Negative Preference Utilitarianism
B.Contestabile First version 2014 Last version 2025
1. Introduction
2. Basics
3. Definition
4. NPU with Metaphysics
5. Critique of Metaphysical Beliefs
6. Can NPU work without Metaphysics?
7. Conclusion
Starting point
Negative preference utilitarianism (NPU) is based on antifrustrationism, an axiology which postulates that perfect preference satisfaction has the same moral value as the non-existence of preferences.
Type of problem
(1) Is there a relation between NPU and Buddhism?
(2) Can non-existence be seen as a perfect state, better than an almost perfect life?
(3) Can NPU work without metaphysical assumptions?
Result
(1) Is there a relation between NPU and Buddhism?
The Noble Truths of Buddhism strive to minimize preference-frustration as well as NPU.
(2) Can non-existence (of the ego) be seen as a perfect state, better than an almost perfect life?
From a Buddhist perspective, non-existence (of the ego) can be interpreted as the end of rebirths, which is seen as entry into Nirvana. In Mahayana and Yogachara Buddhism the Nirvana is a perfect state beyond the human mind. In this specific sense the question can be affirmed.
(3) Can NPU work without metaphysical assumptions?
In secular ethics the Nirvana is solely a state of the human mind. The dissolution of the ego combined with a feeling of perfection can also be reached in drug-experiences. Without metaphysical assumptions the NPU-claim that no state of affairs can be better than non-existence is counter-intuitive for most people.
Starting point
Negative preference utilitarianism (NPU) is based on antifrustrationism, an axiology which holds that perfect preference satisfaction has the same moral value as the non-existence of preferences.
Type of problem
(1) Is there a relation between NPU and Buddhism?
(2) Can non-existence be seen as a perfect state, better than an almost perfect life?
(3) Can NPU work without metaphysical assumptions?
Terminology
- For the purpose of this paper, we can treat the terms welfare, well-being, and life satisfaction as synonyms.
- In the context of disclosing similarities between NPU and Buddhism, we replace the modern term preference by the ancient term desire.
- Occasionally, we use the shorter terms satisfaction and frustration, instead of preference-satisfaction and preference-frustration.
Preferences
There are two definitions of the term preference:
1) In preference utilitarianism (and most philosophical papers) the term means desire. Associated terms are interest, attachment, motivation, goal, reason to act etc. Desires are tied to emotions and control behavior.
2) In welfare economics (microeconomics in particular) and social choice the term defines a preference of ordering. The context is a choice between any variables that affect social welfare, mostly a choice between products or services.
Example: A consumer has a preference (desire) for apples. The same consumer also has a preference (desire) for oranges. If we say that the consumer prefers apples to oranges, then we rank preferences. The ranking is a preference in the economist sense.
Today’s economists instinctively think comparative; philosophers seem not to [Broome 1999, 9].
Mostly – as in this paper – the context discloses which interpretation makes sense.
Preference utilitarianism
Preference utilitarianism is usually seen as an alternative to hedonic utilitarianism. The main difference is the following:
- Hedonic utilitarianism assumes that the happiness and suffering of all individuals is cardinally measurable and can be aggregated.
- Preference utilitarianism rejects this assumption.
In his dissertation Social Choice and Individual Values Kenneth Arrow proved that there is no democratic decision process which aggregates individual preferences into an unambiguous result [Kleinewefers, 48-52].The difficulties in the aggregation are caused by the assumption that individual preferences are not comparable and therefore not cardinally measurable. There is, however, a way to circumvent Arrows’ finding:
(1) Preferences must be ordered; otherwise, the theory is meaningless [Broome 1999, 9-10]. In this paper we consider life satisfaction to be the highest order preference.
(3) Note that within the premises of (2) the different kinds of happiness and suffering are considered to be commensurable as in classical utilitarianism. If a participant of the survey focuses on meditation and reaches the highest level of life satisfaction, then his/her life is considered to be morally equivalent to the one of a participant, who reaches the highest level by living a passionate life.
Classical utilitarianism versus positive preference utilitarianism (PPU)
- In classical utilitarianism non-existence is seen as a neutral state because it is neither happiness nor suffering. A neutral state is given value zero on the hedonic scale [Broome 2004, 257]. Happy lives are given positive value, and suffering lives are given negative value.
- Preference utilitarianism usually has no numerical basis. But if we work with surveys on subjective life satisfaction, then we have such a basis. The non-existence of preferences is given value zero. In PPU life satisfaction is given positive value, and life dissatisfaction is given negative value, in analogy to classical utilitarianism.
Antifrustrationism
NPU is based on antifrustrationism. Antifrustrationism can be characterized by the following statements:
- What matters about preferences is not that they have a satisfied existence, but that they don’t have a frustrated existence [Fehige, 518]. The only moral value is the absence of frustration.
- Since the non-existence of preferences implies no frustrations, it is considered to be the best possible state of affairs, a perfect state. The non-existence of preferences is given the same moral value as perfect preference-satisfaction.
The intuitions supporting these normative claims are investigated in chapters 4 to 6. Christoph Fehige, the inventor of antifrustrationism, explicitly refers to Buddhism [Fehige, 518, 522].
Goal
Negative preference utilitarianism (NPU) strives to minimize overall preference-frustration [Fricke, 20].
Metric
(1) The non-existence of preferences is given the value zero.
(2) According to antifrustrationism (chapter 2) the non-existence of preferences has the same moral value as perfect preference-satisfaction. In view of (1), no life can have positive value [Stanford, chapter 2.4].
Table 1 Hedonic scales used in surveys
- col. 4: Ron Anderson created a suffering measure by reversing the Cantril scale (col.3).
- col. 5: The NPU scale corresponds to Anderson’s scale but uses negative numbers. It measures the distance to perfection.
|
Classical Utilitarianism
|
Description
|
Cantril Scale [Gallup] |
Suffering Measure [Anderson] |
NPU |
|
+5 |
happy |
10 |
0 |
0 |
|
+4 |
“ |
9 |
1 |
-1 |
|
+3 |
“ |
8 |
2 |
-2 |
|
+2 |
“ |
7 |
3 |
-3 |
|
+1 |
“ |
6 |
4 |
-4 |
|
0 |
neutral |
5 |
5 |
-5 |
|
-1 |
suffering |
4 |
6 |
-6 |
|
-2 |
“ |
3 |
7 |
-7 |
|
-3 |
“ |
2 |
8 |
-8 |
|
-4 |
“ |
1 |
9 |
-9 |
|
-5 |
“ |
0 |
10 |
-10 |
The fact that the NPU scale contains only negative numbers doesn’t mean that there is no inter-personal compensation. Take the example of a mini population, consisting of two people:
- Classical utilitarianism: Jim’s welfare level is +4; Pam’s is -3; overall welfare is +1.
- In NPU the same logic is applied, but the result is transformed into the NPU-scale. The value (+1) on the classical utilitarian scale corresponds to the value (-4) on the NPU-scale.
Furthermore, there is intra-personal compensation. Lower order preferences can have moral value (and should not be eliminated), if they prevent the frustration of the highest order preference (life satisfaction).
Since the aggregated total is always negative in NPU, there is a permanent moral pressure to shrink populations –favoring antinatalism. A counter-pressure arises when the frustration from childlessness increases in shrinking populations.
Since NPU strives to minimize frustration, instead of maximizing satisfaction, it makes sense to sacrifice chances in order to avoid risks. Chances can be sacrificed by eliminating preferences (desires) and not creating new ones. What that means in practice can best be illustrated by comparing NPU with Buddhism.
Comparison with Buddhism
If we replace the term preference by the term desire the strategy of preference-elimination (risk elimination) corresponds to the instructions given by the Noble Truths of Buddhism [Contestabile 2010, 105-106]:
- First Noble Truth: “Life is inseparably tied to suffering.”
- Second Noble Truth: “The cause of suffering are attachments (desires) in a world where everything changes, nothing is permanent.”
- Third Noble Truth: “Suffering can be terminated by ending human desire.”
- Forth Noble Truth: “Human desire can be ended by following the Eightfold Path.”
The Eightfold Path does not promote antinatalism, but Buddhists, who strive to leave the cycle of rebirth (samsara) with utmost consequence, like monks and wandering ascetics, adhere to the ethical ideal of childlessness.
Since the elimination of desires causes frustration as well, Buddha recommended a middle way of moderation between the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification (Middle Way, Wikipedia).
The ethical ideal of minimizing overall frustration (suffering) is embodied by the Bodhisattva.
Criticism
(1) NPU implies that a perfect life of 1 year has the same value as a perfect life of 100 years [Stanford, chapter 2.4]
In other words: 99 years of non-existence have the same value as 99 perfect years.
(2) A theory about welfare that denies the possibility of lives worth living is quite counter-intuitive [Ryberg, 140-141].
Even an almost perfect life is given a negative value; see Reverse Repugnant Conclusion.
This criticism by can only be countered by a metaphysical upgrading of non-existence:
Hinduism
From a Hindu perspective, the non-existence of desires can be interpreted as the end of rebirths, which is synonymous with entering Brahman.
In Hinduism meditation is done to realize union of one's self, one's ātman, with the omnipresent and non-dual Brahman (Hinduism, Wikipedia).
Insofar as the Brahman is described as bliss [Raju, 54, 228] it is justified to depict it on the hedonic scale. But the term bliss must be associated with terms such as metaphysical, sublime, non-sensual, transcendent, and divine happiness. Human happiness is transient, whereas the Brahman lasts forever (indicated by the width of the rectangles in Fig.1). The intensity of emotions is depicted by the shading (dark means strong intensity). In approaching the Brahman, the biological intensity fades away and the metaphysical quality prevails.
Fig.1 Human happiness and Brahman
For the finite time, in which human satisfaction reaches the perfection of the Brahman (a state without desires) the antifrustrationist axiom is fulfilled (as indicated by the height of the rectangles in Fig.1). In NPU perfect satisfaction is given the hedonic value zero, to express that its moral value is not higher than the non-existence of desires. Under these premises, imperfect satisfaction must be expressed in negative terms and then aligns with the NPU-metric (Table 1, col.5).
Mahayana Buddhism
Buddhism denied the existence of an individual soul (ātman) but developed concepts of a transcendent reality, inspired by the Hindu Brahman [Fowler, 34]. In Mahayana Buddhism, for example, the notion of an impersonal (not individual) existence within a transcendent reality is expressed in terms of Buddha-nature. Meditation is seen as a chance to get in touch with the Buddha-nature and Nirvana is its full realization. In analogy to Hinduism, non-existence can be interpreted as the end of rebirths, which is synonymous with entering Nirvana.
The Nirvana resembles non-existence insofar as the ego is dead. One can imagine the death of the ego as the beginning of an impersonal spiritual form of existence within a transcendent reality. If finally, the decomposition of the material ego into this spiritual form of existence is seen as a goal, then it becomes clear that the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion is not counter-intuitive for a Buddhist. Buddhism strives for a painless accordance with the inevitable. Non-existence of the ego is the only paramount preference which can absolutely and permanently be satisfied. Our intuition of perfect preference-satisfaction is characterized by the imagination of a land of milk and honey. According to Buddhism, this intuition is completely misleading. In the real world perfect preference-satisfaction can only be approached by eliminating preferences. The closeness of perfect preference-satisfaction (in the Buddhist sense) and non-existence is the key to escape the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion [Contestabile 2010, 108].
Non-hedonic descriptions of the ultimate reality use terms like “perfection beyond emotions” [Fowler, 7] and “universal consciousness”. An example for the latter can be found in Yogachara Buddhism. In NPU non-hedonic perfection is given the hedonic value zero, to express that it is neither happiness nor suffering. Under these premises, imperfect satisfaction must be expressed in negative terms and then aligns with the NPU-metric (Table 1, col.5).
The idea of a universal consciousness (or cosmic mind) is as old as philosophy but has become topical again [Chalmers]. Contemporary physics says that there is no absolute nothingness; the void is a theoretical construct.
- The recent interest in the hard problem of consciousness has revived interest in panpsychism. Why should physical processing give rise to a rich inner life at all? It seems objectively unreasonable that it should, and yet it does. The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive there is a whir of information processing, but there is also a subjective aspect.
- The most popular empirically based argument for panpsychism stems from evolution. This argument begins with the assumption that evolution is a process that creates complex systems out of pre-existing properties but yet cannot make "entirely novel" properties.
(Panpsychism, Wikipedia)
Today, the idea of universal consciousness is mainly supported by philosophers who doubt that consciousness can be fully explained by physics. However, the question of the universal consciousness’ existence must be distinguished from the question of its evaluation. To equate the moral value of a universal consciousness with the one of perfect human happiness is a strong normative claim that can only be justified with metaphysical arguments.
5. Critique of Metaphysical Beliefs
The belief in an eternal soul
Buddha avoided metaphysical speculations in general and rejected the existence of an eternal soul (atman) in particular [Fowler 1999, 81] [Webster 2005, 96]. Following an example from the Alagaddupama Sutta [Thanissaro 2004]:
'This cosmos is the self. After death this I will be constant, permanent, and eternal, not subject to change. I will stay just like that for an eternity' — Isn't it utterly and completely a fool's teaching?" (…)
"Thus, monks, any form or consciousness whatsoever that is past, future, or present; internal or external; blatant or subtle; common or sublime; far or near: every form is to be seen as it actually is with right discernment as: This is not mine. This is not my self. This is not what I am.”
Obviously, Buddha was aiming at a painless dissolution of the self, and not at the preservation and perfection of the self.
The doctrine of rebirth
The painless dissolution of the self is a difficult task. According to Buddha the cycle of rebirth is determined by the law of Karma, which says that all our actions, done deliberately through body, speech or mind, have consequences beyond our actual life. Unless an individual is redeemed, some characteristics of the self survive after death, are reborn and recreate suffering again and again. If we associate “some characteristics” with genetic and epigenetic inheritance, then the doctrine is not so far from contemporary biology [Contestabile 2018, 238-240].
The four great islands, from a Burmese Buddhist cosmology manuscript
British Library, Or.14004, f.27
Today the findings of genetics and epigenetics have demystified the karmic law. The ancient instructions to avoid rebirth have the character of a religious belief.
The belief in heaven
It is unknown how many Buddhists believe that the Nirvana exists as a celestial realm outside of the human mind.
Nirvāṇa is a term found in the texts of all major Indian religions – Buddhism, Hinduism, Jainism and Sikhism. It refers to the profound peace of mind that is acquired with moksha and the liberation from samsara (…). The idea of moksha is connected to the Vedic culture, where it conveyed a notion of “immortality” or “timelessness”, and a notion of being "unborn", or "at the still point of the turning world of time" (…). The hope for life after death started with notions of going to the worlds of the Fathers or Ancestors and/or the world of the Gods or Heaven (Nirvana, Wikipedia).
According to the Nirodha interpretation of the Pali Canon Buddha was convinced that pari-nirvāṇa [Breyer, 535] is the key to the cessation of rebirth, and therefore the key to the cessation of suffering. Did Buddha associate the cessation of rebirth with the beginning of a new (impersonal) form of existence within a universal consciousness? We don’t know because he did not elaborate on metaphysical issues [Thanissaro 2013, chapt.5]. Possibly he was influenced by Samkhya, a dualistic school of Indian philosophy [Baus] which was taught to the young Buddha by Āḷāra Kālāma [Ruzsa, Chapter 1]. According to this doctrine there is an eternal, indestructible form of consciousness, which is different and independent from any conception of the self. Liberation from the cycle of death and rebirth can be attained by leaving the ego and immersing in this consciousness. The Buddhist “deathless” and the Hindu “immortality” are a translation of the same word in Pali/Sanskrit: amata [Batchelor, 89]. However, if there is indeed a universal consciousness, it may be very different from the state of mind experienced in meditation. To associate it with human ideas of perfection has the character of a religious belief.
Beliefs and truth
The beliefs discussed in this chapter cannot be proven wrong, but natural scientists would call them implausible hypotheses. They are implausible because they make more assumptions than necessary to explain the natural phenomena; they violate the principle of parsimony.
We could also take a psychological approach and investigate the interests behind beliefs. All the above beliefs alleviate the fear of death and are therefore suspected to serve this interest.
The need, respectively wish to believe in something is not just an inadequate reason to believe it, but it is always and in itself – if there is no independent evidence – a counterargument to believe it [Tugendhat, 191].
6. Can NPU work without Metaphysics?
The internal perspective
There are two meanings of the term “non-existence of desires”:
(1) An individual without desires (seen from an internal perspective)
(2) The non-existence of individuals (necessarily seen from an external perspective)
The antifrustrationist axiom (chapter 2) could hold for the meaning (1):
- Imagine a simple organism in a state without desires, experiencing a feeling of perfection. We could declare this state morally equivalent to the perfect happiness of a human, because the simple organism doesn’t miss the richness of a human life.
- Similarly, we could declare the Nirwana-state (a state without desires) of a Buddhist monk morally equivalent to the perfect fulfillment of sensual desires, because the meditator doesn’t miss this fulfillment.
However, antifrustrationism and NPU raise the claim that the axiom also holds for the meaning (2). We will investigate this claim in the following sections:
The Nirvana
Can non-existence (of the ego) be seen as a perfect state, better than an almost perfect life? In Buddhism, the non-existence of desires can be interpreted as the end of rebirths, which is synonymous with entering a transcendent reality called Nirwana. In secular ethics, however, Nirvana is solely a state of the human mind. It is therapeutically effective, because it alleviates the suffering from transience and the fear of death. A Nirwana-like dissolution of the ego combined with a feeling of perfection can also be reached in drug-experiences with tranquillizers, benzos, opiates and entheogens. Neither the Nirvana-experience nor drug-experiences weaken the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion, because they do not take an external perspective.
If secular Buddhists think about antinatalism, then because they consider non-existence to be the lesser evil (not a perfect state). The corresponding form of consequentialism is the moderate NU (and not NPU). The confrontation with severe suffering (not minor frustration) marks the beginning of Buddhist reasoning (see Four sights). It is questionable if Buddhism would ever have emerged in a world with only minor suffering.
The fact that the intensity of pain increases in the course of evolution (see The Biological Evolution of Pain) raises the question if the average welfare of the sentient species gets better, the more we go backwards in evolution. Can we describe the reversal of evolution (and the corresponding elimination of desires) as a process which converges towards perfection? It is more likely that the average welfare converges (from negative) towards zero than (from positive) towards perfection; see Negative Utilitarianism and Buddhist Intuition. That is an argument against the NPU and for the moderate NU.
The inevitability of death
Is it possible to comply with the antifrustrationist axiom without upgrading non-existence? One could degrade preference-satisfaction directly for the simple reason that life is destined to decay. In practice this means looking at life from the end and permanently being aware of one’s mortality (Memento Mori).
|
Is there any meaning in my life that would not be destroyed by the inevitable death that awaits me?
[Tolstoi, 44]
|
For illustration imagine that you will have to die tomorrow. Under these premises most of yesterday’s priorities become unimportant. The task is now to detach from everything that made life worth living, in particular from the attachment to the ego. But why should one get attached in the first place, knowing that death is inevitable, even if death is still far away? If individual life is seen as not worth getting attached to, then human lives are characterized by degrees of negative value (Table 1, col.5). However, the normative claim that individual life is worthless because of its mortality is counter-intuitive for most people. Some even assign value to life because it does not last forever. Others identify themselves with a family, a community, a religion etc., i.e. with values that transcend the individual life.
The longing for death
A different idea is to turn frustration into satisfaction by desiring one’s inevitable fate (Amor Fati). However, this strategy, although intellectually comprehensible, is in complete contradiction to the biological intuitions. For most people in most situations, it is counter-intuitive to desire death. Laic Buddhists hope for a better rebirth, and monks hope for an existence in Nirwana (chapter 4), but committing suicide would destroy these hopes. Since the first precept is to refrain from the destruction of life (including one's own life), self-destruction can only worsen the cycle of rebirths (Religious view on suicide, Wikipedia). It is remarkable that Buddhism – in contrast to some Hindu sects – never developed a suicide cult [Beckwith 2015, 85]. Buddha recommended a middle way of moderation between the extremes of sensual indulgence and self-mortification (Middle Way, Wikipedia).
Intuitions and truth
In reddit.com we found the following comment:
Too often in philosophy, counter-intuitive is taken to mean wrong.
In this chapter we discussed the following intuitions:
- the intuition that non-existence is better than an almost perfect life (Reverse Repugnant Conclusion)
- the intuition that the reversal of evolution leads to a state of perfection
- the intuition that life is worthless because of its mortality
We consider these intuitions to be “counter-intuitive for most people”, but we do not call them “wrong”:
(1) Is there a relation between NPU and Buddhism?
The Noble Truths of Buddhism strive to minimize preference-frustration as well as NPU.
(2) Can non-existence (of the ego) be seen as a perfect state, better than an almost perfect life?
From a Buddhist perspective, non-existence (of the ego) can be interpreted as the end of rebirths, which is seen as entry into Nirvana. In Mahayana and Yogachara Buddhism the Nirvana is a perfect state beyond the human mind. In this specific sense the question can be affirmed.
(3) Can NPU work without metaphysical assumptions?
In secular ethics the Nirvana is solely a state of the human mind. The dissolution of the ego combined with a feeling of perfection can also be reached in drug-experiences. Without metaphysical assumptions the NPU-claim that no state of affairs can be better than non-existence is counter-intuitive for most people.
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