Negative Utilitarianism and Justice
B.Contestabile admin@socrethics.com First version 2005 Last version 2013
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Table of Contents
2.1 Social Contract Theory 2.2 Impartiality 2.3 Rawls’ Principles 2.4 Comparison with Bentham’s and Pigou’s Utilitarianism 2.5 Comparison with Mill’s Utilitarianism 2.6 Comparison with Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism 3.1 Historical Background 3.2 Definition 3.3 Original Negative Utilitarianism 3.4 Negative Total Utilitarianism 3.5 Leximin 3.6 Negative Preference Utilitarianism 4.1 Definition 4.2 Comparison with Negative Utilitarianism 4.3 Comparison with Rawls’ Theory 4.4 Comparison with Classical Utilitarianism 4.5 Implementation
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Starting point Starting point of this paper is Popper’s controversial statement “…from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure and especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure” [Popper, 284]. This citation addresses a well-known discomfort with the classical utilitarian accumulation of suffering and happiness across different people. Parfit’s claim about compensation [Parfit, 337] and Wolf’s misery principle [Wolf, 63] agree with Popper’s intuition.
Type of problem 1) What are the differences between the classical utilitarian and Rawlsian concept of justice? 2) Does negative utilitarianism (NU) solve the problem of compensation? 3) How could a synthesis of prioritarianism and Rawls’ theory look like?
Classical utilitarianism versus Rawls’ theory 1) Compensation of human rights: a) In classical utilitarianism it is theoretically possible to override human rights, if it serves the maximization of total welfare. The violation of individual rights is justified (compensated) by the interests of the community. b) In Rawls’ Theory of Justice it is impossible to override human rights, even if this principle causes the perpetuation of suffering.
2) Compensation of economic welfare a) The ethical goal of classical utilitarianism is the maximization of total welfare. It is assumed that economic welfare correlates with general welfare. The negative welfare of a minority can be compensated by the positive welfare of the majority. b) In Rawls theory the compensation of economic welfare is prevented by the difference principle wherein the worst-off are given a special concern.
3) Compensation among generations: a) In classical utilitarianism it is possible to compensate the suffering of one generation with the happiness of a different generation. b) In Rawls’ theory the compensation among generations is prevented by the principle of intergenerational impartiality.
Negative utilitarianism 1) Negative utilitarianism is an umbrella term for ethics that models the asymmetry between suffering and happiness. It includes theories that a) deny the moral value of happiness b) assign an absolute priority to the avoidance of suffering c) assign a relative priority to the avoidance of suffering (prioritarianism)
2) A theory which denies the moral value of happiness is only defensible, if non-existence is seen as a perfect state. This is counter-intuitive for most Non-Buddhists.
3) An absolute priority of (the avoidance of) suffering over happiness solves the classical utilitarian problem of compensation. But ethics which concentrates on the eradication of suffering succumbs in the competition with suffering-tolerant ethics.
Prioritarianism 1) The different versions of NU can also be interpreted as special cases within prioritarianism. For this reason we treat prioritarianism as an autonomous theory and do not subordinate it to NU in this paper.
2) Prioritarianism stands for compassion and risk-aversion. The more compassionate and risk-averse a theory is conceived, the more it turns hostile (see Hostility and the Minimization of suffering) and the less it is capable of winning a majority.
3) From a prioritarian perspective the most urgent amendments to Rawls’ theory are the following: a) A principle for the protection of non-contractual cases. b) A risk-averse population policy c) A risk-averse principle for technological progress.
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Starting point
Starting point of this paper is Popper’s controversial statement
“…from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure and especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure” [Popper, 284].
This citation addresses a well-known discomfort with the classical utilitarian accumulation of suffering and happiness across different people. Parfit’s claim about compensation [Parfit, 337] and Wolf’s misery principle [Wolf, 63] agree with Popper’s intuition.
Type of problem
1) What are the differences between the classical utilitarian and Rawlsian concept of justice?
2) Does negative utilitarianism (NU) solve the problem of compensation?
3) How could the minimization of suffering be implemented in practice?
2.1 Social Contract Theory
Social contract theories are theories on mutual benefit through cooperation.
Contractarians claim that moral principles derive their normative force from the idea of contract or mutual agreement. They are thus skeptical of the possibility of grounding morality or political authority in either divine will or some perfectionist ideal of the nature of humanity (contractarianism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
If an agreement with mutual benefit can be found, it is rational to sign a corresponding contract. But contractarians don’t claim that human behavior can be described by rationality. The claim is only that rationality has a normative force in defining ethical goals. Rationality is a possible common denominator to overcome the cultural diversity of ethical norms.
1) Contractarianism, which stems from the Hobbesian line of social contract thought, holds that persons are primarily self-interested, and that a rational assessment of the best strategy for attaining the maximization of their self-interest will lead them to act morally (where the moral norms are determined by the maximization of joint interest) and to consent to governmental authority. Gauthier, Narveson, or Buchanan are Hobbesian contractarians.
2) Contractualism, which stems from the Kantian line of social contract thought, holds that rationality requires that we respect persons, which in turn requires that moral principles be such that they can be justified to each person. Thus, individuals are not taken to be motivated by self-interest but rather by a commitment to publicly justify the standards of morality to which each will be held. Rawls or Scanlon are Kantian contractualists
(Contractarianism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
In reality social contracts may primarily be shaped by self-interest, but Rawls’ theory is normative and not descriptive [Rawls 1958, 183]. The goal is to establish an ethical ideal against which social contracts can be measured. Contractarian ideals are based on the concept of impartiality.
2.2 Impartiality
Origin
1. Kant's categorical imperative is the best known definition of an impartial moral law. But the idea of moral impartiality is much older and can be found in many religions under the term “Golden Rule” or “ethic of reciprocity. It has been speculated that empathy lies behind the prevalence of the Golden Rule.
2. The ancient Stoic-Skeptic tradition made a significant impact on the most prominent ethical theory of modern Europe – i.e. on Immanuel Kant’s moral philosophy. The Kantian Hellenistic ideal is originating, in my view, from the more profound and more systematic ethical teachings of the Buddhist India [Vukomanovic, 167]
The impartial observer
A contract is impartial if the principles
1) do not depend on the specific interests of a single contractor or a group of contractors
2) do not depend on temporary circumstances
Since politics is characterized by conflicting interests, only an impartial observer could design this kind of principles. The idea of an impartial observer was first mentioned by Adam Smith in his Theory of Moral Sentiments and later taken up by Harsanyi and Rawls.
1. In his Theory of Justice Rawls used the following thought experiment to derive the conditions of an impartial contract: A contract is impartial, if it is derived from an original position in which rational contractors under a veil of ignorance decide how they wish to commit themselves to being governed in their actual lives (Justice as a Virtue, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Behind such a veil of ignorance all individuals are specified as rational, free, and morally equal beings. Behind the veil of ignorance, what will the rational choice be for fundamental principles of society? The only safe principles will be impartial principles, for you do not know whether you would suffer or benefit from the structure of any biased institutions.
2. Rawls called this concept Justice as fairness. Justice in a strict sense would include equality of opportunity in all aspects of life. Fairness is not equivalent to justice, but represents a practicable benchmark for existing political systems.
Buchanan’s anarchistic equilibrium
Buchanan’s theory questions the role of the impartial observer in establishing a social contract. There is no unique interpretation of the impartial observer. Is he/she risk-tolerant or risk-averse? The concept attempts to circumvent the problem of incomparable individual utilities, but now the problem reappears in the ambiguous characteristics of the observer.
Buchanan replaces the veil of ignorance by an anarchistic equilibrium, where people with different interests overcome anarchy by a social contract. Depending on the social status of an individual, the interest to sign such a contract is stronger or weaker.
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I either want less corruption or more chance to participate in it!
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▪ The propagation of universal solidarity and compassion can be interpreted as a strategy of the infirm (as Nietzsche did).
▪ On the other hand, even the rich people become weak with age and the wealthy part of the population is willing to pay a price for stability.
According to Buchanan the courts are solely mediators between the parties. They are obliged to strict neutrality and have no competence in defining justice (Ökonomische Ethik, Roland Vaubel).
Nozick’s liberalism
Nozick, as well as Buchanan, questions the objectivity of risk-aversion and compassion. He emphasizes the importance of property rights and promotes a minimal state. The task of the minimal state is to protect property against violence and theft, but redistribution (like Rawls’ difference principle) has no moral foundation.
Conclusion
From the perspective of Rawls’original position, Buchanan’s as well as Nozick’s vision of justice is distorted by temporary and biased interests:
▪ Buchanan’s concept is rather descriptive than normative
▪ Nozick’s concept doesn’t account for differences in talent and the contingency of life stories.
Both concepts lack the constituents to construct an ethical ideal.
2.3 Rawls’ Principles
Justice has several dimensions, some of which can be influenced, whereas others can’t. Rawls Theory of Justice restricts the investigation to those dimensions that can be influenced.
Definition
1) First principle of justice: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.
2) Second principle of justice: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both
a) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity and
b) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle
(Distributive Justice, Wikipedia)
“Just savings” is what a generation owes its descendants:
▪ immaterial values: just institutions, cultural values
▪ in economic terms: capital, factories, machines, knowledge, techniques, skills, natural resources etc.
The just savings principle follows from the principle of intergenerational impartiality (see below).
Priorities
The principles are ordered in lexical priority as follows:
1) The liberty principle: The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (i.e., to vote and run for office); freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience, freedom of property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest. It is a matter of some debate whether freedom of contract can be inferred as being included among these basic liberties.
Not mentioned in this list but naturally assumed is the protection of the citizen’s physical integrity.
2) The arrangement of social and economic inequalities:
a) The principle of fair equality of opportunity requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed.
b) The difference principle strives for the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society.
Theory of Justice, Wikipedia
Liberty and human rights
1. Rights theorists demand that (1) and (2a) conform to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. By assigning lexical priority to human rights they become a side constraint for every theory that seeks a quantitative optimization of the state of affairs.
2. Liberties are connected to duties (see rights-duty duality). Human rights balance the right to liberty (of the strong) with the right to protection (of the weak).
Liberty and redistribution
A social contract based on the liberty principle is compatible with capitalism and produces social and economic inequalities. Bernard Mandeville, an 18th century political economist and satirist, postulated in his Fable of the Bees that vicious greed leads to invisible cooperation if properly channeled. The idea was taken up by Adam Smith, who claimed that, in capitalism, egoistic behavior promotes the good of the community through a principle that he called “the invisible hand”. Experience has shown however that the “invisible hand” cannot protect many people from starving and that free markets have to be complemented by redistribution.
The essence of Rawls’ understanding of liberty can be found in the Preamble of the Federal Constitution of the Swiss Federation:
“…only those who use their freedom remain free, and the strength of a people is measured by the well-being of its weakest members;
Fair equality of opportunity
Rawls’ concept of equality of opportunity goes beyond the one of classical utilitarianism. He denies an over-representation of upper class members in offices and positions even if it produces an increase in total welfare. The equal formal access to offices and positions is not sufficient; the statistical probability for lower class members to succeed has to be the same as for upper class members. For an example see [Clarenbach, chapt.3.2]
Intergenerational impartiality
If not mentioned otherwise in this paper, the term intergenerational impartiality is used in the sense of intergenerational moral impartiality (see Impartiality, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
1. The principle says that the actual generation isn’t allowed to improve its situation at the cost of future generations.
2. Inversely it says that the actual generation cannot be obliged to sacrifice itself for future generations.
According to Rawls the principle of intergenerational impartiality follows from the idea of the original position.
2.4 Comparison with Bentham’s and Pigou’s Utilitarianism
We start with a comparison of the economic aspect of justice, represented by
1. Rawls’ difference principle
2. Bentham’s and Pigou’s welfare functions
Terminology
1) In classical utilitarianism utility is a function of consumption. Consumption is measured in terms of preferences for goods and services. Utility is associated with the happiness which is created by consumption [Bentham, 120].
a) The principle of utility is the principle that actions are to be judged by their usefulness in this sense: their tendency to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness [Broome 1999, 19]
b) Utility is the value of a function that represents a person’s preferences [Broome 1999, 21].
2) In classical utilitarianism utility is cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable. The term social welfare corresponds to the accumulated utilities of all individuals within the society. For details on Bentham’s utilitarianism see Short History of Welfare Economics.
Rawls’ difference principle
The difference principle holds that differences in wealth, status, etc. can be defended only if they create a system of market forces and capital accumulation whose productivity makes the lowliest members of society better off than they would be under a more egalitarian system. The difference principle is the safest principle (Justice as Fairness, by Charles D.Kay) and corresponds to a risk-averse strategy (Rawls Unrisky Business, by Jim Holt). Its implementation though is far from trivial:
1. Maximin interpretation:
If agents (A, B) can have incomes (5, 6) or (4, 9) then the former distribution has to be chosen.
Maximin encounters the following problem: If agents (A, B, C) can have incomes (5, 6, 9) or (5, 7, 8), then Maximin is indifferent
2. Leximin interpretation (not to be confused with the lexical priority of human rights):
If agents (A, B, C) can have incomes (5, 6, 9) or (5, 7, 8) then the latter distribution has to be chosen. The second worst-off decides. If B’s income is the same in both distributions, then C’s income decides etc.
Leximin encounters the following problem: If agent A’s income is minimally higher in the second distribution and the income of B and C considerably lower, then the first distribution has to be chosen. This consequence is called dictatorship of the worst-off (see The Difference Principle).
3. Prioritarian interpretation: Let’s return to Rawl’s definition of the difference principle: “Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are (…) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged (…)”. The term greatest can be interpreted in such a way that everybody profits from inequalities, but that the least advantaged profit most. A prioritarian rule would e.g. distribute savings in such a way that the quota increases with decreasing welfare. Conversely the taxes owed would increase with increasing welfare.
For more information on this issue see
1. Who are the least advantaged?, by Bertil Tungodden and Peter Vallentyne
2. Rawls Differenzprinzip und seine Deutungen, by Peter Koller, Zeitschrift Erkenntnis, Vol.20, No.1, 1983
In order to compare Rawls’ difference principle with Bentham’s and Pigou’s utilitarianism, we have to map it to a welfare function. In this comparison we will use the Maximin interpretation of the difference principle. Maximin is the rule that is most frequently associated with the difference principle, although in practice it would have to be replaced by a prioritarian rule.
Welfare function according to Bentham
Let’s assume the society consists of two persons P1 and P2, who dispose of two goods G1 and G2. The welfare function according to Bentham would look as follows:
1. Social welfare (W) is the total of the two individual utilities (U): W = U1 + U2
2. The utility functions are identical for both persons. It is assumed that the utility (usefulness) of the two goods is the same for both persons.
3. The utility depends linearly (factors a1, a2) on the quantities (q) of the goods.
U1 = (a1 x q11) + (a2 x q12)
U2 = (a1 x q21) + (a2 x q22)
where q12 = the quantity of good G2, consumed by person P1.
Under these premises social welfare should increase linearly with the Gross National Product (GNP).
[Kleinewefers, 40]
Welfare function according to Pigou
Bentham correlated happiness with the means to happiness. The wealthier a person is, the greater the happiness he can attain. However, he recognized the principle of diminishing marginal utility, i.e. that the greater the amount of utility a person already has, the smaller will be the utility gain of any extra increment of wealth (Jeremy Bentham)
The concept of diminishing marginal utility has a long history (see Marginalism, Wikipedia). It was Gossen who found a convincing mathematical formulation and Pigou (not Bentham) who introduced it in a welfare function.
Let’s assume the society consists of two persons P1 and P2, who dispose of two goods G1 and G2. The welfare function according to Pigou would look as follows:
1. Social welfare (W) is the total of the two individual utilities (U): W = U1 + U2
2. The utility function is identical for both persons. It is assumed that the utility (usefulness) of the two goods is the same for both persons.
3. The utility function U = U (q1, q2) is of the Gossen type, i.e. the marginal utility decreases with increasing consumption.
Under a given GNP the maximum social welfare can be attained, if the goods are equally distributed among the two persons [Kleinewefers, 41]. For more information on the term welfare function see Short History of Welfare Economics.
Comparison
A welfare function according to Bentham sums the utility of each individual in order to obtain society's overall welfare. All people are treated the same, regardless of their initial level of utility. One extra unit of utility for a starving person is not seen to be of any greater value than an extra unit of utility for a millionaire. At the other extreme is the Maximin welfare function. According to the Maximin criterion, welfare is maximized when the utility of those society members that have the least is the greatest. No economic activity will increase social welfare unless it improves the position of the society member that is the worst off. Most economists specify social welfare functions that are intermediate between these two extremes. The social welfare function is typically translated into social indifference curves (Welfare economics, Wikipedia)
An indifference curve shows combinations of individual utilities which make no difference with regard to the total (social welfare):
▪ The Utilitarian Social Indifference Curves on the left hand side correspond to different levels of social welfare (W) in Bentham’s welfare function. Since a utilitarian social indifference curve confines an isosceles triangle, each total of individual utilities represented by a point on the curve, results in the same value. No matter how unequal the distribution is, an improvement of utility of the rich individual always compensates the loss in utility of the poor individual
▪ The Max-Min (Maximin) Social Indifference Curves in the middle correspond to different levels of social welfare in a Rawlsian society. The social welfare of a Maximin social indifference curve is the sum of two equal utilities and is depicted by the vertex of the curve. Increasing the utility of only one person (no matter how much) doesn’t increase social welfare.
▪ The Intermediate Social Indifference Curves on the right hand side can be interpreted as showing that as inequality increases, a larger improvement in the utility of relatively rich individuals is needed to compensate for the loss in utility of relatively poor individuals (Welfare economics, Wikipedia)
How does the Maximin (Rawlsian) indifference curve relate to Pigou’s welfare function? Is the difference principle compatible with the principle of diminishing marginal utility?
The neoclassical principle of diminishing marginal utility says that the greater the amount of utility a person already has the smaller will be the utility gain of any extra increment of wealth. As a consequence, total utility can be increased by a redistribution of welfare from the rich to the poor. Under these premises utilitarianism becomes egalitarian and corresponds to the Maximin principle (see Short History of Welfare Economics).
Rawls’s objection is of course that utilitarianism does not protect the claims of the most deprived from being set aside in favor of greater benefits to other, better off, social groups. But this argument is disputable: utilitarians will argue that given the diminishing marginal utility of wealth, the goal of maximizing average welfare will direct a society to prioritize improvements in the situation of the most deprived. And when one considers the detail of Rawls’s proposed policies for implementing his difference principle, it is hard to see anything incompatible with the implications of an enlightened utilitarianism (Questions of Justice).
If we take into account that the society’s total income is negatively affected by the redistribution (because hard working people lose the motivation to create additional income) then the optimal redistribution is rather prioritarian than egalitarian and can be associated with the prioritarian interpretation of the difference principle. This interpretation corresponds to the intermediate social indifference curve shown on the right hand side of above diagram.
If the prioritarian rule is extended to general welfare (instead of economic welfare) and if it overrules all other principles, then we speak of prioritarianism (chapter 4).
The liberty principle
The two assumptions of classical utilitarianism
1. individuals having similar utility functions
2. diminishing marginal utility
can be interpreted as moral and political principles in a somewhat technical language (rather than psychological propositions).
One might say that this is what Bentham and others really meant by them, at least as shown by how they were used in arguments for social reform (…). But this still leave the mistaken notion that the satisfaction of desire has value in itself (…). To see the error of this idea one must give up the conception of justice as an executive decision altogether and refer to the notion of justice as fairness. Participants in the social contract have an original and equal liberty and their common practices are considered unjust unless they accord with principles which the contractors freely acknowledge before one another and so accept as fair [Rawls 1958, 191-192].
Justice cannot be the result of an executive decision which maximizes the total utility of the society; it must be a consensus of contractors with regard to liberty and solidarity. This consensus or compromise is an example of a reflective equilibrium.
Animal rights
A major point of criticism in Rawls’ concept is the lacking protection of animals. The impartial observer should protect all sentient beings according to their degree of suffering, no matter if they think rational and no matter if they are able to sign a contract. Such an impartial observer, though, would transcend the boundaries of social contract theory.
Bentham became known as one of the most influential of the utilitarians, through his own work and that of his students. These included his secretary and collaborator on the utilitarian school of philosophy, James Mill; James Mill's son John Stuart Mill; and several political leaders including Robert Owen, who later became a founder of socialism (…)
Bentham is widely recognized as one of the earliest proponents of animal rights. He argued that animal pain is very similar to human pain and that the day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been withholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. Bentham argued that the ability to suffer, not the ability to reason, must be the benchmark of how we treat other beings. If the ability to reason were the criterion, many human beings, including babies and disabled people, would also have to be treated as though they were things (Jeremy Bentham, Wikipedia)
Rawls was conscious that his concept doesn’t include all aspects of ethics:
Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. For it is clear that the contractarian idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system, that is, to a system including principles for all the virtues and not only for justice (…) Obviously if justice as fairness succeeds reasonably well, a next step would be to study the more general view suggested by the name "rightness as fairness." But even this wider theory fails to embrace all moral relationships, since it would seem to include only our relations with other persons and to leave out of account how we are to conduct ourselves toward animals and the rest of nature. I do not contend that the contract notion offers a way to approach these questions which are certainly of the first importance; and I shall have to put them aside. We must recognize the limited scope of justice as fairness (Animal Ethics)
2.5 Comparison with Mill’s Utilitarianism
Liberalism according to Mill
John Rawls, in his history of political philosophy [Rawls Lectures], warned to disesteem John Stuart Mill, an indication that he appreciated Mill’s work. There is, however, a profound difference between liberalism with utilitarianism:
▪ Utilitarianism attempts to increase the total utility of the community. The individual is subordinated to this goal.
▪ Liberalism claims that individual actions are only restricted by the condition not to harm others.
How could Mill claim that liberalism is compatible with utilitarianism?
The key for compatibility lies in Mills interpretation of utility [Schefczyk]:
1. Mill stands in the tradition of Epicurus and Bentham according to which happiness (respectively the absence of suffering) is the only rational goal of human behavior. Mill’s innovation was to introduce a ranking for different kinds of happiness. The ranking is justified by competence, i.e. by the judgment of experienced persons. The judgment if football is preferable to the opera can only be made by persons who made a positive experience with both kinds of events. People who don’t enjoy the opera (or don’t even know it) cannot morally valuate the corresponding kind of happiness; they lack a specific perception, respectively knowledge.
2. Even if all competent persons accord in ranking pleasures then this ranking is still not generally relevant. The life of an individual cannot be improved by imposing an “official” ranking upon him/her.
3. Most philosophers agree that the life of an unhappy human is preferable to the life of a happy pig. But Mill doesn’t conclude that we should invest all our energy in top-quality actions. All kinds of happiness reach a point of satiation and we should therefore attempt to diversify our engagements.
The liberal characteristics of Mill’s concept can be summarized as follows [Schefczyk]:
1. Tolerance, accept that perception and experiences are different
2. Informality
3. The denial of external and internal perfectionism
On this basis Mill claims that liberty is a consequence of the utilitarian goal. Since humans are different, the pressure for conformity and the denial of individual liberty contradicts the interests of all humans.
The point in Mill’s argument consists in not only seeing other people as competitors but also as enrichment. Diversified experiences produce empirical data about possible kinds of happiness. The ethical ideal according to Mill is not restricted to tolerance, it is open and affirmative; a liberal is willing to learn and profit from other person’s experiences.
The priority of the liberty principle
The utilitarian arguments for the priority of liberty rights are the following:
1. Without liberty the individuals cannot articulate their preferences and the society lacks diversity. Without diversity there is no maximization of utility.
2. A constitution which is based on liberty rights guarantees legal security. The fear of arbitrariness, torture etc. causes an enormous loss of utility.
The goods that are associated with the term liberty have a corresponding high weight within the utility function. But, from a utilitarian point of view, despite of this high weight, there is still a trade-off with other goods.
Examples:
1. A minor worsening of liberty rights would probably be tolerated for a huge gain in economic welfare. In reality the political debates prove that liberty rights don’t have an absolute priority. In the trade-off between liberty rights and economic welfare repressive regimes often find support in the population.
2. A medic cares for two patients, one of them deadly ill and the other one curable. However he has only one dosage of the required medicament. Rawls would give the medicament to the deadly ill because he/she suffers more, a utilitarian would give it to the one with the higher potential to survive. The utilitarian position has a good chance to be accepted by the majority.
[Clarenbach, chapt.3.3]
In contrast, Rawls’ liberty principle has lexical priority and doesn’t allow any trade-off [Rawls 1958, 184-187].
While Mill recognized that reasons for justice have a special weight, he thought that it could be accounted for by the special urgency of the moral feelings which naturally support principles of such high utility. But it is a mistake to resort to the urgency of feeling; as with the appeal to intuition, it manifests a failure to pursue the question far enough [Rawls 1958, 189].
Example:
The conception of justice as fairness, when applied to the practice of slavery would not allow one to consider the advantages of the slaveholder (…). The gains accruing to the slaveholder cannot be counted as in any way mitigating the injustice of the practice [Rawls 1958, 188].
Classical utilitarianism in general (not only Mill’s utilitarianism) lacks a principle for the protection of the individual.
The example shows that in Rawls’ theory – when liberty is at stake – the means are more important than the end. In contrast to utilitarianism he supports the process-view of justice and not the end-state view (or outcome-view).
The second principle of justice
The second principle excludes the justification of inequalities on the grounds that the disadvantages of those in one position are outweighed by the greater advantages of those in another position. This rather simple restriction is the main modification I wish to make in the utilitarian principle as usually understood (…). It is a restriction of consequence, and one which utilitarians, e.g. Hume and Mill, have used in their discussions of justice without realizing apparently its significance [Rawls 1958, 168]
2.6 Comparison with Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism
Indifference curves (as depicted in chapter 2.4) are a means to compare concepts of distribution but we lack a rational criterion to select a specific distribution out of the many possible ones. Game theory is a possible means to find such a criterion. An impartial observer in the original position considers inequality as a risk, which has to be properly weighed in order to attain the best state of affairs.
Utility
1. In Bentham’s and Pigou’s utilitarianism the term utility corresponds to the happiness which is created by consumption. In the course of history the concept of utility became more abstract and was finally interpreted as the dominant end of human behavior (no matter what that is). The term preference-satisfaction in preference utilitarianism corresponds to this level of abstraction.
2. The replacement of the abstract concept of utility by the concrete meaning happiness is called hedonic reduction. Hedonic reduction opens the theory to empirical testing [Hirata, 24]. Examples:
a. Quality of life (sociology)
b. Well-being (psychology)
c. Welfare (economics)
d. Life satisfaction (happiness economics)
e. Quality-adjusted life year (health care)
3. The application of game theory (a well as the utilitarian welfare function) presupposes that utility can be measured on a cardinal scale and that it is amenable to an interpersonal comparison (see Wohlfahrtstheorie).
Game theory
The classic expositions of Harsanyi and Rawls produce a synthesis that is consistent with the modern theory of non-cooperative games, see Game Theory and the Social Contract. From a game theoretical view Harsanyi’ utilitarianism is compatible with the difference principle according to Rawls. The (risk-neutral) Bayesian maximization of utility converges towards Rawls’ (risk-averse) Maximin principle, if the weight of the worst cases increases.
Consequentialism
Historically, hedonistic utilitarianism is the paradigmatic example of a consequentialist moral theory. This form of utilitarianism holds that what matters is the aggregate happiness, i.e. the happiness of everyone and not the happiness of any particular person (Consequentialism, Wikipedia)
Why should we subscribe to consequentialism?
An argument for consequentialism is contractarian. Harsanyi argues that all informed, rational people whose impartiality is ensured because they do not know their place in society would favor a kind of consequentialism. Broome [1991] elaborates and extends Harsanyi's argument (Consequentialism, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
This argument is of special interest in our context because is reveals that the common denominator of Harsanyi’s utilitarianism and Rawls’ Theory of Justice is contractarian. At the same time Harsanyi opened the door to a new understanding of classical utilitarianism:
Harsanyi’s approach leads to a justification of classical utilitarianism from a remarkably new point of view (see John C.Harsanyi)
In the following we compare Rawls’ difference principle with the major competing theory of Harsanyi:
Harsanyi’s equiprobability model
Harsanyi’s equiprobability model (Gleichwahrscheinlichkeitsmodell) uses the following definition of impartial decisions:
1. The impartial observer is an individual within society.
2. After every decision influencing or changing society this individual can find himself with equal probability in every possible position in the changed society.
3. Risk is defined as a product of utility and (mathematical) probability. The expected value of a decision is calculated by adding all possible risks.
Risk-neutrality
Harsanyi’s concept (similarly to Rawls’) converts normative statements about compassion or solidarity into normative statements about risk.
[Harsanyi 1975] refuses Rawls risk-averse strategy, claiming that it is irrational to make behaviour dependent on some highly unlikely unfavourable contingency regardless of its low probability. He recommends not to base decisions on the worst case but on the Bayesian maximization of utility. Rawls in contrast is convinced that the rational choice of an individual behind the veil of ignorance is the Maximin strategy. For more information about the rationality of risk-aversion see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering.
The priority of the liberty principle
Harsanyi’s concept is not restricted to the economic aspect of welfare (the difference principle). He assumes that, despite of the high weight the liberty principle has within the utility function, there is still a trade-off with other goods. Rawls however, insists on the absolute priority of the liberty principle. Classical utilitarianism can only be reconciled with the concept of fairness, if fairness is considered to be a side constraint of the utility function. But then utilitarianism loses its characteristics:
If one wants to continue using the concepts of classical utilitarianism, at least the utility functions must be so defined that no value is given to the satisfaction of interests which violated the principles of justice. In this way it is no doubt possible to include these principles within the form of the utilitarian conception; but to do so is, of course, to change its inspiration altogether as a moral conception. For it is to incorporate within it principles which cannot be understood on the basis of a higher order executive decision aiming at the greatest satisfaction of desire [Rawls 1958, 191].
Example:
Retributive justice can be implemented within a social contract of the Rawls’ type, but has no priority in the maximization of welfare. Retributive justice postulates that there should be a proportion between doing well and faring well. Not only is the result important but also the means that produced the result:
1. Relative justice: A world where thugs fare better than decent people is morally objectionably, even if the total of the decent people’s welfare is not affected [Temkin, 354].
2. Absolute justice: A world where thugs fare well is morally objectionable, even if decent people fare better than thugs [Temkin, 357]
3.1 Historical Background
Ancient world
1. The idea to formulate an ethical goal negatively originates in Buddhism and is more than 2000 years old.
2. Greek philosopher Epicurus has sometimes been caricatured as crude hedonist. But Epicurus also maintained the puzzling doctrine that the complete absence of pain constituted "the limit and highest point of pleasure" (Epicurus, David Pearce)
3. While Epicurus has been commonly misunderstood to advocate the rampant pursuit of pleasure, what he was really after was the absence of pain (both physical and mental, i.e., suffering) - a state of satiation and tranquility that was free of the fear of death and the retribution of the gods. When we do not suffer pain, we are no longer in need of pleasure, and we enter a state of 'perfect mental peace' (ataraxia). (Epicurus, Wikipedia)
Early utilitarianism
Historically utilitarianism was inspired by Stoicism and Epicureanism and therefore closer to negative utilitarianism than the contemporary interpretation:
Although the favored means of the term negative welfarism – a stoician-like control of the birth of one’s desires which it also calls “liberation” (moksa) – is in a sense opposed to economists’ conception (see Happiness-Freedom, Deep Buddhism and Modernity, Kolm 1982), scholarly welfarism is in fact historically the direct descent of this Indian philosophy. Indeed, the 18th century founders of utilitarianism were thoroughly inspired by Stoicism and Epicureanism, whereas the influence of Buddhist and Jain thoughts on Stoician and other Hellenistic philosophies is explained in the previous reference. The oblivion of self-formation occurred with that of the Rousseau-Kant “autonomy” by some narrowminded post-Mill 19th century scholars (even Mill’s “choice of lifestyle” is a downgrading of full eudemonistic self-formation). Note that the view that utilitarianism is the necessary all-encompassing criterion was, in the West, restricted to English-language scholars influenced by Bentham who introduced this view for a political reason. This is why Rawls appeared to be much less original in other circles who acknowledged constitutional basic rights and where egalitarianism was a familiar ideal. (Macrojustice from Equal Liberty, Serge-Christoph Kolm)
Also the Stoic cosmopolitanism corresponds well to utilitarianism. Stoicism, in contrast to Buddhism, was characterized by an optimistic world view. In contemporary negative utilitarianism we find both, optimistic and pessimistic visions of the future. For a comparison of Buddhism and negative utilitarianism see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering.
Popper
In the 20th century, the idea to formulate an ethical goal negatively is attributed to Karl Popper:
…there are no institutional means of making a man happy, but a claim not to be made unhappy, where it can be avoided. The piecemeal engineer will, accordingly, adopt the method of searching for, and fighting against, the greatest and most urgent evils of society, rather than searching for, and fighting for, its greatest ultimate good [Popper, 158]
At this point of chapter 9, Popper added his controversial note 2:
I believe that there is, from the ethical point of view, no symmetry between suffering and happiness, or between pain and pleasure. Both the greatest happiness principle of the Utilitarians and Kant’s principle “Promote other people’s happiness…” seem to me (at least in their formulations) wrong on this point which, however, is not completely decidable by rational argument (…). In my opinion human suffering makes a direct moral appeal, namely, the appeal for help, while there is no similar call to increase the happiness of a man who is doing well anyway.
A further criticism of the Utilitarian formula “Maximize pleasure” is that it assumes, in principle, a continuous pleasure-pain scale which allows us to treat degrees of pain as negative degrees of pleasure. But, from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure and especially not one man’s pain by another man’s pleasure. Instead of the greatest happiness for the greatest number, one should demand, more modestly, the least amount of avoidable suffering for all; and further, that unavoidable suffering – such as hunger in times of unavoidable shortage of food – should be distributed as equally as possible.
There is some analogy between this view of ethics and the view of scientific methodology which I have advocated in my The Logic of Scientific Discovery. It adds to clarity in the fields of ethics, if we formulate our demands negatively, i.e. if we demand the elimination of suffering rather than the promotion of happiness. Similarly, it is helpful to formulate the task of scientific method as the elimination of false theories (from the various theories tentatively preferred) rather than the attainment of established truths [Popper, 284].
Popper’s ethics was not only influenced by his epistemological work, but also by personal and historical experience:
1) The failure of happiness-promoting philosophies like classical utilitarianism and Marxism
2) Sixteen of Popper’s closest relatives became victims of Nazi Germany, partially in Auschwitz, some committed suicide (from Die Erkenntnistheorie und das Problem des Friedens)
Popper was not a utilitarian and did not use the term negative utilitarianism. His notes on ethics don’t represent a theory; they rather encourage a family of ethical concepts [Fricke, 13]. In spite of that, he was confronted with a narrow utilitarian interpretation of his notes:
R.N.Smart
The term negative utilitarianism was introduced by R.N.Smart in a paper criticizing Popper’s approach to ethics:
….one may reply to negative utilitarianism (hereafter called NU for short) with the following example, which is admittedly fanciful, though unfortunately much less so than it might have seemed in earlier times.
Suppose that a ruler controls a weapon capable of instantly and painlessly destroying the human race. Now it is empirically certain that there would be some suffering before all those alive on any proposed destruction day were to die in the natural course of events. Consequently the use of the weapon is bound to diminish suffering, and would be the ruler’s duty on NU grounds (…).
Admittedly my example does not quite work as it stands against Professor Popper inasmuch as he propounds two other principles to set alongside NU, viz. (briefly) "Tolerate the tolerant" and "No tyranny". Presumably the benevolent world-exploder might be thought intolerant and/or tyrannical (…) …if we allow "Tolerate the tolerant" and "No tyranny" to stand as principles alongside NU, there will be a conflict between them and NU regarding our example. If we take NU seriously, surely we should over-ride the other principles (Negative Utilitarianism)
There is no indication in Popper’s text which says that the minimization of suffering should override the other principles. On the contrary, Popper’s attitude was anti-totalitarian and it is much more likely that he would have promoted human rights as a side constraint for any attempt to improve the state of affairs.
Compensation
Popper’s controversial statement “…from the moral point of view, pain cannot be outweighed by pleasure (…)” can be related to the individual and society level. On the individual level it is counter-intuitive to strictly deny compensation [Fricke, 16]. Many people prefer e.g. a life with ups and downs to a dull life, but there are controversial cases like the following:
1. Sometimes a trauma is perceived like the end of life and new happiness like the happiness of a different person. No happiness of the new person can ever repair what has been done to the old person.
2. If a chain smoker comes down with lung cancer, then it is questionable to claim that the earlier smoking pleasure compensates the later suffering.
We do not further investigate compensation on the individual level because it concerns justice within the same person (in different stages of his/her life). The scope of this paper is justice on the society level. The compensation of suffering by happiness across different persons is decisive for the different versions of NU. The more happiness is devaluated, the more compensation becomes impossible.
3.2 Definition
Negative utilitarianism is an umbrella term for ethics that models the asymmetry between suffering and happiness. It includes concepts that
1) deny the moral value of happiness
2) assign an absolute priority to the avoidance of suffering
3) assign a relative priority to the avoidance of suffering (prioritarianism)
[Fricke]
Without a detailed specification, the term negative utilitarianism usually refers to R.N.Smart’s version, i.e. to a concept, which is characterized by the complete devaluation of happiness. We will call this the original NU and use the abbreviation NU for the entirety of versions.
Versions of NU
The following table shows the different interpretations of Popper’s statement on compensation and the terms used for the corresponding versions of NU:
|
Interpretation
|
Ethical goal |
Term |
|
The only thing that has moral value is the avoidance of suffering |
Minimize suffering |
Original negative utilitarianism |
|
The only thing that has moral value is the avoidance of uncompensated suffering |
Minimize uncompensated suffering |
Negative total utilitarianism |
|
Absolute priority of (the avoidance of) suffering over happiness |
Eliminate the worst cases of suffering, then the second worst etc. |
Leximin |
|
The only thing that has moral value is the avoidance of preference-frustration |
Minimize preference-frustration |
Negative Preference Utilitarianism |
|
Relative priority of (the avoidance of) suffering over happiness |
Maximize happiness in consideration of a prioritarian weighing function |
Prioritarianism |
This table subordinates relative priority (prioritarianism) under the umbrella term negative utilitarianism [Fricke, 14]. Fricke is not the only author who does so:
Example:
1. Any amount of suffering can be outweighed by a sufficient amount of happiness. There may be no imaginable amount of happiness that can outweigh the horrors of Auschwitz. But there might be an unimaginable amount that can do it (see Negativity, utilitarian.org).
If suffering only has a relative priority over happiness, then it is theoretically possible that the suffering of the Auschwitz victims could be outweighed by the happiness of the post war generations. If the avoidance of suffering has an absolute priority then this is impossible, because there is no trade-off between suffering and happiness. Obviously the author subsumes relative priority under the term negative utilitarianism.
2. The man who would give up all his life's joy, rather than have it contain also the slightest degree of suffering, can do so from a classical utilitarian position. The negative utilitarian position is functionally equivalent to a certain type of classical utilitarian position - a position where pleasure holds very little value (Negativity, utilitarian.org).
Also in this example we see that the term negative utilitarianism is used for ethics, which changes the relative weight of suffering, but still leaves “very little value” to happiness.
But above table can also be viewed from the perspective of prioritarianism. The different versions of NU then appear as special cases within prioritarianism (see chapter 4.2).
Terminology
In NU the term utility corresponds to the avoidance of suffering and is considered to be cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable, as well as in classical utilitarianism. For an example, how utility could be measured and compared in practice, see chapter 4.5.
Difference between positive and negative utilitarianism
Theory:
▪ In positive utilitarianism the promotion of happiness has the same ethical priority as the avoidance of suffering, as long as the contribution to total welfare is the same.
▪ In NU the promotion of happiness has less (or even no) priority as compared to the avoidance of suffering.
However, if ethical priorities are modeled within the hedonistic scale (as depicted in chapter 4.4) this distinction becomes obsolete.
Slogan:
▪ The classical utilitarian slogan “The greatest happiness of the greatest number” (Bentham) emphasizes the promotion of happiness
▪ Its NU counterpart “The least suffering of the least number” emphasizes the reduction of suffering.
NU fights dystopias rather than promoting utopias.
Cost-benefit:
▪ In positive utilitarianism the most efficient action consists in saving as many (young) lives as possible.
▪ In NU the most efficient action consists in reducing the number of worst cases, even at the cost of a shrinking population.
For more information about these competing priorities see Negative Utilitarian Priorities.
3.3 Original Negative Utilitarianism
Definition
The intention of the original NU was to prevent the compensation of suffering by happiness, especially across different persons. If happiness has no moral value, then there is no compensation. The only thing that has intrinsic moral value is the avoidance of suffering; happiness is morally neutral. Happy people make a negative contribution to the total, as long as their happiness is not perfect. They do not suffer in the average, but they suffer from time to time and thereby make a contribution. In the figure below we measure the difference to perfection (shaded area).
1. In this diagram the range between maximum suffering and maximum happiness is thought to be measured as a percentage (otherwise it is difficult to depict a scale).
2. A neutral life is such that it is generally neither better nor worse that it is lived than not lived [Broome 2004, 142].
The value of a life worth living surpasses the one of a neutral life.
Since in NU happiness has no intrinsic moral value, perfect lives are morally neutral. Consequently there are no lives worth living.
Moral killing
1. Does the original NU allow painless killing for mercy?
Example: A surgeon could let a patient (painlessly) die in order to take his/her organs and stop the suffering of several other patients. But confidence in health care would get completely lost if such decisions could be taken without the consent of the concerned persons. This loss in confidence would increase the suffering in society and therefore contradict the ethical goal of the original NU.
2. The most controversial strategy of the original NU is a violent reduction of the population-size in order to improve the state of affairs. An extreme pursuit of this thought leads to the extermination of humanity or life as a whole:
a) A negative utilitarian believes that, if it was possible to exterminate all life in the universe instantly and painlessly and permanently, it would be correct and ethically required that we do so in order to prevent any future cases of suffering
b) A classical utilitarian might decide either way, depending on his estimation of the relative amounts of future suffering and happiness.
(Introduction to utilitarianism, utilitarian.org):
But there is an empirical argument against such a strategy: Planning a project for the violent reduction of the population-size (e.g. by sterilization) would provoke immense distress and classify the supporters of the project among the worst kinds of criminals, terrorists and lunatics. A violent extermination of mankind is not feasible in practice. The result of such an attempt would be an increase in suffering and therefore contradict the ethical goal of the original NU.
Population ethics
The original NU is confronted with
1. an extreme form of the Negative Repugnant Conclusion [Broome 2004, 213]. This obstacle can be circumvented by using negative averages (see chapter 4.5)
2. the Reverse Repugnant Conclusion (see The Repugnant Conclusion, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, chapter 2.4).
The Reverse Repugnant Conclusion is also known as the pinprick argument
Would it really be better that life had never arisen if the only unpleasant experience that would otherwise occur is a pinprick? (The Pinprick Argument, David Pearce).
The original NU also denies the value of additional happy lifetime:
A theory about welfare that denies the possibility of lives worth living is quite counter-intuitive. It implies, for example, that
▪ a life of one year with complete preference satisfaction (Person A) has the same welfare as
▪ a completely fulfilled life of a hundred years (Person B) and has higher welfare than
▪ a life of a hundred years with all preferences but one satisfied (Person C). Moreover, the last life is not worth living.
(The Repugnant Conclusion, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, chapter 2.4)
These examples are less counter-intuitive if we
1) consider non-existence as the ultimate perfect state (as Buddhists do)
2) assign a small negative value to human perfection and reserve the value zero for non-existence. In that case the life of person A is better than the one of B, because A returns to perfection after 1 year, whereas B remains at a small negative value. In a world of negativity, lifetime changes its role: a long lifetime becomes undesirable
3.4 Negative Total Utilitarianism
Absolute priority
The original NU may be a misinterpretation of Popper’s statement about compensation. From the statement “suffering cannot be compensated by happiness” we cannot conclude that happiness has no moral value. There are two other possibilities:
1. The avoidance of suffering has absolute priority over happiness
2. Happiness doesn’t have enough moral value to compensate happiness
In this chapter we investigate the first case, for the second see chapter 4.4.
Absolute priority (of the avoidance of suffering) means that we shouldn’t discuss the moral weight of happiness, before having eliminated suffering [Fricke, 15]. Only an absolute priority of (the avoidance of) suffering prevents compensation. Otherwise a large enough number of happy people can always compensate the worst cases of suffering.
Definition
In negative total utilitarianism the value of a neutral life [Broome 2004, 142] is the same as in classical utilitarianism, but the happy majority is morally irrelevant. All that counts is the suffering of the minority (shaded area in the figure below), so that total welfare is negative.
According to negative total utilitarianism the value of a population is calculated by summing the welfare of all lives with negative welfare in the population. Lives with positive welfare neither add to nor detract from the value of a population [Arrhenius, 100].
This definition corresponds to the moral demand to avoid uncompensated suffering, respectively lives not worth living [Fricke, 18].
The purity argument
A negative utilitarian could respond that the pain from a pinprick is of a qualitatively different nature than the pain of, say, bone cancer, or bereavement, or torture, or the mass cruelties of genocide. A pinprick or its equivalent doesn't involve suffering - with its terrible baggage of emotional distress.
Yet this response to the Pinprick Argument seems ad hoc. It undermines the purity of the negative utilitarian ethic. For where is the supposed cut-off point? When does pain become real suffering? How much mild pain/suffering is morally permissible? Who should determine these limits? If the avoidance of pain or suffering is accounted more morally important than happiness, but happiness is not accounted wholly morally negligible, then how can their relative importance be quantified? How can well-being and suffering be made commensurable? What kind of metric should be used? Should the fate of the world rest on an arbitrary, or at least a conventional, cut-off point on the pleasure-pain axis? (The Pinprick Argument)
Above criticism addresses two issues: the problem of commensurability and the problem of purity.
1) The problem of commensurability (i.e. the comparability of the various qualities of pain) is different from the problem of weighing and also exists in classical utilitarianism. Hedonistic utilitarianism assumes that all kinds of happiness and suffering are cardinally measurable and interpersonally comparable.
2) The problem of purity concerns ethics in general. An ethical theory can never be pure like a mathematical function. Take classical utilitarianism: At what point does happiness turn into suffering? No matter where we draw the line between the morally good and the morally bad the cut-off point will always be vague. Contemporary utilitarianism uses the term vague without being suspected to be impure or messy. Example: [Broome 2004, 172].
Moral killing
In contrast to the original NU only lives not worth living could be eliminated for moral reasons, i.e. lives where voluntary euthanasia is at least a matter of discussion [Fricke, 18]. Nevertheless, in those cases, negative total utilitarianism is confronted with the problem of moral killing, as well as the original NU.
Population ethics
Negative total utilitarianism cannot be used as a neutral axiology:
If one population contains a life with negative welfare, and another doesn’t, then the latter population is always better and the difference in positive welfare doesn’t matter at all [Arrhenius, 100].
3.5 Leximin
A consequent application of absolute priority demands
1. that the (elimination of the) worst cases of suffering has absolute priority over the bad cases (otherwise a large enough number of second worst sufferers can compensate the worst cases)
2. If the number of worst cases is equal, then the population with less bad cases is better.
In the unlikely case where suffering could be exterminated
1. the (support for the) less happy people has absolute priority over the (support for the) happier
2. If the number of less happy people is equal, then the population with more of the happier people is better.
Above picture is a simplified version of the Leximin principle. Leximin is a possible interpretation of Rawls’ difference principle
(see chapter 2.4).
Leximin is not a utilitarian rule, because there is always a part of the population which doesn’t count at all. But the same is true for negative total utilitarianism.
Relation to NU
1. Negative total utilitarianism is a special case within the Leximin principle. If we consider the minority in chapter 3.4 as the worst case, then it has absolute priority over the majority. In the unlikely case that uncompensated suffering could be eliminated, we would need a rule for the happy majority [Fricke, 18]. The majority could e.g. be subdivided into the less happy and the happier as depicted above. That would be more consequent than a utilitarian maximization of happiness, where a sufficient number of happier people outweigh the less happy.
2. If, thanks to bioethical abolitionism being “less happy” could be prevented, then probably everybody would strive for maximum happiness. The “happier” would become the “less happy” compared to perfection. If we try to prevent every state that is less than perfect, then we get the same result as in the original NU. But Leximin removes the counter-intuitive consequences that arise if happiness has no moral value (see chapter 3.3). In both categories (the “less happy” and the “happier”) 10 years lifetime are better than just 1 year.
Population ethics
Leximin cannot be used as a neutral axiology for population ethics for the following reason:
Assume that a population A consists of a very large number of people with blissful lives and one person suffering terrible pain. In another population B, everybody suffers terrible pain but slightly less than the poor person in A. According to Leximin, B is better than A.
One could say that Leximin imposes a dictatorship of the worst off [Arrhenius, 101-102]
1. The “slightly less” problem can be circumvented by using rough classes of welfare as e.g. used in surveys on life satisfaction.
Examples:
The Eurobaromenter survey e.g. asks “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”
2. The World Values Survey asks “Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy?”
3. Still another survey asked: “How satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” where answers are indicated on a 7-point scale ranging from “completely satisfied” to “completely dissatisfied”.
[Hirata, 3]
2. The term dictatorship of the worst off is misleading because the worst-off don’t have dictatorial power. The problem is rather that ethics which concentrates on the elimination of suffering is not able to survive in the competition with suffering-tolerant ethics. For more information on this conflict see The Denial of the World and Objective Reason.
3. Leximin is related to average utilitarianism insofar, as quality overrules quantity.
3.6 Negative Preference Utilitarianism
Definition
What matters about preferences is not that they have a satisfied existence, but that they don’t have a frustrated existence (…)
Maximizers of preference satisfaction should instead call themselves minimizers of preference frustration [Fehige 518]
Fehige calls this concept Antifrustrationism. Antifrustrationism doesn’t prescribe a method of aggregating preferences. If we combine Antifrustrationism with a utilitarian aggregation, then we speak of negative preference utilitarianism.
Preference-frustrations can be minimized by
1. satisfying preferences (desires)
2. eliminating preferences (desires)
Since Fehige believes that there are no good or bad features apart from unsatisfied desires, he thinks a life is neutral if and only if it has no unsatisfied desires. He thinks that in practice all lives fall below this level [Broome 2004, 209].
Comparison with the original NU
It is worth pointing out here that if one characterizes pleasure as an experience the subject wants to continue, the distinction between hedonism and desire theories (like preference utilitarianism) becomes quite hard to pin down (Well-being, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).
Similarly, if preference-frustrations are interpreted as suffering, then the original NU can be seen as a hedonistic reinterpretation of negative preference utilitarianism. There is, however, a difference concerning the issue of moral killing:
Moral killing
In contrast to the original NU, the arguments against painless killing are of theoretical and not only empirical nature [Fricke, 21].
Hedonistic and preference utilitarianism disagree over a principle called experience requirement:
Suppose someone secretly spread rumors behind a person's back and thereby destroys their reputation. But further suppose that they never find out about this and experience no ill effects from it. In this case, since they never experienced any displeasure from the act, the act doesn't harm them, according to the hedonist. This is often called "the experience requirement"; hedonism requires that the subject experience something in order for that thing to be good (or bad) for them.
On the other hand, preference utilitarianism rejects the experience requirement. Since the person has a preference (or desire) for a good reputation, spreading rumors behind their back would harm them even if they never experienced any ill effects from it (Preference Utilitarianism, Lumrix)
Applied to our context the rejection of the experience requirement means that it is morally wrong to painlessly kill a suffering person, as long as this person doesn’t explicitly ask for it. Painless killing is only allowed in the context of voluntary euthanasia.
Comparison with positive preference utilitarianism
Let’s assume that life satisfaction is the dominant end in human behavior, respectively the highest-order preference in life. If we satisfy this preference or if we avoid its frustration is the same thing. Also with respect to compensation there is no difference between positive and negative preference utilitarianism; there is not even a difference to classical utilitarianism:
1. the frustration of a person can be compensated by the aggregated preferences of other persons in much the same way as
2. the suffering of a person can be overruled by the aggregated happiness of other persons in classical utilitarianism [Fricke, 21].
The main difference to positive preference utilitarianism concerns population ethics:
Population ethics
1. In negative preference utilitarianism there are no lives with positive value so that the creation of new lives has to be morally justified [Fricke, 22]. A possible justification is e.g. that the creation of new lives avoids the preference-frustration caused by childlessness.
2. Besides antifrustrationism Fehige proposed a Pareto criterion for the betterness of a population [Fehige]:
Given an initial allocation of goods among a set of individuals, a change to a different allocation that makes at least one individual better off without making any other individual worse off is called a Pareto improvement.
It seems that this attempt to find a neutral axiology for population ethics is doomed to fail [Arrhenius 2000, 78-86].
Moral perfectionism
In order to learn something about the practical implementation we look at an objection which was made to antifrustrationism:
Let us suppose that a world A is inhabited by ten billion people, all of whom lead lives of a very high quality. Suppose that these lives contain a great number of satisfied preferences, but always some frustrated ones as well. We can imagine another world B, with a population consisting of a small number of beings, all of whom are endowed with an extraordinarily meager mental life. Each of them has just a few extremely simple preferences which could be rendered like this: “I want to eat. I want to stay alive. I want to procreate.” Suppose further that all of these preferences are always satisfied. According to antifrustrationism world B would be better than world A (Example given by Klemens Kappel).
According to antifrustrationism the quality of life, expressed in mental richness has a high value on the evolutionary scale, but not an intrinsic value on the moral scale. Every individual has the same weight in prioritizing preferences; there is no universal moral priority for mental richness. Insofar antifrustrationism is different from Buddhism. Buddhism resembles Kappel’s perfectionism, although a Buddhist strives for spiritual perfection and not for intellectual perfection.
4.1 Definition
Society level
Prioritarianism or the Priority View is a view within ethics and political philosophy that holds that the goodness of an outcome is a function of overall well-being across all individuals with extra weight given to worse-off individuals. Prioritarianism thus resembles utilitarianism. Indeed, like utilitarianism, prioritarianism is a form of aggregative consequentialism; however, it differs from utilitarianism in that it does not rank outcomes solely on the basis of overall well-being (Prioritarianism, Wikipedia)
Prioritarianism is based on compassion and risk-aversion. Even classical utilitarians admit that there is an asymmetry in the intuitions about suffering and happiness. They agree that in most cases the reduction of suffering should get a higher moral priority than the increase of happiness, but they insist that there are cases where a minority has to sacrifice themselves in order to increase the happiness of the majority [Fricke, 14].
There are indications that a complete devaluation of happiness also doesn’t conform to the intentions of Karl Popper:
1) Popper used the term pain, and not the terms inconvenience and disturbance when he spoke about the moral dubiety of compensation and the context of his note was the fight against the greatest and most urgent evils of society [Popper, 158]. He never denied compensation in minor cases of suffering.
2) If we assume that the moral weight of suffering people is higher than the one of happy people then it becomes difficult to compensate severe cases of suffering. Not because the process of compensation is denied or because happiness has no value, but simply because happiness doesn’t have enough value.
We should realize that from the moral point of view suffering and happiness must not be treated as symmetrical; that is to say, the promotion of happiness is in any case much less urgent than the rendering of help to those who suffer, and the attempt to prevent suffering [Popper, 235]
This citation suggests that happiness has less priority (value) than the avoidance of suffering; it doesn’t say that happiness has no priority (value).
Individual level
The normative claim of relative priority (of suffering over happiness) has been criticised insofar, as compassion and risk-aversion are individual preferences [Fricke, 15]:
1. If somebody thinks that a certain degree of happiness compensates a certain degree of suffering and prefers to experience both (happiness and suffering) instead of none of them, on what grounds could we claim that this compensation is false?
2. Conversely, if somebody thinks that no degree of happiness is able to compensate certain kinds of suffering, then it would be unnecessary to assign additional weight to suffering, because the scale (metric) used by this person already reflects the high weight of suffering.
This kind of criticism is justified for compensation on the individual level. But the scope of this paper is compensation on the society level, i.e. the compensation of suffering by happiness across different persons. Attempts to look at compassion and risk-aversion from an objective point of view are based on game theory (see chapter 2.6):
▪ In classical utilitarianism every person has the same weight in the aggregation of life satisfaction. This weighing corresponds to a risk-neutral game strategy.
▪ Prioritarianism assigns more weight to suffering people than to happy people. This corresponds to a risk-averse strategy.
For more information about prioritarianism and the asymmetry between suffering and happiness see Hostility and the Minimization of Suffering.
4.2 Comparison with Negative Utilitarianism
Within NU we have to distinguish between
1. A practical priority of (the avoidance of) suffering over happiness
2. A theoretical, but relative priority
3. An absolute priority
[Fricke, 14]
1) Practical priority means that total welfare can more efficiently be increased by eliminating the sources of suffering than by looking for ways to increase happiness. A strategy is more efficient, if it attains a better result (total welfare) with the same (financial) resources. It also seems easier to find a consensus for kinds of suffering to be removed than for kinds of happiness to be promoted. A common enemy (suffering) unites people; different visions of happiness separate them. This reflection, however, is not sufficient to make the theory distinct from classical utilitarianism [Fricke, 14].
2) A theoretical, but relative priority corresponds to prioritarianism. Each degree of suffering and happiness is multiplied with a weighing factor. The factor increases with the degree of suffering and decreases with the degree of happiness (left hand side of the picture below). If we use an exponential function, as e.g. proposed by [Lumer] then there is a good chance that total welfare turns negative.
3) Within the absolute priority the following cases can be distinguished:
a) The original NU assigns the same weight to all classes of welfare, as well as classical utilitarianism (middle of the picture below), but the hedonistic scale is different. In the original NU there are no values for happiness on the scale, just different degrees of lacking perfection.
b) In negative total utilitarianism uncompensated suffering – lives with negative welfare, lives not worth living – is valuated as in classical utilitarianism, but happiness has no weight (blue line on the right hand side).
c) Under the Leximin principle only the worst cases have moral weight. Not only happiness, but also minor cases of suffering are irrelevant (red line on the right hand side). If the worst cases are removed, then the second worst get priority etc.
Conclusion:
All versions of NU can be seen as special cases within prioritarianism:
▪ A weighing function which assigns more weight to suffering than to happy people is the most plausible interpretation of Popper’s notes on compensation.
▪ The original NU is a border case of prioritarianism with a trivial weighing function (same weight for all classes of welfare) and with an unusual hedonistic scale.
▪ Negative total utilitarianism uses a special (discontinuous) weighing function, applied to the same hedonistic scale as classical utilitarianism.
▪ Leximin is a successive application of such discontinuous functions to different classes of welfare.
4.3 Comparison with Rawls’ Theory
Rawls knew Popper’s normative claims [Rawls 1958, 174] and may have been influenced by Popper’s work:
1. The liberty principle is the basis of an open society as defined by Popper.
2. The difference principle takes account of Popper’s notes on the asymmetry between suffering and happiness.
Non-contractual cases
Philosophers, who treat morality as primarily contractual tend to discuss non-contractual cases briefly, casually and parenthetically, as though they were rather rare. The contractarian view is that those who fail to clock in as normal rational agents and make their contracts are just occasional exceptions, constituting one more minority group, but not a central concern of any society [Midgley]
In prioritarianism and NU the ethical goal to minimize suffering is guided by compassion and risk-aversion. As compared to social contract theory it seems to be built on emotions. But these emotions conform to the contractor’s self-interest in the following cases:
1) Every human being passes through stages where he/she depends on compassion. The child spends many years acquiring the competence in speech and consciousness which is typical for humans. Old people, finally, lose step by step their mental capabilities, in particular by strokes and dementia (e.g. Alzheimer’s disease).
2) Ones own future children or grand-children could be mentally retarded, insane, handicapped or become orphans.
The protection of non-contractual cases gets support from recent discoveries in biology:
1) There is a close genetic relation between all humans.
Human genetic variation is estimated to be at least 0.5%, i.e. there is a 99.5% similarity (Human Genetic Variation).
The characteristics of an individual is also formed by the environment and by chance (not only by genes), but the phenotype and the socially caused differences belie the wide commonalities. There are good reasons to claim that the 0.5% deviation and the life story form individuality, but why should the other 99.5% not be an important part of our “self”? The higher the degree of suffering, the more we are all alike, i.e. the peculiarities of an individual’s gene combination and life story become unimportant.
2) Self-interest is strongly influenced by the biological utility function, see God’s Utility Function. The insight that the temporary and biased self-interests (the motives of self-realization) are in truth the ones of the biological utility function can lead to a feeling of being manipulated, to the consciousness of heteronomy and to solidarity with the victims of biological mechanisms.
In prioritarianism – as well as in Bentham’s utilitarianism (chapter 2.4) – non-contractual cases also include sentient animals, speciesism is denied. This reminds of ancient concepts or reincarnation, although genes are reincarnated rather than souls. Sentient animals have a surprising genetic similarity to humans. Example: Chimpanzees and humans have 95% of their DNA sequence and 99% of coding DNA sequences in common (Humanzee, Wikipedia).
Human rights and the higher purpose
The relation between human rights and prioritarianism is complex and ambivalent:
Prioritarianism is totalitarian, i.e. contradicts human rights
If total welfare turns negative, then the problem of moral killing arises in prioritarianism as well as in the original NU. Empirical arguments (as discussed in chapter 3.3) are not convincing under all circumstances. An attempt to solve the problem of moral killing consists in switching to a preference-based ethics. In preference-based ethics the preferences of the individuals have to be respected, so that the arguments against painless killing are of theoretical and not only empirical nature [Fricke, 20]. However, in a utilitarian preference-aggregation, the preferences of the majority overrule the ones of the individual and the majority could theoretically decide to exterminate a minority [Hare, 121-122].
Note that the subordination of human rights under a higher principle concerns consequentialism in general [Larmore, 4].
1) The capital punishment in the U.S. illustrates that the idea is not far fetched (The U.S. constitution was influenced by classical utilitarianism).
2) Human rights may be violated in a moral dilemma called torture of the mad bomber
3) The arguments against moral killing (e.g. against taking an organ from an old patient and giving it to a young one) in classical utilitarianism are only of empirical nature.
A major argument against consequentialism is the experience with totalitarian ideologies. History justifies a deep skepticism opposite to ethical theories which promise improvements by restricting human rights. According to Rawls the attempt to find objective values stands in democratic competition with subjectivism. A major task of human rights is the protection of subjective values. The minority problem is not only disturbing in tyranny and fascism, but also in democracies. An extreme form of totalitarianism concerns moral killing. Prioritarianism (as well as NU, see chapter 3.3) is theoretically obliged to eradicate life, if the expected value of total welfare is negative. This violates the rights of those who prefer to survive and procreate; but note that the eradication of life is also a moral obligation in classical utilitarianism, if the estimated future amount of suffering exceeds the future amount of happiness.
Human rights partially contradict the prioritarian goal
In order to move prioritarianism closer to Rawls’ theory, human rights would have to be guaranteed as side constraints of welfare maximization [Nozick]. These side constraints guarantee that the individual cannot be subordinated to a higher purpose of any kind. But thereby prioritarianism loses its original characteristics. If the higher purpose is the extermination of suffering then side constraints might make it impossible to ever reach this goal.
Human rights partially support the prioritarian goal
Human rights are the result of historical experiences (in particular the Holocaust). Insofar they prevent some of the worst cases of suffering.
Animal rights and the higher purpose
Animal rights are in conflict with both Rawls’ theory of justice and prioritarianism:
1) Animal rights conflict with Rawls theory (human rights) if animals and humans compete for resources
2) Animal rights conflict with prioritarianism in cases where a violation of animal rights could reduce total human suffering.
Moral dilemmas can only be avoided by retreating from life like Buddhist monks. But not every problem in the context of animal rights is an ethical dilemma:
1. Slaughterhouses are not part of a moral dilemma because a vegetarian human population could progress as well.
2. Animal experiments are only part of a moral dilemma, if they cannot be replaced by other research methods.
The difference principle
A prioritarian weighing function is a possible interpretation of the difference principle (chapter 2.4).
According to Rawls risk-aversion follows from the idea of the original position and justifies the difference principle. But it is hard to see why distributive justice should be risk-averse and human rights risk-tolerant. Rawls obviously considered human rights to be risk-averse – consistent with the difference principle. This is plausible insofar, as human rights prevent some of the worst cases of suffering (like the torturing of opposition members in totalitarian systems). But it is implausible in other cases:
Example: If a certain speed limit causes 2% or 20% victims a year is irrelevant in Rawls’ theory, as long as it reflects the will of the majority. A moral principle which demands to lower the speed limit against the will of the majority is considered to be totalitarian.
Let’s look at possible justifications of risk-tolerance:
1. Suffering belongs to life. Risk belongs to progress. This argument doesn’t hold because life and progress go on despite a lower speed limit.
2. A further restricting of liberty rights asks too much from the majority and induces counterproductive results. This argument doesn’t hold because there are many laws which demand more self-control than a lower speed limit.
3. To tolerate certain kinds suffering increases the competitiveness (or even the vitality) of a culture. This is probably the essence of the matter. Road traffic is just one example of a whole collection of cruel customs with winners and losers, customs which are tolerated by the majority. The injustice concerns those who become victims in spite of denying the custom.
Conclusion: In many areas of life Rawls’ liberty principle allows applying Harsanyi’s (risk-neutral) utility maximization, although the concept of the original position argues for the rationality of risk-aversion.
Population ethics:
1) Rawls’ theory is neutral with regard to expansion and contraction, as long as the principle of intergenerational impartiality is respected, i.e. as long as the changes don’t disadvantage an actual or future generation.
2) Prioritarianism considers population ethics as a means to improve the quality of life.
4.4 Comparison with Classical Utilitarianism
Positive total welfare
Prioritarianism is challenged by classical utilitarianism. Classical utilitarianism could implement risk-aversion and compassion in the metric of the hedonistic scale. The following picture shows a very simplified population, with a happy majority and a suffering minority. Adding a new life with a positive welfare increases the value of the population, adding a person with negative welfare decreases it. The suffering of the minority is compensated by the happiness of the majority, so that total welfare is positive:
Negative total welfare
In prioritarianism it is possible to
▪ decrease the moral value of the happy majority and to
▪ increase the moral value of the suffering minority
in such a way, that total welfare turns negative.
Example
The following table shows
1. how total welfare can turn negative, if an exponential weighing function is applied
2. how the measurement of life satisfaction with a 5-point scale can be converted into a cardinal scale.
|
life satisfaction = welfare |
welfare % |
x = welfare in units of 20% |
moral weight f(x) = |
w = moral weight % |
z = (x times w) times (persons) |
z |
|
highly positive |
+30 till +50 |
+2 |
0.135 |
1.2 |
(+2.4) (300) |
+720 |
|
moderately positive |
+10 till +30 |
+1 |
0.370 |
3.3 |
(+3.3) (500) |
+1650 |
|
neutral
|
-10 till +10 |
0 |
1.000 |
8.7 |
(0) (100) |
0 |
|
moderately negative |
-30 till -10 |
-1 |
2.718 |
23.5 |
(-23.5) (90) |
-2115 |
|
highly negative |
-50 till -30 |
-2 |
7.388 |
63.3 |
(-126.6) (10) |
-1266 |
|
|
Total 100 |
|
11.611 |
100.0 |
Total 1000 persons |
-1011 |
Exponential weighing functions have e.g. been proposed by [Lumer].
In this example there are many more happy people than suffering ones, but (because of the exponential weighing function) total welfare turns negative (-1011). Since we counted with 1000 persons, total welfare is -1.011 (in units of 20%) = -20.22%.
The numbers in above table and the weighing function are just an example to illustrate the mechanism of valuation. They can be modified or replaced as long as total welfare remains negative. The rationality of a negative total is investigated in The Denial of the World and Objective Reason.
The hedonistic scale
The same revaluation can be realized within the metric of the hedonistic scale. If the negative values increase e.g. exponentially with the degree of suffering, then the suffering of a minority (physical trauma, psychological trauma and major depressive disorders) is given a high negative number and the happiness of the majority a low positive number:
The problem consists in finding a universally valid metric for assigning numbers to each degree of happiness and suffering. This problem, however, concerns classical utilitarianism as well as prioritarianism. John Broome maintains that the above kind of metric makes the priority view obsolete. Why should we measure the degree of suffering and then apply a weighing function? Why not define the degree in such a way, that it expresses the moral value (weight) we want to give it?
If the priority view should turn out to be untenable, that would not be the failure of a substantive view that the good of worse-off people deserves priority. It would simply be because we have no metric for a person’s good that is independent of the priority we assign it [Broome 1991, 222].
For the suffering people it doesn’t make a difference which technique is used, as long as the asymmetry in the priority of (the avoidance of) suffering and happiness is accounted for. The reason for using a prioritarian weighing function is a practical one. Existing measurements of life satisfaction are based on classical utilitarian metrics.
Examples:
1. The Eurobaromenter survey e.g. asks “On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with the life you lead?”
2. The World Values Survey asks “Taking all things together, would you say you are very happy, quite happy, not very happy, not at all happy?”
3. Still another survey asked: “How satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?” where answers are indicated on a 7-point scale ranging from “completely satisfied” to “completely dissatisfied”.
[Hirata, 3]
Terminology
1) A theory which increases the moral weight of suffering relative to happiness is characterized by the term prioritarianism. The fact that (depending on the weighing function) total welfare may turn negative is not sufficient to use a different term. Even in classical utilitarianism total welfare may turn negative, if a population contains more suffering than happy people.
2) If the higher moral weight of suffering is expressed as a metric within classical utilitarianism and total welfare turns negative, then we should use the term classical utilitarianism.
4.5 Implementation
In order to compare the welfare of nations we have to use averages, so that the population size doesn’t matter. Welfare maximization becomes quality maximization.
Average utilitarianism is the most popular theory among welfare economics [Arrhenius, 53].
Negative averages
Can the average be manipulated in such a way that it contradicts the ethical goal?
1) The option to increase the weighed average by (violently) removing sufferers has to be prevented by an additional ethical principle. All versions of hedonistic consequentialism require human rights as side constraints; this is not a peculiarity of average utilitarianism.
2) An undesired manipulation of the weighed average is the following:
By adding a large enough population with low (positive) welfare to a population with negative average welfare, we can increase the average more, than by adding a small population with high welfare. An axiology which rates adding a large amount of low quality better than adding a small amount of high quality reminds of the Repugnant Conclusion [Arrhenius 2000, 54]. This problem, however, is more of a theoretical than of a practical nature.
The practical problem with negative averages is one of acceptance:
Whatever the future holds, negative utilitarian ethics will presumably still fail to resonate with the overwhelming majority of the population - especially after our emotional well-being increases as the adoption of enhancement technologies gathers pace. So perhaps the most effective way for a negative utilitarian to promote his/her ethical values is not to proselytize under that label at all. Instead, the negative utilitarian may find it instrumentally rational to give weight overtly to the "positive" values of ordinary classical utilitarians, preference utilitarians/preference consequentialists, and the far wider community of (mostly) benevolent non-utilitarians who share an aversion to "unnecessary" suffering. The indirect approach to NU is likely to yield the greatest payoff. Only by our striving to promote "positive" goals as well, and campaigning for greater individual well-being, is the ethic of NU ever likely to be realized in practice (Direct versus Indirect NU, in The Pinprick Argument, by David Pearce)
Positive goals are plausible as long as they don’t have to be “paid” by future suffering (as apprehended in pessimistic world views like Buddhism).
Moderate weighing functions
Since the concept of negative averages is counter-intuitive for the majority we could use moderate weighing functions where the average remains positive. Since the currently used indices for the quality of life (e.g. life satisfaction index) assign the same weight to happy and suffering people, this would still be a significant improvement.
If we deal with positive averages, then new lives don’t have to be morally justified, but we encounter the following objections:
1) For any population with very high positive welfare, there is a better population consisting of just one person with slightly higher welfare, other things being equal [Arrhenius 2000, 54].
For adherents of NU (who valuate total welfare negative and accept the positive sign only for pragmatic reasons) this is no threat, because a smaller population represents a smaller amount of negative welfare.
2) Another counter-intuitive conclusion of average utilitarianism (with positive averages) is that adding a new life with less than average welfare is morally bad, although the life is worth living. Again, for adherents of NU this is no threat. The sentence “the creation of a new life with less than average is morally bad” is not counter-intuitive in negative territory.
3) Finally there is an objection called “sadistic conclusion” [Arrhenius, 63] which says that it can be better to add people with negative welfare than to add people with positive welfare. The objection applies if a large number of people with positive (but lower than average) welfare pushes down the average more than a small number of people with negative welfare. Can the average be manipulated so that it contradicts the ethical goal?
a) First of all a population policy which produces a large number of people below average welfare makes no sense.
b) Furthermore (if happiness is devaluated relative to suffering by an exponential weighing function) the goal of a rational population policy will always be to reduce the number of major sufferers.
Subjective indices
Since weighing functions are not used in the currently used indices, prioritarians look for alternatives on the basis of available data:
1. Defining a subjective suffering index by simply reversing the scale of the life satisfaction index [Anderson, 5-6] doesn’t solve the problem. From a prioritarian point of view both indices are only useful, if we compare nations with the same distribution of happy and suffering people. If the distribution is the same, then a weighing function doesn’t change the ranking of nations.
2. The alternative index in col.4 of the table below doesn’t weigh the distribution as well, but it has the advantage that the welfare of a (in the average) suffering nation could be expressed by a negative number. In such a case it is intuitively clear that the expected value of additional lives is negative and their creation has to be morally justified.
|
Subjective Life Satisfaction |
Classification |
Subjective Suffering Index |
Alternative |
|
10 |
thriving |
1 |
+5 |
|
9 |
“ |
2 |
+4 |
|
8 |
“ |
3 |
+3 |
|
7 |
“ |
4 |
+2 |
|
6 |
struggling |
5 |
+1 |
|
5 |
“ |
6 |
0 |
|
4 |
suffering |
7 |
-1 |
|
3 |
“ |
8 |
-2 |
|
2 |
“ |
9 |
-3 |
|
1 |
“ |
10 |
-4 |
|
0 |
“ |
11 |
-5 |
Because subjective indices include unavoidable kinds of suffering (like illnesses, aging and death) a corresponding ranking of nations cannot be related to the ethical standard of these nations.
Objective indices
Objective indices like the International Human Suffering Index and Anderson’s objective suffering index [Anderson, 7] rely on the statistic of the World Bank, UN and other readily available resources. They suggest that underdeveloped nations suffer more than developed ones.
▪ Objective indices exclude natural disasters in order to limit the measure to preventable suffering [Anderson, 8].
▪ Objective indices account for factors that are closely related to the definition of underdevelopment [Anderson, 7]. The correlation with the Human Development Index [Anderson, 14] therefore doesn’t come as a surprise.
Above indices do not consider the ambivalence of progress as investigated in
▪ The Cultural Evolution of Suffering
▪ On the Perception of Risk and Benefit
Subjective versus objective
1) In Happiness Economics, subjective suffering is related to objective data by means of factor analysis [Oswald]. Whereas above objective indices are defined by experts, factor analysis lets the majority decide about the determinants of suffering. Subjective suffering accounts for the ambivalence of progress.
2) Ron Anderson assessed a moderately high correlation between his subjective and objective suffering index. It seems in particular that in higher developed nations subjective suffering correlates less with objective suffering than in lower developed nations [Anderson, 11]. If we replace “subjective suffering” by “subjective happiness” and “objective suffering” with the level of economic development (absolute income) then this result reminds of the Easterlin paradox.
Classical utilitarianism versus Rawls’ theory
1) Compensation of human rights:
a) In classical utilitarianism it is theoretically possible to override human rights, if it serves the maximization of total welfare. The violation of individual rights is justified (compensated) by the interests of the community.
b) In Rawls’ Theory of Justice it is impossible to override human rights, even if this principle causes the perpetuation of suffering.
2) Compensation of economic welfare
a) The ethical goal of classical utilitarianism is the maximization of total welfare. It is assumed that economic welfare correlates with general welfare. The negative welfare of a minority can be compensated by the positive welfare of the majority.
b) In Rawls theory the compensation of economic welfare is prevented by the difference principle wherein the worst-off are given a special concern.
3) Compensation among generations:
c) In classical utilitarianism it is possible to compensate the suffering of one generation with the happiness of a different generation.
d) In Rawls’ theory the compensation among generations is prevented by the principle of intergenerational impartiality.
Negative utilitarianism
1) Negative utilitarianism is an umbrella term for ethics that models the asymmetry between suffering and happiness. It embraces theories that
a) deny the moral value of happiness
b) assign an absolute priority to the avoidance of suffering
c) assign a relative priority to the avoidance of suffering (prioritarianism)
2) A theory which denies the moral value of happiness is only defensible, if non-existence is seen as a perfect state. This is counter-intuitive for most Non-Buddhists.
3) An absolute priority of (the avoidance of) suffering over happiness solves the classical utilitarian problem of compensation. But ethics which concentrates on the eradication of suffering succumbs in the competition with suffering-tolerant ethics.
Prioritarianism
1) The different versions of NU can also be interpreted as special cases within prioritarianism. For this reason we treat prioritarianism as an autonomous theory and do not subordinate it to NU in this paper.
2) Prioritarianism stands for compassion and risk-aversion. The more compassionate and risk-averse a theory is conceived, the more it turns hostile (see Hostility and the Minimization of suffering) and the less it is capable of winning a majority.
3) From a prioritarian perspective the most urgent amendments to Rawls’ theory are the following:
a) A principle for the protection of non-contractual cases.
b) A risk-averse population policy
c) A risk-averse principle for technological progress.
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1. Anderson Ron (2012), Human Suffering and Measures of Human Progress, Presentation for a RC55 Session of the International Sociological Association Forum in Buenos Aires, Argentina 2. Arrhenius Gustav (2000), Future Generations, A Challenge for Moral Theory, FD-Diss., Uppsala University, Dept. of Philosopy, Uppsala: University Printers 3. Bentham, J., Value of a Pain or Pleasure (1778), in: B. Parekh (ed.): Bentham´s Political Thought, London 1973 4. Broome John (1991), Weighing Goods, Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 5. Broome John (1999), Ethics out of Economics, Cambridge University Press, UK 6. Broome John (2004), Weighing Lives, Oxford University Press 7. Clarenbach Lars Albert (1999), Die Wohlfahrtstheorie auf der Grundlage kardinaler Messbarkeit und interpersoneller Vergleichbarkeit von Nutzen, Diplomarbeit, Köln 8. Dworkin Ronald (1977), Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press 9. Everett, Daniel L. (2008), Don't Sleep, there are Snakes, Pantheon Books 10. Fehige Christoph (1998), A Pareto Principle for Possible People, in C. Fehige and U. Wessels, eds., Preferences, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter 11. Fricke Fabian (2002), Verschiedene Versionen des negativen Utilitarismus, Kriterion Nr.15, pp.13-27 12. Harsanyi, John C. (1955): Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility. In: Journal of Political Economy 63. Pp. 309-321. 13. Harsanyi John C. (1975), Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls’ Theory, American Political Science Review 69: 594-606. 14. Hare Richard Mervyn (1976), Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, Contemporary British Philosophy, H.D. Lewis Ed. 15. Hirata Johannes (2004), Happiness and Economics 16. Kleinewefers Henner (2008), Einführung in die Wohlfahrtsökonomie, Verlag W. Kohlhammer, Stuttgart 17. Larmore Charles (2010), Vernunft und Subjektivität, Frankfurter Vorlesungen, Zürcher Version 18. Lumer Christoph (2005), Prioritarian Welfare Functions, in Daniel Schoch (ed.): Democracy and Welfare, Paderborn: Mentis 19. Midgley Mary (1994), Duties concerning islands, an Essay in Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, Oxford University Press 20. Nozick Robert (1994), The Rationality of Side Constraints, in Ethics, edited by Peter Singer, Oxford University Press 21. Oswald Andrew (1999), A Non-Technical Introduction to the Economics of Happiness 22. Parfit Derek (1984), Reasons and Persons, Clarendon Press, Oxford 23. Popper Karl R.(1945) The Open Society and its Enemies, Volume I, London, Fifth Edition (revised), Routledge, UK, 1966 24. Rawls John (1958), Justice as Fairness, in Philosophical Review 67, pp.164-194. 25. Rawls John (1971), A Theory of Justice, Belknap Publishers, Cambridge 26. Rawls John (2007), Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, edited by Samuel Freeman. 27. Scarre Geoffrey (1996), Utilitarianism, London 28. Schefczyk Michael (2010), Der Nutzen der Freiheit, in Neue Zürcher Zeitung Nr.12, S.69 29. Smart J.J.C. (1973), An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C.Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against, Cambridge 30. Temkin Larry (1994), Weighing Goods: Some Questions and Comments, Philosophy and Public Affairs 23, no.4, pp.350–380. 31. Vukomanovic Milan (1998), Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein: Assessing the Buddhist Influences, University of Belgrade 32. Wolf Clark (2004), Repugnance, Where is Thy Sting? in The Repugnant Conclusion, Essays on Population Ethics, Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Further Reading
Empathy 1. Coetzee J.M. (1999), The Lives of Animals, Princeton University Press 2. Davis Mark, Empathy: A Social Psychological Approach 3. Rutgers University, Animal Rights 4. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Moral Development, 5. Sztybel David, Empathy and Rationality in Ethics 6. Singer Peter (1979), Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 7. Smith Adam (1759), Theorie der ethischen Gefühle, Felix Meiner Verlag, Hamburg, 2004
Empirical Research 1. Bosmans Christoph, Schokkaert Erik, Social Welfare, The Veil of Ignorance and Purely Individual Risk 2. Traub Stefan, Seidl Christian, Schmidt Ulrich, Levati Maria, Friedman, Harsanyi, Rawls, Boulding – or somebody else?
Game Theory 1. Baker L.S. (1999), Risk Aversion, Interactive Tutorial 2. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Game Theory and Ethics, 3. Voss Thomas, Wiese Harald, Vertragstheorie aus spieltheoretischer Sicht
Justice 1. Brian Barry (1989), Theories of Justice, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles 2. Cordes Christian, Schuber Christian, Towards a Naturalistic Foundation of the Social Contract 3. Nzitat Henry P., From Equality to Inequality 4. Mongin Philippe, The Impartial Observer Theorem of Social Ethics 5. Rawls John (1999), The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 6. Sen Amartya, Equality of What? 7. Shearmur Jeremi (1996), The Political Thought of Karl Popper, Routledge, London
Population Ethics 1. Arrhenius Gustav (1999), An Impossibility Theorem in Population Axiology with Weak Ordering Assumptions, Uppsala Philosophical Studies 49. 2. Pearce Fred (2010), Earth’s nine lives, in New Scientist, 27 February, p.31-35
Rawls’ Theory 1. Kay Charles, Justice as Fairness 2. Scott Alex, John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 3. WordiQ, A Theory of Justice
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