Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering

It seems that expansion at the cost of the quality of life is a characteristic of the utility function of biology and that the moral value of negative utilitarianism (which does not favor this expansion) conflict with biological forces. Does this conflict necessarily lead to a hostile theory?

Hostility

1) Negative utilitarianism devaluates (volatile) chances in order to avoid risks and is therefore risk-averse ethics. Negative utilitarian population ethics is hostile in a pessimistic scenario and life-friendly in an optimistic scenario.

2) Monastic Buddhism is risk-averse as well as negative utilitarianism. In contrast to negative utilitarianism it excludes an optimistic scenario and is therefore definitively hostile.

3) With a complete devaluation of chances no world can be morally superior to the empty world. In Prioritarianism the devaluation is incomplete and represents a (theoretical) consensus with regard to compassion. The moral value assigned to the world can be positive or negative depending on this consensus.

Rationality

1) A specific kind of population ethics is considered to be rational by the majority, if it corresponds to the risk-profile of the majority.

2) The population ethics of the majority is risk-tolerant because (in the course of evolution) it proved to have a higher survival value. In a competitive environment prioritarian population ethics succumbs to risk-tolerant population ethics. Competition can only be stopped if the perception of risk and benefit changes on a global level.

3) For an observer in the original position risk-averse population ethics is rational.

1 Introduction

1.1 Type of Problem

Classical utilitarianism has the deficiency, that it favors expansion at the cost of the quality of life:

Example: A population Z, consisting of 500 billion individuals, each with a life that is barely worth living, is better than a population A consisting of 1 billion individuals, each having lives that are of extremely high quality – as long as the sum of happiness (welfare) is greater in Z than in A. (Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion)

It seems that expansion at the cost of the quality of life is a characteristic of the utility function of biology (the maximal proliferation of genes) and that the moral value of negative utilitarianism (which does not favor this expansion) conflicts with biological forces. Does this conflict necessarily lead to a hostile theory?

1.2 Terminology

Axiology

Axiology is roughly synonymous with value theory. Axiology can be thought of as primarily concerned with classifying what things are good, and how good they are (Value Theory, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In population ethics a distinction is made between neutral and person-affecting axiologies. This paper defines the terms as follows.

1) Neutral axiologies:

a) values are assigned by a neutral observer

b) view from outside of the populations

c) static comparison of populations

2) Person-affecting axiologies:

a) values are assigned by persons who take decisions and thereby affect other persons

b) view from inside of a population

c) dynamic view, valuation of changes, exposure to risk

The term person-affecting axiology as used in this paper differs from the term neutral axiology in the same way as the concept of marginal utility differs from a utility function.

Hostility

1. An ethics is called hostile if it considers the empty world to be the best state of affairs.

2. A theory which allows painless killing in order to improve the state of affairs is called militant.

Preference

For a definition of the term preference see Preference-frustration and the Hedonistic Scale.

Utility

1) Utility is the dominant end of human behavior. The replacement of the abstract concept of utility by the concrete meaning happiness is called hedonic reduction.

2) Individual utility is not equivalent to egoism. It can imply altruistic preferences as well as egoistic ones.

Welfare

The term quality of life, well-being or welfare is the net result of all preference-frustrations and -satisfactions. Satisfied preferences are counted positively and frustrated preferences negatively.

1) It corresponds to positive welfare, if the sum of all preference-satisfactions exceeds the one of all frustrations.

2) It corresponds to negative welfare, if the individual has lost his/her preference to exist. In this case we speak of a life not worth living.

3) In utilitarianism the term welfare corresponds to utility.

Rationality

The following definitions are taken from Rational , Wikipedia:

1. Rationalism is a movement which asserts that reason and evidence should be held superior to religious teachings.

2. A rational argument is logically valid, i.e. does not lead to contradictions

3. Individuals are rational if they act optimally in pursuit of their goals, whatever those goals may be

The definition used in this paper is analogous to the one of artificial intelligence and corresponds to the third of above definitions:

The behavior of an individual is rational, if it maximizes his/her utility under the given level of cognition.

This definition is much narrower than the first one. In this paper we use

1. the term reason for the wider definition

2. the term (instrumental) rationality for the narrower definition

Applying this terminology we can say that the parameters in the definition of rationality are examined and changed by reason:

1. The preferences which determine utility are examined by reason

2. The risk-profile which guides the preferences is questioned by reason

3. The level of cognition is raised by natural sciences and hermeneutics.

2 Risk Ethics

2.1 Definition

Risk

Risk is a state of uncertainty where some of the possibilities involve a loss, catastrophe, or other undesirable outcome (Risk, chapter “Risk vs. uncertainty”, Wikipedia)

Obviously, in order to define risk, one has to define situations like loss, catastrophe or undesirable outcome. Risk can be expressed in terms of suffering, preference-frustration, negative utility, negative welfare etc. This definition makes clear, that risk (in contrast to uncertainty) can only be valuated relative to a goal. Risk can take two directions:

1) The risks of active behavior, e.g. the risks in the fight for dominance and expansion

2) The risks of passive behavior, e.g. the risks of stagnation in a changing environment (Stillstand = Rückschritt)

Risk-Profile

The risk-profile of a person is the entirety of the person’s attitudes towards risk (in different areas of decision-making).

The perception of risk

1) The biological goal is to survive and procreate or, more precisely, to maximize the proliferation of genes (see Dawkins, God’s utility function). Nature designed the hedonistic mechanism in such a way that it serves survival. Animals are suffering-tolerant.

2) In many cultures the hedonistic mechanism serves survival as well as in biology. But in contrast to animals, humans can reflect and deny goals. Asceticism, seen as adaptation to a scarce environment, serves two contradicting goals:

a) it serves survival as demonstrated by the Spartans and the Roman Stoics

b) it serves the avoidance of suffering as demonstrated by the Buddhists. In monastic Buddhism the goal to avoid suffering overrules the goal to survive. Intense (but volatile) happiness is devaluated in order to avoid suffering. This example of suffering-averse ethics may be called hostile but not irrational. Cultural rationality is different from biological rationality.

3) In high-technology cultures we observe a similar phenomenon. Technology serves two contradicting goals

a) it improves the Darwinian fitness

b) it serves the avoidance of suffering as demonstrated by abolitionism. The goal to live eternally without pain overrules the goal to have a biological and human existence. This kind of ethics is neither hostile nor irrational, but certainly deviates from biological rationality.

Since the biological nature of humans is characterized by suffering-tolerance and unrealistic optimism, the perception of technological as well as natural risks are distorted (see On the Perception of Risk and Benefit). Individual distortions depend on individual experience. The more experience, the less distortion. The perception on the society level is an aggregation of individual perceptions.

Risk ethics

1) Risk ethics investigates the general question under which conditions a person is permitted to expose him/herself or others to a risk [Philosophisches Seminar, 4].

2) Risk ethics is a form of consequentialism.

3) Risk ethics investigates the basis for rational decision-making in ethics.

4) The most important criteria to valuate risks/chances are Bayes and Maximin [Philosophisches Seminar, 18]. It is assumed that the risks are cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable

5) The term risk can relate to objective risk or to a distorted perception

Risk-aversion

1) Risk-aversion is the reluctance of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoff rather than another bargain with more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoff. The opposite of risk-aversion is risk-tolerance. For an example see Interactive Tutorial on Risk-Aversion.

2) A person behaves risk-neutral if he/she doesn’t demand a premium for risk-taking. The person tolerates risk but doesn’t seek it.

3) A person is risk-seeking if it is attracted to risk, i.e. he/she prefers an investment with a lower expected return but greater risk, to a no-risk investment with a higher expected return. Example: A bungee-jumper pays for risk.

According to the two contradicting goals addressed in the title of this paper (survival and the minimization of suffering) there are two kinds of risk-aversion and corresponding kinds of ethics:

1. Suffering-aversion. Suffering-averse ethics tolerates a loss of Darwinian fitness in order to avoid suffering.

2. Nonexistence-aversion. In nonexistence-averse ethics survival has priority over the avoidance of suffering.

Risk-averse ethics

Risk-averse ethics devaluates (volatile) chances in order to avoid risks.

If not mentioned otherwise in this paper, the term risk-averse ethics

1. is used in the sense of suffering-averse ethics

2. excludes distorted perceptions

Risk-averse population ethics devaluates the chances of possible people in order to avoid risks.

2.2 Bayes

Definition

The Bayes criterion represents a utilitarian position. It maximizes the (subjective) expected value of a decision’s consequences. The expected value is calculated as follows:

1. in cases of chance: the product of probability times profit (positive utility)

2. in cases of risk: the product of probability times loss (negative utility)

Obviously the Bayes criterion corresponds to the definition of rationality used in this paper (chapter 1.2)

But what does it mean to maximize utility? In real life we are confronted with a mixture of risks and chances, i.e. we have to take chances and avoid risks at the same time.

For the following investigation we assume that

1. chances (utility) can be expressed in terms of preference-satisfaction

2. risks (negative utility) can be expressed in terms of preference-frustration

Under the assumptions given in Preference-frustration and the Hedonistic Scale these terms can be mapped to the hedonistic scale (i.e. to terms like happiness and suffering)

Social welfare

Depending on the definition of utility, the application of Bayes on the society-level results in the following theories:

1. In classical utilitarianism utility is defined as happiness

2. In negative utilitarianism utility is defined as the avoidance of suffering

Utilitarianism considers society as an entity (complex organism) which is exposed to risk. For such an entity the same reflections apply as for an individual; the maximization of utility is a complex mixture of expansion and contraction. It is plausible to assume that this mixture is influenced by the biological nature of humans. Since the biological goal is characterized by a maximization function (see God’s utility function) it is also plausible to assume that it favors the expansive strategy. Classical utilitarianism has a tendency to support the biological mechanism; it favors the expansive strategy even in a scarce environment and assigns a moral value to the creation of lives barely worth living (see Parfit’s Repugnant Conclusion). By doing so the biological preference to expand life at any price (which has been questioned by cognition) is reinstalled at the cultural level.

1) On the biological level the goal to propagate genes is encoded in relatively rigid mechanisms which do not consider long-term risk or radical changes in the environment. This lack of flexibility can lead to the destruction of basic life resources and to the downfall of the species. But in slowly changing environments the risk-tolerance of biological mechanisms proved to be superior to risk-aversion.

2) From an evolutionary point of view technological progress represents a quickly changing environment. The biological nature of humans, which is adapted to slowly changing environments, has a tendency to underestimate technological risks (see on the Perception of Risk and Benefit). In times of rapid technological progress the risk-tolerant strategy doesn’t necessarily have the best survival value. Overpopulation and over-consumption may lead to the loss of sustainability and to the collapse of the environment which is necessary for survival. We call this a destructive (but not a hostile) potential.

In nature the destructive potential of expansionism normally leads to a partial destruction and rarely to a complete destruction of the species. Partial destruction is followed by a period of shock until the biological forces resume expansion. Adaptation is rather a history of expansionism and catastrophes, than a history of smooth alignment.

Conclusion

Risk-averse population ethics (as long as it doesn’t turn into hostility) has the following characteristics:

1. It is inferior (with regard to survival value) in times of growing resources

2. It is superior in times of diminishing resources. But this superiority is of theoretical nature; insight into the destructive potential of expansionism stands against the power of (unconscious) biological forces.

2.3 Maximin

Definition

The Maximin criterion maximizes the minimal utility (instead of accumulating utilities) and is therefore non-utilitarian. On the other hand it can be considered as an extreme case of Bayes: The more weight is given to the worst case, the more the maximization of utility converges to Maximin (A Drink from the Group, Livia Levine).

Social welfare

1) Rawls promotes the Maximin criterion on the society level. He objects that we cannot carry the (utilitarian) Bayes criterion (on the individual level) to decisions on the society level, e.g. to decisions about risky technologies.

2) According to Harsanyi the Maximin strategy is irrational because it is based on some highly unlikely unfavorable contingencies. He maintains that the distinction between small scale and large scale is irrelevant in this context.

3) Shrader-Frechette votes in favor of Rawls:

„Situations of individual risk are voluntarily chosen, whereas situations of societal risk typically are involuntarily imposed“. There is no analogy between the two situations [Shrader-Frechette, 105]:

a) Fairness: With the (utilitarian) Bayes criterion each person gets equal weight in decisions on the society level. If some persons profit from such a decision whereas others are harmed, then it may be unfair to equally weigh them.

b) Human rights: With the Bayes criterion even human rights could be violated in order to maximize utility on the society level.

[Philosophisches Seminar, 21].

Things become clearer if we discern the ethical goals behind the two strategies. Let’s consider a concrete example like a predicted asteroid impact with a small probability. Let’s further assume that the predicted impact destroys humanity if it occurs:

1) If the goal is survival at any price (nonexistence-averse ethics) then, according to the Maximin strategy, all resources must be concentrated on the deflection of the asteroid. The strategy is rational because it makes every effort to save humanity, but it is at the same time Bayes-irrational because it consumes all available resources for an unlikely event.

2) If the goal is to increase economical welfare (i.e. if the value of humanity is associated with welfare) then, according to the Bayes strategy, we can take the small probability of the impact into account and allocate much fewer resources to the deflection of the asteroid. The strategy is rational because resources can be allocated to promising projects with a high probability, but it is at the same time Maximin-irrational because it takes the (small) risk to be annihilated.

If two nations are in competition and each of them is threatened with a different asteroid, then the one with the Bayes-strategy will succeed with a high probability. The Maximin strategy of the other nation proves to be inferior in the context of competition. Obviously two kinds of survival are pursued in this example:

1. the survival of humanity as a whole

2. the survival of individual genes (expressed in terms of welfare)

From a biological point of view the second goal is the prime goal, i.e. the survival of humanity as a whole is only important as far as it serves the survival of individual genes. The hedonistic system is not designed to care about life as a whole. As long as humanity is not destroyed, the people who concentrate on the second goal win the competition.

A different argument against Maximin is cited in the context of population ethics. Maximin cannot be the basis for a neutral axiology for the following reason:

Assume that a population A consists of a very large number of people with blissful lives and one person suffering terrible pain. In another population B, everybody suffers terrible pain but slightly less than the poor person in A. According to Maximin, B is better than A. One could say that Maximin imposes a dictatorship of the worst off [Arrhenius, 101].

Conclusion

1. The application of Maximin is inappropriate, if there are several cases with immense loss, each one with a specific probability. Maximin is as an extreme case within Bayes, but not the basis for a general ethical theory.

2. There is a conflict of goals between the survival of humanity as a whole and the survival of individual genes. Individuals attempt to burden the cost of the first goal on the community and save their resources for the second.

2.4 Prioritarianism

Definition

1. Prioritarianism is a compromise between Bayes and Maximin on the society level.

2. The convergence from Bayes to Maximin can be implemented by Prioritarian Welfare Functions.

Social welfare

As we have defined the Priority View, it implies the Repugnant Conclusion since it ranks populations according to the total sum of people’s transformed welfare. But the core idea of the Priority View – that gains in welfare matter more, the worse off people are, and losses in welfare matter less, the better off people are – can be combined with other aggregation methods. No specific method for aggregating the (transformed) welfare of different lives seems to follow from the core idea of the Priority View and, hence, it is hard to see how this idea could affect our evaluation of different-number cases. It seems that the Priority View is an idea mainly about how to distribute welfare among a fixed number of people [Arrhenius, 110].

The term Prioritarianism, as used in this paper combines the core idea of the Priority View with the utilitarian aggregation method and therefore implies the Repugnant Conclusion. Prioritarianism is also a possible interpretation of the NU slogan “The least suffering for the highest number”. This slogan is the converse of Bentham’s “Greatest happiness for the greatest number”. To search for happiness doesn’t mean to forget about suffering and vice-versa. The original NU which doesn’t give any weight to happiness is not the only possible interpretation of the slogan.

Prioritarianism preserves the efficiency of utilitarianism and a particular concern for those badly off. Prioritarianism, with all its mathematical subtleties is based on the intuition of sympathy [Lumer, 2]. But the degree of sympathy which is encoded in the formulas can be challenged by more or less deviating concepts. Since there is no universal consensus on the desirable degree of sympathy, the normative force of such an approach is limited. Prioritarianism is rational for those who agree with the encoded degree of sympathy.

Conclusion

1. Prioritarianism is risk-averse, but less so than NU and Maximin.

2. Since Prioritarianism doesn’t ask for an unconditional reduction of the population it cannot be called hostile. It is, however, inferior to classical utilitarianism in a world of competition.

2.5 Hostile Potential

A society is threatened

1) by the limitation of natural resources which makes utilitarianism (Bayes) destructive

2) by the competition with other societies which makes the Maximin strategy disadvantageous

Prioritarianism defines a strategy between the mentioned risks, i.e. the utilitiarian expansionism is partially devaluated in order to avoid the worst case.

Example: If a further expansion of the population-size increases the risk of global warming, then

1) utilitarianism continues the expansion until lives are barely worth living (see Repugnant Conclusion)

2) the adherents of the Maximin strategy reduce the number of their children (which puts them in disadvantage opposite to classical utilitarians)

Prioritanians attempt to negotiate between the two groups.

3 Negative Utilitarianism

3.1 Original Version (NU)

Utility.

The only thing that has utility (moral value) is the avoidance of suffering. Happiness has no intrinsic value; happiness (or its non-existence) is morally neutral.

1. Suffering is a synonym for negative reinforcement, or punishment and tends to extinguish a certain behavior.

This definition is adopted from The ethics of pain, by Richard Ryder.

2. Utility increases with the degree of the suffering that is avoided.

3. The term suffering applies to all sentient beings, not only humans

4. The degree of suffering is defined by a combination of intensity and duration (Negative Utilitarianism, Dan Geinster).

Utility function

The dominant end of life is the minimization of suffering, i.e. the maximization of utility. All other preferences are subordinated to this goal.

1. NU counts gross suffering. The goal is to construct a world, where compensation is not necessary because there is no suffering in the first place.

2. For a definition of the term compensation (in the wider and narrower sense) see Preference-frustration and the Hedonistic Scale.

Social welfare

The goal of NU is to minimize suffering across all generations, not only for the actual one.

1. The individuals with the highest degree of suffering have the highest marginal utility and get the most attention.

2. The creation of new sources of happiness is morally neutral, if there is no suffering from the absence of these sources. Consequently a possible life has moral value only if somebody (e.g. the possible parents) suffers from its absence.

Principle of consequentialism

An agent should perform the act, which leads to the best consequences or state of affairs.

Conclusion

In NU the chances are devaluated as well as in Maximin but probabilities are taken into account.

Example: Resources have to be allocated in order to avoid the following disasters:

1. Asteroid impact

2. Climatic catastrophe

3. Nuclear terror

Each of the three events has a devastating potential but the probabilities are different. There is no single clearly defined worst case.

3.2 Comparison with Classical Utilitarianism

Utility

Bentham found pain and pleasure to be the only intrinsic values in the world: "nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure." From this, he derived the rule of utility: the good is whatever brings the greatest happiness to the greatest number of people, human beings (Utilitarianism, Wikipedia)

In contrast to classical utilitarianism happiness does not have an intrinsic moral value in NU

Utility function

In classical utilitarianism, the happiness of every period in one’s life is equally weighed to calculate the value of a life. Negative periods are compensated by positive ones [Broome]. The negative utilitarian denial of compensation is based on the idea that the same person in different stages of his/her life has to be regarded like a different person. This may be plausible in cases where a traumatic event changes the personality. But the claim that absolutely no kind of suffering can be compensated contradicts intuition. For examples of compensation see Preference-frustration and the Hedonistic Scale.

Social welfare

Any amount of suffering can be outweighed by a sufficient amount of happiness. There may be no imaginable amount of happiness that can outweigh the horrors of Auschwitz. But there might be an unimaginable amount that can do it (see Negativity, utilitarian.org).

In classical utilitarianism it is theoretically possible that the suffering of the Auschwitz victims could be outweighed by the happiness of the post war generations. In NU actual suffering can only be justified, if it prevents future suffering of an even greater magnitude. But the Holocaust certainly doesn’t allow such an interpretation.

Population ethics

NU cannot be the basis for a neutral axiology for the following reason:

If one population contains a life with negative welfare, and another doesn’t, then the latter population is always better and the difference in positive welfare doesn’t matter at all. Negativist theories don’t allow for any trade-offs between negative and positive welfare [Arrhenius, 100].

Terminology

There are theoreticians who see NU as a branch within classical utilitarianism, demanding for a higher priority in the fight against suffering. NU can be seen as a distinct version insofar, as it avoids Derek Parfit's “Repugnant Conclusion”.

3.3 Hostile Potential

The preference for the empty world

1. The doctrine of NU is counter-intuitive, not least insofar as it entails that from a purely ethical perspective it wouldn't matter if nothing at all had existed, or if everything ceased to exist (David Pearce, Negative utilitarianism).

The doctrine is counter-intuitive for a happy person, but not for a suffering person (population), at least not if suffering exceeds a certain degree.

2. NU corresponds to a “Schopenhauerian” theory of well-being: There are no lives with positive welfare. Practical lives have negative welfare and the theoretically best life has neutral welfare. This assumption avoids Derek Parfit's Repugnant Conclusion but implies the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion:

According to NU a universe with no individuals is better than a universe in which there are 10 billion individuals with extremely happy lives, but where one of these individuals experiences a minor preference-frustration. This is an absurd implication.

For an answer to the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion see On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes in Population Ethics.

3. From the preference for an empty world does not follow a corresponding political claim. Such a claim would definitely be counterproductive. Pessimistic supporters of NU therefore tend towards a retreat oriented way of living.

Painless killing

1) The most controversial implementation strategy of NU is a violent reduction of the population-size in order to improve the state of affairs. A radical pursuit of this thought leads to the extermination of humanity or life as a whole and therewith to a major disagreement between negative and classical utilitarianism (see Introduction to utilitarianism, utilitarian.org):

a) A negative utilitarian believes that, if it was possible to exterminate all life in the universe instantly and painlessly and permanently, it would be correct and ethically required that we do so in order to prevent any future cases of suffering

b) A classical utilitarian might decide either way, depending on his estimation of the relative amounts of future suffering and happiness.

There is an empirical argument against violence: Even contemplating and planning a project for the violent reduction of the population-size would provoke distress. In addition, it would classify the supporters of the project among the worst kind of terrorists. A violent extermination of mankind is not feasible in practice. The result would be an increase in suffering and therefore contradict the utility function.

2) In NU there are only empirical arguments against killing for mercy.

Example: In NU a surgeon could let a patient (painlessly) die in order to stop somebody else’s suffering by organ transplantation. The empirical argument says that confidence in health care would get completely lost if such decisions could be taken without the consent of the concerned persons.

The pinprick argument

1) The Pinprick Argument puts the idea of painless extermination to an extreme and makes the empirical argument against violence even stronger. In order to defend the pinprick argument one has to assume, that the term painlessly not only refer to the victims of destruction but also to the agents. A possible suicide of the agents would certainly exceed the pain of a prinprick.

2) The pinprick argument is also applied to the creation of the world:

Would it really be better that life had never arisen if the only unpleasant experience that would otherwise occur would be a pinprick? (Pinprick Argument by David Pearce)

a) Here the argument is based on the false assumption, that a human being can evaluate the world without being part of the world. In reality, in an empty world there is no regret about the loss of happiness.

b) Under the assumption that there is a human observer, the world is not empty and the emotions of the observer have to be accounted for. Weighing the suffering produced by annihilation against the pain of a pinprick should result in a clear wish to survive. Only the assumption that the observer can painlessly annihilate himself allows defending the pinprick argument.

c) What is the tolerable limit of suffering in a world to be created? There is no general answer to this question, because it is an individual matter. Some individuals like to take risks, others not. It can only be said that a negative utilitarian (out of his commitment to rationality) would refuse to create a life of extreme suffering, a life where he/she wishes not having been born. In a negative utilitarian world suffering would be accordingly limited.

Voluntary euthanasia

Theoretically the risks involved in life (e.g. the risk to be paralyzed by a stroke or to be burnt alive in a car accident) have to be compared to the suffering produced by suicide at any point in time (see To be or not to be). The risk estimations are biased by the will to live, but towards the end of life and in a state of extreme suffering, the will to live weakens. NU promotes voluntary euthanasia in order to limit suffering.

Population ethics

1) Indeed, if the option were humanly available, the logic of NU morally obligates bringing the world to an end were this the only way to banish the suffering endemic to it. Happily, there is a much better way to rid the natural world of its endemic nastiness. This is to use biotechnology to eradicate aversive experience in all sentient life, David Pearce, Negative utilitarianism

If above vision becomes true, then suffering could be seen as a limited, intermediary state associated with the birth of an ecstatic or spiritual world. By this interpretation suffering receives a sense and a purpose. Evolution could be regarded as a project which reduces or eliminates suffering, whereas otherwise it would persist or increase. If suffering can be besieged one day, then the accumulated suffering up to this point may be the smallest among all possible paths of evolution. The actual generation is morally obliged to sacrifice itself, if it serves the long-term purpose to minimize suffering. The transhumanist belief in progress stands in the tradition of enlightenment and shares its optimism. A corresponding negative utilitarian constitution should prevent expansion at the cost of the quality of life (see introduction). It should avoid suffering rather than create new desires. In the words of Karl Popper: The role of the state is not to make people happy but to relieve avoidable suffering. Note that the happiness in a transhumanist world doesn’t have moral value; it is only the absence of suffering which counts.

2) Supporters of NU who don’t believe in the promises of transhumanism would prefer a reduction of the population (and in the extreme case an empty world).

3) The choice between the two scenarios may never be evident so that the best strategy is a pragmatic adaptation:

a) If the current cultural project reduces the number of extreme sufferers (where otherwise it would persist or increase) and the number of contributors accelerates the project, then the population-size should be increased (up to the point, where this policy becomes counter-productive).

b) If the number of extreme sufferers persists or increases the only way to improve the state of affairs is to reduce the population-size (up to the point, where this policy becomes counter-productive, e.g. the point where childlessness causes extreme suffering). Consider the following pessimistic scenario: If it were known, that mankind will be destructed within the next generation (e.g. by an asteroid) most people would agree that childlessness is an ethical duty. Nevertheless from a biological point of view the strategy is hostile. There remains a little chance that somebody could survive.

The probabilities of the two scenarios are investigated in

1. Utility and Suffering in Culture

2. On the Perception of Risk and Benefit

For the consequences of risk-averse population ethics on the individual level see The Procreation of Risk.

Conclusion

A violent reduction of the population-size remains a theoretical option, as long as the suffering produced by the reduction is smaller than the suffering eliminated. Even if the optimistic transhumanist implementation of NU is supported by the majority, a pessimistic and militant minority could attempt to exterminate mankind (or single persons). For this reasons NU never gained practical importance and is considered to be refuted. The logical attempt to rescue NU as a general ethical theory is to remove the painless killing argument and drop the claim that absolutely no kind of suffering can be compensated. Such a moderate version of NU is investigated in Negative Utilitarianism and Justice.

4 Buddhism

4.1 Definition

The Noble Truths

Following a brief description of the teachings:

1. “Life is inseparably tied to suffering.”

2. “The cause of suffering are attachments (desires) in a world where everything changes, nothing is permanent.”

3. “Suffering can be terminated by ending human desire.”

4. “Human desire can be ended by following the Eightfold Path.”

In the language of utilitarianism:

1. First Truth: The utility (dominant end) in Buddhism is the avoidance of suffering. Negative utility increases with the degree of suffering.

2. Second Truth: Suffering is caused by preference-frustration. Concerning this link of terms see Preference-frustration and the Hedonistic Scale.

3. Third Truth: Suffering can be terminated by ending the creation of preferences.

4. Forth Truth: The creation of preferences can be ended by following the Eightfold Path.

Utility function

1. Looking at the details of the Eightfold Path it becomes clear that the maximization of utility is a complex matter. The difficult task is to suppress and eliminate preferences without suffering from missed chances. Whereas the goal can be reached for a short period of time during meditation, the daily life forces the mind back into the body. The Eightfold Path attempts to reconcile the requirements of daily life with the goal of meditation.

2. The precondition for meditation is a non-violent, low-risk life, a life without passionate attachments. Since Buddha was a pragmatic philosopher he learnt from experience, that extreme ascetism distracts the mind from meditation. The reason might be that passion is the root of all extremism. Preference elimination should not cause the kind of suffering one tried to avoid in the first place. This means in particular that the preference to exist ought not to be frustrated. The optimum is a middle way between the frustrations caused by biological attachments and the frustrations caused by the disrespect of biological needs.

Social welfare

1. At its origin (which is Theravada) the Buddhist concept concentrated on individual redemption. But the Eightfold Path is tied to the doctrine of reincarnation and therefore implies a concept of justice. The idea to become globally active rose up with the Mahajana movement in the 2nd century. The ideal of the Mahajana School is that of the Bodhisattva, a person who delays his or her own enlightenment in order to compassionately assist all other beings.

2. According to Buddhism the best state of affairs is a world without suffering. The best possible approximation to this state (and therefore the ethical ideal) is a world where all human beings live according to the Eightfold Path.

What kind of ethics is Buddhism?

Following some important aspects for a classification:

1) Buddhism is a form of consequentialism. An agent should perform the act, which leads to the best consequences or state of affairs.

2) The root of Buddhism is hedonistic: the avoidance of suffering.

3) Suffering is caused by preference-frustration. Since there are many kinds of preferences there are also many kinds of suffering. The moral value is preference-based.

4) Buddhism defines morally desired and undesired preferences. The Eightfold Path is virtue ethics.

5) Buddhism devaluates (volatile) biological preferences in order to reduce suffering and is therefore risk-averse ethics.

For more information on Buddhism see On the Principles of Non-Violence and Disengagement.

4.2 Comparison with Risk Ethics

Individual level

Meditation

In Buddhism meditation is an approximation to the perfect state. But meditation can also be seen as a rational adaptation to the fact, that death is inevitable.

The modest life (Eightfold Path)

In Buddhism the modest life sets the preconditions for meditation. But the modest life can also be seen as an adaptation to a (possible) scarce environment, i.e. as a strategy which makes the individual less dependent from the environment. Because of the omnipresence of contingency [Hampe], it has a rational aspect.

Monasticism

Monastic Buddhism sacrifices intense (but volatile) biological happiness in order to avoid suffering. This strategy can be called risk-averse but not irrational.

Society level

Justice

Buddhism denies the world as it is or, more precisely, it denies our distorted perception of the world. Justice is realized by the cycle of reincarnation and not by means of a political system. The denial of the world cannot be called irrational but the belief in the reincarnation of an individual soul has no scientific basis.

Progress

Buddha may have been a pessimist with regards to the eradication of suffering, but he was an optimist with regards to ethical progress (see Was the Buddha a Pessimist?).

1. Ethical progress goes before economical progress. The social welfare function of Buddhism (if there were any) would have to be compassionate and risk-averse, i.e. in favor of those who suffer the most.

2. Ethical progress also goes before technological progress. Buddhism is skeptical with regard to the curative potential of technology because it cannot be separated from the destructive potential.

The struggle for survival and procreation is denied in favor of a retreat-oriented way of living. This strategy can be called risk-averse but not irrational.

Conclusion

Buddhism is a special form of risk-averse ethics. It is only irrational as far as its risk-aversion is based on the belief in reincarnation. The thesis that suffering cannot be besieged (first Noble Truth) is open to falsification, but cannot be called irrational.

4.3 Comparison with NU

The minimization of suffering

Buddhism advocating minimizing dukkha (pain, dissatisfaction) – rather than maximizing sukkha (from which “sugar” comes) may be a kind of negative welfarism. [Kolm, 8]

The transformation of (volatile) biological preferences into virtue-type (durable) preferences serves the minimization of suffering. Non-existence of the ego is the only preference which can permanently and absolutely be satisfied.

Perfectionism

In order to understand Buddhist perfectionism we look at an objection which was made to NU:

Let us suppose that a world A is inhabited by ten billion people, all of whom lead lives of a very high quality. Suppose that these lives contain a great number of satisfied preferences, but always some frustrated ones as well. We can imagine another world B, with a population consisting of a small number of beings, all of whom are endowed with an extraordinarily meager mental life. Each of them has just a few extremely simple preferences which could be rendered like this: “I want to eat. I want to stay alive. I want to procreate.” Suppose further that all of these preferences are always satisfied. According to NU world B would be better than world A (Example given by Klemens Kappel).

1. According to NU the quality of life, expressed in mental richness has a high value on the evolutionary scale, but not an intrinsic value on the moral scale. Every individual has the same weight in prioritizing preferences; there is no universal moral priority for mental richness.

2. Buddhism resembles Kappel’s perfectionism. Mental preferences are given a higher moral value than the preferences for food, survival and procreation. But Buddhism strives for spiritual perfection and not for intellectual perfection. Spiritual perfection is associated with non-existence of the ego. This makes Buddhism a hostile philosophy.

Antifrustrationism

The term Antifrustrationism was introduced by Fehige [522]. His concept is inspired by the Second Noble Truth of Buddhism (suffering is caused by preference-frustration; without preferences there is no suffering). According to Antifrustrationism the only thing that has moral value is the avoidance of preference-frustration. The creation of satisfied preferences is morally neutral. The best state of affairs is the empty world.

What does that mean in practice?

1) If we assume that the highest order preference is the biological one (survival and procreation) then the creation and satisfaction of countless low order preferences gets moral value:

a) The claim, that our world is worse than an empty world does not imply, that we should empty the world we live in; we can’t for there have been preferences already [Fehige, 522].

b) Antifrustrationism doesn’t say that mankind should stop procreating because future people will have frustrated preferences [Fehige, 523].

2) If we assume that the highest order preference is the avoidance of suffering, then the ethical ideal is completely different. In monastic Buddhism procreation doesn’t get moral value, although the preferences “are already there”. The promotion of childlessness seems to be more consequent for a philosophy which considers the empty world to be the best state of affairs.

Conclusion: In order to derive ethical guidelines from antifrustrationism one has to work with the degree (strength) of preference-frustrations, so that the concept moves closer to NU. For more information on preference hedonism see Negative utilitarianism and Justice.

4.4 Hostile Potential

The preference for the empty world

1. According to the First Noble Truth, life is inseparably tied to suffering. Buddhism therefore denies the utopia of a world without suffering and promotes an unconditional preference for the empty world. An empty world is a world without preferences, a world with absolute indifference concerning valuations. There is no ex ante preference for happiness and consequently no regret about a possible but unrealized happy population. We cannot valuate the empty world without being part of the world. Under the assumption that there is a human observer, the denial of the empty world simply reflects the preferences of this observer.

2. For a Buddhist an empty world doesn’t have the same meaning as for a Western nihilist because he believes in a spiritual form of existence.See On the Buddhist Truths and the Paradoxes in Population Ethics.

Painless killing

Interestingly Buddhists have a strong aversion against killing, although biological life takes place in the minus zone of the Buddhist axiology. The reason might be that the suffering caused by violence plays an eminent role in Indian philosophy (see Ahimsa). The doctrine of reincarnation says that killing (by the law of the karma) increases the risk to be reborn in an unfavorable position. For a Buddhist not only the killing of humans but also the killing of animals is immoral.

1. It is immoral to kill for mercy without the patients consent. Buddhism rejects the Experience Requirement.

2. It is immoral to commit (painless) suicide in order to shorten the path to non-existence.

3. It is immoral to kill oneself by extreme ascetism.

Voluntary euthanasia

No difference to NU.

Population ethics

Monastic Buddhism asks for childlessness, not only because a new life is a high risk but simply because non-existence of the ego is considered to be the perfect state. A monk may suffer from childlessness but is not allowed to improve his situation at the cost of a child. The demand for childlessness makes monastic Buddhism a hostile philosophy.

5 Cross Comparison

5.1 Axiology

Neutral

NU measures the lacking difference to a world without suffering. A person with a live barely worth living is not slightly above 0% but far in the minus zone because he/she is far from perfection. This is an interesting way to look at ethics but counter-intuitive for all people who don’t associate a life worth living with a negative number.

1. The axiology of NU is counter-intuitive for most people.

2. NU doesn’t account for (existing and possible) positive welfare. Consequently it cannot be a neutral axiology.

Prioritarianism is a plausible neutral axiology since the Repugnant Conclusion argument isn’t conclusive. In a world of finite resources the population-size will be finite as well. The weight given to extremely suffering individuals can be chosen in such a way, that it overrules the total weight of all others.

Person-affecting

Let’s assume that we use a neutral axiology on the basis of a prioritarian welfare function. Since the moral weight increases with the degree of suffering, the extreme sufferers have the highest marginal welfare. The addition of lives barely worth living would be highly inefficient as compared to the avoidance of overpopulation. The principle of marginal value, applied to a prioritarian welfare function, avoids the Repugnant Conclusion. For more information about prioritarian population ethics see The Procreation of Risk.

Affinities

1) NU is a specific form of Prioritarianism where the weight of happiness is set to zero.

2) Buddhism (except from its metaphysical dimension) resembles a pessimistic and non-violent version of NU.

5.2 Risk-Aversion

The creation of risk

Is it counter-intuitive to claim that, other things being equal, we make a population better by creating an extra person with very high welfare?

Such a question is typical for neutral axiologies. However it is based on unrealistic assumptions. There is no guarantee allowing us to create people with high welfare. In practice the distribution of welfare is a question of statistics (accidents, illnesses etc.) so that the happy people do not exist without the suffering people and vice-versa. We have to account for risk when valuating the decisions about new lives.

The avoidance of risk

Risk-aversion is characterized by the devaluation of chances in order to avoid risks.

The theories investigated so far show that chances can be devaluated in two ways:

1. disallow compensations (NU)

2. eliminate and suppress preferences (Buddhism)

The suppression of new preferences is a logical consequence in every theory which disallows compensation, because new preferences create new risks (which cannot be compensated by chances). This entails in particular that there is no intrinsic moral value of new lives.

There is no universal consensus on the degree of risk-aversion. Different groups of people consider different degrees of risk-aversion to be rational. Prioritarianism is the most flexible concept because it allows different degrees of risk-aversion.

5.3 Hostile Potential

The preference for the empty world

In NU and Buddhism there is no “ex ante” preference for life.

1) For Buddhism, the empty world is considered to be the best state of affairs, but emptiness is associated with a spiritual form of existence (similar to the Hindu Brahman).

2) In NU utopia is a world without any suffering, e.g. an empty world or a transhumanist world. The world could be sacrificed for the pain of a pinprick (although under unrealistic assumptions, see chapter 3.3)

NU accounts for the possibility that suffering could be removed by transhumanism although it doesn’t rate the transhumanist world morally higher than the empty world. Since evolution is not predictable (so far) we don’t know if the empty world is easier to realize than the transhumanist world. If evolution were predictable, the theory would decide for the smaller evil whatever that is.

The disallowance of compensation

The hostility of a theory increases, if we disallow the compensation of suffering by happiness. To compensate means to justify suffering by happiness. Following an overview ordered by increasing hostility:

Theory	Compensation	Hostile potential
Classical utilitarianism	Happiness can outweigh suffering	superior in a world of competition
Prioritarianism	Compensation is impeded by the prioritarian rule of weighing	inferior in a world of competition
Negative utilitarianism original version (NU)	Actual happiness cannot outweigh actual suffering	hostile in a pessimistic scenario
Buddhism	Actual and future happiness cannot outweigh actual suffering	hostile (scenario is definitely pessimistic)

6 Metaphor

The city of Omelas

The metaphor of Omelas (see The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas, by Ursula K.LeGuin, 1974) describes a city whose well-functioning depends on the suffering of a child. It corresponds well with the NU world view, if the suffering child is identified with the most suffering individual (or if it is regarded as a symbolic representation of extreme suffering). The child is used as a symbol to express the innocence of the victim. In a certain sense, the most suffering individual pays the price for all others who suffer less or are happy.

Hostile inhabitants

The inhabitants of Omelas who believe, that the suffering of the child persists or even increases with evolution can be divided in the following two groups:

1) The ones who walk away from Omelas: Buddhists and other pessimists, who retire from life. Hindus who attempt to leave the wheel of reincarnation.

2) The ones who try to destroy Omelas: Militant negative utilitarians or other people, who combat life.

Life-friendly inhabitants

The inhabitants of Omelas who believe, that the suffering of the child decreases with evolution can be divided in the following two groups:

1. The ones who try to improve Omelas: Paradise engineers and Abolitionists

2. The ones who believe in salvation: The supporters of various revealed religions

The future of the city

The people who accept Omelas as it is and comply with the state of affairs (e.g. Stoics) don’t contribute to the global termination of suffering. The optimistic and conciliatory inhabitants of Omelas have a better Darwinian fitness than the hostile ones. Omelas will therefore remain populated, even if the suffering of the child persists or increases. The end of suffering (ironically) will rather come by the destruction of life; see Utility and Suffering in Culture, chapter 5.

global termination of suffering

by non-human forces

by human forces

by destruction

close to certain

Buddhists

possible

Militant NU

by salvation

very unlikely

Believers

unlikely

Paradise engineers

7 Conclusion

Hostility

2) Monastic Buddhism is risk-averse as well as negative utilitarianism. In contrast to negative utilitarianism it excludes an optimistic scenario and is therefore definitively hostile.

Rationality

1) A specific kind of population ethics is considered to be rational by the majority, if it corresponds to the risk-profile of the majority.

3) For an observer in the original position risk-averse population ethics is rational.

References

1) Arrhenius Gustav, Future Generations, A Challenge for Moral Theory, FD-Diss., Uppsala University, Dept. of Philosopy, Uppsala: University Printers, 2000

2) Broome John, Weighing Lives, Oxford University Press, 2004

3) Fehige Christoph, “A Pareto Principle for Possible People”, in C. Fehige and U. Wessels, eds., Preferences, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter , 1998, p.508-543

4) Hampe Michael, Die Macht des Zufalls, Wolf Jobst Siedler Verlag, Berlin, 2006

5) Kolm Serge-Christoph, Macrojustice from Equal Liberty

6) Lumer Christoph, Prioritarian Welfare Functions, in Daniel Schoch (ed.): Democracy and Welfare, Paderborn: Mentis, 2005

7) Philosophisches Seminar der Universität Zürich, Elemente der Risikoethik, Wintersemester 2005/06

8) Shrader-Frechette Kristin, Risk and Rationality, Philosophical Foundations of Populist Reforms, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991

Bibliography

Negative utilitarianism

1. Mega Essays: Essays about negative utility

2. Open Directory Project, Negative Utilitarianism

3. Philosophy Forums Negative Utilitarianism

4. Ryder Rychard, Painism - historical and ethical aspects

5. Ryder Rychard, Darwinism, Altruism and Painience

6. Singer Peter, Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979

Decision Theory

1) Döring Sabine and Feger Fritz, Risk-Assessment as Virtue

2) Ericson Richard V. and Doyle Aaron (eds.). Risk and Morality, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 2003

3) Mostad Petter, Decision Theory and Bayesian Statistics

4) Michon Gérard, Utility-based Decisions

5) Phung Albert, Behavioral Finance

Population Ethics

1. Parfit Derek, Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984

2. Ryberg, J., “Is the Repugnant Conclusion Repugnant?” Philosophical Papers, XXV, 1996, p.161-177

3. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Repugnant Conclusion

4. Wolf Clark, Repugnance, Where is Thy Sting? in The Repugnant Conclusion, Essays on Population Ethics, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004