioms of expected utility theory.

In this paper we assume that the devaluation is the same in both cases. For a decision-maker in the original position compassion and risk-aversion is the same thing:

Some theorists have developed a justification of prioritarianism, based on risk aversion in the original position [Atkinson / Stiglitz, 340; Hurley, 368-382]. This justification is based on the Rawlsian [1958], Harsanyian [1955] framework of an impartial decision, operationalized via a hypothetical ignorance of one's proper qualities and position in society so that the decider may end up in everybody's skin. Harsanyi has argued that in such a situation one should consider the various possibilities as equiprobable and treat them risk-neutrally; this then leads to utilitarianism. Rawls has argued that in such a situation of uncertainty the Maximin criterion for rational decisions should be applied. Prioritarians have criticized both justifications: Maximin (or leximin) is equivalent to infinite risk aversion, which seems to be nearer to paranoia than rationality, and Harsanyi's risk-neutrality is not rational either. The right maxim in such situations is moderate risk aversion, which together with the framework's assumptions leads to prioritarianism as the impartial and morally just welfare function (Prioritarian Welfare Functions

Population ethics

As well as classical and negative utilitarianism, prioritarianism doesn’t remove the Mere Addition Paradox:

a) The Repugnant Conclusion is unavoidable, if the expected value of an additional child’s welfare is thought to be positive.

b) The Reverse Repugnant Conclusion is unavoidable, if the expected value is negative.

In classical utilitarianism the expected value is usually positive; in negative utilitarianism always negative. In prioritarianism both cases are possible depending on the weight given to the expected suffering. For information on risk-averse population ethics see The Procreation of Risk.

3.2 Hostile Potential

Destructive potential and competitive inferiority

A possible climatic catastrophe and the limitation of natural resources reveal the following conflict of interest:

1) the expansionist character of classical utilitarianism (Bayes) makes it destructive

2) the competition with other societies makes the Maximin strategy disadvantageous

Prioritarianism defines a strategy between the mentioned risks, i.e. the classical utilitiarian expansionism is partially devaluated.

Example: If a further expansion of the population-size increases the risk of global warming, then

1) classical utilitarianism continues the expansion until lives are barely worth living (see Repugnant Conclusion)

2) the adherents of the Maximin strategy reduce the number of their children (which puts them in disadvantage opposite to classical utilitarians)

Prioritanians attempt to negotiate between the two groups.

The preference for the empty world

The more the chances are devaluated, the more a prioritarian welfare function becomes risk-averse. With a complete devaluation of chances no world can be morally superior to the empty world. In prioritarianism the devaluation is incomplete and represents a (theoretical) consensus with regard to compassion. The moral value assigned to the world can be positive or negative depending on this consensus.

4 Negative Utilitarianism (NU)

4.1 Definition

Concerning the historical background of NU see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice.

For a definition of the terms utility and welfare see chapter 2.1

For a definition of the terms risk-aversion and expected utility see chapter 2.2

Relation to prioritarianism

We can roughly distinguish between two attitudes relative to suffering:

1. Accept the world as it is, i.e. postulate that no matter what kind of suffering existed and exists; it is worth to preserve life.

2. Deny the world as it is, i.e. postulate that there are kinds of suffering that cannot be justified (compensated) by other values in life.

In prioritarianism

1. the first attitude is characterized by positive social welfare

2. the second attitude is characterized by negative social welfare

In this paper we interpret negative utilitarianism as the domain within prioritarianism where social welfare is valuated negative.

Risk-aversion in the original position

Let’s assume that we start in a position, where social welfare has a positive sign, and then increase compassion. At a certain degree of compassion social welfare turns negative. From the point of view of a decision-maker in the original position, the turning point is characterized by a certain degree of risk-aversion, i.e. compassion corresponds to risk-aversion in the original position.

The different versions of negative utilitarianism correspond to different degrees of risk-aversion in the original position:

1) According to pinprick version the turning point (degree) is extreme compassion/risk-aversion

2) In this paper we suggest that a more plausible turning point (degree) is high compassion/risk-aversion.

For a definition of the terms high and extreme compassion/risk-aversion see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice.

We will use the abbreviation NU for the second of above two versions.

Rawls’ decision-maker in the original position doesn’t know in which position he/she will be born. But he/she knows that the more people exist with a specific utility, the higher the probability is to be born in exactly this position. The probability to become a victim of extreme suffering corresponds to the number of people with a corresponding degree of suffering. There is not only the risk to become the victim of a tragic destiny, but also the risk to be born as a very sensitive person (who cannot bear the horrible suffering or death of other persons). Nevertheless, statistically spoken, the probability to become an extreme sufferer is small. So why should the decision-maker in the original position assign a negative total utility of life (respectively social welfare)? The answer is experience. Experience enforces risk-aversion because of the asymmetry of suffering and happiness (see Negative Utilitarianism and Justice). With increasing experience, the dominant end of behavior converges towards the avoidance of extreme suffering. A hypothetical complete experience (including all kinds of suffering and happiness) would therefore result in a clear first priority given to the avoidance of extreme suffering. NU postulates that the judgments of Rawls’ decision-maker should be based on such a complete experience.

It may be rational to distribute economical welfare according to a risk-neutral strategy, but it is irrational (for an experienced person) to take the risk of extreme suffering (unless it prevents suffering of an even higher magnitude).

Population ethics

There are theoreticians who see NU as a branch within classical utilitarianism, demanding for a higher priority in the fight against suffering. It would be more appropriate to call it a branch within prioritarianism. The fact that happiness has no intrinsic moral value implicates that new lives have no intrinsic moral value. NU avoids Derek Parfit's “Repugnant Conclusion” but implies the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion. This makes it distinct from classical utilitarianism.

4.2 Hostile Potential

Destructive potential and competitive inferiority

In NU the chances are devaluated as well as in Maximin but probabilities are taken into account.

Example: Resources have to be allocated in order to avoid the following disasters:

1. Asteroid impact

2. Climatic catastrophe

3. Nuclear terror

Each of the three events has a devastating potential but the probabilities are different. There is no single clearly defined worst case.

1. NU is inferior to classical utilitarianism (Bayes) if the probabilities for a disaster are small. Classical utilitarians allocate the resources to promising projects and take the (small) risk that humanity will be annihilated.

2. NU is superior to classical utilitarianism if the probability for a disaster is significant and the disaster can be prevented

3. NU is inferior to classical utilitarianism, if the disaster cannot be prevented and if there is a small probability of survival.

Example: If it were known, that mankind will be destructed within the next generation (e.g. by an asteroid) most people would agree that childlessness is an ethical duty. Nevertheless from a biological point of view the strategy is hostile. There remains a little chance that somebody could survive.

The preference for the empty world

1. The doctrine of NU is counter-intuitive, not least insofar as it entails that from a purely ethical perspective it wouldn't matter if nothing at all had existed, or if everything ceased to exist (David Pearce, Negative utilitarianism).

The doctrine is counter-intuitive for a happy person, but not for a suffering person (population), at least not if suffering exceeds a certain degree.

2. NU corresponds to a “Schopenhauerian” theory of well-being: There are no lives with positive welfare. Practical lives have negative welfare and the theoretically best life has neutral welfare:

According to NU a universe with no individuals is better than a universe in which there are 10 billion individuals with extremely happy lives, but where one of these individuals experiences a minor preference-frustration. This is an absurd implication.

For an answer to the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion see On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes in Population Ethics.

3. From the preference for an empty world does not follow a corresponding political claim. Such a claim would definitely be counterproductive. Pessimistic supporters of NU therefore tend towards a retreat oriented way of living.

4. The pinprick argument:

Would it really be better that life had never arisen if the only unpleasant experience that would otherwise occur would be a pinprick? (Pinprick Argument by David Pearce)

a) The argument is based on the false assumption, that a human being can evaluate the world without being part of the world. In reality, in an empty world there is no regret about the loss of happiness.

b) Under the assumption that there is a human observer, the world is not empty and the emotions of the observer have to be accounted for. Weighing the suffering produced by annihilation against the pain of a pinprick should result in a clear wish to survive. Only the assumption that the observer can painlessly annihilate himself allows defending the pinprick argument.

c) What is the tolerable limit of suffering in a world to be created? There is no general answer to this question, because it is an individual matter. Some individuals like to take risks, others not. It can only be said that a negative utilitarian (out of his commitment to rationality) would refuse to create a life of extreme suffering, a life where he/she wishes not having been born. In a negative utilitarian world suffering would be accordingly limited.

Moral killing

1) In NU there are only empirical arguments against painless killing for mercy.

Example: In NU a surgeon could let a patient (painlessly) die in order to stop somebody else’s suffering. But confidence in health care would get completely lost if such decisions could be taken without the consent of the concerned persons. This loss in confidence would increase the suffering in society and therefore contradict the ethical goal of NU.

3) The most controversial NU strategy is a violent reduction of the population-size in order to improve the state of affairs. A radical pursuit of this thought leads to the extermination of humanity or life as a whole and therewith to a major disagreement between negative and classical utilitarianism (see Introduction to utilitarianism, utilitarian.org):

a) A negative utilitarian believes that, if it was possible to exterminate all life in the universe instantly and painlessly and permanently, it would be correct and ethically required that we do so in order to prevent any future cases of suffering

b) A classical utilitarian might decide either way, depending on his estimation of the relative amounts of future suffering and happiness.

Note that the painless extermination of life is also a moral obligation in classical utilitarianism, if the estimated future amount of suffering exceeds the one of happiness. But there is an empirical argument against violence: Even contemplating and planning a project for the violent reduction of the population-size would provoke distress. In addition, it would classify the supporters of the project among the worst kind of terrorists. A violent extermination of mankind is not feasible in practice. The result of such an attempt would be an increase in suffering and therefore contradict the utility function.

4) The Pinprick Argument puts the idea of painless extermination of life to an extreme. In order to maintain the pinprick argument one has to assume, that the term painlessly not only refer to the victims of destruction but also to the agents. Such an assumption is counter-intuitive since the pain of suicide exceeds the pain of a pinprick.

5) Note that also in classical utilitarianism there is an obligation to kill in the name of ethics. The obligation is even more dubious because it serves the increase of total happiness. The capital punishment in the U.S. illustrates that the idea is not far fetched (The U.S. constitution was influenced by classical utilitarianism). The arguments against moral killing (e.g. against taking an organ from an old patient and giving it to a young one) are only of empirical nature, as in NU. Utilitarianism in general lacks a moral principle for the protection of minorities. A version of negative utilitarianism which accounts for this objection is proposed in Negative Utilitarianism and Justice.

6) A different argument that makes NU less hostile is technological progress:

Indeed, if the option were humanly available, the logic of NU morally obligates bringing the world to an end were this the only way to banish the suffering endemic to it. Happily, there is a much better way to rid the natural world of its endemic nastiness. This is to use biotechnology to eradicate aversive experience in all sentient life, David Pearce, Negative utilitarianism

If above vision becomes true, then suffering could be seen as a limited, intermediary state associated with the birth of an ecstatic or spiritual world. By this interpretation suffering receives a sense and a purpose. Evolution could be regarded as a project which reduces or eliminates suffering, whereas otherwise it would persist or increase. If suffering can be besieged one day (e.g. by bioethical abolitionism), then the accumulated suffering up to this point may be the smallest among all possible paths of evolution. The actual generation is morally obliged to sacrifice itself, if it serves the long-term purpose to minimize suffering. The belief in progress stands in the tradition of enlightenment and shares its optimism. A corresponding negative utilitarian constitution should prevent expansion at the cost of the quality of life (see introduction). It should avoid suffering rather than create new desires. In the words of Karl Popper: The role of the state is not to make people happy but to relieve avoidable suffering. Note that the happiness in a NU world doesn’t have moral value; it is only the absence of suffering which counts. Supporters of NU who don’t believe in the promises of technological progress prefer a reduction of the population (and in the extreme case an empty world).

5 Buddhism

5.1 Definition

The Noble Truths

Following a brief description of the teachings:

1. “Life is inseparably tied to suffering.”

2. “The cause of suffering are attachments (desires) in a world where everything changes, nothing is permanent.”

3. “Suffering can be terminated by ending human desire.”

4. “Human desire can be ended by following the Eightfold Path.”

In the language of utilitarianism:

1. First Truth: The utility (dominant end) in Buddhism is the avoidance of suffering. Negative utility increases with the degree of suffering.

2. Second Truth: Suffering is caused by preference-frustration. Concerning this link of terms see Preference-frustration and the Hedonistic Scale.

3. Third Truth: Suffering can be terminated by ending the creation of preferences.

4. Forth Truth: The creation of preferences can be ended by following the Eightfold Path.

At its origin (which is Theravada) the Buddhist concept concentrated on individual redemption. But the Eightfold Path is tied to the doctrine of reincarnation and therefore implies a concept of justice: a deviation from the Eightfold Path produces reincarnation and corresponding continuous suffering. The dependency of redemption on ethical knowledge induced a controversial debate in early Buddhism. Is there a moral obligation to actively promote ethical knowledge? The idea of a global missionary activity rose up with the Mahajana movement in the 2nd century. The ethical ideal of the Mahajana School is the Bodhisattva, a person who delays his or her own enlightenment in order to compassionately assist all other beings.

Risk-aversion in the original position

In the life story of Buddha it is reported that he spent his youth in the sheltered environment of a noble family. His father, who was hoping his son would later become his successor, protected the child from all evils of life and enclosed him with every imaginable luxury. But one day the future Buddha managed to leave the palace unnoticed by the guards. On his excursion to the outside world he was confronted with four situations which he understood as signs:

- In the first situation he was shocked about the condition of an old man.

- In the second situation he was confronted with illness

- In the third situation he was confronted with death.

- In the forth situation he was impressed by the inner calmness of a monk

When he realized, that he was exposed to illness, aging and death as everybody else, he left his wife and his son and went to the jungle where he spent six years in rigorous asceticism, hoping to find a solution to the problem of suffering. The life story of Buddha clarifies that transience and decay is at the root of Buddhism. Only the insight into unrealistic emotional attachments can liberate from suffering. With Zarathustra’s “all joy wants eternity” the expected utility of life inevitably turns negative. We can also replace eternal happiness by the (non-hedonistic) survival at any price or the wish that the most loved persons don’t have to die; the result will be the same. Any unrealistic dominant end implies a negative utility of life.

The normative imposition of risk-aversion to the society is of course a questionable undertaking. But we have to imagine this norm as guideline or warning (as practised in Buddhism) and not as coercion:

1. If the dominant end is the avoidance of extreme suffering, then risk-aversion helps protecting ones own future self, by warning from short-sighted and illusionary forms of happiness.

2. If the dominant end is eternal life, then risk-aversion is a reminder of transience, like the Buddhist destruction of sand mandalas or the Christian „Memento homo, quia pulvis es, et in pulverem reverteris“ (“Remember, man, that you are dust and unto dust you shall return”). It prevents from building castles on sand and suggests changing the dominant end.

What kind of ethics is Buddhism?

Following some aspects for a classification:

1) Buddhism is a form of consequentialism. An agent should perform the act, which leads to the best consequences or state of affairs.

2) The root of Buddhism is hedonistic: the avoidance of suffering.

3) Suffering is caused by preference-frustration. Since there are many kinds of preferences there are also many kinds of suffering. The moral value is preference-based.

4) Buddhism devaluates (volatile) biological preferences in order to reduce suffering and is therefore risk-averse ethics.

5) Buddhism defines morally desirable and undesirable preferences. The Eightfold Path is virtue ethics and can be seen as a kind of moral perfectionism.

Moral perfectionism

In order to understand the Buddhist kind of moral perfectionism we look at an objection which was made to NU:

Let us suppose that a world A is inhabited by ten billion people, all of whom lead lives of a very high quality. Suppose that these lives contain a great number of satisfied preferences, but always some frustrated ones as well. We can imagine another world B, with a population consisting of a small number of beings, all of whom are endowed with an extraordinarily meager mental life. Each of them has just a few extremely simple preferences which could be rendered like this: “I want to eat. I want to stay alive. I want to procreate.” Suppose further that all of these preferences are always satisfied. According to NU world B would be better than world A (Example given by Klemens Kappel).

1. According to NU the quality of life, expressed in mental richness has a high value on the evolutionary scale, but not an intrinsic value on the moral scale. Every individual has the same weight in prioritizing preferences; there is no universal moral priority for mental richness.

2. Buddhism resembles Kappel’s perfectionism. Mental preferences are given a higher moral value than the preferences for food, survival and procreation. But Buddhism strives for spiritual perfection and not for intellectual perfection. Spiritual perfection is associated with non-existence of the ego.

For more information on Buddhism see On the Principles of Non-Violence and Disengagement.

5.2 Hostile Potential

Destructive potential and competitive inferiority

1. Buddhism is inferior to classical utilitarianism (Bayes) if the probabilities for a disaster are small. Classical utilitarians allocate the resources to promising projects and take the (small) risk that humanity will be annihilated.

2. Buddhism is superior to classical utilitarianism if the probability for a disaster is significant and if the risks are caused by expansionism

3. Buddhism is inferior to classical utilitarianism, if the disaster cannot be prevented and if there is a small probability of survival.

The preference for the empty world

1. According to the First Noble Truth, life is inseparably tied to suffering. Buddhism therefore denies the utopia of a world without suffering and promotes an unconditional preference for the empty world. An empty world is a world without preferences, a world with absolute indifference concerning valuations. There is no ex ante preference for happiness and consequently no regret about a possible but unrealized happy population. We cannot valuate the empty world without being part of the world. Under the assumption that there is a human observer, the denial of the empty world simply reflects the preferences of this observer.

2. Monastic Buddhism asks for childlessness, not only because a new life is a high risk but simply because non-existence of the ego is considered to be the perfect state. A monk may suffer from childlessness but is not allowed to improve his situation at the cost of a child. For a Buddhist an empty world doesn’t have the same meaning as for a Western nihilist because he/she believes in a spiritual form of existence; see On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes in Population Ethics.

Moral killing

Buddhism excludes moral killing by the principle of ahimsa. Interestingly Buddhists have a strong aversion against killing, although non-existence of the ego is a moral ideal. The reason might be that the suffering caused by violence plays an eminent role in Indian philosophy. The doctrine of reincarnation says that killing (by the law of the karma) increases the risk to be reborn in an unfavorable position. For a Buddhist not only the killing of humans but also the killing of animals is immoral.

1. It is immoral to kill for mercy without the patients consent. Buddhism rejects the Experience Requirement.

2. It is immoral to commit (painless) suicide in order to shorten the path to non-existence.

3. It is immoral to kill oneself by extreme asceticism.

There are different views about Buddhism and Euthanasia, many of which are critical of the procedure (Buddhism and Euthanasia, Wikipedia).

6 Cross Comparison

6.1 The Minimization of Suffering

Buddhism advocating minimizing dukkha (pain, dissatisfaction) – rather than maximizing sukkha (from which “sugar” comes) may be a kind of negative welfarism. [Kolm, 8]

Suffering can be reduced by devaluating risky kinds of happiness, i.e. happiness which has to be “paid” by suffering and where the price is too high. In practice this requires the transformation of (volatile) biological preferences into virtue-type (durable) preferences. The devaluation of (volatile) happiness in order to avoid risk is the characteristic of risk-averse ethics.

1) Prioritarianism is the general model for risk-averse ethics.

2) NU can be interpreted as a special case within prioritarianism.

3) Buddhism (apart from its metaphysical dimension) can be interpreted as a pessimistic version of NU.

Risk-aversion in the original position

Whereas unrealistic goals (like eternal happiness) can be replaced, the NU goal to avoid extreme suffering is forced upon all sentient beings. Since we are caught in a physical body, we can only repress but not eliminate the threat. For a decision-maker in the original position the expected utility of life will be negative, no matter in which position he/she will be born (at least as long as there is a risk of extreme suffering). So far NU agrees with Buddhism. There are, however, reasons to question Buddha’s claim on the original position:

1) Justice

Buddhism denies the world as it is or, more precisely, it denies our distorted perception of the world. Justice is realized by the cycle of reincarnation and not by means of a political system. The denial of the world cannot be called irrational but the belief in the reincarnation of an individual soul has no scientific basis. The Buddhist concept of justice and the moral perfectionism which is based on this concept are accordingly questionable. If possible parents suffer extremely from childlessness then the birth of a child is morally defensible, see The Procreation of Risk.

2) Progress

Buddha may have been a pessimist with regard to the eradication of suffering, but he was an optimist with regard to ethical progress (see Was the Buddha a Pessimist?).

a) Ethical progress goes before economical progress. The social welfare function of Buddhism (if there were any) would have to be compassionate and risk-averse, i.e. in favor of those who suffer the most.

b) Ethical progress also goes before technological progress. Buddhism is skeptical with regard to the curative potential of technology because it cannot be separated from the destructive potential.

The struggle for survival and procreation is denied in favor of a retreat-oriented way of living. This strategy can be called risk-averse but not irrational. On the other hand, we cannot exclude that a high technology culture will decrease the degree of suffering relative to a low technology culture. The corresponding probability has to be compared with the Buddhist probability of ethical progress. For the believers in Enlightenment technology reduces risks and the denial of technology appears accordingly risky. The Eightfold Path may reduce suffering, but also reduces Darwinian fitness. Since life (and therefore suffering) cannot be besieged by volunteer childlessness, the Eigthfold Path is in contradiction to the technological fight against suffering. We cannot question the principle of risk-aversion in the original position, but we can question the Buddhist interpretation of risk-aversion. Since the future is not predictable we have to account for both the pessimistic (Buddhist) and the optimistic (bioethical abolitionist) interpretation of risk-aversion.

3) Internal risks

If you knew that you will be terribly hurt (or even have to die) tomorrow in a car accident, then the search for happiness would become unimportant. In fact we are in a similar situation at all times. Only the kind of suffering that awaits us and the date of death are unknown. And usually we get more than one day to think about the situation. From this point of view it seems to be rational to devaluate the search for (volatile) happiness and concentrate on the unavoidable risks. But risk-aversion also has to consider the risk of depression. The consciousness of a constant deadly threat paralyzes all activity and leads to mental illness. Buddhism provides a psychological method for painlessly giving up preferences, but (because of a questionable belief in reincarnation) underestimates internal relative to external risks.

a) For a discussion on pathological and therapeutic answers to pessimism see Cultural Pessimism and Therapy

b) For the conflicts between individual interests and the NU concept of justice see Konkurrierende Lebensziele

Population ethics

1) Optimistic scenario

If we image technological progress as a project which requires a huge number of participants, then the reduction of future risk by means of technology may require an expansive population policy. Fig.1 shows different populations, with population size represented by column width, and the population's happiness represented by column height. The shadowed areas represent the suffering part of the population. In the optimistic scenario the quantitative suffering of the high technology population may be higher, but the qualitative suffering is lower and therefore morally preferable. If humanity is not extinguished by a natural disaster, then the alternative to technological progress is the persistence of the higher degree of suffering.

2) Pessimistic scenario

According to Buddhism (in an overall consideration of the human condition) the price for happiness in terms of suffering is too high, and technology cannot change this valuation. Since the future is not predictable we must even account for a possible worsening of the state of affairs, i.e. for a quantitative and qualitative increase in suffering (see Fig.1). The logical consequence is therefore

a) to eliminate the preference for existence as painlessly as possible

b) to suppress the creation of preferences which increase the attachment to life.

The Buddhist suppression and elimination of preferences is also appropriate in pessimistic NU, because new preferences create new risks (which cannot be compensated by chances). This entails in particular that there is no intrinsic moral value of new lives. Buddhism is only irrational as far as its risk-aversion is based on the belief in reincarnation. The thesis that suffering cannot be besieged (first Noble Truth) is open to falsification, but cannot be called irrational.

Fig.1

The best strategy to minimize suffering seems to be a pragmatic adaptation:

1) If technology reduces suffering (where otherwise it would persist or increase) and the number of contributors accelerates the project, then the population-size should be increased (up to the point, where this policy becomes counter-productive).

2) If suffering persists or increases then the only way to improve the state of affairs consists in reducing the population-size (up to the point, where this policy becomes counter-productive, i.e. up to the point where childlessness causes extreme suffering).

The probabilities of the two scenarios are investigated in Utility and Suffering in Culture and On the Perception of Risk and Benefit.

For more information on risk-averse population ethics see The Procreation of Risk.

6.2 Hostile Potential

Destructive potential and competitive inferiority

Classical utilitarianism is risk-tolerant and develops a destructive potential in times of limited resources.

Prioritarianism is risk-averse, but less so than Maximin. In a non-competitive environment it has the following characteristics:

1. It is inferior (with regard to survival value) in times of abundant resources

2. It is superior in times of diminishing resources

The preference for the empty world

1) For Buddhism, the empty world is considered to be the best state of affairs, but emptiness is associated with a spiritual form of existence (similar to the Hindu Brahman).

2) NU attempts to realize the world with the least suffering which is (in a pessimistic scenario) the empty world. In contrast to Buddhism NU accounts for the possibility of an earthly redemption (e.g. by bioethical abolitionism) although it doesn’t rate a redeemed world morally higher than the empty world.

In both cases there is no “ex ante” preference for existence.

Moral killing

An attempt to solve the problem of moral killing consists in switching to preference-based ethics [Fricke, 20]. In preference-based ethics the preferences of the individuals have to be respected, so that the arguments against painless killing (chapter 4.2) are of theoretical and not only empirical nature. However, in preference utilitarianism, the preferences of the majority overrule the ones of the individual. The majority could theoretically decide to exterminate a minority [Hare, 121-122]. Ethics which attempt to minimize suffering require human rights as side constraint. In Buddhism minorities are protected by the principle of non-violence (ahimsa).

6.3 Relation between Risk-Aversion and Hostility

Classical utilitarianism stands for a risk-neutral strategy whereas prioritarianism relates to a risk-averse strategy.

The judgment concerning the price of happiness in terms of suffering is accordingly different.

The more happiness is devaluated relative to suffering the more compensation becomes difficult.

The hostility of a theory increases, if we deny the compensation of suffering by happiness. To compensate means to justify. If the compensation of suffering by happiness is devaluated or denied

1. and the scenario is optimistic, then actual risk may be justified by a reduction of future risk.

2. and the scenario is pessimistic, then (painless) preference-suppression and elimination is the only way to reduce suffering (Buddhism)

Following an overview ordered by increasing hostility:

Theory	Justification of suffering	Hostile potential
Classical utilitarianism	Happiness outweighs suffering	destructive potential of expansionism
Prioritarianism	Compensation is impeded by the prioritarian rule of weighing	inferior in a world of competition
Negative utilitarianism original version (NU)	A future decrease in suffering could justify actual suffering	hostile in a pessimistic scenario
Buddhism	No belief in a future decrease in suffering	definitely hostile

7 Metaphor

The city of Omelas

The metaphor of Omelas (see The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, by Ursula K.LeGuin, 1974) describes a city whose well-functioning depends on the suffering of a child. It corresponds well with the NU world view, if the suffering child is regarded as a symbolic representation of extreme suffering. The child is used as a symbol to express the innocence of the victim. In a certain sense, the most suffering individuals pay the price for all others who suffer less or are happy.

Hostile inhabitants

The inhabitants of Omelas who believe, that the suffering of the child persists or even increases with evolution can be divided in the following two groups:

1) The ones who walk away from Omelas: Buddhists and other pessimists, who retire from life. Hindus who attempt to leave the wheel of reincarnation.

2) The ones who try to destroy Omelas: Militant negative utilitarians or other people, who combat life.

Life-friendly inhabitants

The inhabitants of Omelas who believe, that the suffering of the child decreases with evolution can be divided in the following two groups:

1. The ones who try to improve Omelas: Bioethical abolitionists and like-minded Paradise engineers

2. The ones who believe in salvation: The supporters of various revealed religions

The future of the city

The people who accept Omelas as it is and comply with the state of affairs (e.g. Stoics) don’t contribute to the global termination of suffering. The optimistic and conciliatory inhabitants of Omelas have a better Darwinian fitness than the hostile ones. Omelas will therefore remain populated, even if the suffering of the child persists or increases. A technological solution to the problem is possible but unlikely. The most probable end of suffering seems to be the destruction of life. But we shouldn’t associate this eventuality with militant strategies like moral killing. Ironically destruction will rather be caused by risk-takers who desperately want to live, e.g. the creators of the MAD doctrine or the millions of people who cause a climatic catastrophe (see Utility and Suffering in Culture).

global termination of suffering

by non-human forces

by human forces

by destruction

close to certain

Buddhists

possible

Risk-takers

by salvation

very unlikely

Believers

unlikely

Paradise engineers

8 Conclusion

Hostility

2) Monastic Buddhism is risk-averse as well as negative utilitarianism. In contrast to negative utilitarianism it excludes an optimistic scenario and is therefore definitively hostile.

Population ethics

1) A specific kind of population ethics is considered to be rational by the majority, if it corresponds to the risk-profile of the majority.

3) For an observer in the original position risk-averse population ethics is rational.

References

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4) Broome John (2004), Weighing Lives, Oxford University Press

5) Fricke Fabian (2002), Verschiedene Versionen des negativen Utilitarismus, Kriterion 15, pp.13-27

6) Hampe Michael (2006), Die Macht des Zufalls, Wolf Jobst Siedler Verlag, Berlin

7) Hare Richard Mervyn (1976), Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, Contemporary British Philosophy, H.D. Lewis Ed.

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15) Rawls, John B. (1958): Justice as Fairness. In: Philosophical Review 67. Pp. 164-194.

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